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THE MODERN REVOLUTION.

INTRODUCTORY HISTORICAL ANALYSIS.

IN THE MORNINGLAND.

IN THE MORNINGLAND

OR

THE LAW OF THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF CHRISTIANITY.

BY

JOHN STUART STUART-GLENNIE, M.A.

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VOL. I.

THE NEW PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY,

AND

THE ORIGIN OF THE DOCTRINES OF CHRISTIANITY.

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PREFACE.

RESTING at midday, under a fig-tree, above a fountain, on the way from Nazareth to the Sea of Galilee, and with Cana over against us on the height, Mr. Buckle remarked that the test of the philosophical theories which I had been maintaining in discussion with him during the previous months of our journeyings in Egypt, Arabia, and Palestine, would be found in their application to some definite historical problem, and suggested to me that of the origin of Christianity. I admitted that the views which I had opposed to his theory of the non-effect of Moral Forces as historical causes could thus alone be scientifically verified; but I added that, so great appeared to me the difficulty of the problem he had proposed, that, if the verification of my views depended on its solution by means of them, I feared that such verification was quite beyond my powers. Nothing more was said on the subject, and soon after we rose, mounted, and rode on our way, up hill and down dale, till in the eventide we descended to the Holy Lake, all aglow in the splendour

of a sunset that encrimsoned also the far snows of Mount Hermon.

Ten years had passed in further study of the great questions discussed in our travels together in the birthcountries of Christianity, when, last spring, I thought I might venture on some expression of the conclusions at which I had arrived, and this volume was actually printed. Revision of it, however, led to an almost entire re-writing; and even now, after the expenditure of a year's more labour, I hesitate about publication. But this, not because, as the process of verification has gone on, doubt, but assurance, has increased of the truth of, at least, the main views and principles set-forth. For this being so, dissatisfaction has constantly arisen with expression, either in respect to clearness or to fulness, even approximately adequate. And if I now do venture to present the volume, notwithstanding my dissatisfaction with it, and notwithstanding the more special cause of that, noted at p. xiii, it is only because I feel that, in introductory volumes like the present, there must necessarily be inadequacy in almost every respect. But this, I believe, will be the more readily allowed, the more competent is the critic. And so I would proceed at once briefly to state the plan of the work.

In an Introduction on the New Philosophy of History I point out, first, the needfulness of an Ultimate Law of History, and that the inference from

the study of the history of the New Philosophy of History would appear to be, that a new enquiry into Causation is the necessary preliminary of any further attempt at the development, if not, indeed, the most direct road to the completion, of this New Philosophy by the discovery of an Ultimate Historical Law; I then summarily state the principles of the Method of this new enquiry into Causation, and that new Classification, at once systematic and historic, of the Sciences and the Arts, which is the immediate result of the application of these principles; and finally, as the result of this new enquiry would appear to have been, at length, the discovery which was its great aim, I indicate the chief points in the three stages of the discovery of the Ultimate Law of History. But from the Law thus discovered, and shown to be the completion of Hume's Theory of the Natural History of Religion by an integration of the Laws of Hegel and of Comte, we are led to the deduction of a great moral revolution initiating a long middle Age in the history of Humanity; it is further deduced that we should find in the history of Humanity, as the history of the progressive unity of recorded Thought, three specially distinguished Ages; and further, that the Second Age of Humanity should be found to be, in its most conspicuous social phenomena, characterised by a moral transformation of the corresponding phenomena of the First Age. Having generally verified our Ultimate Law in discovering that such a

moral revolution, as is one of the first deductions from it, did actually occur in the Sixth Century B.C.; to verify it more particularly by showing that the Doctrines of Christianity had their origin in a moral transformation of the myths of Naturianism, the religion of the First Age of Humanity, is the object of the first Book of this work, and the present volume; and further to verify our Ultimate Historical Law, by showing that the Morals of Christianity had their origin in a subjective transformation of the laws of Customalism, the polity of the First Age of Humanity, is the object of the third Book, and the concluding volume of this work. In our second Book and volume, our object will be still further to verify our Historical Law in pointing out that such a transformation of the Ideals of Christianity, as is deducible from it, is, in fact, now, and has, since the beginning of our Present Historical Period in the Sixteenth Century, been, with ever more clear and rapid progress, taking place. And we shall terminate the work, and our third volume, with a general Conclusion, in which, under the title of the New Ideal of Humanity, will be summed-up our main constructive results with reference to religious emotion, and its expression in the Future.

The general object, then, of the three volumes is to verify a certain Ultimate Law of Man's History, or Law of Historical Thought, by the explanation which it affords of the origin, and the forecast which it gives of

the transformation of Christianity. But this verification is merely an introductory proceeding, and the work, therefore, can be fairly judged only if considered as but of such an introductory character. For the Law of History, of which this work attempts to give a general historical verification, is essentially a Law defining the earlier and later stages of Man's conception of Causation, and the process of the development of the later form of the conception. But if the final conception of Causation is truly what our Law affirms in defining it as the conception of MUTUAL DETERMINATION; then, the development of this conception—which is, in fact, but the final expression of the conception of LAW—will give, to Philosophy, new Principles; to Religion, new Ideals; and to Polity, new Institutions. And hence, before entering fully on that attempt, which will be my chief lifework, thus to develop this conception of MUTUAL DETERMINATION, it is of the utmost importance to see whether that historical Law which affirms this to be the final conception of Causation, and defines the process of attaining it, can be verified in an explanation of the origin, and prediction of the transformation of such an historical system as Christianity.

And thus—though, in the long course of laborious years, Mr. Buckle's remark and suggestion at the midday-rest of that day's journey in Galilee, was quite forgotten till lately recalled by a chance-look into

my Eastern Diary—it was, at length, seen that the discussion of the problem of Christianity was, in fact, as he said, the true test, and therefore the necessary introduction to a general exposition, of those views, already, with tolerably definite clearness, maintained in discussion with him. In connecting the main divisions of the argument with respect to the origin and transformation of Christianity with special scenes and emotions of travel in its birthcountries, I have sought in some degree to compensate for summariness of treatment by vividness of presentation. But such connection of the divisions of the argument with special places is by no means fictitious; for the arguments, in the various chapters set-forth, are, in every case, but the development of thoughts which did, in fact, occupy me amid the scenes and emotions, brief descriptions, or rather suggestions, of which form the prologues and epilogues of the chapters.

J. S. S.-G.

LINCOLN'S INN:
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NOTE.

[1] The publication of these fourth and fifth chapters having been for the present prevented by an originally slight, but, in its consequences, calamitous accident, which has made it impossible for me adequately to revise them; I trust that I may be permitted thus to present in its completeness the scheme, at least, of the Book; and excused also for now publishing it without these chapters, as they do not essentially advance the argument, though giving to it completeness, generality, and further verification.

INTRODUCTION.

ON THE ROCK OF MALTA

There is no question of importance whose decision is not comprised in the Science of Man; and there is none, which can be decided with any certainty, before we become acquainted with that science. In pretending, therefore, to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a complete System of the Sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security. And, as the Science of Man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation which we can give to this science itself must be laid in experience and observation.

HUME, *Treatise of Human Nature, Phil. Works,* vol. i. p. 8.

THE NEW PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY.

INTRODUCTION.

1. On the Rock of Malta—a rock over which have swept all the successive civilisations of the continental shores of Asia, Africa, and Europe, and where these have all, on receding, left recording vestiges [1]—I was chiefly occupied, during our three weeks' sojourn, with what it may, in this Introduction, be desirable to give a brief account of, as subsequently developed—considerations, namely, on the New Philosophy of History, with a view to the discovery of what is still needed for its completion—an Ultimate Law of History. And a place more suggestive of general historical reflection could hardly be named than Malta, the classical Μελίτη, or Melita.[2] For not only is it generally remarkable as having been overswept by all the successive civilisations of the Mediterranean, but it is more especially remarkable as having been, from the earliest period of West-Eastern history, a meeting-place of those two great races of Semites and of Aryans [3]

[1] See Vassallo, *Monumenti Antichi nel Gruppo di Malta*; and the popular, descriptive, and historical works of Badger, Tallack, Porter, &c.

[2] The neighbouring island of Gozo was by some identified with the Homeric Ogygia (*Odyss.* i., v. and xii.), the island of Calypso. See Strabo, i. 44, vii. 299.

[3] The chief centre, however, of primitive communication between Semites, Aryans, and Egyptians should seem to have been Cyprus, with its rival Phœnician and Hellenic ruling races. Thence came, particu-

who have woven between them the wonderful, changeful web of that Western Civilisation the most potent and progressive of all.[1] First, in Homeric times, Semites in a Phœnician colony;[2] then Aryans, in Greek conquerors or colonists; then again Semites, in Carthaginian colonists or conquerors:[3] once again Aryans, in Roman conquerors, and their Greek successors of the Byzantine Empire; yet again Semites, in Arabian conquerors; yet once again Aryans, in Norman conquerors, and various European sovereigns, till it was given over by Charles V. of Germany to the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem; and, rescued by the British from the French Revolutionists, the conquerors of the Knights, a Semitic-speaking[4] population finally rests contented, because free, under the imperial sway of the most composite, and perhaps, on the whole, the greatest of the Aryan races—the Britannic, or Anglo-Celtic.[5] In con-

larly, the Greek ideals of Herakles and Aphrodité (Herodot. I. 105). And, for a knowledge of the manner in which Semitic and Egyptian worship and art generally influenced the primitive development of the Greek mind, we have now invaluable material in the immense archæological collection formed by General di Cesnola. See Newton and Colvin, *Antiquities of Cyprus.*

[1] Compare Renan, *De la Part des Peuples sémitiques*, pp. 9, 10. And see below, B. I. ch. v. [2] Diod. v. 12.

[3] A bilingual inscription shows Greek and Punic to have been—as now, Italian and Arabic, in its Maltese dialect—prevalent at the same period. Boeckh, *Corpus Inscr. Gr.* 5752–5754.

[4] See Schlienz, *The Maltese Language.*

[5] The term Anglo-Saxon is accurately applied to but a single early period of English history in contradistinction to Anglo-Danish and Anglo-Norman, (see Pearson, *History of England in the Early and Middle Ages*, vol. i.), and, as applied to the modern British people and Britannic race, is a gross misnomer. Even the English are now rather Anglo-Celts than 'Anglo-Saxons;' and still more certainly is Anglo-Celtic a more accurate term than 'Anglo-Saxon,' not only for that British nationality which includes the Scots, the Irish, and the Welsh,

siderations, then, thus naturally suggested on History, I sought more clearly to define, not only my philosophical views, but the aims and objects of my proposed travels in the birth-countries of that greatest product of the contact of Aryan and Semite—Christianity.

2. So I first recalled at Malta how, many years before—urged, not merely by speculative curiosity, but by the practical necessity of gaining for morality and religion surer bases than Hebrew Tradition, and Spiritist Philosophy, beliefs and doctrines which Aryan science had already caused to appear incredible mythology, and puerile supernaturalism—the necessity of finding for morality surer bases than the legend of God's descent on Sinai with the Tables of the Law; surer bases for religion than the legend of the 'Holy Ghost' conception of a Jewish girl—I had turned to a more systematic study of the history of Man. It was at Rome that such a

but also for that Britannic race, chief elements in the formation of which have been Welsh, Irish, and Scottish immigrants. Nor is the term 'Anglo-Saxon' justified by a qualitative, any more than by a quantitative, predominance of the Teutonic element in our variously composed race and nationality. For let a list but be made-out of the so-called 'Englishmen' or 'Anglo-Saxons' who have during, say, the last two centuries, been most distinguished, and have exercised the widest influence in the various directions of intellectual activity, philosophical and literary, political and military, legal and commercial. It will, I believe, be found that a very large proportion of these so-called 'Englishmen' are, on one side, or on both, Scotsmen; many also Irishmen, or Welshmen; while many even of the great Englishmen, properly so called, will, if their ancestry is looked into, be found, if not as much Anglo-Celts as the Scots, the Irish, and the Welsh, most certainly at least not 'Anglo-Saxons.' See the present writer's essay on *Arthurian Localities*, prefixed to vol. III. of the Early English Text Society's *Merlin*, pp. xix, xlii–iv, cxxxi–ii.; see also Huxley, *Critiques and Addresses* (*British Ethnology*), pp. 177–8; Murray, *Dialect of Southern Scotland*, pp. 1–92; and generally Nicholas, *Pedigree of the English People*. As to special literary influence, compare Arnold, *Essays on Celtic Literature*.

course of research as the only likely means of issue from doubt, and its consequent aimlessness, first became clear. It was at Rome, amid the immortal memories of those successive world-empires of the Cæsars and of the Popes which have twice given unity to the human race,[1] that the undefined emotion at least, if not as yet the definite conception, arose of a unity vaster and more sublime than any hitherto outwrought, a new unity of which the creative force would, as ever, be a new Ideal. It was at Rome that despair, at least, was allayed when, in contemplating the Gods created by classic, and by romantic art; in contemplating the triumphant Apollo, and the transfigured Christ; the divinity of Man himself was felt, the divinity of the creator of Gods. What mattered it, then, though it should be found necessary wholly to abandon the notion of miracle? Christianity would not, therefore, cease to be divine. Our conception only of the nature of the divine element in human history would undergo a change; we should have but to consider it also as the subject of science; and so to picture it as a golden thread, not miraculously let-in, but continuously interwoven in the web of History—a golden thread of which the pattern is determined by ascertainable laws.

3. And, with such thoughts as these, Malta took for

[1] 'The great unity, the one life of the world, had twice been elaborated within her walls. Other peoples, their brief mission fulfilled, disappeared for ever. To none save to her had it been given twice to guide and direct the world.'—Mazzini, *Life and Writings*, vol. I. p. 37. And so Mr. Freeman, 'The history of Rome is in itself the great example of the oneness of all history.'—*The Unity of History*, p. 43. But, as we shall see in the sequel, it is in the history of Thought that the complete oneness of history is to be found.

me something of a symbolic meaning. In its aspect, both physical and architectural, as in its history, its population, and its language, it is half of the East, half of the West. Our windows, sun-protected by a verandah, opened on the broad flat roof of a lower part of our hotel. There, one might walk about in the cool of the day, and thence one might look down on two very different scenes. On the one hand, narrow crowded streets, under grave, stately houses, with great expanses of wall, and but few windows, save massively balconied ones at the corners, and over the gateways; on the other hand, our own courtyard, on which, as usual, opened most of the windows of the house for delicious shade, and sight of trees and flowers, and sound of birds and falling waters. Enlarging one's view, two other very different scenes met the gaze. For from our housetop one might look over more than half the island—it is but 17 miles by 7—from the forts of Valetta to the ridge on which is Civita Vecchia; or, half-blinded by the glare from the sandstone rocks and the stony soil, on which, except in the old gardens of the Knights of St. John, there grows scarce a tree but a solitary palm or two, one might look to the east over the blue sea. And it was eastwards, over that historic sea, that I chiefly looked. For landwards, the view of sentinelled fortifications, antiquarian remains, and glaring barrenness, was too much like the aspect of that 'west-eastern' islet of Christian Orthodoxy, on which there are, indeed, many interesting relics of various old superstitions, and on which there is a very strong fortress of selfish interests,

but which is now but a barren rock, from which I had long looked over the gleaming sea of History, in the hope that, voyaging across it, I should come, at length, to a Morningland of fuller and fairer life.

4. But, elevating above the mere interests of the moment, the outlook over the history of Man is beyond aught else suggestive of those sublime questions of the speculative intellect—Where? Whence? and Whither? One finds oneself for a few years an existence in the infinite system of Nature; for a few years a consciousness in the incalculable progress of Humanity; and one would know something of where one stands; something of whence one has come; something of whither, when one departs into the Unknowable, these, one's associates of a day, will be borne. And it is in History that is to be found the most approximate, though still, how infinitely far from being the complete, answer to those great questions to which it elevates. For all we know is but states of consciousness; and the history of Man is the history of consciousness. Where? Whence? and Whither? In the consciousness of being a part of this incalculable progress, all knowledge is felt to be self-knowledge, and the craving for it no idle curiosity, but the godlike desire to know oneself. Γνῶθι Σεαυτόν. The maxim has a wider meaning now than in ancient philosophy.[1] For I am but a moment in the development of Humanity. And to know oneself, therefore, the past facts of human consciousness and its future possibilities must be known. And thus contemplating the starry Universe;

[1] See below, p. 18.

thus meditating on the succeeding Ages; and thus realising our oneness with the All—how far soever we may feel ourselves from a complete solution of the mysteries of our being—Where? Whence? and Whither?—we may rise, at least, above the embarrassments, the misunderstandings, and the hates of momentary life, and above the fear of enfranchising death.

5. Christianity, however, in an intellectual point of view, is an historical theory which professes finally to answer all these questions. Suppose, then, that, with such thoughts as these in our mind, we should pass a day alone on the beach which has been identified[1] with that on which the ship which carried Paul a prisoner to Rome was run aground, 'being exceeding tossed with a tempest;'[2] suppose that our reading of his Acts, and reading in his Epistles, should work as a spell, raising the great Apostle of the Gentiles to bodily presence before us; and suppose that to him we should put these great questions, urged on us now by the study of History—'Where?' 'In the midst,' he answers, 'of the miraculous scheme of Christ's Redemption.' 'Whence?' The question he declares to have been long ago rendered unnecessary by the record of the Creation preserved for us in the Scriptures of the Jews. 'Whither?' 'To the final consummation,' he cries,

[1] Wrongly, however, perhaps. Compare the argument *against*, in Falconer's *Dissertation on the Voyage of St. Paul*, controverting, in its second edition, those *for* Malta, in Smith's *Voyage and Shipwreck of St. Paul*, and Conybeare and Howson's *Life and Epistles of St. Paul*. Renan follows the last-named authors.—*St. Paul*, p. 556.

[2] *Acts* xxvii. 18-44.

'looked forward to by Jesus, and seen in vision by John.' Well, let those who have in these days studied the history of Nature, and the history of Humanity, honestly express their inmost conviction; and certainly the vast majority of them would, to Paul's very face, say that these answers of his to the great questions discussed by Modern Science, these Christian theories of the Creation and Fall, the Incarnation, and the Last Judgment, are simply the offspring of popular ignorance and mythic imagination. Shipwrecked here was Paul, the Jew of Tarsus, in his mission to the Gentiles; and shipwrecked now in the Gentile waters of Science is that bark which Christianity came from Judæa in—the Spiritist Philosophy of History.

SECTION I.

THE NEEDFULNESS OF AN ULTIMATE LAW OF HISTORY.

Wer in der Weltgeschichte lebt,
Dem Augenblick sollt' er sich richten?
Wer in die Zeiten schaut und strebt,
Nur der ist werth zu sprechen und zu dichten.

GOETHE, *Zahme Xenien.*

SUBSECTION I.

The Need of a Law of History as the Basis of a New Ideal.

1. CHRISTIANITY, like all other great historical phenomena, presents three aspects, corresponding to the intellectual, emotional, and volitional sides of human nature. It is not only a Religion, but a Philosophy,

and a Polity.[1] And these products of mental action, under the influence of external circumstances, are ever as indissolubly connected with, and dependent upon each other as are the mental faculties from which each of them more especially proceeds. Now, the distinguishing characteristics of the Philosophy which is the intellectual basis, or rather we should perhaps say, coexistent of Christianity, considered as a Religion, are two. It is, in the first place, a Spiritist Philosophy; and, secondly, a Philosophy of History. As a Spiritist Philosophy it is related to that great class of Primitive Philosophies in which the notion of Law has not as yet been developed and in which events are conceived as caused by supernatural agents, or 'spirits.'[2] As a Philosophy of History, it is related to that general development of historical speculation contemporary with the rise, or, at least, greater prominence of Messiahism in the sixth century before Christ.[3] In Persia, these speculations seem first to have been in-

[1] When I speak of Christianity, not generally, but as a mythical, or doctrinal system, I shall, for the sake of clearness, use the term *Christianism*.

[2] To the general theory of Supernatural Agents, and beliefs in Spiritual Beings, Mr. Tylor, in his learned and suggestive work on *Primitive Culture*, has given the name of *Animism*. But I venture to think that Spiritism would be a preferable term. For, in the first place, 'Animism,' as he himself acknowledges (vol. II. p. 384), is a term in great measure identified with the special theory of Stahl. Secondly, 'Animism' does not, while 'Spiritism' does at once, explain itself as the doctrine of Spirits. Thirdly, 'Spiritism' has the advantage, not shared by 'Animism,' of connecting the vulgar theory of what I would call Homian phenomena with the general theory of Supernatural Agents, and thus making the one throw light on the other. Fourthly, 'Animism' does not, while 'Spiritism' does, apply equally well to the supernatural theory of God as to the supernatural theory of the Soul. And, finally, 'Animism' gives no such expressive adjective, and adjective-noun, as 'Spiritist,' and 'Spiritists.'

[3] See below, Sect. III. Subs. (III.), and Book I. ch. III.

itiated through the Mazdayaçnian[1] doctrines with respect to the conflict between Ahura-Mazda and Ahrimanes.[2] But it was not till the conquest of Babylon by Cyrus the Great in 539 B.C., and afterwards of Egypt by his son Cambyses in 525 B.C., that these Zoroastrian ideas had a general influence in intellectual speculation, and took a more clear and definite shape in the Messiahism of the Jews. For, not only the fact of their having been released from their captivity, and assisted in rebuilding their Temple by Cyrus, but the facts also of the similarity of the purer creed of Zoroastrianism to their own, and the accordance of its historical theories with those Messianic notions then gaining prominence among them, were certainly such as to predispose the Jews to be influenced in their further religious development by their Aryan masters. Those general conceptions of History, which thus originated in Persia, and of the Word that existed before all, and was revealed in Serosch,[3] had a wide and, though indirect, not less powerful influence on the development of Christianity through the great vogue[4] which they had about the time of the origin of that religion throughout the whole Roman world. And we may well believe that

[1] '*Mazdâyaçnô* est un adjectif au nominatif, masc. sing., composé de *mazda* (forme absolue abrégée), une des épithètes d'Ormuzd, et de *yaçna*, qui n'est autre que le sanscrit *yadjña* (sacrifice). . . . M. Rask traduit (et compose) *Oromazdis cultor* . . . il signifie littéralement, qui célèbre le sacrifice en l'honneur de Mazda.'—Burnouf, *Commentaire sur le Yaçna*, t. I. pp. 6, 7.

[2] See Spiegel, *Avesta*, and *Commentar über das Avesta*. And as to the age of the Mazdayaçnian Scriptures, see *Avesta*, vol. I. p. 14; and below Sect. III., Subs. (III.)

[3] Çraoscha-tanumathra—the 'articulate incorporation of the Word.'

[4] As testified by the Sibylline books, the Fourth Eclogue of Virgil, &c.

the apocalyptic visions, in which currency was given to combined Mazdayaçnian and Messianic ideas by the authors of the books ascribed to the ancient prophets Enoch and Daniel,[1] but actually written by Jews of the time of Antiochus Epiphanes, about a century and a half before Christ,[2] greatly influenced the lyrical soul of Jesus.[3]

2. In the Messiahism of the Jews—thus influenced in its development by the immemorial Zoroastrian conception of the history of Man as one grand progressive action—human progress was, with a characteristic conceit, imagined subordinate to the destinies of their own small and perpetually vanquished Syrian nationality. But dogmatic Christianity is, for the most part, only an Aryan elaboration of this peculiar historic theory of the Hebrews. And this is true in a quite singular manner. All the greater religions, indeed, have historical theories, legends of the Past, and visions of the Future. But Christianism stands alone in this, that without belief in the whole series of its legends and visions respecting Man's history, there is no logical belief possible in its central dogma. A Mohammedan, for example, might hold a variety of theories of History without any contradiction of his cardinal belief that 'there is no God but God, and that Mohammed is his prophet.' And still more readily might a Buddhist accept all the main results and theories of Western science; and still, without any logical self-contradic-

[1] We see from Ezekiel xiv. 14 flg., and xxviii. 3, that the legend of Daniel was then already formed—that is, in the sixth century B.C.

[2] See Davidson, *Introduction to the Old Testament*, vol. III. pp. 199 flg.

[3] Renan, *Vie de Jésus*, p. 37.

tion, profess belief in all the characteristic doctrines of Buddhism.[1] Not so, however, is it with the central dogma of Christianity. For the incarnation of the infinite God in the person of the carpenter's son, Jesus of Nazareth, is not only an historical theory, but an historical theory in indissoluble logical connection with the legend of the Fall, and the vision of the Last Judgment. Nor this only. But so intimately bound up are these Christian historical theories with all the accepted bases of morality and religion, that, if this Christian cosmology and anthropology be found untrue, or rather purely imaginary and delusive; religion and morality must,—to those born into Christianity, and, unfortunately for their faith, trained to thought,—appear altogether baseless; or, at best, Christianity must, as thus deprived of any definite channel of dogma, lose itself in a mere trackless quagmire of mist-enveloped sentiment.

3. But a thing is clearly seen to be what it is, only in being brought into relation with its correlate, or its contradictory. So, if we now clearly see Christianism to be a Philosophy of History, it is but because of the development of a New Philosophy of History. And in connection with this I would first point out a singular instance of the ever-recurring Sophoclean irony[2] of events. For, just before the rise of this New Philosophy, an orthodox bishop and arrogant theologian wrote[3] a 'Discours sur l'Histoire universelle' from the

[1] See Eitel, *Lectures on Buddhism*, p. 14.

[2] See Thirlwall, *Philological Museum*, vol. II., pp. 483–537.

[3] 'Vers la fin de 1679. Ce fut l'époque (!) à laquelle le mariage de M. le Dauphin avec la princesse de Bavière fut arrêté.'—De Bausset, *Histoire de Bossuet*, t. I. p. 376.

Christian point of view. Yet, in 'epicising the Catechism, and concentrating the universal history of mankind around that of Judaism, the Roman Catholic hierarchy, and the monarchs who protected and defended it,'[1] Bossuet but stated the Christian theory and its consequences in such a synthetic form as made its overthrow more easy. Unwittingly, he but sounded the challenge to that great modern movement now resulting in the general substitution of a philosophy of History founded on the conception of human development, for a belief concerning it based on the notion of Divine interference. For it was by forces that took him in the rear, and advanced over his routed battalions that the trumpet of Bossuet was answered. After the 'Discours' of Bossuet came the 'Scienza Nuova' of Vico.[2] As to Bossuet, so indeed also to Vico, historical events were under the immediate superintendence of God; and History he defined as 'a civil theology of Divine Providence.'[3] But here was the advance. He saw, and set himself to prove the Divine action, not only as an external, but as an internal, Providence; as such an *internal* force, not merely in the history of the Jewish race and Christian Church, but equally, though in diverse manifestations, among all peoples; and thus he, in fact, referred the explanation of History to mental analysis.[4] And hence, though in

[1] See Bunsen, *Outlines of Universal History*, vol. I. p. 12.

[2] Dedicated to the Cardinal Lorenzo Corsini (!), 'Napoli, 8 maggio, 1725.'

[3] 'Una Teologia civile ragionata della Provvedenza.' *Scienza Nuova. Opere*, vol. v. p. 178.

[4] Compare Hodgson, *Theory of Practice*, vol. II. p. 128, and the passage which he cites:—'Ma in tal densa notte di tenebre, ond' è coverta

detail Vico is full of erroneous and unscientific views; and though in his theory, more particularly of historic cycles, he represents Progress, not as it is now found to be more truly conceived, as a trajectory, but as an orbit;[1] still, having regard to his main idea, we may accord him the honour of having first conceived, in the scientific form required by Western intellects, that great problem which originally presented itself, as we have seen,[2] to the Zoroastrian sages of the Orient; that problem of human destinies which was solved with apocalyptic rapture by the nameless Jewish prophets who immediately preceded, and who probably so greatly influenced Him of Nazareth; that problem, the true solution of which will, in serving as the basis of a grander, because more true Ideal, be the final destruction of the Christian solution of it, and of the Ideal thereon founded.

4. Yet already, and incomplete as the New Philosophy of History still is, the mere external authority of its origin has, to all those who have seen its connection with the general development of philosophic thought, and of the idea particularly of Law, tended, at least, to make incredible that Christian Philosophy of History to which it has, with an ever-increasing clearness and definite-

la prima da noi lontanissima antichità, apparisce questo lume eterno, che non tramonta, di questa verità, la quale non si può a patto alcuno chiamar in dubbio; che questo mondo civile egli certamente è stato fatto dagli uomini; onde se ne possono, perchè se ne debbono, ritrovare i principj dentro le modificazioni della nostra medesima mente umana.' Vico, *Opere*, vol. v. p. 139. Hence Quinet rightly says of Vico, 'De la représentation il s'est élevé jusqu'à l'idée, des phénomènes jusqu'à l'essence.' *Histoire de l'Humanité. Œuvres*, t. III. p. 355.

[1] See the remarks of Mill, *System of Logic*, vol. II. pp. 503-4.

[2] See above, p. 11.

ness, opposed itself. The New Philosophy of History, preluded, as we have just seen, by Vico, was initiated almost contemporaneously by the chief eighteenth-century thinkers of France, Scotland, and Germany; he to whom is most justly due the honour of being regarded as its founder will in the sequel,[1] I trust, appear to have been Hume; and it has reached, at length, definite laws in those of which the works of Hegel and of Comte are the many-sided exponents. And this New Philosophy of History is no accidental and perverse speculation, but the normal and legitimate development of the whole course of Western Thought. This, a general survey of that history of Philosophy, which has thus culminated in a philosophy of History, will make clear. For we remark, in these two thousand four hundred years of intellectual development, three Ages. The first, which we may distinguish as that of Ancient Philosophy, extends from Thales in the sixth century before, to the closing of the Schools of the Neoplatonists in the sixth century after Christ. The second is the Christian or Transitional Age, from the sixth to the sixteenth century. And the third or Modern Age is that which then began with Bacon (b. 1561—d. 1626), and Descartes (b. 1596—d. 1650); and of which the second period, initiated by Hume[2] (b. 1711—d. 1776), and

[1] See below, Sect. III. subs. iii.

[2] And if Hume is, as generally acknowledged, the initiator of a new European period of philosophic thought, he, and not Reid, must be regarded as the true founder of the Scottish School. For, through Hume, Scotland's contribution to the great results of modern philosophic thought has been of infinitely greater weight than anything

Kant (b. 1724—d. 1804), was closed by Hegel (b. 1770—d. 1831), and Comte (b. 1798—d. 1857). Now this Age, in the turn given to philosophic research by Descartes, is essentially an epoch of thought respecting Thought. But, in that second period of the New Age which is distinguished by the development of the Philosophy of History, Thought is seen taking as its subject not merely the phenomena of Thought as observed in individuals, but as observed in the development of Humanity. And the new reading thus given to the ancient maxim, 'Know Thyself,' seems well worth meditation. With Thales, Γνῶθι Σεαυτὸν is the maxim of the solitary meditative thinker; with Sokrates, it is an exhortation to psychological and ethical study; with Plato its aim is acquaintance with the Eternal Ideas of which sense awakens the reminiscence; and with Proclus, it is the theosophic quest of knowledge of the Divine One, of which the soul is but a ray; by Descartes, on the opening of the new era after the darkness of the transitional age dominated by Christianity, the maxim had new meaning given to it by its object, the foundation of Science on the clear replies given in an examination

derived from the shallow—though Sir W. Hamilton has tried to make it look as profound as possible—Common Sense of the theologian ordinarily placed at the head of Scottish Philosophy. And nothing, I venture to think, but the strength of the reactionary movement against the first French Revolution can in any degree excuse the preference, as a University textbook, of the works of Reid—'a mere alarmed though very worthy and intelligent divine,' as Dr. Stirling (*Secret of Hegel*, vol. II. p. 12) justly calls him—to the works of Hume; the exaltation, thus, of a co-mate of Jacobi over a co-equal of Kant; and the support hence given to the usurpation of Mediocrity, holding the throne against Genius.

of Consciousness; by the initiators of the New Philosophy of History further development is given to this new meaning of the maxim; and finally, Γνῶθι Σεαυτὸν is by us students of History now read as urging to the study of historical origins as at once the ultimate test of Ideals, and the only method of obtaining for them assured bases. But if such is the relation of the New Philosophy of History to the whole course of Western scientific Thought, what theory can be offered of these two thousand four hundred years of intellectual development which will not justify that Anti-Christian Philosophy of History in which it has culminated?

5. But secondly, it is not merely by the external authority of its origin, but by the internal might of its own characteristic generalisation, and the unbounded variety of its verifications, that the New renders the Christian Philosophy of History incredible. This great generalisation, corollary as it is of a Law which, though empirical as yet, we may, before concluding this discussion, find capable of derivation from an Ultimate Law,[1] affirms that narratives of miracle are records, not of former facts of Nature, but of early states of Mind. And the verification of this great generalisation is found in three immense classes of facts. The first class includes those facts which have been collected for us in the many admirable recent compilations on Primitive Culture[2]—collections of facts which prove that, in the

[1] See below, sect. III.

[2] See Lubbock, *Prehistoric Times*, and the *Origin of Civilization*; Tylor, *Researches into the Early History of Mankind*, and *Primitive Culture*; Bastian, *Mensch in der Geschichte*; Waitz, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, &c.

earlier and more ignorant stages of mental progress, natural events are constantly attributed to, or so narrated as to be apparently explicable only by, supernatural causes. The second class is made up of the physiological, psychological, and economical facts which explain the origin of this primitive conception of Causation—facts to which attention has been more particularly called of late years in the discussion of the true causes of those modern phenomena of which Spiritist explanations are vulgarly given—the phenomena of so-called 'Spiritualism.'[1] And the third class of facts includes those which support the Theories of natural Evolution, Development, and Progress, and render the Theories of supernatural Creation, Inspiration, and Providence untenable. The first class of facts give simply an expression to the generalisation itself in a detailed form. The second class of facts explain the origin of that great fact affirmed by the generalisation. And the third class of facts show how phenomena which, in accordance with this generalisation, are attributed to supernatural, are explicable by natural causes. Of this last class of facts, the most directly important and convincing are, as it appears to me, those which, connected more particularly with the theory of Mental Development, show that there is no action of supernatural causes of any kind—as it is an essential part of the Christian theory of History to affirm that there is—in the daily occurring phenomena of 'Conversion,' and in the conduct thereafter following of Christians. For, is there a psycho-

[1] See below, ch. II. sect. ii.

logist in all Europe; is there a single man of the world anywhere to be found; nay, is there a single Christian even, whose experience of mankind and impartiality of judgment would entitle him to be heard in such a matter, who will come boldly forward and affirm explicitly what implicitly he affirms, that the conduct of Christians is supernaturally noble, righteous, and holy? But seeing that the affirmed supernatural action of the 'Holy Ghost' on the soul, in the contemporary phenomena of 'Conversion,' is utterly negatived by a comparative study of the conduct of Christians, and of Non-Christians; it would indeed be strange if credit were any longer generally given to that still more extravagant affirmation of the Christian theory of History, the dogma which affirms the supernatural action of the 'Holy Ghost' on the womb, in a certain Syrian maiden's conception, 1873 years ago, of Jesus of Nazareth.[1]

6. The causes, however, of the incredibility of the Christian Philosophy of History are not to be found

[1] The examination of the physical value of Prayer, which seems to have been the chief intellectual excitement of the autumn of 1872, (see particularly the *Fortnightly Review*, the *Contemporary Review*, the *Spectator*, and the *Examiner*), is a partial introduction into the general polemic of what appears to me the most practical and popularly efficacious of all the arguments against the supernatural character of Christianity. But in confining our consideration of Prayer to its effect as a *physical* agency, we give too much advantage to the apologists of Christianity. The true question is, has Prayer any supernatural effect as a *moral* agency? That, like every other form of lofty meditation and aspiration, it has a stimulating and ennobling natural effect is admitted. That it has any supernatural effect appears to me wholly negatived by our daily experience of the mental capacity and moral conduct, not of those only who are reviled by their brethren as 'professors' merely, but of those even who are pointed to as 'saints.'

only in the authority with which the New Philosophy of History comes to us as the legitimate culmination of the historic development of philosophic thought, and hence of the idea of Law; nor only in the amplitude and completeness of the proof of a generalisation that cuts at the very root of the Christian Philosophy of History; but there is yet a third cause of the incredibility of this Christian Philosophy. For as a belief has its sources, not in reasoning only, but in emotion,[1] so also is it with the corresponding unbelief. And as one of the main causes with many of continued belief in the Christian Philosophy of History is simply the suitability to their emotional nature of the Ideal founded upon it; so an important cause with many of contemptuous unbelief of the Christian Philosophy is to be found in the grander and more truly moral character, as it appears to them, of that New Ideal of Humanity which arises from the New Philosophy of History. For the most remarkable thing about this New Philosophy is that, in less than a hundred years, the speculations initiated in such works as those of Montesquieu and Turgot, of Adam Smith and Hume, of Herder and Kant, had become, with Hegel, with Comte, and with Mazzini, the basis of a New Religion. With Hegel, no doubt, this New Religion was but a sort of mystical resuscitation of Christianity,[2] singularly similar, as we

[1] 'We may divide the sources of Belief into three different classes as follows: First, the Intuitive or Instinctive; second, Experiences, with the reasonings and inferences supplemental thereto; third, the Influence of the Emotions.' Bain, *The Emotions and the Will*, pp. 578–9.

[2] See Dr. Stirling's remarkable exposition of it, *Secret of Hegel*, vol. i. pp. 578–598. And compare vol. i. pp. 147–196.

may in the sequel[1] more clearly see, to the Neoplatonic resuscitation of Olympianism. But those who were not equally exposed to the social persuasions that were latterly brought to bear on Hegel, or had not the defect of breeding that made him liable to be thus unduly influenced,[2] readily, for the most part,[3] saw through these lamentable sophistries of the great thinker. And men were thereby only led, in general, to a more or less clear discovery of the untruth, or at least distrust of the truth, of that fundamental principle from which it could be made plausibly to appear that the Christian Trinity, which constitutes to Hegel the central and vital principle of Christianity, has an objective

[1] Below, Bk. I. ch. I. sect. iii.

[2] 'It cannot be denied that Hegel in his actual connection with the Prussian State seemed to play, at least *weakly*, into the hands of the aristocratic reaction. It is not impossible, however, something to extenuate the blame of Hegel. Pain, disappointment, difficulty, mortification—in a word, humble-pie had been his only nourishment from the moment he stepped out of sanguine student life into the chilling world. At Berlin he was at last (at forty-eight years of age) in full sunshine; no wonder that he opened to the heat, that he chirruped to it, that in thought he truckled to the givers of it. The natural truckling in thought to exalted benefactors is but too apt by such bookish innocents to be translated into a truckling in fact,—and they cannot help it.' *Secret of Hegel*, vol. I. p. 649. Compare also as to Hegel's character, *Ibid.* p. 273.

[3] Yet not all. For even Dr. Stirling, Hegel's most able expositor, has put forward the Hegelian system as a grand new way of giving a sort of reality to the dreams of Christianity. And yet in passage after passage, Dr. Stirling is candid enough to let us see how much he doubts the actual effectiveness of the legerdemain into which Hegel was tempted, partly at least, by the patronage of the *Hochwohlgeboren*. Thus, for instance, he says, 'Very obscure, certainly, in many respects is the system of Hegel, and in none, perhaps, obscurer than in how we are to conceive God as a Subjective Spirit, and man as a Subjective Spirit, and God and man as in mutual relation.' *Ibid.* vol. i. p. 244. Wherewith compare such passages as are to be found vol. i. pp. 62 and 73, and vol. ii. pp. 528, 538.

reality, because—if any clear *because* at all is to be made out of his utterances on the subject—because the notion of it is, as it could not indeed but be, in accordance with the subjective Law of Human Thought. With Comte, however, there was no such weakness as that into which Hegel was betrayed, partly by his fundamental principle of Identity, and partly by social persuasions. And that Ideal of Humanity which naturally arises from the New Philosophy of History—and which even the sophisms of Hegel cannot bring into accordance with any real belief in the dogmas of Christianity—was, by Comte, boldly put forward as, what in fact it is, a New Ideal, and hence a New Religion.[1] Of the elaborate ceremonial development that Comte gave to this Ideal, it is unnecessary here to do more than remark that those quite humorously mistake the force of the New Ideal of Humanity who flatter themselves that it can seriously suffer from attacks on such mere accidents as the Comtean mode of giving to it religious expression. For in Mazzini, and in the multitudes whom he and others, inspired like him with the new faith, have so powerfully influenced, the Ideal of Humanity has already shown itself to have all the restraining and constraining power of *religion* in the highest sense of

[1] I agree, however, with M. Littré in thinking that 'La conception positive du monde étant posée, rien n'autorise à y choisir pour l'*adorer*, soit l'humanité, soit toute autre fraction du grand tout, soit le grand tout lui-même. Mais la conception positive du monde n'en a pas besoin; car elle est douée de deux grands caractères pour lesquels, à l'ascendant intellectuel qui lui est propre tout d'abord, elle unit l'ascendant moral qui doit lui advenir: l'un est l'amour de l'humanité qu'elle trouve naissant dans les âmes; l'autre est le sentiment d'une immensité où tout flotte, sentiment qu'elle trouve pénétrant aussi les âmes de plus en plus.' *A. Comte et la Philosophie positive*, p. 524.

the term. And small as has been Mazzini's contribution to the scientific development of the New Philosophy of History,[1] he could with as little justice be passed unmentioned in the history of it as his countryman Vico. Amid all the errors of the one, there is to be found the germ, at least, of the fundamental conception of the New Philosophy; and little as the other may have contributed to its development, he witnessed, in the life of a prophet, and in the death of a martyr, to the efficacy of that New Ideal which is its supreme outcome.

7. Such then will, I think, be found to be the three main causes of the modern incredibility of those dogmas which constitute the Christian Philosophical System. But of all the three sources of adverse argument above indicated, the most destructive is that great generalisation which, directly or indirectly, every discovery whatever of Modern Science tends to verify—that great generalisation which affirms that narratives of Miracle are records, not of actual facts of Nature, but of ignorant states of Mind. Yet in all the vast flood of Christian Literature, and though I have examined it not only rather extensively, but also somewhat attentively, I am unable to point to a single work in which, so far from these arguments, and particularly the central one of all, being met, there is any perception even, or, at least, due appreciation, of what the arguments are which have to be met. Instead of meeting such arguments as those above summarised, and meeting them

[1] Yet of great interest, and of no little importance, are many of his historical essays. See his *Life and Writings.*

in their whole cumulative force, as they require to be met, we find generally in the works of modern Christian apologists either mere misrepresentations of their opponents, and triumphs, therefore, which are no triumphs; or arguments which, even when forcible, are quite partial and wholly inconclusive, tending only, in fact, to complete the undeveloped expression, not to refute the essential principle of some particular theory of the New Philosophy; or we find but the transparent sophistries of an impossible attempt to disconnect Christianity from its general historical theory, and so evade the utterly destructive antagonism of the New Philosophy of History. Of these sophistries, just note one or two of the most popular. 'Truth cannot be opposed to Truth.' Doubtless. But the question is, Is the assumed truth—is the Mosaic theory of the history of Nature, and the Pauline theory of the history of Man—indeed truth—in accordance, that is, with the verifiable facts of the history of Nature and of the history of Man? Again: it is affirmed that 'the spheres of Religion and of Science are independent.' The relation, then, of a Religion, which teaches dogmas founded on what it declares to be historical facts, to a Science, which teaches that these foundations of dogma are historical myths, is a relation of 'independence!' Again: 'The Bible is not meant to teach Science.' Well, this is no doubt true; for of Science its writers had no conception. But they certainly meant to record facts, or supposed facts; and the Biblical assertions as to the history of Nature are not only shown by the Science of

Nature to give a wholly false view of it, but these assertions, and the still more important assertions of such facts in the history of Man as a Fall, an Incarnation, an Atonement, a Resurrection, a Second Coming, and a Last Judgment, are, by the Science of Man, shown to be false by that most conclusive of refutations which accounts for that which it refutes; accounts for it, in this case, by referring to the great and unquestionable fact of the universality of such narratives in the primitive stages of Culture, and their untruth, or non-accordance with the realities of things. This is *the* argument against Miracles.[1] Yet, as I have said, nowhere, so far as I am aware, has it been by Christian Apologists met; or, at least, with any sort of adequate knowledge of those three above distinguished classes of facts which are its verification, met. Hence those sophistries, pitiable or contemptible according as we estimate their honesty, which would attempt to disconnect Christianity from its Philosophy. It cannot be done. The New Philosophy of History contains a principle which obliges Christianity to proclaim itself, not in its assertion only that Jesus of Nazareth was begotten by the 'Holy Ghost,' (how future ages will

[1] And, as Mr. Lecky justly remarks: 'It is the fundamental error of most writers on miracles'—(and he particularly instances, not only Canon Mozeley and the Duke of Argyll, but Professor Tyndall)—'that they confine their attention to two points—the possibility of the fact, and the nature of the evidence. There is a third element, which in these questions is of capital importance: the predisposition of men in certain stages of society towards the miraculous, which is so strong that miraculous stories are then invariably circulated and credited, and which makes an amount of evidence that would be quite sufficient to establish a natural fact, altogether inadequate to establish a supernatural one.' *History of European Morals*, vol. I. p. 381.

be amazed at the long domination of such a myth!), but in its whole story, from Genesis to Revelations, an opposed Philosophy of History, or to vanish altogether from the scene.

8. But if so, what shall take its place? Certain it is that men cannot live nobly, cannot long live at all, without an atmosphere of the Ideal. It is from this impossibility, indeed, that the possibility arises of Humanity. If, then, notwithstanding that destruction of Christianity as a Religion which we now see to be involved in its destruction as a Philosophy, men are to continue to live as, save for brief, anarchic, and transitional periods, they only can live, in a settled social order, there must arise for them a New Ideal, a New Religion. Nor can the general nature, at least, of such a New Ideal be doubtful. The very fact that Christianity is an Ideal founded on a false Philosophy of History may assure us that the New Ideal must arise from, at least, a more true Philosophy of History; and that no Ideal that has not such a basis can be adequate to take the place of that of Christianity. And this, for three reasons. In the first place, the discovery of the falsehood of a theory only sets to men the task of discovering a true theory; and they are already on the road to a new theory when the falsehood of an old theory has been discovered. Secondly, the very fact that the Christian Philosophy of History is a natural development of the human mind shows it to be but a stage which has its necessary sequent in a more true Philosophy of History. The Christian Philosophy may be a false solution of the problem of History; but

no less has it set a problem which it is idle to imagine that men will be contented without, at least, a more true solution of. And as all the other chief problems of Science have had, first, theological, before men attained to scientific solutions of them, we may confidently argue that the Christian theory of History is but the normal theological prelude to the scientific solution of the problem. But there is yet a third consideration which may assure us that the Ideal which alone can replace the Christian Ideal must be founded on a more true Philosophy of History; this, namely, that men having been for two thousand years accustomed to a definite historical Ideal, historical still, yea, and more grandly historical must be the Ideal that can now alone give peace. So far, then, being clear, we now ask, Does that New Philosophy of History which destroys the Christian Philosophy of it, afford an adequate basis for such a reconstruction of the Ideal as is required by the ruin of that religion, which the explosion of the Christian Philosophy of History brings to the ground? Candidly we must reply, Not yet. For the differences that exist between Hegelians, Comtists, and Mazzinists in the conception of, and corollaries drawn from the New Ideal of Humanity, might alone suffice to make us certain that there must be some profound defect in that New Philosophy of History which is the basis of that Ideal. What this more particularly is we shall presently see in a brief review of the development of the New Philosophy. Here I must content myself with but remarking that, if the required New Ideal must be based on a New Philo-

sophy of History, that New Philosophy can be fully adequate to the reconstruction of the Ideal, only when it is complete in, at least, its central theory. Now, only an Ultimate Law of History can give such completeness to the New Philosophy. But such a law is confessedly, as yet, not discovered. And clear is, therefore, I trust, the need of an Ultimate Law of History as the basis of the Ideal.

9. In the meantime, undiscovered as such a law as yet is, and incomplete as the New Philosophy of History is, therefore, still, we cannot but feel confident that it will at length be thus completed. And seeing that the relation of the New Philosophy of History to Christian beliefs is that of an historical theory, implying the notion of Law to beliefs concerning History, involving the notion of Miracle; the cup which contains the Christian Revelation,—an historical theory, guarded in a castle built on this notion,—seems most truly to have been imaged in the Holy Grail of Arthurian Romance; and Christianity, considered as a Religion, seems likenable only to that Chatel Merveil in which the Holy Grail was preserved. But a Castle this is, in these days threatened, not only by open assaults and wary parallels, but by a continually advancing mine. Such a mine it is that is driven by the great, and, as we have seen, most amply verified generalisation of the New Philosophy of History. For, if narratives of miracle are indeed to be regarded as records, not of actual facts of Nature, but of ignorant states of Mind; miracles are exposed to a new and infinitely more destructive, because incomparably more scientific, method of attack. And to

what, indeed, can the pushing home of such a generalisation be compared but to a many-galleried mine, which if we are brought to see, the ordinary attacks on the Castle of Miracle must appear but as brilliant, perhaps, but quite unnecessary charges against the defenders of a fortress, built on a hill so completely honeycombed that the castle-walls rest on a mere crumbling crust? But as this mine advances from without, treason becomes more rife within. For, as the footing of the besieged sounds more and more hollow, none but the most uneducated emotional natures can any longer be blinded by those old sophistries, touched by those old appeals to mere sentiment, or terrified by those old threats of everlasting torment which have from time immemorial constituted the armoury of the priestly defenders of Miracle. Besides, a large section of them profess, at least, principles that make all their attempts to stop the spreading treason illogical and incoherent. For, if they do not urge, their principles will not permit them openly to reprobate the exercise of the right of free enquiry and private judgment. But what is this but, as their priestly adversaries of the other faction truly declare, to permit the besieged to aid the besiegers in the sap of the very foundations of their citadel? Was ever such madness? And can it, then, be a matter of just surprise that the more logical party is continually recruiting adherents from the other? Such must ever be the case in a period of widespread, and thoroughgoing controversy. That, however, this more logical sect, in authoritatively prohibiting enquiry by

proclaiming itself a supernatural corporation with an infallible chief, can thus prevent those only from examining the foundations of their refuge who are willing to accept this monstrous pretension, need hardly be pointed out. And this Chatel Merveil, with both its Protestant and Papal factions—this castle built on a mount thus mined, a hill thus honeycombed—can appear to those who live on the *terra firma* of verifiable fact but as a mere castle in the air, a Nephelococcygia, or Cloud-cuckoo-town, presided over by a wildly hopeful Euelpides, and an arrogantly plausible Peisthetairos.[1]

SUBSECTION II.

The Non-Discovery, as yet, of the Ultimate Law of History.

1. We have seen, then, that the Ideal which has for centuries constituted the religion of the most advanced peoples of the Earth having been founded on an untrue historical theory, there is needed, as the basis of the reconstruction of the Ideal, a true historical theory; but we have also acknowledged that such a theory, essentially consisting, as it must, in an Ultimate Law of History, has not as yet been discovered. Are we to admit that such a law is undiscoverable; or to believe that, in studying the development hitherto of the New Philosophy of History, the road may be indicated to

[1] See the most brilliantly witty, perhaps, and most finely imaginative of all the Comedies of Aristophanes, *The Birds*.

that discovery which will be its completion? Let us first consider what value there may be in those views of History which would make our hopes of discovering the ultimate, or indeed any law of its phenomena, appear altogether groundless. For such is the present state of philosophic thought in England, at least as applied to human history, that, by two of our most eminent historical writers—by Mr. Carlyle, and his disciple, Mr. Froude—the whole doctrine of Progress which has given unity to the great movement towards a New Philosophy of History is either doubted to be true, or denied to be worth much. Mr. Froude, for instance, declares that the History of Man 'seems to him like a child's box of letters with which we can spell any word we please;'[1] and so, with equal truth or falsehood, either Progress or the reverse, or anything else whatever. 'There is, then'—the enthusiastic student questions incredulously—'there is, then, no such progress as was thought to have been discovered in the history of Humanity? The supposed Revelation of God's will, and of Man's destiny, has failed us; yet in Science there is no help; and in the history of Man no general laws are revealed? And scholars and thinkers have, then, missed their sacred aim—to show that History may, at least, become a science, and that on verifiable laws may be reconstructed the Ideal?' We must, replies Mr. Froude, accept despair. We must nerve ourselves to Stoicism. And if we occupy ourselves with History, we must aim only at some picture of the things acted, which picture

[1] *Short Studies on Great Subjects*, vol. I. p. 1, and compare p. 13.

itself will at best be but a poor approximation, and leave the inscrutable purport of them an acknowledged secret. 'What!' the student of the school of Science exclaims, 'is there, then, no discoverable meaning in the succession of such phenomena as Paganism, Christianity, and that new system of thought and of society which we more or less clearly have in view when we speak of the Modern Revolution? What! have the discoveries which prove that the individual is made up of countless cells, and that their birth, life, and death is the condition of his higher life; have the discoveries which prove a succession of phenomena to which you may not attach any meaning but this definite signification, progressive complexity, progressively harmonious co-existence; have these discoveries no bearing on, or analogy with, the life of Humanity, the history of Man? What! is there no science of logic, no science of proof, or of evidence, applicable to humanital, as well as to natural phenomena; and is it indeed possible to spell what you like from your box of letters, without giving anyone the right to laugh at your childishness?' But let us more particularly consider Mr. Froude's objections to the doctrine of Progress. In his last disquisition on this subject, the state of society now is compared with what it was one or two hundred years ago, and with respect particularly to the condition of the peasantry, the character of the clergy, and the reality of education.[1] The comparison is in favour of the past. And, taken in conjunction with such passages as those above

[1] *Short Studies*, vol. II. p. 249.

quoted, it should seem as if Mr. Froude imagined that such a result invalidates somehow the theory of Progress. Yet to proclaim, as if it touched the scientific theory of Progress, such a result as that obtained by Mr. Froude, is as if, in refutation of a theory of the gradual approach of the sea on a certain shore, a man were to declare that, having stood on it for hours, he had, without question, witnessed—an ebb-tide. 'But,' it may be asked with naïve astonishment, 'can you pretend to know, or hopefully to search for the general, nay, the ultimate laws of human history, while we are in the midst of illimitable uncertainties as to the most recent historical facts?' Unquestionably! For is it not long since we have not only known the general laws of the planetary motions round the sun, but deduced them from the ultimate law of gravity; and yet, is not the theory of the tides on our own planet still far from complete? A clear apprehension, therefore, of the difference between the conditions of the discovery of general, and of special laws is one of the first requisites of a right understanding of the theory of Progress, and right estimate of the extent of the historical periods that can alone be as yet fit subjects of scientific treatment.

2. The main objection, however, stated by Mr. Froude is to be found in the following sentences. 'When natural causes are liable to be set aside and neutralized by what is called volition, the word Science is out of place. If it is free to a man to choose what he will do, or not do; there is no adequate science of him. If there is a science of him, there is no Free

Choice, and the praise or blame with which we regard one another is impertinent, and out of place.'[1] And the late Professor of History at Cambridge, with a similarly amazing dogmatism, declares that, 'as long as man has the mysterious power of breaking the laws of his own being, (historical) sequence not only cannot be discovered, but it cannot exist.'[2] But if Science of History there is none, and yet, if forewarning signs there are of future events; the logical conclusion were that the true auguries of the Future are to be found, not in the idle investigation of human forces; but in busying oneself in studying, and in warning us by interpreting the terrors of meteoric appearances, the twists in the entrails of sacrificial victims, and the horns of the beasts of apocalyptic visions. These critics of the New Philosophy of History have not, however, the courage of their opinions. And with a strange complacency they go on refuting themselves with explanations of past, and predictions of future changes or events, either from the influence of supernatural causes, of which they deny that we have any knowledge, or from the action of knowable social forces, the admission of which is the refutation of their denial of the possibility of a Science of History. Mr. Froude, in particular, though scouting all historical theories,[3] himself ventures on some most sweeping historical generalizations.[4] Such an immense induc-

[1] *Short Studies*, vol. I. p. 11. Compare also pp. 15, 22, and 24.

[2] Kingsley, *The Limits of Exact Science as applied to History*, p. 22.

[3] *Short Studies on Great Subjects*, vol. II. p. 485, and passim.

[4] For others of less scope, see *History of England*, vol. V. pp. 70, 108, and 109: and for similar examples of self-refutation by Canon Kingsley,

tion is his affirmation that 'opinions alter, manners change, creeds rise and fall, but the moral law is written on the tablets of eternity. For every false word or unrighteous deed, for cruelty or oppression, for lust or vanity, the price has to be paid at last; not always by the chief offenders, but paid by some one. Justice and truth alone endure and live.'[1] But Mr. Froude, who declares that 'not patriots, or politicians, or divines are looser, worse, or more troublesome manipulators of history than the philosophers,'[2] offers us still other theories which, if not of a more sweeping character than the above, make it certainly less likely that he should ever be mistaken for one of the philosophers he contemns. 'It may be,' he says, 'that by natural and intelligent agencies in the furtherance of the everlasting purposes of our Father in heaven, the belief in a life beyond the grave may again (as in the case of the Israelites when they left Egypt) be about to be withdrawn.'[3] The belief in Immortality about to be *withdrawn*, in furtherance of *purposes*? And Mr. Froude not only 'objects for the present to all historical theories;' but looks forward with desire to the time 'when the speculative formulas into which we

see *Alton Locke*, preface (1854), pp. xxi. xxiii. xxiv. and xxvii.; all as cited by Mr. Herbert Spencer in the second of his admirable essays on *The Study of Sociology—Contemporary Review*, March, 1872, pp. 713, 715. After comparing these natural explanations of historical events with statements by the same authors, denying the possibility of a Science of History, Mr. Spencer remarks, 'If the sole thing meant is that sociological previsions can be approximate only—if the thing denied is the possibility of reducing Sociology to the form of an exact science—then the rejoinder is that the thing denied is a thing which no one has affirmed.'—*Ibid.* p. 715.

[1] *Short Studies*, vol. I. p. 18.

[2] *Ibid.* vol. II. p. 484.

[3] *Ibid.* 285.

have mapped out the mysterious continents of the spiritual world have been consigned to the place already thronged with the ghosts of like delusions which have had their day and perished!'[1] Is he, then, serious, or but ironically humouring the presumed prejudices of his reader, in proposing such a theory as this of the causes of those changes which have marked the history of belief in Immortality? But further. In the very statement on which Mr. Froude chiefly grounds his objections to historical theories, there is in fact implied an immense historical theory of his own. That statement, as we have seen, is that, 'if there is a Science of Man, there is no Free Choice.' But does not this imply that what Science, and what Volition means, is now perfectly understood; while this is, in fact, the very point at issue? Implying this, does not such an affirmation imply a most venturesome historical theory, and thus itself refute the corollary drawn from it, namely, that historical theories of no kind are to be ventured on? For does it not imply that Mr. Froude's is the true theory of Causation, and that in no possible development of thought is a theory of Causation attainable in which the notions of Science and of Volition shall, notwithstanding that to Mr. Froude they appear mutually exclusive, be reconciled?

3. Instead of what he would have us regard as the futile attempt to discover laws of History, Mr. Froude upholds the historical plays of Shakspeare as, in their impartial representation of all characters, and in their high justice to contending parties, the ideal of the his-

[1] *Short Studies*, vol. II. p. 487.

torian.[1] Here, I entirely agree with him, and with the more pleasure, as I have been unfortunately obliged to express disagreement with one to whom English Literature is so much indebted. But it is surprising that, with so true an ideal of historical writing, and, in adopting subjects no larger than Shakspeare's, achievements of his own that are such ironical commentaries on that ideal; it is surprising that reflection on the exceedingly contested results which are all he has himself attained in his portraitures of, for instance, Henry VIII., Elizabeth, and Mary Queen of Scots,[2] has not convinced Mr. Froude that,—if one would write History not only with that abstract justice characteristic of Shakspeare, but with that concrete truth, or accordance with actual fact, which is required of the scientific, but neither required of, nor found in the poetical historian,[3]—one must fill one's

[1] Bunsen, however, had already said: 'the great prophet of human destinies, on the awakening of the new world, was William Shakspeare; he was so, much more, and in a higher sense than Bacon. His *Histories* are the only modern epos . . . They are the Germanic *Niebelungen*, and the Romanic *Divina Commedia*, both united and dramatised.' *Outlines of Universal History*, vol. I. p. 9.

[2] See particularly, with respect to the latter, Hosack, *Mary Queen of Scots and her Accusers*; and the promised final defence of her by Prof. Petit, *History of Mary Queen of Scots*. But, barring an actual hand in the murder, it is surely, historically, a matter of absolute indifference, and even personally, of but small consequence, whether her feminine nature and the circumstances of the time led her into a little more naughtiness, or a little less. For even admitting more against her than Mr. Hosack would allow; even admitting that she *may* have had some touch of the traitress whom Mr. Swinburne, in his fine tragedy, represents as Chastelard's perdition; one might still, as I judge, think with no unworthy satisfaction of having had lineal ancestors among the historical partisans of so beautiful a woman, so gifted and passionful a spirit, and so unfortunate a Queen.

[3] As witness, for instance, Shakspeare's portraiture of that glory of inspired womanhood—Joan of Arc.

canvas with far larger subjects than Shakspeare did, and to keep to the spirit of the Shakspearian Histories, enlarge the matter of our own. For, in order to be, not only in our general spirit, but in our particular judgments, just, we must truly know. True personal History is, however, only possible from about the beginning of the Sixteenth Century downwards; and even from that date is not yet possible.[1] But even for such History, Universal History, or the Philosophy of History is indispensable. For a true conception of historical characters must be in great part a deduction from our conclusions with respect to the general state and relations of the moral and intellectual development of their time. Such deductions, however, can only be drawn from some general law or laws of the succession of historical phenomena, and can be obtained, therefore, only if a Science of History is possible. And hence, that ideal of historical representation which Mr. Froude to us holds up, and himself condemns by, can be even approached only through that Science, the possibility of which he denies.

4. On the whole, then, brief as has been our consideration of the objections taken to the New Philosophy of History, it appears to have been sufficient to convict their authors of gross misconceptions, and self-stultifying contradictions. Nothing would appear to have been advanced, making it in any degree incumbent on us to admit that an Ultimate Law of History,

[1] Of this I was finally convinced in conversation with the late Mr. Bergenroth. See the introductions to the volumes he edited of *Calendars of State Papers (Spanish)*, 1485–1509 (Master of the Rolls' Series). See also Cartwright, *Memorial Sketch of G. A. Bergenroth*.

though undiscovered as yet, may not still be discoverable; nothing, to compel us to adopt that alternative conception of History as 'the essence of innumerable biographies,'[1] with which one scarcely produces aught better than a series of more or less apocryphal portraits, more or less fanciful descriptions, or with which one but follows the master who thus first defined History, in giving a more or less forcible expression to a poetic feeling of existence; nothing would appear to have been advanced that can reasonably require us to abandon the sublime task now laid on the scientific student of History, or the hope of aiding in that reconstruction, of which the discovery of an Ultimate Law of History is the indispensable basis. Let us, therefore, now see whether a general study and survey of the development hitherto of the New Philosophy of History, may not, at least, indicate for us the road to that discovery, by which it may be completed, and religious and social reconstruction made possible. Now, though, as I have already pointed out,[2] Vico is to be named as having been the first to conceive, in a scientific form, the problem of the New Science, 'La Nuova Scienza,' the New Philosophy of History; yet, that he is to be named only as preluding, and not as truly initiating the modern movement towards a Philosophy of History will, I think, be admitted on duly comparing his work, as to method and scientific value throughout, with those which in France, Scotland, and Germany, did fully initiate the movement. Compare,

[1] Carlyle, *On History, Fraser's Magazine*, vol. II. No. X., 1830.
[2] Above, p. 15.

then, the 'Scienza Nuova,' first, with those works which in France initiated the New Philosophy—Montesquieu's 'Esprit des Lois;' and Turgot's second discourse at the Sorbonne, 'Sur les Progrès successifs de l'Esprit humain.' By these great thinkers, as also by their contemporary, Voltaire, historical events were treated as a connected whole, depending on large social causes, rather than on mere individual idiosyncrasies. It is no small honour to Voltaire to be acknowledged as the originator of some of the profoundest remarks that still direct historical speculation and research.[1] But by Montesquieu, the immensely significant attempt was made to effect a union between the historical science of Man and the sciences of Nature. And Hume and Comte were, by Turgot, anticipated in that profoundly revolutionary generalisation which presents the notion of Gods, and hence of Miracles, as but an early stage of the conception of Causation; shows further, that, for the divinities originally conceived as the causes of phenomena, there are gradually substituted abstract essences and virtues which, however, do not really explain anything; and affirms that, finally, events are, and can only be, explained by verifiable hypotheses of relations between things themselves.[2] Com-

[1] See, for a statement of some of these remarks, Buckle, *History of Civilisation*, vol. I. pp. 740–2. And compare Morley, *Voltaire*.

[2] But, as M. Littré justly observes, 'trois points principaux marquent l'indépendance où M. Comte a été de Turgot. Celui-ci n'a vu dans la conception qu'une idée à méditer; Comte y a vu une loi sociologique; Turgot n'y a point rattaché une esquisse du développement humain; Comte a développé à l'aide de cette loi toute la série historique; Turgot n'a point aperçu qu'il tenait un des éléments nécessaires d'une philosophie; Comte, du même élan de pensée, est allé de l'histoire devenue

pared with views so pregnant and profound as these of Turgot and of Montesquieu, the place that has, by some,[1] been claimed for Vico's 'Civil Theology of Divine Providence'[2] cannot, I think, be justly maintained.

5. Still less can Vico be considered as the founder of the New Philosophy of History, when we consider those works of Adam Smith and Hume which Scotland contributed to the initiation of this grand and revolutionary direction of research. The 'Theory of Moral Sentiments' and the 'Inquiry into the Wealth of Nations,' taken together as complementary parts of one great whole—and as such they must, since Mr. Buckle's luminous criticism, be regarded[3]—were the largest and most systematic foundations that had yet been laid for a true philosophy of History. But consider these works of Adam Smith, not only in relation to each other, but both in relation to those of his yet more illustrious friend, on 'Human Nature,' and on

science à la philosophie devenue positive. La loi sociologique, isolée dans Turgot, fait chez Comte partie d'un vaste ensemble; ce sont donc deux créations indépendantes.'—*A. Comte et la Philosophie positive*, p. 48.

[1] See, for instance, Hodgson, *Theory of Practice*, vol. II. p. 128.

[2] See above, p. 15.

[3] 'Between the two works there elapsed an interval of seventeen years; the *Wealth of Nations* not being published till 1776. But what shows that to their author both were part of a single scheme, is the notable circumstance, that, so early as 1753, he had laid down the principles which his later work contains. This was while his former work was still in meditation, and before it had seen the light. It is therefore clear that the study which he made, first, of sympathy, and then of selfishness, was not a capricious or accidental arrangement, but was the consequence of that vast idea which presided over all his labours, and which, when they are rightly understood, gives to them a magnificent unity.'—Buckle, *History of Civilisation*, vol. II. p. 442.

the 'Natural History of Religion'—the contribution made by Scotland towards the foundation of the New Philosophy of History will then appear in its true proportions. Adam Smith is a greater Montesquieu; Hume a greater Turgot. Yet, not only has the importance of the 'Natural History of Religion' been ignored—further developed though its ideas are in the 'Dialogues on Natural Religion'—but the very title has been strangely left unmentioned by Comte and his disciples,[1] and that, even when acknowledging the great philosophic merits of Hume. But, as I shall have occasion hereafter to show, Comte's 'Law of the Three Periods' was, as a law, but a formulising of Hume's generalisations with respect to the most important phenomena of man's development. And published though this 'History' of Hume's was after the 'Discourse' of Turgot;[2] yet, if we consider the development given in it to that idea no doubt previously enunciated by the French statesman, and its relation to the general philosophic system of its author; we shall, I think, be justified in considering Hume's theory of the natural history of Religion as the true first stage in the discovery of the Ultimate Law of the history of

[1] See *Philosophie positive*, t. II. p. 442; Littré, *A. Comte et la Philosophie positive*, première partie, chaps. iii. iv. and v.; and Papillon, *David Hume, Précurseur d'Auguste Comte*, in the chief literary organ of the Comtists, *La Philosophie positive*, t. III. pp. 292–308.

[2] Turgot's *Discourse* was delivered in 1750, and Hume's *History* was published in 1757; but his *Dialogues* on the same subject, though not published till after his death, were written about the same time as Turgot's *Discourse*, and at least before 1751. See Burton, *Life of Hume*, vol. I. pp. 266–328, and vol. II. pp. 15–36. For some remarks curiously indicative of the state of opinion and feeling in reference to these yet unpublished *Dialogues*, see Monboddo, *Antient Metaphysics*, vol. I., Preface, pp. iv, v.

Humanity.[1] Hence, if Vico must be acknowledged as having first conceived the problem of the Philosophy of History in a scientific manner; Hume must take rank as the thinker who, if he was not the first to see, was the first to give anything like due recognition and development to that prophetic generalisation, which was, in fact, as we may in the sequel more clearly see, the first approximation to the solution of the great problem. And hence, if any one of the initiators of this new movement of philosophic thought, in which all Western Europe participated, is to be accorded the exclusive title of Founder of the New Philosophy of History, it would, I think, be, more justly than to any other, awarded to Hume.[2]

6. Herder, though later than all those contemporaries just named, is usually considered as, in his 'Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit,' the initiator of Germany in this great enterprise of European Philosophy. But it must be noted that, even before Herder's work (1784–95), the universal Kant had published his little-known, but important opuscule entitled 'Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht.'[3] By the theologian, as, of course, by the philosopher, the history of Man is conceived as a series of natural phenomena which has discoverable

[1] And yet, in reference to the work in which this most pregnant theory is set forth, he says: 'Dr. Hurd's pamphlet against it gave me some consolation for the otherwise indifferent reception of my performance.'—*My Own Life, Phil. Works*, vol. I. p. x. See below, Sect. III., Subs. (III.)

[2] See, before judging of such an award, below, Sect. III., Subs. (II.)

[3] For a French translation see Littré, *A. Comte et la Philosophie positive*, pp. 53–68. It has been translated into English by De Quincey. As to its 'signal merits' see *Fortnightly Review*, No. XXXVIII. N.S. pp. 136–7.

laws. The theologian, however, characteristically supposes a first impulse that comes neither from external nature nor from man himself—a primitive and supernatural revelation. And by neither is any such great verifiable law indicated as we find in Turgot and in Hume. Yet, as to their relative importance in the history of the New Philosophy of History, I venture to think that by far the higher place belongs to Kant. That Montesquieu's idea of the connection of human development with physical conditions, and of the interrelations of Man and Nature, should be further worked out, as by Herder, was, no doubt, very important. But it might, I think, be maintained, that even the few pages in which the philosopher of Königsberg sets forth, in mathematical-like form, his nine propositions on the history of Mankind are, in a scientific point of view, not unequal in value to the three diffuse, though often eloquent, volumes of the Fénelon of Germany. In the case, however, of Kant, as in that of Hume, we cannot rightly judge the work in which he treats directly of the history of Mankind, save we consider it in relation to his philosophy generally. And considering the 'Thoughts for a general History in a world-citizen Regard' in its relation to the Kantian Philosophy generaly, and to that historical Law of Thought in which, as we shall presently see, it culminated in the Hegelian Philosophy, we shall, I think, be unable to doubt that Kant's true place, not only with regard to philosophic genius—that of course is utterly beyond question—but with respect even to the development of the New Philosophy of History, is

far above that of Herder, though it is Herder alone who is usually named in this connection.

7. Thus, before the destructive outbreak of the French Revolution, France, Scotland, and Germany may each claim to have initiated, or rather to have contemporaneously and independently contributed to the initiation of that great European achievement—a true Philosophy of History. Then came the diffusion and varied development of this new historical idea. And as such a development, the most characteristic works, not merely of the distinctively philosophical, but of the scientific, critical, and poetic activity of Europe, since the initiation of the New Philosophy of History, assume an aspect of wonderful unconscious unity, mutual support, and significance. For remark that the historical sciences of Nature, the sciences which we shall hereafter include under what we shall distinguish as Cosmogenetic, or the sciences of natural Evolution, all come after, or are contemporary with, the foundation, by Turgot, Hume, and Kant, of the general historical science which we shall hereafter distinguish as Logogenetic, or the Science of Mental Development. The astronomical theory of the evolution of Solar Systems, the geological theory of the formation of the Earth, and the biological theory of the evolution of Living Beings, all date from the same great era: nay, of the first, if not also of the second of these two theories, Kant himself was the founder, and no inconsiderable contributor, at least, to the third.[1]

[1] See his *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels* (*Werke*, b. VIII. p. 217); his *Physische Geographie*, IV. *Abschn. Geschichte*

Then consider literary criticism. It is only from the same great era that the historical idea, now paramount in it, dates. So, too, with poesy. And it is remarkable to observe that not only such poets as Goethe, Byron, and Shelley, but poets even the most opposed to the great revolutionary tide of thought, as, for instance, Sir Walter Scott, are, if men of genius, unconsciously led into developing in some new direction that very historical idea which is the most revolutionary of all, or rather, which gives to all the rest their unity and force. 'To find a true and positive, not negative, solution of the problem of the philosophy of History may be said,' remarks Bunsen, 'to have formed, and to continue to form, consciously and unconsciously, the ultimate object of that great effort of the German mind which has produced Goethe and Schiller in literature; Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel in philosophy; Lessing, Schlegel, and Niebuhr in criticism and historical research.'[1] But it is a vain presumption to talk of the New Historical Idea as peculiarly German. It is European. Germany, indeed, was, as we have seen, the last country to take it up. The solution of the problem of the Philosophy of History should rather be said to have been the characteristic object of that effort of the

der grossen Veränderung, welche die Erde ehedem erlitten hat, und noch erleidet (*Werke*, b. ix. p. 307); and his *Schriften zur Anthropologie* (*Werke*, b. x.). Compare Haeckel, *Natürliche Schöpfungs-Geschichte*, Vorl. XIII.

[1] *Outlines of Universal History*, vol. I. p. 28. But to those named by Bunsen ought also (as I have been reminded by Mr. G. H. Lewes) to have been added Wolff, whose *Prolegomena* to Homer has been the fountain of so much of the later historical, and particularly mythological and religious criticism. With reference to Schiller, see Mazzini *On the Historical Drama: Life and Writings*, vol. II.

European mind which has produced all that is greatest in modern science, literature, and art. And the labours of all the greatest discoverers, scholars, and thinkers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries will, we may confidently predict, be more and more clearly seen to have, in this, their unity—in contributing to or establishing a New Philosophy of History, therewith also a New Ideal, and what that, in fact, is, a New Religion. For though historical continuity may, from a moral point of view, be preserved, yet as, in its intellectual aspect, Christianity is a Creed as to Man's history, new knowledge must make a new Creed. A new Creed will, indeed, be but the moral aspect of the new knowledge in its final synthetic form.

8. The movement initiated in France by Montesquieu and Turgot did not fail to be carried on as might have been anticipated from the large, ardent, and scientific genius of the people. Condorcet worthily followed these great masters with his 'Esquisse d'un Tableau historique des Progrès de l'Esprit humain.' Singularly tragic is the fact of its having been written under sentence of death by a revolutionary tribunal—'hors la loi'—but not, as his noble protectress said, 'hors l'humanité!'[1] The Revolution we here see devouring its own children. And them we see, with a splendid heroism and sublime faith in Humanity, still working to the very death for those who had condemned them to death. To this work of Condorcet's Comte acknowledges his indebtedness for 'la conception générale du travail propre à élever la

[1] See Morley, *Fortnightly Review*, 1870, p. 39.

politique au rang des sciences d'observation.'[1] And most significant it is that the 'Philosophie positive,'—which, whatever may be its defects, must still be considered as beyond comparison the greatest philosophical work which France has in this century produced,—is but a variously wrought-out commentary on an historical law.[2] Thus, also, as we shall presently see, may the whole system of Hegel be characterised. Both his work and Comte's are essentially philosophies of History. And we thus have a striking verification of the periods we have above distinguished in the development of the Modern Era of European Philosophy. The second period, we have said, was that which began with Hume and Kant, and closed with Hegel and Comte. And we now see that this period is distinguished by a fact so important as the initiation of the New Philosophy of History, and its culmination in systems of which the central principles are altogether historical. Comte's great work has been followed in France by others, in which the New Philosophy has been still further developed. Of these the most important, perhaps, and suggestive is that in which Quinet has proposed to himself the great aim 'de faire entrer la révolution contemporaine de l'histoire naturelle dans le domaine général de l'esprit humain. . . . Il s'agit de découvrir les points de relation entre le domaine des sciences naturelles et celui des sciences historiques,

[1] *Système de Politique positive*, t. I. p. 132.

[2] 'Tel doit être le premier grand résultat direct de la philosophie positive, la manifestation par expérience des lois que suivent dans leur accomplissement nos fonctions intellectuelles.'—*Philosophie positive*, t. I. p. 40.

morales, littéraires. . . . . La nature s'expliquait par l'histoire, l'histoire par la nature.'[1] But as Comte's Empirical Law has not yet been transformed into a Rational or Ultimate Law, Comte still represents the last stage of the development, by France, of the New Philosophy.

9. By Scotland, though, as we have seen, standing foremost among the eighteenth-century initiators of the great European movement towards a New Philosophy of History, little of a direct kind has, in this century, as yet been accomplished. What the causes of this have been, it would be interesting, but here irrelevant to enquire. And I shall only note that among the proximate causes, the most powerful will probably be found to have been the adoption of Reid and Stewart instead of Adam Smith and Hume as University Textbooks. But, however caused, the fact is that towards the solution of the great problem, Scotland, notwithstanding her magnificent contributions in the last century, and notwithstanding that it is a son of hers who should seem to have the best claim to be called the Founder of the New Philosophy of History, has, in this century, contributed little more, as yet, than the chapters on the 'Logic of the Moral Sciences' of Mr. J. S. Mill's 'System of

[1] *La Création, Préface,* pp. i. ii. and iv. Compare the last phrase with Montesquieu's 'L'histoire expliquée par les lois, et les lois par l'histoire.' But this conception of M. Quinet's may be deduced as a corollary from the principles of that New Method, the outlines of which are traced in the following section; and only from the postulates of this New Method can such a conception receive its fundamental justification. It is interesting to find that M. Quinet began his literary career by translating Herder's *Ideen*; and that his lifelong friend, M. Michelet, began by translating Vico's *Scienza Nuova.* See Chassin, *Quinet, sa Vie, et son Œuvre,* p. 92.

Logic.' For the histories, and historical essays of Mr. Carlyle, with their heroes and hero-worship, are, in relation to the scientific conception of History, altogether reactionary. Yet, in the general movement towards a New Philosophy of History, Scotland has still retained her place. To the understanding of the history of Man she has, indeed, lately little contributed directly, but much to the history of his Dwelling-place. For the science, founded by Hutton,[1] has been worthily developed by his countrymen, Lyell and Murchison. And thus indirectly, at least, through showing the falsity of the Theological or Spiritist, and developing the Scientific or Relational Theory of Causation, Hume's theory of mental development has been confirmed and advanced. But if Scotland has for a time retired from the direct line of research, England has at length entered the field. She can, however, as yet show, and that only in a fragment, Mr. Buckle's 'History of Civilisation.' It has been succeeded by historical works so important, and in so many respects admirable, as those of the Irishman, Mr. Lecky,[2] and the American, Mr. Draper.[3] But there are in these later works no such new systematic views on the Philosophy of History as to entitle them to be considered as in any degree advancing the solution of the problem; and Mr. Buckle's work, the main results of which we

[1] 'His system has not only supplanted that of Werner, but has formed the foundation of the researches and writings of our most enlightened observers, and is justly regarded as the basis of all sound geology at the present day.' Richardson, *Geology* (1851), p. 38. Cited by Buckle, *History of Civilisation*, vol. II. p. 521.

[2] *History of Rationalism*, and *History of European Morals*.

[3] *History of the Intellectual Development of Europe*.

shall presently have occasion briefly to note,[1] may thus be said to mark the last phase, not only of English, but of English-written speculation on the historical laws of Human Development.

10. Thus, then, stand France and Britain in the great race, of which the torch was seized for the one by Montesquieu and Turgot, and for the other by Adam Smith and Hume. But Germany, though latest of all her champions started, has had the torch carried on with the most splendid vigour of all. Important as are the few pages which were all that Kant devoted to the direct consideration of History 'in weltbürgerlicher Absicht,' we cannot, as I have already said, fairly judge the value of his contribution to the New Philosophy of History, except we consider it in its relation to the development of his general philosophical system. And, similarly, if we would truly judge the value of what Germany has contributed to the New Philosophy of History, it is not so much the works directly treating of the history of Man—numerous and important as these have been—that, if we would either do her justice, or penetrate to the core of the development, we must consider; but the general outcome in relation to our conception of History, and the logical sequence of the systems of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. Here, however, I must confine myself to pointing out, and that in but the briefest possible manner, the character of the philosophy of Hegel, and its germination from that of Kant. Now, as to character, not only is Becoming, that is, Progress, the great

[1] See below, p. 57.

leading idea of the Hegelian Philosophy, but it is essentially nothing else than the working-out in abstract logical, and concrete historical forms, of a Law of Becoming, a Law of Progress in its most fundamental aspect, as the outward manifestation of a Law of Thought. Thus, as already remarked with reference to Comte, those ideas towards a New Philosophy of History which were published as mere occasional essays, in no organic connection apparently with the general systems of Hume and of Kant, the great initiators of the second period of Modern European Philosophy, had, like the cloud on the horizon no bigger than a man's hand, overspread at the close of that second period of the Modern Era the whole heaven of systematic Philosophy. The direct development of the system of Comte from that of Hume is to be seen more particularly, as we shall have occasion in the sequel,[1] somewhat fully to show, in the consideration of Hume's theory of Causation, and theory of 'the natural history of Religion.' And as to the direct development of the system of Hegel from that of Kant,[2] it is to be seen with greatest clearness in the consideration of the Kantian Categories. For the Categories of Kant were but generalisations, and the Notion of Hegel was but a generalisation of *them*. The function of the Categories, as they are understood by Kant, is the conversion of the Universal, through the Particular, into the Singular. And this it was that Hegel treated under the name of

[1] See below, sect. III. subs. (II.)

[2] A derivation this was, however, which Hegel most disingenuously concealed, and thus chiefly made the understanding of his system difficult. See Stirling, *Secret of Hegel*, vol. I. pp. 270–6.

the *Begriff*, or Notion, as the movement of Conscious ness, as what is ultimate in the constitution of the Universe, and as the universal historical Law, at once of Being and of Thought.[1]

11. Such then has been, stating it in the most general outlines, the history of the New Philosophy of History, in its initiation, diffusion, and culmination. What is the general result of our survey of it, with reference to the purpose with which it was undertaken? In the first place, we remark that that philosophical study of History which distinguishes the second period of the Modern European Era has had, as its outcome, two great historical Laws: the one, a formulising of the general historical theory of Hume; the other, a generalising of the general logical theory of Kant. But, secondly, we note that the former is confessedly, though a remarkably verified, still but an Empirical;[2] and the latter confessedly also,[3] though in form an Ultimate, yet in fact not, as hitherto stated, a clearly verifiable Law of History. And, thirdly, on considering the distinctive character of Empirical and Ultimate Laws, we see that the one is the mark of an essentially Materialist, the other of an essentially Idealist system; and we find, in verification of this, that the historical law, and general philosophical system of Comte is the culmination of a Materialist, and the historical law, and general philosophical system of Hegel, the culmi-

[1] Compare Stirling, *Secret of Hegel*, vol. I. pp. 154, 272, 279, &c.

[2] Admitted to be but such by even the Comtist Littré, *Paroles de Philosophie positive*, pp. 71, flg.

[3] As for instance by the Hegelian Stirling, *Secret of Hegel*, vol. II. p. 538, and *Supplementary Notes* to Schwegler's *History of Philosophy*, p. 475.

nation of an Idealist strain; and that such two strains have distinguished, not only, more particularly, the history of the New Philosophy of History, but the course generally of that great philosophical movement of which it is but a part, the movement initiated by Bacon and Descartes.[1] But what are Idealism and Materialism essentially but antagonistic theories of Causation? Have we, however, in the fact that the Hegelian and Comtean Philosophies of History are founded on antagonistic theories of Causation, any valid reason for an abandonment of the attempt at a more complete Philosophy of History? Such, indeed, may be the conclusion of those who imagine, with Mr. Froude, that because to them there seems to be an irreconcileable antagonism between what they call 'Science and Volition,' irreconcileable it is. But would it not be at once more reasonable, and less presumptuous to conclude that such antagonism may belong, not to the nature of things, but to our ignorance merely, and hence that, by the detection of it, we are but directed to a new enquiry into Causation? And is not the general aim also of such an enquiry defined for us by the very fact that leads us to see the necessity of it; defined for us as the reconciliation of Idealism and Materialism; defined for us as—to use the simile of a great naturalist—the attempt to bring into generative union the different-sexed flowers of that monœcious Tree of Knowledge, of which Idealism and Materialism are the two great branches?[2]

[1] See above, p. 17.

[2] 'If a botanist found this state of things in a new plant, I conceive that he would be inclined to think that his tree was monœcious, that

12. Nor, if objection is taken to the too great generality, and therefore vagueness of such a definition of the aim of the enquiry to which we are thus directed, is a more strict definition not readily attainable. For, as I have elsewhere[1] more fully pointed out, the most important result of that work which was the occasion of the criticism of the New Philosophy of History which we have, in the opening paragraph of this Subsection, itself criticised,—the most important result of Mr. Buckle's 'History of Civilisation,' considered in its relation to the development generally of the New Philosophy of History, was just this—more strictly to define the aim of a new enquiry into Causation as a true definition of Moral Forces. For Mr. Buckle's theory of the non-effect of such Forces was but an outspoken expression of that general Materialist Theory which attributes all to External Conditions, and nothing to Internal Spontaneities. And his work has had this general, and these two more special results: In the first place, he has made it impossible, henceforth, rationally to attempt a philosophical treatment of History without either showing, on the one hand, far stronger grounds than any advanced by himself for eliminating Moral Forces in our reckoning of historical causes; or, on the other hand, showing how such

the flowers were of different sexes, and that so far from setting up a barrier between the two branches of the tree, the only hope of fertility lay in bringing them together . . . I must confess that this is exactly my notion of what is to be done with metaphysics and physics. Their differences are complementary, not antagonistic, and thought will never be completely fruitful till the one unites with the other.' Huxley, *Lay Sermons*, p. 371.

[1] *Fraser's Magazine*, April 1873.

Forces are to be scientifically conceived, how their action in History is to be investigated, and what have been the laws of that action. But not merely such a negative, but a positive value also Mr. Buckle's contribution to the New Philosophy of History must, on a candid consideration of it, be admitted to have. For even if we should be convinced of the fallaciousness of Mr. Buckle's arguments against the historical efficacy of Moral Forces, his work has had these two more special results. First, it has made clear how immense is the efficacy in primæval societies of mere physical conditions in determining both moral and intellectual phenomena; and secondly, how great is the influence, in modern societies, of intellectual agencies in determining phenomena which we might be disposed rather to attribute to moral agencies. And hence we are led to conclude that what is meant by such a scientific theory of Moral Forces, as the fallaciousness of Mr. Buckle's arguments against such Forces must convince us of the necessity of, is a *relative* theory—a theory in which, if it is maintained that an internal element must be, not only admitted, but positively defined, it is also acknowledged that the form of the manifestation of such an element is externally determined.

13. Far removed, then, as to the superficial thinker may appear those abstract researches involved in a new enquiry into Causation—far removed as such researches may, at first sight, appear from any connection with the task of the historian—I trust that even the foregoing brief remarks may have been sufficient to make it clear that it is to such an enquiry

that he must necessarily address himself if he would give any such further development to the New Philosophy of History as the untruth of the Christian theory of it renders indispensable. And when we find that the most eminent disciples of Hegel and of Comte, the representatives in this century of those antagonistic Causation-theories which result, the one in Rational, and the other in Empirical Laws—when we find that Dr. Stirling[1] and M. Littré[2] are equally dissatisfied with the principles of their masters, and that on grounds which manifestly point to a reconciliation of those principles—we should seem to have at least a general justification of such a new enquiry. But when we further and more particularly consider the bearings, on the general theory of Causation, of that great principle of the Conservation of Energy, in which modern physical researches have culminated—unsuccessful as Schopenhauer, the chief opponent of Hegel,[3] and Spencer, the chief antagonist of Comte,[4] would appear to have been in their respective attempts at a reconciliation of Idealism and Materialism, and incommensurable as would certainly be the consequences of such a reconciliation—it cannot but suggest itself that scientific Causation-theories are probably opposed to each other, as either Idealist or Materialist, only because our knowledge of the relations of things

[1] See *Secret of Hegel*, vol. ii. pp. 528-538, and *Annotations* to Schwegler, *History of Philosophy*, p. 445.

[2] See *A. Comte et la Philosophie positive*, p. 677, and *Paroles de Philosophie positive*, pp. 71 flg.

[3] See F. de Careil, *Hegel et Schopenhauer*.

[4] See *Reasons for Dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte*, appended to Mr. Spencer's pamphlet on *The Classification of the Sciences*.

has been hitherto inadequate, and because, therefore, of some radical and similar error in both theories, which will disappear on a better knowledge of the relations, and hence truer conception of the causes of things. And another, a third, suggestion occurs that clinches all the foregoing considerations, and seems to make of a new enquiry into Causation, not a mere preliminary course of research, but the most hopeful, at once, and direct that could be entered on with the view of discovering what alone can make the New Philosophy fully adequate to take the place of the Christian Philosophy of History—an Ultimate Law. For, when we enlarge our view, the great epochs of the Revival of Learning, the Renaissance of Art, the Reformation of Religion, and the French Revolution, are seen to form, with the movement of the present century, but progressive stages of a great historical change; and not only so, but we believe that we can discern in this change an Intellectual Revolution, which may be defined as, in its profoundest significance, *a change in men's notions of the causes of change.* If, therefore, through the study of the relations of things, as our later knowledge reveals them to us, we can but get at a clearer conception of the true nature of Causation; may it not be that we shall not only obtain a theory reconciliative of the long antagonism of Idealism and Materialism, but shall, in comparing this later with earlier conceptions of Causation, discover also the most general ascertainable Law of Man's history—a law that shall be to those Laws of Comte which formulated the historical theory of

Hume, what the Law of Newton was to the Laws of Kepler—an Ultimate Law that will enable us rightly, at length, to interpret the Past, and truly to prophesy the Future? Magnificent, then, as are the general views presented by the Philosophies of History, let us turn from these high speculations to the drudgery, though it may be, of making ourselves acquainted, through experimental research, with the most exact results of our later knowledge. These, in their inmost meaning, let us master; these let us evaluate, and as fully as possible develope in those more true conceptions which they seem to afford of Causation, before we make any further attempt at a scientific comprehension of the starry sphere of History. Newton laid aside his researches on the orbits of the Planets till he had obtained a more exact value of the semidiameter of the Earth.[1] And we may hope that when, after a like evaluation of the ground on which we stand, we resume our study of the ensphering system of Humanity, we shall gather knowledge, not inapproximately, perhaps, as accurate as that of the astronomers from the base which they had thus ascertained.

[1] In Picard's more accurate measurement of an arc of the meridian, correcting Newton's estimate of sixty miles to a degree, and hence giving greater accuracy to his calculation of the Moon's distance in semidiameters of the Earth. See Grant, *History of Physical Astronomy*, p. 24.

SUBSECTION III.

The need of a Law of History as the Authority of a New Polity.

1. We have thus seen, first, that Religion, having become with Christianity an Ideal based on a Philosophy of History, and this philosophical system having been found incredible; a true and complete Philosophy of History, or, more definitely, an Ultimate Law of History is needed as the basis of the Ideal, or, what that in effect will be, the Religion of the Future. Secondly, though we have found only misconception and inevitable self-contradiction in the objections urged against the New Philosophy of History; a general survey of it has obliged us to acknowledge that it is still far from complete; yet has shown us, at the same time, to what this incompleteness is due, and has, at least, directed us on the road to the discovery of that Law which is required for its completion. And now, before passing on to state the principles of that New Philosophical Method by which the discovery was, at length, as I venture to think, made of the Ultimate Law of History; I would point out the urgent need of such a Law, not only in order—as in the first subsection I have shown—to give the required new basis for the Ideal; but in order to have such guidance for Policy as can, in times so revolutionary as these, alone save from worse than suicidal, from nation-

destroying, humanity-mutilating error. And thus I would desire to impress on the reader that—merely speculative as may appear to be a search for the Ultimate Law of History which, in the way in which we have been led to take it up, resolves itself into, or at least demands as its preliminary, an enquiry so abstract as one having for its aim the reconciliation of the antagonistic causation-theories of Idealism and Materialism—distinctly practical our researches, nevertheless, are in their whole spirit and purpose. It may, indeed, be confessed that, only the clearness with which was seen the baselessness now of the Ideal, the unauthoritativeness now of Polity; and the fervour with which it was desired to gain, at length, a true basis for the reconstruction of the Ideal, and an acknowledgable authority for the reorganisation of Polity; this only it has been that has strengthened and encouraged in the prosecution of a task often apparently desperate. Nor, indeed, need one hesitate to acknowledge this. For that New Era, initiated by Bacon and Descartes, has had no more significant characteristic than the increasingly practical tendency of its conscious aims. At first, expressly disavowing not only all intention of disturbing, but all capability of affecting the religious Creed, and social organisation of Christendom, Philosophy has gradually become not only conscious of such capability, but emboldened to avow such intention. Descartes specially guarded himself from the imputation of having any social aims in his philosophy.[1] Both Hegel and Comte carry their philosophical

[1] See his *Discours sur le Méthode.*

theories distinctly out into social applications.[1] And those who are blind enough honestly now to deny the transforming effect which the diffusion of scientific knowledge, and more than all, the diffusion of the scientific mode of thought is having, and will certainly more and more have on religious beliefs, and hence on social institutions, are simply some three centuries behind time. Not for the golden apples thrown-down before Atalanta, and which, tempting to stoop for them, lost her the race; not for lucre; not for the sake only of self-culture; not with the view even of establishing a new sect or doctrine; but, as with Bacon, in this also before his time, in order to 'lay the foundations of human happiness and enlargement'[2]—is the 'augmentation of the sciences' now avowedly sought.

2. An epoch in Politics may be dated from that famous speech of Lord Palmerston's,[3] in which Public Opinion was proclaimed as, for the true statesman, at once the guide to the conception, and the means to the execution of his ends. 'There are,' said the hitherto unobserved subaltern, henceforth the world-renowned statesman, 'There are two great parties in Europe: one which endeavours to bear sway by the force of public opinion; another which endeavours to bear sway by the force of physical control. The principle on which the system of this party is founded is, in my view, fundamentally erroneous. There is in nature no

[1] M. Littré thus but expresses what is universally felt by thinkers when he says:—'Le sort des destinées sociales et celui de la science sont désormais unis indissolublement.' *Paroles de Philosophie positive*, p. 69.

[2] 'Utilitatis et amplitudinis humanæ fundamenta moliri.' *Instau. Mag. Præf.* *Works* (Ellis and Spedding), vol. I. p. 132.

[3] In the Portugal Debate, 1st June, 1829.

moving power but mind; all else is passive and inert.[1] In human affairs, this power is opinion; in political affairs, it is public opinion; and he who can grasp this power will subdue the fleshly arm of physical strength, and compel it to work out his purpose.'[2] But those who, instructed by the experience of these forty-four years since Public Opinion was thus avowed as the true guide of Policy—those who have most deeply reflected on its worth—have probably come to the more or less conscious conclusion that, though unanimous, or comparatively unanimous, Public Opinion may often be right, and therefore wisely followed in its general estimates, and moral judgments, of large political events;[3] yet that utter political scepticism, and hence—save in times of, at least, comparative calm—utter political incapacity, is the result of having

[1] This puts one in mind of Sir William Hamilton's favourite motto—

On earth there is nothing great but man,
In man there is nothing great but mind.

As to the authorship of the similar verse—

Νοῦς ὁρᾷ καὶ Νοῦς ἀκούει, τἆλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά,

see Hamilton's note in his edition of Reid's *Works*, pp. 878 flg.

[2] He thus eloquently continued: 'The powers of the mind of man have triumphed over the forces of things, and the subjugated elements are become his obedient vassals. And so also is it with the political affairs of empires; and the statesmen who know how to avail themselves of the passions, and the interests, and the opinions of mankind, are able to gain an ascendancy and exercise a sway over human affairs, far out of all proportion to the resources of the State over which they preside; while those, on the other hand, who seek to check improvement, to cherish abuses, to crush opinion, and to prohibit the human race from thinking—whatever may be the apparent power which they wield—will find their weapon snap short in their hand when most they need protection.' Hansard, *Parl. Debates*, Second Series, vol. xxi. p. 1668.

[3] Compare Bucher, *Parlamentarismus wie er ist*, kap. vi. *Presse-Oeffentliche Meinung*, ss. 137 flg.

as ordinary guide but the opinion and voice of that multitude of which Jack Cade asked, in his bitter soliloquy, 'Was ever feather blown so lightly to and fro?'[1] Not Public Opinion which, looked at, or listened to indiscriminately is, with us at least now, in this our transitional and revolutionary period, a mere chaos of contradictory and changeful clamour—not undiscriminated Public Opinion—but that special current of Opinion, that particular drift of Human Thought, which tends to become the most powerful, must now and henceforth be the guide of the statesman. And Lord Palmerston's proclamation of indiscriminated Public Opinion as the statesman's guide, was but such an enunciation of the maxim, that must be substituted for it, as was fitted for the transitional period which he ruled. For now one must be blind and deaf indeed, if one does not hear and see, in all the manifestations of Public Opinion, *two* more and more definitely adverse *sets* of Opinions. And the question has become, not whether Policy shall be guided by Public Opinion; but what opinions belong essentially to which set, incoherent as their utterers may be; and which of the two adverse sets of opinions will have its truth, at length, by victory, witnessed and warranted? That is the question. And to answer it, nothing will avail but the discovery of a verifiable Law of Human Thought—an Ultimate Law of History. Through such a law, and such a law only, will the statesman, truly distinguishing different opinions and rightly appreciating their respective forces, be en-

[1] Shakspeare, *Henry VI. Part* II.

lightened by the splendour of an aim which will purify him from the sordidness of mere personal ambition; and, assured of ultimate justification by Public Opinion, its present antagonism will not affright him from his end, and its variance will only instruct him how to change his means; he will know when it may be faced, and when it must be followed, and will understand what clamour he may treat with contemptuous composure.

3. I would now proceed—in order to enable my readers in some degree to realise the urgent practical need of the discovery and establishment of a Law of History—if Polity is to have an acknowledgable Authority, and hence, Policy to be anything better than either, on the one hand, an infatuated striving against irresistible historical forces, or anything better, on the other hand, than a degrading game of selfish intrigue and personal ambition—I would now proceed briefly to point-out, not only a revolutionary change in the basis of the Polity, or Social System of Christianity, but those verifiable causes of this revolutionary change which have to myself appeared to make a Law of History so needful, as authority for a New Polity, and—in affording the only possible means of truly interpreting, and rightly influencing events, in the immense complexity now of their interrelations,—as guide of a statesmanlike Policy. With these causes may be compared those which, in the first subsection, I have stated as the main causes of the general incredibility now of the Religion, or Ideal System of Christianity. But as we did not then think it necessary to enter on any general analysis of the forces that determined the origin of Christianity as an Ideal

System, or Religion, but confined ourselves to indicating merely its intellectual basis, and the causes of the underminedness of that; neither shall we now consider it necessary to do more than briefly allude to the influence of the Roman Jurisprudence, and the economical conditions produced by the downfall of the Western Empire, and the irruptions of the Barbarians, as among the determining causes of the origin of Christianity as a Social System, or Polity; and we shall confine ourselves to pointing out merely its moral basis, and the causes of the revolutionary change in that. Now, as we found the intellectual basis of the Christian Ideal to be an historical theory, we shall, I think, find the moral basis of the Christian Polity to be the mood of mind generated by, or rather the necessary coexistent of, genuine belief in that historical theory. Of that mood of mind, the distinctive characteristic is humility, ideal aspiration, and submissiveness. For, but reflect on the individual and supernatural character of the Ideal of Christianity,[1] and on the mood of mind which such an Ideal would naturally produce—an Ideal consoling the miserable with hopes to be realised, not in life here on

[1] It has been said that Christianity immensely contributed to the progress of mankind in this—that it put the Ideal in the Future, instead of in the Past, transferring the Golden Age from the beginning, to the end of Time. See, for instance, the remarks of Sir H. S. Maine on the history of the Law of Nature, *Ancient Law*, pp. 73 fig. This, in a certain general sense, may, no doubt, be admitted. But two remarks have to be made that exceedingly modify our judgment of the contribution thus made by Christianity to the progress of mankind. In the first place, Christianism did still, in its Garden of Eden, even as Naturianism in its Golden Age, deify the Past. And secondly, the Ideal which it did set in the Future was, even as the Ideal Futures of the later Naturian Religions, not a social and natural, but, mainly at least, an individual, and altogether a supernatural Ideal.

Earth, but after death in Heaven—hopes, one of the main conditions of the realisation of which is a faith in that future consolation, which has to be evidenced by submission to present misery.[1] And, considering what the condition of the vast majority of the European populations has been, and is, under the Social System of Christianity, how could such misery have been, and be patiently borne, without a humility of mind, an ideality of aspiration, and a submissiveness of temper on the part of the priest-ridden millions of the miserable, which, only made more conspicuous by occasional revolutionary outbursts, is truly one of the most pathetic things on Earth?

4. Now, the causes which have produced a revolutionary change in that mood of mind which is the moral basis of the existing Polity of Christendom—the causes which have produced the unquestionable change in that humility, ideal aspiration, and submissiveness of the Christian populations on which the existing forms of social institutions morally rest—will, I think, be found to be all derived from that New Philosophy of History from which the causes are derived of the underminedness of the Ideal System of Christianity. The first of these causes is, I think, to be found in that knowledge of the origin of the existing forms of social institutions which is one of the chief results of the various lines of research which must be included in any adequate view of the develop-

[1] For some suggestive remarks on the influence of the Christian Ideal in weakening the opposition to the Terrorists of the French Revolution of '89, see *Blackwood's Magazine*, September 1872, pp. 361–2.

ment of the New Philosophy of History. For to the general development of this New Philosophy belongs that school of historical jurists[1] which, in the antagonistic tendencies which marked its origin, may, perhaps, best be represented by the names of Savigny and of Gans.[2] From these researches it results that though, in some form or other, Marriage, Property, and Government are as permanent as they are fundamental institutions of society; yet, that the forms of these institutions—the forms, in other words, of Sexual, Proprietary, and Political relations—have been of the most various kinds; and, further, that their established forms have had origins that certainly suggest, at least, scepticism as to their authority, and hence inferences not favourable to their unchanged existence.[3] But to these

[1] It is interesting to remark that almost all the great names in the history of the Philosophy of History, from Vico to Hegel, are great names also in the history of the Science of Jurisprudence. See Lerminier, *Introduction à l'Histoire du Droit.*

[2] The first was the author of the well-known *Geschichte des Römischen Rechts im Mittelalter*, 1814–26; the other, of *Das Erbrecht in weltgeschichtlicher Entwickelung*, 1824–25. Their respective schools are thus characterised by Lerminier: 'Écoles rivales . . . consacrées l'une (Gans) au culte exclusif du dogmatisme philosophique, l'autre (Savigny) à la recherche également exclusive de la réalité historique.' *Ibid.* p. 269.

[3] The following, for instance, are among the 'practical inferences' which—in respect to the established form of the institution of Property—Mr. Mill deduces from Sir Henry Maine's work on *Village Communities*: That the system under which the soil is held in Great Britain is 'neither the only, nor the oldest form of Landed Property, and that there is no natural necessity for its being preferred to all other forms.' That 'the nation would not overpass the limits of its moral right' in deciding that 'the transmutation of collective landed ownership into individual shall proceed no further.' . . . 'Nay, further, that if the nation thought proper to reverse the process, and move in the direction of reconverting individual property into some new and better form of collective, as it has now long been converting collective property into individual, it would

results the philosophical students of Man's history add another, of the greatest possible significance. They show that, enlarging our historical view, it is found, not only that the institutions of society have changed in their forms, and that the authority of their established forms is by no means confirmed by laying bare their proximate origins; but that, in their ultimate origins and bases, they are ever in vital connection with the state of intellectual speculation, and the theories and sentiments resulting therefrom.[1] And to this great generalisation yet another is added by those who have taken the widest and most penetrating view of the history of Man. The great, and more and more fully verified result of a general survey of History is, that the forms of these theories and sentiments, which are thus vitally connected with the forms of the fundamental social institutions, depend on, and will certainly be still further transformed in accordance with, that great Law of Change in our conceptions of Causation first clearly stated by Hume in his 'Theory of the Natural History of Religion,' and afterwards formulised by Comte in his 'Law of the Three Periods.'

5. Such then, will, I think, be found to be the three main destructive results of the New Philosophy of

be making a legitimate use of an unquestionable moral right.'—*Fortnightly Review*, May 1871, pp. 549–50. Compare the late work of Lassalle on *Das Erbrecht*.

[1] On this law of the 'correlation between the form of government existing in any society and the contemporaneous state of civilisation' Mr. Mill remarks that it is 'a natural law which stamps the endless discussions, and innumerable theories respecting forms of government in the abstract, as fruitless and worthless, for any other purpose than as a preparatory treatment of materials to be afterwards used for the construction of a better philosophy.' *System of Logic*, vol. II. p. 511.

History, considered in its relation to Social Institutions. These are, therefore, the three main elements of what may logically be distinguished as the first cause of that change in the moral temper of the Christian populations, which has deprived the Christian forms of social institutions of their moral basis. And this we shall more clearly see on considering what must be stated as the second cause of this revolutionary change, namely, popular reflection on the facts of social injustice, vice, and misery. Hence, chiefly, that turbulence of millioned multitudes, which makes the whole seeming-fair social organisation which rests upon them so terribly unstable. Let us try in some degree sympathetically to realise this tremendous insurrectionary spirit, for otherwise Modern History will either be utterly inexplicable to us, or explicable only on some miserably cruel, as well as false hypothesis of 'fiends in human shape.'[1] Let us, then, suppose ourselves born into, and growing up amid the injustice, vice, and misery which are, and during the whole of the Christian Era have been, the conditions of existence of so many millions. Well, suppose we put to ourselves the question, Why this miserable existence of mine, and of millions of others, my fellows? Christianity is at hand with a theory of the Fall, which explains it—a theory of Redemption, and lessons of submission, which reconcile me to it all. But, after a time, I find that these historical theories of Christianity are, as but derived from the false conceptions of primitive ignorance, utterly rejected

[1] As in the diatribes against the Parisian Communist Insurrection.

by all the heads of historical science throughout Europe; I further find that the result of historical research is, that the present forms of social institutions are in great measure due to the influence of these false historical theories of Christianity; and, further, I find that social institutions have in their present forms been, even in the opinion of jurists, so much more influenced by circumstances of superior might than by considerations of impartial right, that the general result is, that scrutiny of the origin, both ultimate and proximate, of the present forms of the institutions of Marriage, of Property, and of Government, deprives them, in no inconsiderable degree at least, of sanctity. Then—the veil which Christianity has drawn over things being thus rent into shreds, and blown to the winds—then comes direct and passionate reflection on the facts of social injustice, vice, and misery. And what can now follow on that, but revolutionary turbulence, by which the whole moral basis of the institutions of Christendom is disturbed, and not the rightfulness only of the Christian forms of social institutions, but the rightfulness in any form of the institutions of Marriage, of Property, and of Government anarchically questioned? Yet it is but a narrow intellect, and narrow unsympathising heart that can be filled with hatred, rather than with pity, even of anarchists.[1]

[1] 'The compact which unites us to our brethren in misfortune is injustice and inequality. We are the white slaves. Ceaseless labour is our chain; infirmity is our lash; misery our life; the hospital our refuge; degrading charity our alleviation; and death our only rest. Shall we suffer longer this affront, this ignominy? No! a thousand times, no! We are the disinherited, the pariahs, the helots, the plebeians, the scum, the dregs, the mire of society. We are those who have no sentimentality,

For the misery which is but a far-off spectacle to us, has been an unconsoled and unalleviated experience to these our brethren.

6. There is, however, yet to be noted, a third cause of the revolutionary change in the moral basis of the Christian Social System. The New Philosophy of History which has, in the course of these hundred years since its initiation, penetrated to the thought-atmosphere, even of the labouring classes, is not destructive only of the present forms of social institutions, but also reconstructive. In pointing out the causes of the underminedness of the Christian Ideal, I showed that one of the most important of these was to be found in the fact that the New Philosophy of History had given a New Ideal, and thus become the basis of a New Religion. And I have now to point out that, similarly, one of the most important causes of the underminedness of the Christian Polity, one of the most important causes of the disturbance of that humility and submissiveness which is the moral basis of that system, is to be found in the fact that the New Philosophy of History gives, not only inter-

no education, no shame. We have reached the climax of suffering. But the hour of our reparation is at hand. . . . Let us unite, and with head erect, and spirit decided, cry aloud with a voice that shall strike terror into the tyrant, "War to the rich! war to the powerful! war to society!" . . . . We will not conceal our aspiration from you. It is absolute and complete social levelling. And we are many—innumerable—much beyond what you believe; for in the midst of your pleasures you cannot hear the cries and maledictions which issue from the coverts to which you have reduced us. . . . As to forms of government, all to us are bad, for under all our lot has been to suffer and to labour. . . . Anarchy is our only formula. . . . War to the Family! War to Property! War against God. *Los Desamisados* (Madrid 'Red' Newspaper). See *Times*, 9th April 1873, p. 10.

pretations of the Past, but forecasts of the Future, and, based thereon, social reconstructions, or schemes of a New Polity. What the value of these may be—what the value may be of Hegel's *Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft*,[1] of Comte's *Politique Positive*, and of those outlines of a New Social System which have been sketched by so many other authors of the New Historical School,—it is unnecessary here to enquire. Sufficient for our present purpose it is to note that the existing forms of social institutions have been, and are constantly being, more and more completely undermined, not only by those destructive results of the New Philosophy of History, which show them to be, to a very great extent at least, deprived of sanctity by scrutiny of their origin; nor only by that passionate reflection on the actual facts of social injustice, vice, and misery which is the natural consequence of that destructive criticism, which thus strips the present forms of social institutions of their sanctity; but also by those reconstructive results of the New Philosophy of History which give to social discontent aims more or less definite and practical, and, what is more, aims that are presented as the legitimate outcome of the whole course of Human Development. As a man who has been brought seriously to reflect on his past life, and to see the sources of his misfortunes in causes that may be partially at least counteracted; so, the European races now, in the brains of their great thinkers, thus reflect on the Past, and thus become conscious of external causes of their miseries in institu-

[1] *Philosophie des Rechts, Werke*, b. VI.

tions which may be made at least more just, and in beliefs which may have shapes given to them at least less false.

7. When considering the intellectual basis of Christianity as a religion, we remarked the Sophoclean irony of such a prelude to the New Philosophy of History as Bossuet's 'Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle.' And so now, I would point out that a similar irony will certainly mark the fate of the Discourses on Social Progress of those who would still maintain the dogmas of, and encourage the temper resulting from the historical theory of Christianity, and that, not with the illogical partiality and incoherency of Protestantism, but with the systematic completeness and coherency of Popery. Considering the accordance of the principles which underlie ecclesiastical and monarchical institutions, and having regard to the immense array of facts verificative of Comte's great, though as yet but empirical, generalisation—'that there is a constant relation between the state of society and the state of intellectual speculation'—scientific thinkers have come to the conclusion that the disconnection between priests and kings is, wherever it exists, accidental only, and a sign of but a transitional period. But our new Ultramontane preachers,—of whom, perhaps, M. Mermillod of Geneva may be taken as the representative,—would, on the contrary, have us believe that it is the connection between priests and kings that is accidental; and they do not hesitate to declare that Christianity, in its Popish form, is not only not opposed, but positively 'favourable to the most advanced re-

publicanism.'[1] Try it. As Bossuet with his 'Discourse on History' was but as a straw indicating the direction of the mighty tide that was bearing men to that New Philosophy of History that was to render utterly incredible the Christian Philosophy of it, so are you with Discourses on Republicanism, that but show how powerfully the tide is now running in a direction that will soon make, even to yourselves, apparent that terrible irony which we may so constantly observe in the infatuation which makes men themselves, with an unconscious and joyful eagerness, hasten their doom. What was one of the main causes of the success of Christianity, but the consolations which, amid the miseries and corruptions of the Present, it offered in a heavenly Future? And you expect that when these miseries and corruptions have been, as it is the common aim of Science and of Republicanism that they should be, removed, there will be the same emotional impulse as ever to belief in Christianity! What is the fundamental principle of Republicanism but Self-Government? And you expect that self-governing men will be priest-governed devotees! What makes self-government possible but such enquiry into the Forces of Nature and of Humanity, as, both in its initiation and in its results, goes right in the teeth of your Christian theories? And you expect that men may be urged to Republican progressiveness, and yet kept submissive to those ecclesiastical dogmas which would shut them out from those enquiries,

[1] See *Rome during the Vatican Council, Contemporary Review*—Oct. 1872, p. 653.

through the results of which alone their misery has, in the Past, been ameliorated, and may, in the Future, be removed! 'Quem Deus vult perdere prius dementat.'[1]

8. But—admitting that the moral basis of the social system of Christianity is such as I have stated; admitting particularly that a chief element of it is a submissive temper on the part of the great masses of the people; and admitting that, from the causes which I have just specified, this moral submissiveness of the Christian populations is greatly shaken, and is indeed fast disappearing,—it may be asked how, not Christian only, but how any forms of social institutions could subsist without popular submissiveness? Pressing this home it may be urged,—not indeed logically by the Protestant who has himself ultimately but a mere subjective authority to refer-to in his 'right of private judgment' of the meaning of his Bible,—but forcibly by the Papist who, testing his interpretations, not by accordance with his own mere individual notions, but with the traditions of the Church, and the utterances of its presumedly infallible Pope—forcibly by the Papist it may be urged that, in order to such popular submissiveness as is the necessary condition of any social order at all, there must be some external objective Authority. And it may then be triumphantly asked, What external objective Authority is there but the revelation of Christianity, as interpreted by the Church, and its Vicegerent on

[1] The old Scholiast, to whom we owe this saying, certainly thus attributes to the Deity a humourously malignant humour.

Earth, that can guarantee us from mere social anarchy by securing popular submissiveness to, at least, some accepted forms of social institutions? Well, without doubt, popular submissiveness must be the moral basis, not only of Christian, but of any forms of social institutions; doubtless also, in order to such popular submissiveness, there must be a distinct objective Authority to which common appeal may be made; and, without question, Popery has an immense advantage over Protestantism in having an accepted method of interpreting the 'Book' to which they make a common appeal. There is, however, the submissiveness of reason, and there is the submissiveness of faith; the one, the submissiveness of an intellectual activity which has had full scope, and has thus freely verified for itself the doctrines which it has been taught; and the other, the submissiveness of an intellectual activity which has exercised itself only in the abandonment of its functions. Of the latter character has been the popular submissiveness on which the social institutions of Christianity have historically rested; of the former kind is that popular submissiveness on which the social institutions of the Future must rest. For it is no mere devilish perversity that has deprived the social system of Christianity of its moral basis of submissiveness. Men are as willing, as desirous, as ever to submit to Authority. Only it must simply now be an Authority worthy to be acknowledged in a more developed stage of reflection than that in which the Christian Scriptures have been acknowledged as authoritative. Still, however, like the Authority of Christianity, our

Authority will be Written Records. But these will now be Literature, in the widest sense of the term, as a Record of the facts of Nature and of Humanity. Still, there must be a definite and accepted objective Method of interpreting our authoritative Record. But this will now be, not the method deducible from the traditions of a certain Church, and the dicta of its Popes,—but the method deducible from the principles of a complete scientific Logic. And still there will be a general historical theory, as at once result and means of interpreting our Records. For—as we find in Literature an immense diversity of contradictory representations of the facts of Nature and of Humanity—how are these contradictory representations to be judged except a Law of Thought, and hence, of Representation, except, in other words, an Ultimate Law of History is discoverable?[1]

9. Not merely, then, to discover a new Theory, nor only to discover a more true basis for the Ideal, but to discover a Law that shall give to Polity an acknowledgable Authority, and hence, to Policy an

[1] As to such a principle of authority as that 'supplied' by Mr. Matthew Arnold's 'Culture,' (see his *Anarchy and Authority*,) it would appear impossible to show in what important respect it is, as he proclaims it, a 'new principle;' how our 'best self' or 'light' differs essentially from the principle of authority of every mystic since philosophising began; how 'best selfs' are to be kept from perpetually falling out with each other on the most important points; how such a principle is anything better than a slight refinement of the mere subjective 'private judgment' of Protestantism; or, finally, in what manner it can possibly be adequate to bring order into an anarchy which, consisting essentially in the negation of a hitherto accepted external objective authority, can only, as it should seem, have order brought into it by such a new external objective authority as, in an Ultimate Law of History, Science aims at discovering.

authoritative guide in the attempt at a more just reorganisation of Society,—this is the sublime task now laid on the scientific student of History. And I trust that, in pointing out what the moral basis is of the existing Social System of Christendom, and what the causes are of the revolutionary change in the temper of the Christian populations, I have made it clear how urgent a practical need there is of such a discovery as is required to complete the New Philosophy of History. It is, indeed, true that almost every age is inclined to exaggerate its own historical importance. But those who adequately reflect on those presently-working causes of revolution above so inadequately indicated, will, I venture to think, probably be of opinion that the scope of the changes now in operation is more likely to be unduly limited by narrowness of vision, than overextended by illusions of fancy. Wild may often, indeed, be popular expression, and anarchic, popular demand. But the fact that, to almost all historical students and thinkers, the Religion of Christendom is but an Ideal System founded on an unscientific Philosophy of History, and the Polity of Christendom but a Social System of which the moral basis is derived from this unscientific Philosophy,—such a fact as this gives to popular turbulence, and even passionate revolt, a strength, against which hysterical outcry, or even, save for a moment, the cowardly fury of Versaillaise butcheries can nothing avail. To what, then, can all that fair-seeming plain, in the ancient structures of which the upper classes of Christian Society, with but individual exceptions, rejoice—to what can it be

fitly compared but to a Fools' Paradise resting on but a crust, of which the once-solid pillars, and supporting vaults have become molten with volcanic heat, and in vast lava-floods roll tumultuous? Immense, no doubt, nay, if you will, incalculable, is the repressive force of the menaced selfish interests of a whole Social System combined with, at least, some measure still of genuine belief in the Dogmas which are its intellectual basis, and genuine enthusiasm for the Ideal which has been its historical coexistent. But still more incalculable is the upheaving, and allrenewing might of those Moral Forces which, rising with the scornful thunders of that sublime, but, to oppression, appalling cry, 'If JUSTICE be with us, what can be against us?'[1]—have marked the history of Humanity with revolutions, comparable only to the geological eras of the Earth. And such, however immense the force of repression, such will be the resistless upheaving, and allrenewing might given to the, as yet, chaotic swayings of revolutionary passion by statesmen who, with a general verifiable Law of History as the guide of their Policy, are able thus, not only to quicken men with the fire of those who know themselves in accord with unvanquishable world-forces, but are thus also able truly to forecast, and rightly to direct the action of these forces. And, 'in gubernanda republica, prospicere res impendentes, moderantem cursum, atque in sua potestate retinentem, magni cujusdam civis, et divini pæne est viri.'[2]

[1] Compare *Rom.* VIII. 31.

[2] I cannot recall where I read this passage.

SECTION II.

THE PRINCIPLES OF A NEW PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD.

Qui tractaverunt scientias aut Empirici aut Dogmatici fuerunt. Empirici, formica more, congerunt tantum et utuntur; Rationales, aranearum more telas ex se conficiunt; apis vero ratio media est, quæ materiam ex floribus horti et agri elicit, sed tamen cum propria facultate vertit et digerit. Itaque ex harum facultatum (experimentalis scilicet et rationalis) arctiore et sanctiore fœdere (quod adhuc factum non est) bene sperandum est. BACON, *Novum Organum, Aph.* XCV. *Works*, vol. I. p. 201.

SUBSECTION I.

The Proximate Principles of Philosophical Investigation.

1. LET me now, briefly summarising the arguments of the foregoing section, recall the most important of the conclusions to which we have been conducted. The following, then, are the main facts that have, in their connection, constituted our argument. Reflection on History—on the Past and Future of Mankind—which seems to have originated but little before the Sixth Century B.C., gave to Christianity, as intellectual basis, a Philosophy of History. But this Philosophy, viewed in its essential aspect as a theory of Causation, belongs to that class of Philosophies which we find current in, and characteristic of, the lower stages of Culture, and distinguish as Spiritist. And this distinction we are led to make by considering this theory of Causation in relation to that other theory of it which we find originating in the first outlines of the

Natural Sciences, and, so far as we are specially concerned, in the first outlines of the Natural Sciences of the Greeks, about the Sixth Century before the Christian Era. Now this latter Theory of Causation has gradually extended the sphere of its application till—though, as we have seen, but little more than a century ago[1]—it attempted to view in its characteristic manner the most complex of all phenomena—those of the history of Man. Of this, the result has been utterly to destroy, for the great mass of educated and reflecting persons, the credibility of the Christian Philosophy of History. For this is now seen to be but a survival, and—considering how complex are the phenomena of Human History—a natural and necessary survival of the earliest mode of explaining, or giving a reason for things. In the course, however, of the Christian Period, this Spiritist Philosophy of History has become the basis of ideal emotion, or of Religion; has given to Morality what are believed to be its most effective sanctions; and has importantly determined the form of social organisation, or of Polity. Manifestly, then, that New Philosophy of History which has arisen from the fuller development and wider application of the scientific conception of Causation, has imposed on itself an immense reconstructive task by its destruction of the Christian Philosophy of History. But we have found that the New Philosophy of History, though adequate enough to destroy, is inadequate as yet to reconstruct. And this, because its achievements hitherto-

[1] See the above sketch of the history of the New Philosophy of History, Sect. I. Subsect. ii.

are, on the one hand, but a Law—that of Comte —which, though remarkably verified, is still but empirical; and, on the other, a Law—that of Hegel— which, though stated as ultimate, is enunciated in a form capable only of the most general psychological, and not of accurate historical verification. But, though our survey of the history of the New Philosophy of History has obliged us thus candidly to admit its inadequacy as yet for that great work of reconstruction which its destruction of the Christian Philosophy of History has rendered necessary; yet, as our historical survey has also shown us that these two Laws are the results, the one of that general strain in modern philosophical speculation which is distinguished as Materialist, and the other of that general strain which is distinguished as Idealist; and as reflection on Materialism and Idealism has shown each of these doctrines to be but a partially scientific theory of Causation, it has become clear that the first preliminary to a further development of the New Philosophy of History — if not, indeed, as we hope, the most direct road to the discovery of its great aim, an Ultimate Historical Law, —is a new enquiry into Causation, having as its aim the reconciliation of those Causation-theories presently distinguishable as Materialist and Idealist.

2. But now, what shall be the Method of a new enquiry into Causation of which the aim is thus defined? For a methodless doctrine is but such pap as babes are fed on. And an articulate method is as essential to a philosophy which would support a highly-developed intellectual life as a bony skeleton to the

organisms which are the chief material food of grown-up men. Only gradually, however, and in the application of it, does the need, and do the characteristics of a New Method become clear. For in the principles of the Method are implicitly contained the results of the System. The laying down of such principles is like the depositing of the bones on which the rounded organism will be moulded. And as the bones must have outgrown their cartilaginous state before the skeleton can be clearly described; even so, in the following very summary statement of the principles of a New Philosophical Method, I shall endeavour to present them, not in their original vagueness, but in their later definiteness. Now, a Method is simply a *way* of getting to know; μέθοδος (μετά, ὁδός), the afterway or way after, or in quest of that knowledge which Aristotle grandly considered a fundamental craving of the human mind.[1] But the way of getting to know is just the way of thinking or reasoning about things. Reasoning, from a psychological point of view, is a process of voluntary, as distinguished from spontaneous redintegration. Thus the statement of a Method is the statement of the result of reflection on what has been, or on what it may seem desirable should be, the process of redintegration as determined by the Will.[2] A Method is, therefore, the application of a Logic. For Logic may be defined as the science in which the formal relations

[1] Πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει. (All men by nature reach forth to know.) *Metaphysics*, lib. i. cap. i.

[2] Compare Bailly, *Theory of Reasoning*, ch. iv., and Spencer, *Principles of Psychology*, Part ii. chap. i.

of the processes and results of Thought are distinguished and systematised.[1] And Logic thus sums up the results of such reflection as is, to the scientific thinker, what reflection on the conduct which has brought success, and the conduct which has brought failure, is to the practical man.[2] Partial and incomplete, therefore, if such reflection is; partial and incomplete if our logical view is of the processes of Thought; partial and incomplete also will be our Method, and hence the results of our researches. And so, conversely, if one School of Philosophy gives but confessedly Empirical, and another only ostensibly Rational Laws; or if the theory of Causation of one School is essentially but a theory of External Conditions, and the theory of Causation of another, is essentially but a theory of Internal Forces; we may with confidence conclude that the Logic of each takes but a partial and incomplete view of the processes of Thought, and hence, that, in the Method of each, there is a fundamental defect. Evidently, therefore, the admitted antagonism of the Schools of Materialism and Idealism can be reconciled; a theory of Causation elaborated, which will integrate what is true in the theories of the External with what is true in the theories of the Internal Element; and finally, Laws be

[1] Compare Mr. Mill's definition of Logic as 'the Science of the operations of the understanding which are subservient to the estimation of Evidence': *System of Logic*, vol. I. p. 4. But my definition would more readily include, as one of the functions of Logic, suggestions as to Discovery. See Bain, *Logic*, vol. I. p. 340, and vol. II. Ap. H., pp. 413–23.

[2] And such being the true nature of Logic, the futility of the objections sometimes urged against its utility must be apparent.

obtained, at once rational in their form, and empirical in their content,—only by a Method which is new in this, that it is founded on a Logic which takes a more complete and systematic account of the processes of Thought. Whether the Method of which I would now proceed to state the Proximate Principles of Investigation can justly claim to be founded on such a more complete and systematic Logic, it will be for others to judge. But that such must necessarily be the foundation of the Method that effects, at length, a reconciliation of Idealism and Materialism will be, I think, readily admitted. For Logic itself is not to be regarded as fixed. On the contrary, all revolutions in Science, as in History generally, will be found to depend on this, that man has changed his categories.[1]

3. Now, endeavouring thus to derive the principles of Method from as complete and systematic a view as possible of the processes of Thought, our first principle of Investigation will be derived from what would appear to be the initial process of the mind in its quest of knowledge. This process is that in which the mind advances from perceptions of particulars to conceptions of generals. And that there is such a process is enough for us in Logic; a science which, as we have defined it, deals only with the formal relations of Thought. Hence, not to Logic, but to Metaphysic, which I would distinguish therefrom as the Science of the causal relations of Cognition,[2] belong all ques-

[1] Compare Stirling, *Philosophy of Law*, p. 60.
[2] See below, *Classification of the Sciences*.

tions as to the fact or possibility of 'conceptions of generals unpreceded by perceptions of particulars;' the fact or possibility of 'Innate Ideas independent of Experience;' the fact or possibility of 'synthetic judgments *à priori*.' No doubt the answering of these questions is the chief aim of our Method. For, as it is different solutions of these problems that have characterised Idealism and Materialism, as the antagonism has presented itself in Modern Philosophy; to define the aim of our new enquiry into Causation as the reconciliation of that antagonism, is to define the aim of its Method as the solution of these problems. But at present our only hypothesis with respect to these problems is, that a true solution of them may be attained, if our Method is based on a thoroughly complete and impartial distinction and systematisation of the actual,—individual and historical,—processes of Thought, directed to the ascertainment of Truth. Now, in such a survey, we find, as has been said, that the initial process of Thought is an advance from perceptions of particulars to conceptions of generals. This may be defined as the process of Unification, or of Induction. For it consists in the generalising of particular perceptions of the relations of Things in hypotheses of Thought. And on this, as the initial process of the mind, must be founded the first of our proximate principles of Investigation. But we must further remark that Truth, as we now conceive and acknowledge it, has been attained only in *progressive* Inductions—generalisations, first, of the simplest objective relations of things, and then, of the more

complex.[1] So significant a fact as that, in the general history of Knowledge, the first sciences formed were those which deal with the simpler objective relations of Things, and that these sciences arose from the experiences gained in the precedent arts,[2] must not be disregarded in the statement of a Method which makes no claim to acceptance save so far as its principles may be deducible from the general Logic of Human Thought. And hence, our First Principle—the generalising principle of Induction—may be stated in the following terms: *Knowledge is to be sought in the Induction of Hypotheses of Thought from the simpler Relations of Things.*

4. But neither in this principle of Induction, nor in that which I shall presently state as the principle of Deduction, is there anything new. Further reflec-

[1] Anterior to the Sixth Century B.C., we find only the Objective, or Natural Sciences. Egypt was unquestionably the most advanced civilization of that anterior age. But though papyri have been discovered showing at least a rudimentary formation of all the chief natural sciences; none have been discovered showing even such a development of any one of the mental sciences. And wonderful as was the precocity of the most subtle philosophic thought in India, even there the earliest developed of the mental sciences,—Grammar and Logic,—were not formed till the Sutra Period, and after the sixth century B.C. See Muller, *History of Sanscrit Literature*, pp. 158 flg.; and with respect to the papyri from which our knowledge is derived of Egyptian Science, see Mahaffy, *Prolegomena to Ancient History*, pp. 317–20.

[2] Commenting on a passage with respect to the interdependence of the Sciences and the Arts in Mr. Spencer's *Genesis of the Sciences*, M. Littré says:—'Je n'ai qu'une objection, accessoire d'ailleurs, à soulever. Selon moi, l'art et la science n'ont pas été uns à l'origine, ils sont distincts l'un de l'autre, et les arts ont précédé les sciences. . . . Ils proviennent des besoins à satisfaire, tandis que les sciences proviennent de l'intelligence cherchant le vrai. . . . Des arts existent chez les animaux sans qu'aucune science existe chez eux. La série animale sert ici de preuve à la série psychologique dans l'humanité.'—*A. Comte et la Philosophie positive*, p. 307.

tion, however, on the processes of Thought has led me to the distinguishing of what would appear—truly or not, it will be for others to judge—to have been hitherto either not distinguished at all, or not duly appreciated in its relations to other processes. If this is so, then Logic will be completed by a new department, and Method by a new instrument. Let me, then, with the summary brevity here necessary, state and illustrate that fact of Thought on which I would found that principle of Method which, in its relation to the other two principles of Investigation here stated, gives whatever justification it may have to the epithet *new*, as applied to the Method by which I would seek to reconcile the antagonism of the existing scientific theories of Causation, and so, gain more true bases for the Philosophy of History. Now, the process which —in reflecting on the processes of Thought, both in my experience of myself, and—through the study of speculation generally, literature, and art—in my experience of others—the process which I have been thus led to distinguish is one which ought, I think, to be placed between those of Induction and of Deduction. It is the process, not of such a passage from particular perceptions to a general conception, and hence hypothesation of a general proposition, as is named Induction; nor is it the process of such a passage from a general conception to particular perceptions, and hence verification of a general proposition, as is named Deduction; but it is the process of such a passage from conceptions to other conceptions, and hence development of general propositions, as

may distinctively be named Correlation. Among the great historic illustrations of this process of Thought — not from things to general formulæ or conceptions, nor from general formulæ or conceptions to things, but from conceptions to differentiative and integrative conceptions—I would point, first, to all theological and—so far as deductive verification does not form an essential part of its method — to all metaphysical speculation; secondly, and more particularly, to the Dialectic of Plato,[1] the Logic of Hegel,[2] and the Subjective Method of the *Politique Positive* of Comte;[3] and thirdly, in illustration of this process of Thought, I would point to the relations which connect the artistic creations of all the greater poets, and those especially of Shakspeare.[4] M. Littré, in his criticism of Comte's 'Méthode Subjective,' declares that 'it has had its day, and must not be brought back.'[5] Fully I agree with him, that it is not to be brought back as an *independent* method. But I venture to think that if Logic is to be as complete, and

[1] See Whewell, *Trans. Camb. Phil. Soc.* vol. I.

[2] The analogy of the Hegelian to the Platonic Logic has been often pointed out. See, for instance, Vera, *Platonis, Aristotelis, et Hegelii de Medio Termino Doctrina.*

[3] I do not remember to have seen Comte's later method thus directly compared with that of Hegel and of Plato; but the comparison would, nevertheless, appear to throw considerable light on each of the methods compared.

[4] The relations to which I refer are those which give a complementary, mutually defining, and hence systematic character to these creations. See the *Shakspeare Commentaries* of Ulrici, and particularly of Gervinus, who has most fully carried out those principles of criticism first indicated by Goethe, though by him only applied to showing the organic unity of the tragedy of *Hamlet*. See *Wilhelm Meister's Lehrjahre*, kap. iv.–xiii.

[5] 'La méthode subjective a eu son âge qui ne doit pas revenir.' *A Comte et la Philosophie positive*, p. 536.

hence, Method as powerful as possible, there must not be rejection of any, but organisation of all the great processes of Thought. Everything, therefore, depends on the place assigned in our Method to that principle derived from the distinguishing of this process. And what its place should be in Method is, I think, determined by our observation of what its place has been in History. Now, though the two most remarkable illustrations of this process of thought —the methods of Plato and of Hegel—belong, the one to the Classical, and the other to the Modern Period; yet, on a general survey of the whole course of philosophic Thought, and not in Europe only, but in India, we shall find that chiefly characteristic this process has been of that great Transitional Age of philosophic development, which may, in the West, be distinguished as extending from the end of the Classic, and the beginning of the Neoplatonic, to the end of the Scholastic, and beginning of the Modern Period, initiated by Bacon and Descartes. To the principle, therefore, of Method, which is derived from distinguishing this process, we shall assign a place after the principle of Induction, and before that of Deduction. For if we duly carry out our general aim in constructing it, our New Method should be a synthesis of all Methods; and, in the sequence of its principles, should be mirrored the sequence of the processes characteristic of the great Ages of Philosophic Thought. And hence, the Second Principle of our New Philosophical Method, or the developing principle, as it may be named, of Correlation, may, in some such terms as

these, be enunciated: *Hypotheses of Thought are to be developed in progressive Differentiations and Integrations of Thought.*[1]

5. It is, however, only in relation to our next principle that this second and central principle of our New Method is of value; and this I would now proceed to state. We have seen that three processes of Thought are to be distinguished, and that the third is that of inference from a general conception to particular perceptions. This is Deduction, in the proper sense of the term, as a *verifying* process. And in this sense, and as the correlate of Induction, from which it obtains its general conception, and to which—if that general conception is true—it gives back, multiplied a millionfold, its particular facts, Deduction is the process of Thought, especially characteristic only of our Modern Era, which must be distinguished as, at least, preparatory to a Third great Age in the history of Knowledge. The so-called Deduction distinctive of the great intermediate Age of Theological and Metaphysical Speculation was, in fact, but a differentiation and integration of conceptions, the explicit or implicit test of the truth

[1] Compare Mr. Spencer's proposition—'A peculiarity observed to be common to cases that are widely distinct, is more likely to be a fundamental peculiarity, than one which is observed to be common to cases that are nearly related,'—and the method which, as he points out, is therefrom deducible of 'guiding ourselves towards true hypotheses.' 'For . . . it is, then, obviously our policy, when seeking the most general characteristic of any category, not to compare the instances contained in it with each other, but to compare them with instances contained in some allied category.'—*Principles of Psychology*, p. 347. But the *alliance* of this 'allied category' can, at first, be but an hypothesis due to that differentiating and integrating Association to which we are, by the above principle, recommended to give, *in its due place*, free play.

of the result of which was simply the apparent accordance of these conceptions with each other. But the conception of Truth which guides the process of Modern or Scientific Deduction is—as I shall have occasion in the sequel more fully to point out—by no means the accordance merely of Thought with Thought, but of Thought with Things.[1] And hence it appears to me of very great importance that we should cease to call by the same name two essentially different processes. Let the one which is the completing correlate of Induction retain its name of Deduction; and let the other be distinguished as Speculation, or by any other name that may appear more fit. But if this process of Speculation is to be justified as having a clearly assignable place in philosophic investigation, and if such a principle of Method as that just stated is to be accepted; then, evidently, Deduction will not, as hitherto, be regarded as the process immediately following on Induction; but as the process for which preparation must first be made by that of differentiative and integrative Speculation in the definition and suggestive development of the generalisations of Induction. And that, not only on the great macrocosmic stage of History, but on that microcosmic stage which mirrors it in the

[1] Compare M. Littré's distinction between what he calls the 'subjective' and the true deductive method: 'Dans la méthode subjective, les conséquences sont métaphysiques comme le point de départ, n'ont besoin que de satisfaire à la condition d'être logiques, et ne trouvent ni ne requièrent les confirmations *à posteriori* de l'expérience; aussi s'étendent-elles sans peine à perte de vue. Dans la méthode déductive, les conséquences ne valent qu'après vérification expérimentale; la déduction indique, l'expérience vérifie; aussi ne s'étendent-elles qu'avec lenteur et par un travail tout-à-fait analogue à celui qui a créé expérimentalement les points de départ ou principes.' *A. Comte et la Philosophie positive*, p. 532.

individual, modern or scientific Deduction has been immediately preceded, not by the simple generalisations of Induction, but by a speculative, or, if you will, imaginative development of these, by the differentiative and integrative spontaneity of the mind, might, I think, be proved from all the facts, both individual and historical, of the development of that deductive process characteristic of Modern Science.[1] But if so, then Deduction should, in our New Method, while it distinguishes itself from that earlier process, improperly so called, integrate both it and Induction. And hence our Third Principle—the verifying principle of Deduction—may be stated in the following terms: *Knowledge is to be verified in the Deduction of the Relations of Things from the developed Hypotheses of Thought.*

6. Such, then, summarily stated in their relations to, and mutual definition of each other, are the Proximate Principles of our New Philosophical Method. And as in the principles of the Method are, as I have above remarked, implicitly contained the results of the System, we have now to enquire whether these principles afford us reasonable ground for hope that, in the System which will issue from their application, there will be found such a reconciliation as is desired of the antagonistic theories of Causation. I venture to think that there is such ground of hope in the principles of the Method just stated. For consider, first, and generally, how this Method will require us to proceed in our new enquiry into Causation. Reflect on the above-stated principles, and it will be evident that the

[1] See on Newton's 'habit' of thought, Whewell, *History of the Inductive Sciences*, vol. II. p. 192.

question—Why do we believe that a change must have a cause? or, What is the cause of our notion of cause? —must, as the more complex, be postponed till we have answered the simpler question, How is the cause of a change truly to be conceived? And so, also, the problem of the Natural Sciences being stated in the question, What are the Relations of Things? we shall make the study of these Sciences precede that of the Mental Sciences, of which the more complex problem is stated in the question, What are the Relations of our Notions of Things? As opposed, therefore, to the ordinary course of Idealists, this Method requires that speculation on subjective phenomena, or Internal Spontaneities, be preceded by, and based on investigation of objective phenomena, or External Conditions; and, as opposed to the ordinary course of Materialists, it demands the progressive study of the Natural Sciences, not as an end in itself, but as a means to the study of the Mental Sciences. Is there not, then, in such a general procedure, good ground of hope that we shall attain that reconciliation at which we aim of the antagonistic Causation-theories of Idealism and Materialism? Seeing that the fundamental question as to the origin of our ideas, and particularly as to the origin of our idea of Causality, has been solved, or at least answered, in antagonistic ways by two opposite schools of philosophy; may this not justly lead us to suspect some error, common to both schools, in the general conception of Cause; or, in other words, that the antagonism of the theories of Causation but indicates that our general conception of Origin, and notion of Cause,

is itself erroneous? But if so, what more likely method can be stated of arriving at a theory of Causation in which this antagonism will disappear, than a method by the principles of which we are required to precede our investigation of the more complex metaphysical problems of Causation by first gaining clear ideas on the subject generally of Origin and of Cause, in such investigation of it in the simpler physical phenomena as has already led to a verifiable principle, with so profoundly important a bearing on the whole theory of Causation, as that of the Conservation of Energy?

7. But further. By the place assigned to that principle of Discovery which, in its relation to those of Induction and Deduction, gives this Method whatever claim it may have to be considered a New Method, that differentiating and integrating activity of Thought—of which the most wonderful examples, in the directions respectively of abstract Thought, and concrete Art, are probably to be found in the works of Hegel, and of Shakspeare[1]—this magnificent activity—like some strange, swift, and strong desert-animal that has hitherto, so far as Science at least is concerned, run wild—is now subjected to bit and bridle, tamed, and domesticated. Hitherto, this differentiating and integrating activity of the speculative thinker has been chastened and controlled only by the accident of vastness of knowledge—the accident to which it is owing that the speculations of Hegel are so rich as suggestions, even when defective as expressions of the reality of

[1] Only, as Dr. Stirling thinks, with such an imagination as Shakspeare's can that of Hegel be compared.

things. But by assigning to the differentiating and integrating activity of Speculation a place midway between the experimental generalisations of Induction and the experimental verifications of Deduction, the guidance and control of it is not left to accident, but subjected to principle. That 'scientific use of the Imagination,' for which a distinguished physical discoverer has pleaded in a brilliant essay,[1] has thus, in effect, its systematic place assigned to it, as an organic process of a general Method—a process, therefore, with an acknowledged scope and function, and defined limits and relations. For, with the Idealist, Thought is thus, not only consciously allowed, but on principle stimulated to the full exercise of its splendid activity. Yet, with the Materialist—if I may venture so quickly to change the physical shape in which I have just imaged mental activity—with the Materialist, one holds oneself, as it were, in a calm reserve above the lightnings of Thought, giving only a provisional credence to what its flashes may seem to reveal, till these have been verified by the processes of scientific deduction. Is there not, then, good ground to hope that the application of a Method which thus, at once, trusts Thought and controls it, will lead to a System in which the partialities will be at length complemented, and the obscurities dispelled, that hitherto characterise our theories of phenomena and their causes; a System that will thus be a more adequate expression of our growing universality of knowledge and catholicity of sentiment; a System in which there will be brought-back, and presented to us by that now-

[1] Tyndall, *Fragments of Science*, pp. 170 flg.

controlled splendour of Thought-activity, which has ever been the only 'Light of the World,' some more true, or at least, less untrue tidings of the incommensurable reality of Things?

SUBSECTION II.

A Classification of the Sciences, and the Arts.

1. The remarks with which we have just concluded our statement of the Proximate Principles of this New Method may already have suggested that the most important illustration, as indeed the immediate result of the application, of the most characteristic of these principles, will be a classification of the Sciences. The subject of our enquiry is Causation. The distinguishing principle of the method of our enquiry demands a procedure at once progressive and systematic in our investigation of the relations of things. Hence, there arises a system of conceptions, which are drawn, in the first instance, from investigation of the simplest relations of things; these are then defined and systematised by being brought into relation with other conceptions; and—these all being held only as provisional generalisations or hypotheses—these conceptions are then submitted to deductive verification, and, according to the results of that, rejected or retained as truly correlative. But such conceptions will define the various departments of a System of Knowledges. A Classification, therefore, of the Sciences, or Systematisation of Knowledges will thus, evidently, be the outward form, as it were, or embodiment of the principles of our New

Method. And hence, in order to a clear comprehension of these principles, it will be necessary for me to give the outlines, at least, of such an embodiment. What the steps, however, were of this classification, how various the changes in the course of it, and how numerous the tabular reconstructions in the attempt to bring the antitheses of Thought into accordance with the relations of Things, it would be out of place here to note. Nor will I make any further preliminary remark than that, to be in accordance with the general aim of the method stated in the above-enunciated principles, the classes of the sciences should correspond, both in matter and in form, with the laws which are their respective contents. Both in matter and in form. For a law, in one point of view, is an objective relation of Things, and, in another aspect, a subjective mode of Thought. Hence, the classes of the sciences, as distinguished by this method, should correspond, at once, with the general categories of Things, and with the fundamental processes of Thought. The aim, therefore, of our systematisation will be to classify Things by their real relations, and Knowledges by their true methods. And if this aim should be in any degree realised, our Classification may have some claim, perhaps, to that highest of all merits which would be implied in the application to it of the epithet *natural*.[1]

[1] 'The phrase Natural Classification seems most peculiarly appropriate to such arrangements as correspond in the groups which they form to the spontaneous tendencies of the mind, by placing together the objects most similar in their general aspect; in opposition to those technical systems which, arranging things according to their agreement in some circum-

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2. Now, proceeding on the Method, the principles of which have been just stated, hence, forming our general conceptions from investigation of the actual relations of Things, and beginning with the simplest of these relations; we shall, I think, be led to consider formal relations of Position, or quantitative relations, as the true starting-point, both of our investigation of Things, and of our systematisation of Knowledges. With the mathematical sciences, therefore, we begin. But now, how are these to be classified? How are the quantitative relations, the subject-matter of Mathematic, to be distinguished and connected? What are the various kinds of formal relations of Position? The answer to these questions is to be found in the investigation of the history, present development, and tendencies of the mathematical sciences. But here I can only remark that, since Descartes' great discovery of a general method of reducing conceptions of Position to conceptions of Magnitude and Number,[1] geometry has not only tended more and more to be absorbed in analysis, or algebra; but our conception of the very basis of it has been modified through recent speculations on the possible curvature of our three-

stance arbitrarily selected, often throw into the same group objects which, in the general aggregate of their properties, present no resemblance, and into different and remote groups, others which have the closest similarity.'—Mill, *System of Logic*, vol. II. p. 265. Compare Cuvier, *Règne animal, Introd.* See also Ueberweg, *System of Logic*, § 63, *Division.*

[1] This mathematical discovery of Descartes' will, on reflection, be seen to have a profound connection with the general change in philosophic conception indicated by his famous axiom *Cogito, ergo sum.* For Thought is sequence, and Matter, coexistence. And to reduce conceptions of Position to conceptions of Number is to reduce conceptions of Coexistence to conceptions of Sequence.

dimensioned Space.[1] Since Descartes, then, the conception of Position has become generally expressible in terms of Number. And, by our Second Principle, developing our conception of Position, or of Number, the conception to which it may be reduced, we find that it may be regarded either as discontinuous, or continuous.[2] May not, then, the sciences of Mathematic be distinguished as sciences, first, of *discontinuous*, and secondly, of *continuous* Position? But again, our Second Principle, as one of integration, as well as of differentiation, suggests a third class of mathematical truths integrating the conceptions of the two previous classes in a science of *ordered* Position.[3] The first class might be named Arithmetic in the most general sense of the term, and as including algebra in its ordinary signification;[4] the second class, Algebraic,

[1] Euclid's solid space is a homoloid. And it is asked why this solid should be under a disability to which the line and the plane are not subjected—why should it not, as well as the line and the plane, be capable of curvature? See Riemann *On the Hypotheses*, and Helmholtz *On the Facts upon which Geometry is based*; the former, in the *Abhandl. der Königl. Gesellsch. d. Wissensch. zu Göttingen*; the latter, in the *Nachrichten* of the same, June 3, 1868.

[2] 'The subject-matter of arithmetic, or of algebra (commonly so called), is discontinuous number. . . . . Infinitesimal calculus, on the contrary, considers number in its aspect of continuous growth.'—Price, *Infinitesimal Calculus*, vol. I. pp. 16–17.

[3] Dr. Ingleby, to whom, in the beginning of 1871, I communicated these conceptions of discontinuity, continuity, and order as those on which I proposed to classify the Mathematical Sciences, greatly encouraged me by remarking that the late Sir W. R. Hamilton had, in conversation with him some years before his death, defined mathematics as 'the Science of arrangement in Time, Space, and Order.' Compare the classification of Hegel, *Encyclopädie* (*Werke*, b. VII. a.), and the division *Quantität* of *Die Lehre von Seyn Logik* (*Werke*, b. III.); that of Comte, *Philosophie positive*, t. I. leç. iii.; that of Ampère, *Philosophie des Sciences*, t. I. pp. 32–54; and that of Spencer, *Classification of the Sciences*, p. 15.

[4] Prof. De Morgan had 'no doubt' that Algebra got its Arabic name *al*

if its subject-matter is considered as Position, or Number in its continuous aspect;[1] and the third class might be named Tactic.[2]

3. Having thus exhausted the conception of Position in its three general forms of discontinuity, continuity, and order, we proceed to the differentiation of this conception. Motion, and its systematic or causal relations, suggests itself as the correlate of Position, and its sequential or formal relations. Whether this conception is thus truly differentiated or not must, by our principle of verification, be decided by investigation of the actual relations

jebr e al mokābala, restoration and reduction, from the *restoration* of the term which completes the Square, and *reduction* of the equation by extracting the square root—the solution of a quadratic equation being the prominent part of Arabian Algebra. *Trigonometry and Double Algebra*, p. 98, n. In his *Elements of Algebra*, p. xxxvii., he distinguishes an *arithmetical* problem as one in which numbers are given, and certain operations; and an *algebraical* problem as one in which numbers are either given or supposed to be given, and a question is asked of which it is not at once perceptible *what operations will furnish the answer*. Comte includes in Arithmetic, 'tout ce qui a pour objet *l'évaluation* des fonctions.' (*Philosophie positive*, t. I. p. 184.) Compare Price, *Infinitesimal Calculus*, as above cited, and Peacock, *Algebra, Arithmetical and Symbolical*, vol. I. ch. i. Compare also with the latter De Morgan, *Trigonometry*, book II. ch. ii. *On Symbolic Algebra.*

[1] Lagrange defined Algebra as 'le Calcul des Fonctions;' and citing this definition, Sir W. R. Hamilton says: 'It is not easy to conceive a clearer or juster idea of a function in this science, than by regarding its essence as consisting in a law connecting change with change.'—*Theory of Conjugate Functions, Trans. Royal Irish Acad.* vol. XVII. p. 290. Note also that Trigonometry, or to speak more properly Goniometry, (Peacock, *Algebra*, vol. II. p. v.), as a branch of algebra, is defined by De Morgan, as 'the science of continually undulating magnitude.'—*Trigonometry*, p. 1; but compare p. 20, note.

[2] This term was first invented by Dr. Sylvester to denote a certain special department of algebraical research. And whether it can now be conveniently used with such a meaning as that given to it in the text must depend on his approval, and that of Professor Cayley and the other eminent mathematicians by whom the term has, in Dr. Sylvester's sense of it, been employed. But no more convenient term suggests itself to me.

of things. We proceed, therefore, to investigate the phenomena of Motion, and first, the simpler of these phenomena. But, in so summary a statement as the present necessarily is, I must content myself with saying merely that, in the investigation, first, of ordinary mechanical, or, as I should prefer to call them, energetical[1] phenomena, we are led to explicate the conception of Motion in the more definite conception of Translation, which is itself further explicated in the conceptions of simple translation, rotation,[2] and compound translation and rotation. Our effort, then, is to explain those phenomena of translation which are commonly attributed to 'forces of attraction and repulsion,' by such differential relations of Pressure as are the causes of ordinary phenomena of translation.[3] And, as final result, Energetic, conceived as the general Science of Translation, is found to have, as its first sub-science, the Molar Energetic of solids, fluids, and gases; as its second sub-science, the Molecular Energetic of the forces at present distinguished as 'physical;' and as its third sub-science, the Correlational Energetic of

[1] 'Energetics' was a term introduced by Rankine to signify 'a science whose subjects are material bodies and physical phenomena in general.' *Edin. Phil. Jour.* N.S. 1855, p. 125. In my papers in the *Philosophical Magazine*, 1861, I used Energetic to denote the 'General Theory of Mechanical Forces.' And using this term as the general name for the first of the three great classes of the Physical Sciences, I would, as will be seen farther on, similarly use the term Mechanic for the first of the three great classes of the Physical Arts.

[2] 'C'est une chose très-remarquable qu'un même livre, écrit sur la science des forces, pourrait sans cesser d'être exact et de traiter régulièrement la même science, être entendu de deux manières différentes, selon qu'on attacherait au mot *force* l'idée d'une cause de translation, ou l'idée toute différente d'une cause de rotation.'—Poinsot, *Théorie nouvelle de la Rotation des Corps*, p. 13.

[3] See below, Sect. III. Subs. i.

the transformations of 'physical' forces. But now again applying our Second Principle, the conception of motion as translation is differentiated in that of motion as Transformation;[1] and, to verify this antithesis, we proceed to the investigation of chemical phenomena. As result of such an investigation, I think, it may, or at least will one day, be shown that chemical changes are, in fact, due to transformations of systems of molecular motion.[2] Hence, Chemic, as the Science of the Transformation of Substances, is brought into strict correlation with that simpler science of motion which, under the title of Energetic, I would define as the Science of the Translation of Bodies (molar or molecular). And Chemic will be found to have sub-sciences, analogous to those above indicated of Energetic. But again applying our Second Principle, an integration is required of these conceptions of translation and transformation in order to the complete development of the conception of motion. Let us then endeavour, in the investigation of a new and more complex order of phenomena, the phenomena of Life, to discover, or make clear to ourselves such a conception of motion as may integrate the two elementary conceptions which have just been studied in Energetic and Chemic respectively. Now, assimilation would appear to be the most general phenomenon distinctive

[1] 'C'est surtout au moyen âge que les alchimistes . . . . . ont pénétré dans le problème chimique véritable, et commencé à poursuivre l'étude proprement dite des *transformations de la matière*.'—Berthelot, *Chimie organique*, vol. I. p. xxxvi. 'Analyse et synthèse, telles sont en définitive les deux faces opposées de la conception chimique de la nature.'—*Ibid.* p. xii.

[2] See below, Sect. III. Subs. I.

of life. And that assimilation is a phenomenon of motion, which is, in fact, but a synthesis of the two simpler modes of motion which we distinguish as translation and transformation, is, if not proved, at least in the way of being proved by the whole of that modern biology of which the boast is to be 'mechanisch begründet.'[1] Hence, we define Organic as the Science of the Assimilation of Organisms. This, again, has its three main sub-sciences.[2] And thus, finally, Energetic, Chemic, and Organic, are co-ordinated by the conceptions of translation, transformation, and assimilation, as component parts of the one General Science of Motion, or, giving the term what will now be seen to be, at once, its widest and its truest significance—Physics.

4. But now our Central Principle, as a principle of synthesis, as well as of antithesis, comes into play on still larger elements; and we seek to integrate those conceptions of Position and of Motion themselves by which we have differentiated the mathematical and

[1] 'Dahin gehört das bekannte Experiment, welches schon von Reil, 1796, in seiner klassischen Abhandlung "von der Lebenskraft" benutzt wurde, um zu zeigen, dass die Assimilation, die Ernährung und das Wachsthum der Thiere nichts weiter seien als eine thierische Krystallisation, d. h. eine Anziehung thierischer Materie nach Gesetzen einer chemischen Wahlverwandschaft.'—Haeckel, *Generelle Morphologie*, b. II. s. 146.

[2] But compare Haeckel, *Op. cit.* b. I. ss. 237–8; and Hegel, *Naturphilosophie, Organik. Werke*, b. VII. a, ss. 430 et seq. Adopting the term Metaphysic to denote the science which considers the phenomena of Consciousness from the subjective point of view, I should define Psychology as the science which considers these phenomena in their objective aspect. And hence, Psychology would become with me a sub-science of Organic, or Biology. Thus, it may be remarked, that I would but return to the Aristotelian mode of treating the subject—*φυσικοῦ τὸ θεωρῆσαι περὶ ψυχῆς, ἢ πάσης ἢ τῆς τοιαύτης.—De Anima*, i. 1. But see Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. I. pp. 130–136.

physical sciences, and co-ordinated their sub-sciences respectively. The historical investigation of phenomena discovers the idea of Evolution as at once more strictly defining, completing, and integrating those of Position and of Motion. So we complete the trinity of the natural sciences by adding to Mathematic and Physic, Cosmogenetic. And an historical investigation of natural phenomena, guided by the principles of our new method, leads us to distinguish in Cosmogenetic, as the general science of Evolution, the sciences of Astrogenetic, Hulegenetic,[1] and Ontogenetic.[2] Astrogenetic we are thus led to conceive as the historical science of the mechanical evolution of Bodies, (starry systems and stars); a science, within the scope of which would come all those investigations of the Stellar Universe to which Laplace,[3] or rather, one should perhaps say Kant,[4] first gave a scientific direction. Astronomy would, indeed, as I conceive it, be absorbed in, or become but a sub-science of this historical science of Astrogenetic; and astronomical enquiries would thus have their true aim and highest theoretical value given to them in being considered as contributions to such an historical science. And I venture further to think that Geology has its true scientific place assigned to it as a sub-science of such a mechanically-conceived historical Astronomy.[5] As to Hulegenetic, it is from the magni-

[1] Ὕλη, matter, or stuff of which a thing is made.

[2] This, I venture to think, a very preferable term to 'Palæontology.'

[3] *Système du Monde*, t. II. chap. vi.

[4] *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels. Werke*, b. I. p. 207.

[5] Compare Hodgson, *Theory of Practice*, vol. II. p. 457.

ficent stellar discoveries of spectrum-analysis that the mind takes an assured leap to such a new historical science as that of the chemical evolution of Substances. And, as I would consider Geology as a sub-science of Astrogenetic, so I would treat Mineralogy as a sub-science of Hulegenetic. For only on historical considerations can the classification which is one of the chief aims of Mineralogy be truly and permanently based.[1] Of Ontogenetic, as the historical science of the organic evolution of Beings, it seems unnecessary here to do more than note that its true position would appear to be assigned to it in conceiving it thus as the cosmogenetical science of which the integrated elements are Astrogenetic and Hulegenetic, as above defined. But I must indicate, at least, the important verification which the order of these sciences, as determined by the historical investigation of natural phenomena, seems to afford of the foregoing classification generally. For, just as from a conclusion found capable of deductive verification, we can argue for the truth of the provisionally assumed premises from which it has been drawn; so, from their correspondence with the historically determined divisions of the science of Evolution, we can argue for the truth of our thought-suggested divisions of the elementary sciences of Motion and of Position.

5. Thus is completed our classification of the Natural Sciences;[2] but completed only to bring to the

[1] 'Our classifications will come to be, as far as they can be so made, *genealogies*; and will then truly give what may be called the plan of creation.'—Darwin, *Origin of Species*, p. 486. So, Huxley. 'And after all, is it quite so certain that a genetic relation may not underlie the classification of minerals?' *Lay Sermons*, p. 339.

[2] Cf. Hegel, *Naturphilosophie, Werke*, b. VII. a; Arnott, *Survey of*

differentiating activity of Thought the reflection that we have hitherto, after all, investigated relations merely of an objective or outwardly apprehended character; hence, to suggest a complementary investigation of subjective, or inwardly apprehended phenomena; and thus to differentiate the Natural, by a correlative class of Mental Sciences. Proceeding, then, to the classification of these subjective sciences as correlates of the objective sciences, there is suggested as starting-point, sequential or formal relations of Thought. And this conception of the general subject-matter of the logical sciences, as sciences of qualitative relations,[1] brings them into correlation[2] with the mathematical sciences, as sciences of quantitative relations. But in the investigation of the formal relations of Thought we distinguish three kinds of ratiocination—not only inference from particulars to generals, and from generals to particulars, but inference from particulars, *or generals*, to correlates. Mr. J. S. Mill has shown,[3] that inference from particulars to correlates is implied in both the other kinds of inference; and Mr. J. H. Newman has specially recognised and discussed it in relation to the formation of religious

Human Progress; Comte, *Philosophie positive*, t. I.; Ampère, *Philosophie des Sciences*, p. 41; Whewell, *Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*, vol. II.; Spencer, *Classification of the Sciences*, p. 6; and Haeckel, *Generelle Morphologie*, b. I.

[1] Compare Jevons, *Pure Logic*, or *the Logic of Quality*.

[2] See Littré's refutation of Comte's later notion of the identity of Logic and Mathematic, *A. Comte et la Phil. positive*, Part iii. chap. v. But our conclusion with respect to the relation of these sciences is determined more particularly by our conclusion with respect to the 'quantification of the predicate.' See, therefore, the logical works of Hamilton, Mansel, Thomson, Boole, and Jevons, in which the 'quantification' is maintained; and the *Appendix* on this subject of the translator of Ueberweg, *System of Logic*.

[3] See Mill. *System of Logic*, vol. I. pp. 209 fig.

beliefs.[1] But as I have, in the foregoing subsection, had occasion to point-out, we must distinguish also inference from generals to correlates—a kind of inference which may be placed between the two others. The Logics, or Sciences thus formed of the different kinds of Inference,—Inductive, Correlative, and Deductive,—correspond with the Mathematics of Discontinuous, Continuous, and Ordered Position. The first, as the objective Logic of ordinary Thought, which, in a generalising induction, forms hypothetical conceptions of Things, may be named Epagogic.[2] The second, as the subjective Logic of speculative and poetic Thought, I would distinguish as Dialectic, which, in its two processes of differentiation and integration, has correlates in the two calculi, differential and integral, of its correlative Natural Science, Algebraic. And the third, as the objectivo-subjective Logic of scientific Thought which, in a verifying deduction that is a complex of induction and speculation, integrates the processes of both the other Logics, may be termed Systematic.[3] But the second, as I conceive it, is a New Logic. For it was worked-out as one of the results, or rather correlates of that new theory of Causation,[4] the principles of which we shall have in the next section briefly to state. And this new Logic is founded on the

[1] See *Grammar of Assent.*

[2] Ἐπαγωγή, Aristotle's word for induction.

[3] This term has already been used to denote a department, or subscience of Logic. With reference to the verifying or demonstrating character of this Logic, the term 'Apodeictic' might have been used. But 'Systematic' brings it into more evident relation with its corresponding natural science 'Organic.'

[4] See my letter on *The Principle of the Conservation of Force, and Mr. Mill's System of Logic,* in *Nature,* vol. I. p. 583.

recognition of a process of Thought, which, as I have, in the foregoing subsection, said, does not appear to have yet been adequately distinguished in its relation to the other processes of Thought. It is to this new Logic of Correlation that would, as I think, properly belong the subjects of Nomenclature,[1] Definition, Classification,[2] Syllogism, and those 'Fallacious Tendencies of the Mind,' and 'Fallacies of Confusion,'[3] which may be termed Speculative, as distinguished from Inductive and Deductive Fallacies. And it is as contributions to this new speculative Logic of Discovery that such researches as those of Boole, De Morgan, and Jevons are, as it appears to me, rightly to be regarded. The most notable illustrations of this Logic are, as I have already remarked, to be found in the speculations of Hegel, and the plays of Shakspeare. But it cannot be too often repeated that its whole worth and importance depends on ever keeping in view that its true place is intermediate between the generalising Logic of Induction and the verifying Logic of Deduction.[4]

[1] The application to philosophic Nomenclature of the principle on which this Logic is founded would lead to the distinguishing of things by different names, according as they are conceived in a more general, a more special, and differentiative, or a more concrete, and historical manner. Thus, for instance, would be distinguished, 'Hypothesis,' 'Theory,' and 'Principle.' And thus, likewise, would be distinguished, to the immense benefit of clear discussion, 'Notion,' 'Conception,' and 'Idea,' with their German equivalents, 'Begriff,' 'Vorstellung,' and 'Idee.'

[2] Under Dialectic, as thus conceived, would therefore come the Methodology and Architectonic of Kant—the first used in a more general, the second in a more special sense.

[3] At present these fallacies are, as Dr. Bain points-out, most illogically, yet necessarily treated apart in special books. See his *Logic*, vol. II. b. (XI.) c. 2,—*The Positum of Fallacies.*

[4] Compare Trendelenburg, *Logische Untersuchungen*, b. II. s. 294; and Beneke, *Logik*, b. II. pp. 159–188.

6. Again differentiating the general conception of sequential or formal relations of Thought by that of systematic or causal relations of Cognition; we define the subject-matter of Metaphysic as the correlate, in its own order of sciences, of Logic,[1] and the correlate, in the correlative order of sciences, of Physic. And the investigation of the subjective phenomena of Metaphysic, guided by the general principles of our method, and by those lights which it offers of physical analogies, leads to the development of the general conception of Cognition in the more specific conceptions of Consciation, Ideation, and Conation as subjective correlates of those of Translation, Transformation, and Assimilation. By Consciation,[2] I mean the phenomena of Consciousness—that is, of sensation and perception conceived as the manifestation of an inward activity which it is the object of the special science which treats of these phenomena to define, and demonstrate in its various forms. By Ideation,[3] I mean the phenomena of emotion and conception regarded as phenomena of systems of consciation, and their transformation. And by Conation,[4]

[1] This *correlation* of Logic and Metaphysic as necessarily implies a fundamental postulate of the Correlativity of Thought and Existence (see below, pp. 137–140), as Hegel's *identification* of these sciences of the form and content of Thought follows from his general theory of Identity.

[2] Derived from *conscientia* and *conscire*, the former originally used almost exclusively in the ethical sense expressed by our term *conscience*. But since Descartes, *conscientia* has been the recognised Latin term for *consciousness*, its synonyms in the Romanic languages, and *Bewusstseyn*. On the history of the synonymous terms for Consciousness in different languages, see Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. I. pp. 195 flg.

[3] *Ideate* is used by Donne: 'I could ideate nothing which could please.'

[4] A term brought into currency by Sir W. Hamilton, who derived it from Cudworth's *Treatise on Free Will*. See *Op. cit.* vol. I. p. 186, note *a*.

I mean the phenomena of desire and volition (of voluntary, therefore, as opposed to spontaneous redintegration treated of under the foregoing head), explained as integrations of the simpler phenomena of Ideation and Consciation. These are the conceptions[1] which I would make the bases of metaphysical sciences, the subjective correlates of those of Mechanic, Chemic, and Organic, and which may be named respectively Animastic,[2] Ideatic,[3] and Noetic.[4] And thus I would attempt, through the clear distinction at once and correlation of objective and subjective phenomena, and of the physical and metaphysical aspects of causation, to make of Metaphysic a science as *positive*, as definite, that is, in its divisions, and verifiable in its conclusions as Physic.[5] Nor should such a correlation of the Natural and Mental Sciences be deemed either fanciful or surprising. For, if motion and cognition are, as all our later knowledge would lead us to believe, but aspects of a

[1] Compare with the usual division of mental phenomena, first promulgated by Kant (*Kritik der Urtheilskraft—Einleitung*), and adopted by Sir W. Hamilton in his Cognitive Faculties, Feelings, and Conative Powers,—terminology. Distinctions which point to a similar division are to be found in the earliest Indian speculations.

[2] Psychic, but for its illsoundingness, and the confusion that might arise with Psychology, would be the right word; but *Anima* is the equivalent of ψύχη.

[3] Ἰδέα (ἰδεῖν), semblance as opposed to reality, archetype, idea.

[4] With regard to the most appropriate name for the science designated by this term, there should seem to be but little doubt, for its subject may, with sufficient accuracy, be described as the noetic soul of Aristotle. See the *De Anima*, and Mr. Grote's chapter on the Aristotelian Psychology, *Aristotle*, vol. II.

[5] And unless this is done, nothing is done. For until 'the difficulties of Metaphysics are resolved, positively if possible, but at any rate negatively, we are never assured that any human knowledge, even physical, stands on a solid foundation.'—Mill, *Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy*, p. 2.

process, or activity, inconceivable except under two such limiting forms, (to borrow a phrase from algebra), it would only be surprising if these phenomena were not capable of correlative distinctions throwing light on each other.

7. Integrating, now, the general conceptions of formal relations of Thought and causal relations of Cognition, we obtain that of concrete relations of Development. This evidently is the subjective correlate of that conception of Evolution which, we found, integrated the conceptions of Position and of Motion. And as Cosmogenetic, or the science of the evolution of the Cosmos, is the general historical science of those forces of Motion of which Physic is the general systematic science; so, Logogenetic, or the science of the development of the Logos, (of reason, that is, or thought) is the general historical science of those forces of Cognition of which the general systematic science is Metaphysic. Now the investigation of the development of Thought presents to us the phenomena, first, of Language; secondly, of Religion; and thirdly, of Philosophy. And thus, relative positions are assigned to sciences which I would name Glossagenetic, Mythogenetic, and Mathegenetic,[1] not only in accordance with the actual relations of the phenomena; but in accordance also, (as would appear from the best examples of recent research on these subjects,) with the true methods of

[1] *Μάθη = μάθησις*, knowledge, science. The history of philosophy is thus conceived as a whole, and its historical development is, as with Hegel, conceived to correspond, viewing it generally, with its logical development. See *Gesch. d. Phil. Werke*, b. XIII. s. 326; and compare Schwegler, *History of Philosophy, Introd.*, and Stirling's note thereon.

these sciences.[1] Further, the relative positions of these historical sciences of Cognition correspond with the relative positions of the systematic sciences of Cognition, —the sciences of Consciation, Ideation, and Conation— from which, respectively, the explanation of each of the sets of phenomena, which are the subjects of these historical sciences, is ultimately to be drawn.[2] And thus, as in the historical investigation of the phenomena of Nature, we found a verification of our order of the physical, and hence also of the mathematical sciences; so here, in the historical investigation of the phenomena of Mind, we find a verification of our order of the metaphysical, and hence also of the logical sciences.

8. But we must now proceed to a yet wider application, than any hitherto attempted, of the principle of Correlation, and endeavour, by means of it, to define a third great order of sciences, integrating the conceptions both of the Natural, or Objective, and of the Mental, or Subjective Sciences, and which may be distinguished as the Objectivo-subjective, or Humanital Sciences. Now, as to what shall be the first of these Sciences, we remark that it was the conceptions of Position and of Thought that we found to co-ordinate the simpler phenomena respectively of the Natural and Mental Sciences.

[1] I allude particularly to the foundation of the comparative science of Religion (Mythogenetic, as I name it), on the comparative science of Language (Glossagenetic).

[2] 'For the succession of states of the human mind and of human society cannot have an independent law of its own; it must depend on the psychological and ethological laws which govern the action of circumstances on men and of men on circumstances.'—Mill, *System of Logic*, vol. II. p. 505. Compare Hodgson, *Theory of Practice*, vol. II. pp. 464 flg.; and Littré, in *La Philosophie positive*, t. II. p. 66.

What, then, is the conception which will integrate these of Position and of Thought, and so become the co-ordinate conception of a third class of sciences of Formal Relations? Is it not the idea of Beauty? For to what are the elements of Beauty reducible but just these, Position and Thought? Or, in other words, what is Beauty essentially but the accordance of quantitative and qualitative relations, the harmony of form and idea, of the visible and the invisible?[1] Is not, then, Æsthetic rightly defined as the science of the formal relations of Beauty; and is not its place rightly assigned in the relations thus indicated to Mathematic, as the science of the formal relations of Position, and to Logic, as the science of the formal relations of Thought? Guided by the analogies of the subdivisions of the sciences of Position and of Thought, we further distinguish three orders of relations in which Beauty may be found; in relations, namely, of Sight, of Sound, and of Action.[2] And these would appear to exhaust the contents of Æsthetic. For the Æsthetic of Sight, or Theatic,[3] would comprise

[1] Compare Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik. Werke*, b. x. th. 1. 'Das *Schöne* bestimmt sich dadurch als das *sinnliche Scheinen der Idee*,' is his definition, s. 141. See his review of the theories of Kant, Fichte, Schiller, Winckelmann, Schelling, &c., ss. 72–89. Compare also Schopenhauer, *Zur Metaphysik des Schönen und Aesthetik, Parerga*, b. II. ss. 447–86; and Bayer, *Aesthetische Untersuchungen*, ss. 2 et seq. Also compare, as of another school, Taine, *Philosophie de l'Art*: 'L'œuvre d'art a pour but de manifester quelque caractère essentiel ou saillant, partant quelque idée importante, plus clairement et plus complètement que ne le font les objets réels. Elle y arrive en employant un ensemble de parties liées, dont elle modifie systématiquement les rapports.' p. 64.

[2] Compare Hegel's remarks on 'die bekannte Eintheilung in die *bildenden* Künste . . . . die *tönende* Kunst, die *Musik*, und . . . . die *Poesie*, als *redende* Kunst.'—*Æsthetik. Werke*, b. x. 2. Th. s. 255.

[3] Θέα, sight.

the sciences of beauty in Form, Colour,[1] and Construction; the Æsthetic of Sound, or Music, the sciences of beauty in Rhythm,[2] Melody, and Harmony; and the Æsthetic of Action, or Poetic, the sciences of beauty in Movement, Personation, and Plot. The verification of this order of the æsthetical sciences,[3] corresponding as it does, in its fundamental conceptions, with those both of the mathematical and the logical sciences, is, of course, to be sought in the historical development of the effort at the realisation of Beauty.[4] And that Beauty, in the various relations above distinguished, has its laws; and that the laws of Beauty in each of these triads separately; and in all three, when compared with each other, will be found to present analogies of the most profound and interesting character, cannot, I think, be doubted. We have here,

[1] See Benson, *Principles of the Science of Colour*.

[2] Rhythmic, Dr. Sylvester divides into Metric, Chromatic, and Synectic. 'Metric is concerned with the discontinuous, Synectic with the continuous aspect of the Art. Between the two lies Chromatic, which comprises the study of the qualities, affinities, and colorific properties of sound. We look to Metric for correctness of form; to Chromatic for beauty of colour; it is to Synectic and its main branch Syzygy that we must attend in order to ensure coherence and compactness.'—*Laws of Verse*, pp. 10–13.

[3] Compare the very different classification of Hegel, *Æsthetik. Werke*, b. x. ss. 257–8.

[4] Hegel also maintained his classification to be in accordance with the historical development of art. But with reference to such verification he has a very characteristic remark:—'Bei der Beantwortung der Frage jedoch welchen Anfang die schöne Kunst dem Begriffe und der Realität zufolge genommen habe, dürfen wir sowohl das *empirisch Geschichtliche* als auch die äusserlichen Reflexionen . . . . *durchweg ausschliessen*.' (*Op. cit.* s. 265.) And the development of the Wagnerian conception of the Drama as the union, in one indissoluble whole, of mimetics, music, and poetry, may, I think, be reckoned as one of the historical verifications of the above. See Wagner, *Lettre sur la Musique*, prefixed to his *Quatre poemes d'opéra*, and compare Liszt, *Lohengrin et Tannhauser de Wagner*.

therefore, a subject which may fitly constitute a science; but, it must be confessed, a new science. For it follows from this conception of Æsthetic that most of the subjects, hitherto treated under this title, will be relegated to other sciences.[1] There need not, however, be any considerable hesitation about this. For the very name of the science dates only from Baumgarten,[2] though the notion of it may, indeed, be traced to Aristotle.[3] Every science presents itself, at first, as embracing in its scope subjects of which it is disembarrassed by a better and clearer conception of its aims. And hence, in defining Æsthetic as the science only of the formal relations of Beauty, I but follow the course of those who have rid Mathematic of physical, and Logic of metaphysical questions.

9. The general conception of Beauty is differentiated in that of Conduct. As in that case, so in this, we should find the elements of the conception in those of the corresponding objective and subjective sciences respectively, the sciences, namely, of Motion and of

[1] As, for instance, the subject of the history of Art, which forms the greater part of Hegel's *Æsthetik*. Of this most popularly interesting of all Hegel's works, I may here note that there is a French translation in five volumes by M. Ch. Bénard. And his *Essai analytique et critique sur l'Æsthétique de Hegel*, appended to the fifth volume of his translation, is also published separately.

[2] Born 1714; became a disciple of Wolff; and died, professor at Frankfort-on-the-Oder, 1762. His *Æsthetica* (two vols.) was published in 1750–58. Sir W. Hamilton remarks that 'the term Apolaustic would have been a more appropriate designation.' *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. I. p. 124. And without doubt Æsthetic, as derived from *αἴσθησις*, the antithesis of *νόησις*, should more properly have such a meaning as that in which it is used by Kant. But the Baumgartian has prevailed over the Kantian sense of the term, and sense of *sense*.

[3] In his *Poetics*.

Cognition. And is this not so? Are not the causes distinctive of Ethic, ends, determined at once by the External Conditions which are the causes investigated in objective, and by the Internal Spontaneities which are the causes considered in subjective science? And does not an analysis of Conduct give a result in accordance with the synthesis indicated by our principle of Correlation? For what essentially is Conduct but the determination of motion by the cognition of it as a means towards, or determinative of, a certain end? And do not motions become actions, become capable, that is, of being pronounced moral or immoral, good or bad motions, only when the being that moves, freely moves, knows, and truly knows, the tendency of its motions? If a motion, or in less abstract language, a course of conduct, is pursued with an untrue belief as to its tendency, then it is only subjectively moral, or immoral, as the case may be. And hence, for conduct at once subjectively and objectively moral, true knowledge of the tendencies of action (or motion) is necessary. But now, what are those specific conceptions through which the general conception of Conduct is explicated, and which, therefore, may serve to co-ordinate the Ethical Sciences? An investigation of the phenomena of Conduct, guided by the general principles of our method, leads us to distinguish, as the subjects of three primary ethical sciences, Action, Virtue, and Policy. These sciences I would name respectively Orectic,[1] Deon-

[1] Ὄρεξις, propension, desire. Aristotle thus distinguishes it from βούλησις. Βούλησις, μετὰ λόγου ὄρεξις ἀγαθοῦ, ἄλογοι δ' ὀρέξεις ὀργὴ καὶ ἐπιθυμία. *Rhet.*

tic,[1] and Juridic.[2] Orectic I would define as the science of Motives or Passions,[3] considered as the result of the action of circumstances on those mental powers which Aristotelians distinguish as Orective Faculties, the Germans as Bestrebungs-Vermögen, and Sir W. Hamilton as Exertive Faculties.[4] And it seems to me of great importance to make such a science the first of the ethical sciences. For a science of Passions is certainly the true foundation of the science of Duties and of Rights.[5] With reference to Deontic, I need here only remark that its precedence to Juridic implies the derivation of the theory of Rights from that of Duties.[6] Juridic, in

I. 10. Compare *Nichom. Eth.* I. 2, 1. *Orectic* is a term already used in British philosophy, though not in that ethical sense here given to it. It is thus distinguished from *Gnostic* by Lord Monboddo: 'By the first we know and perceive, and by the second we desire and incline; under which I include also aversion; for aversion is the desire of the absence of anything.'—*Antient Metaph.*, vol. I. p. 110. Compare pp. 126 and 130. See Hamilton, *Metaphysics*, vol. I. p. 185.

[1] Δέον, that which is right. Compare Bentham's Deontology, which he defined, 'the knowing what is fit to be done on every occasion.' *Deontology*, vol. I. p. 21. For his bifurcate subdivisions of Deontology, as 'Dicastic Ethics,' see Table V. of his *Chrestomathia*. *Works*, vol. VIII.

[2] To be distinguished, as the Science of Political Laws as they ought to be, from Jurisprudence, the Science of Political Laws as they are.

[3] 'The de facto empirical *Motives* of individuals are the different degrees of pleasure, contained in, and defined by different emotions; the de facto empirical motives of a group of individuals are, the actions of the individuals flowing from their character.'—Hodgson, *Theory of Practice*, vol. II. pp. 95–6. As to Motive and Intention see Austin, *Province of Jurisprudence*, vol. II. p. 86, and Mill, *Utilitarianism*, pp. 26–7, n. Compare the science of Character as conceived by Mill, and by him named Ethology.—*System of Logic*, vol. II. bk. (VI.) ch. v. See also Bain, *Study of Character*.

[4] *Metaphysics*, vol. II. p. 180.

[5] This would appear to be the true thought in the speculations, often sufficiently wild, of Fourier.

[6] 'Rights,' says Mr. Hodgson, 'are conferred only by commanding duties; duties are commanded immediately; rights, derivatively.'—*Theory*

the large sense in which I conceive it,[1] would better be named Politic, were this word not required for the Art derived from this third ethical science, just as Therapeutic (or Medicine) is derived from the third science of Physic. For of Juridic, as I conceive it, the first subscience is Political Economy,[2] or, as I would name it, Economic. And this, inasmuch as natural rights or the claims that, apart from legal sanction, appear just, are, in the first place, determined by the physical conditions, the action of which, in determining the distribution of power and creating social classes, it is one of the first objects of Economic to investigate.[3] In this distinction and order of the sciences of Conduct there will, I think, be found a correspondence both with the sciences of Cognition and of Motion. And in historical development[4] also there should seem to be a verification of the relations thus assigned to these sciences of Conduct, distinguished as Action, Virtue, and Policy.

of Practice, vol. II. p. 170; see also pp. 79, 209, 210; and compare Comte, *Philosophie positive*, t. VI. p. 454; Austin, *Jurisprudence*, vol. I. p. 256 n., and vol. II. p. 454 n.; Savigny, *System des heutigen Römischen Rechts*, b. II. § 52; and Mazzini, *Life and Writings*, vol. I. pp. 38, 42, 181, 202, and 288.

[1] Compare with Juridic, as here conceived, the views of M. Charles Comte's *Traité de Législation*.

[2] 'The art and science of Political Economy are properly defined by the action which is their object-matter, namely, the acquisition of wealth, or of commodities having exchange value.'—Hodgson, *Theory of Practice*, vol. II. p. 275. Compare Harrison, *Limits of Pol. Econ.*, *Fortnightly Review*, June 1865.

[3] See below, Book I. Ch. (II.) Sect. ii.

[4] Note, for instance, of how early a date, in the development of the general science of Ethic, is the *Characters* of Theophrastus (the friend and executor of Aristotle), and of how recent a date the *Wealth of Nations*.

10. We must now proceed to the consideration of that third class of Humanital Sciences, the conception of which must, not only like that of the science of Evolution, and the science of Development, integrate the conceptions of the two preceding sciences of the same order, but must stand also in a like relation to these conceptions themselves of Evolution and Development, belonging respectively to the objective and subjective orders of sciences. This last class of sciences is that of which I would name the co-ordinating conception Progress. And I venture to think that by thus conceiving Progress as an integration of the conceptions of Evolution and Development, a new clearness and definiteness is given to a word of which the meaning is, in general, in the highest degree vague. I would restrict the term Evolution to the history of Motion in its three chief realisations—Bodies, Substances, and Organisms. The term Development I would use to signify the history of Cognition in its three great concrete results—Language, Religion, and Philosophy. And by the term Progress, I would be understood to mean the history of Conduct in its three main phenomena—Industry, Morals, and Policy, considering these as the objectivo-subjective results of the external conditions of objective Evolution and the internal forces of subjective Development. The sequence of these historic sciences of Conduct is to be compared, as was that of the historic sciences of Motion, and of Cognition respectively, with the sequence of the corresponding systematic sciences. And this sequence is to be verified in the actual facts of Progress, industrial, moral, and

jural.[1] As to these, however, I can here only note the confirmation given to the classification just-stated by those modern researches which show that the recorded ages of moral and of jural progress were preceded by a vast, and, (save in the literature of inscriptions, and hieroglyphic or hieratic papyri,) unrecorded age of distinctively industrial progress. And as a further confirmation of this classification, I would but note those modern researches, which, in tracing the origin of laws, not to law-givers, but to customs and habits, show the historic falsity of the Benthamite conception of a law.[2] Finally, the place thus assigned to Sociology, or, as I should rather call it, Poligenetic, as the science of that Progress of which the end is a universal πόλις, or well-ordered Commonwealth, would appear to be in accordance—as the aim of our classification requires that it should be—not only with the actual relations of the phenomena, but with the true method of the science. For by this conception of it as the objective-subjective science of the historic laws of Industry, Morals, and Policy—the science of which the subsciences are Ergagenetic, Ethogenetic, and Nomogenetic[3]—we are required to found the study of it

[1] A word coined by Whewell in contradistinction to moral. See *Elements of Morality including Polity.*

[2] 'The further we penetrate into the primitive history of Thought, the further we find ourselves from a conception of law which at all resembles a compound of the elements which Bentham determined. It is certain that in the infancy of mankind, no sort of legislature, not even a distinct author of law, is contemplated or conceived of. Law has scarcely reached the footing of custom; it is rather a habit.'—Maine, *Ancient Law*, pp. 7–8.

[3] Jurisprudence, as the classificatory and descriptive Science of the

on studies both of objective Evolution, and subjective Development; and yet more particularly, on studies of those Ethical Sciences with which its constituent sciences are more closely related; and which, again, are founded on the most general results both of the subjective and objective systematic sciences. And hence, not only that study of the physical sciences so much insisted on by Mr. Buckle as a necessary preliminary to the study of the history of Civilisation; but the previous study also of those metaphysical and ethical sciences with which, except Economic, he practically dispensed, is required by the mere place of the study of Progress in our classification of the Sciences.

11. 'Utinam, quemadmodum universi mundi facies in conspectum venit, ita philosophiæ tota nobis posset occurrere simillimum mundo spectaculum.'[1] And so, let me now present, at a glance, the outlines of this embodiment of our new philosophical Method in what offers itself as, in different aspects of it, a synoptical history of Things, a system of Correlative Categories of Causation, and a synoptical history of Knowledges, Scientific, and Technical—

Political Laws of a given historical period, and hence, as distinguished from Juridic as above-defined, can, I think, be rightly constituted only on principles derived from this general historical Science of Nomogenetic: —just as truly scientific Natural-history Classifications must be derived from, or coincide with, the facts of Ontogenetic.

[1] Seneca, *Epist.*, lxxxix.

A CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES AND THE ARTS.

I.

THE OBJECTIVE, OR NATURAL, SCIENCES AND ARTS.

I	II	III
Formal Relations of POSITION, *Discontinuous, Continuous, Ordered*, define	Causal Relations of MOTION, *Translation, Transformation, Assimilation*, define	Concrete Relations of EVOLUTION, *Astronomical, Chemical,* and *Biological*, define
MATHEMATIC	PHYSIC	COSMOGENETIC
(I) *Arithmetic*	(I) *Energetic. Mechanic*	(I) *Astrogenetic*
(II) *Algebraic*	(II) *Chemic. Cheirotechnic*	(II) *Hulegenetic*
(III) *Tactic*	(III) *Organic. Therapeutic*	(III) *Ontogenetic*
Arts of Calculation		Arts of Description

II.

THE SUBJECTIVE, OR MENTAL, SCIENCES AND ARTS.

I	II	III
Formal Relations of THOUGHT, *Inductive, Correlative,* and *Deductive*, define	Causal Relations of COGNITION, *Consciation, Ideation,* and *Conation*, define	Concrete Relations of DEVELOPMENT, *Linguistic, Religious,* and *Philosophic*, define
LOGIC.	METAPHYSIC.	LOGOGENETIC.
(I) *Epagogic*	(I) *Animastic. Graphic*	(I) *Glossagenetic*
(II) *Dialectic*	(II) *Ideatic. Ceremonic*	(II) *Mythogenetic*
(III) *Systematic*	(III) *Noetic. Hygienic*	(III) *Mathegenetic*
Arts of Method		Arts of Description

III.

THE OBJECTIVO-SUBJECTIVE, OR HUMANITAL, SCIENCES AND ARTS.

I	II	III
Formal Relations of BEAUTY, *Visual, Musical,* and *Poetical*, define	Causal Relations of CONDUCT, *Action, Virtue,* and *Policy*, define	Concrete Relations of PROGRESS, *Industrial, Moral,* and *Jural*, define
ÆSTHETIC.	ETHIC.	POLIGENETIC.
(I) *Theatic*	(I) *Orectic. Pædagogic*	(I) *Ergagenetic*
(II) *Music*	(II) *Deontic. Rhetoric*	(II) *Ethogenetic*
(III) *Poetic*	(III) *Juridic. Politic*	(III) *Nomogenetic*
Arts of Cyvation		Arts of Description

But, surveying now this classification of the Sciences and Arts,[1] Thought, yet again differentiating and integrating, shows them to form but parts of a greater whole; and, distinguishing the Sciences as the objective kingdom of the general written result of Mental Activity, shows that, in relation thereto, Poesy, in its widest and true sense, as the recordation of Ideals, whether in the style and rhythm of prose or of poetry, is of a subjective character; while the Arts form what, in relation to the Sciences and to Poesy, must be characterised as the objectivo-subjective kingdom of those mental products which exist in Writing, or Letters. And we thus obtain a General Classification of Recorded Knowledges, under the three great heads of the Sciences, Poesy, (or Literature in the more restricted sense of the term), and the Arts.

SUBSECTION III.

The Ultimate Principles of Philosophical Investigation.

1. Already it may suggest itself that, if such a classification of the Sciences and Arts is really even in general accordance with the facts of Thought-development, there is implied in it an Ultimate Law of History. We must trust that the verification of this suggestion will show that, even for an introduction to

[1] I regret that the addition of the Arts to this Table of the Sciences was too late an afterthought to permit of my adding, to the foregoing paragraphs of this subsection, such remarks and notes, with respect to the Arts in their connection with the Sciences, as I should have desired.

an Introduction so summary as the present necessarily is, the foregoing Classification has not been set-forth at any disproportionate length. In the meantime, we must complete the exposition of the Method by which we were finally led to the explicit enunciation of the Law which would appear to be implicit in the above Classification. For neither that central principle of our Method, of the working of which an illustration is afforded in the foregoing Classification, nor those by which it is limited and defined, can be characterised as ultimate. Ultimate can only be those conceptions of Truth which underlie such principles of Method as those in the first subsection stated; or rather those Postulates on which are based those conceptions of Truth. And on us, in a new inquiry into Causation, mainly urged by the falsehood of the Christian Philosophy of History, and the incompleteness of the New Philosophy of History, the clear statement of the Ultimate Principles of the Method of our new inquiry is more especially incumbent. For it is just the untruth of hitherto-granted postulates of Truth that we shall, on more profound reflection, find to be what is ultimately implied in an admission of the untruth of the Christian theory of History. *Τί ἐστιν ἀλήθεια;*[1] what is Truth? This question of Pilate's, unanswered by Christ, is crucial to Christianity. And the question put by a more penetrating consideration of the untruth of the Christian theory of History is identical with that which the practical sense of the Roman Governor put. For the conception of Truth implied

[1] John xviii. 38.

by the Christian theory of History is, that it is Thought which is in accordance with the Book which contains that theory; and this, either as it is interpreted by 'private judgment,' or by 'the Church.' The very supposition, therefore, of the untruth of a theory implying such a conception, or postulate with respect to the nature of Truth, implies either a more or less distinct new conception of Truth, or scepticism as to the possibility of attaining to anything that can be called Truth. Nor is this a mere imaginary consequence of discovering the untruth of the Christian theory of History. For it was just with the conception that it was possible for the same thing to be at once true to the dogma, and false to the reason, that Christian Philosophy, the so-called Scholasticism, fell.[1] The history of Modern Philosophy, initiated by Bacon and Descartes, has been, in one of its profoundest aspects, but an attempt to answer this question, What is Truth? And with the initiation of Modern Philosophy, was initiated also Modern Criticism, in that great work, at once the flower of the earlier, and the germ of the later period of doubt of the Christian historical theory, Spinoza's 'Tractatus Theologico-Politicus.'[2]

2. To complete, therefore, the statement of the principles of our New Philosophical Method, it will be necessary that—having in the two foregoing subsections first stated, and then illustrated the principles by which we would guide ourselves in attempting to gain true con-

[1] See Schwegler, *History of Philosophy*, p. 146.
[2] Hamburg, 1670. Compare *Epist.* xxi. *Opera*, t. I. p. 510.

ceptions, and demonstrate their truth—we now proceed to lay bare our deepest foundations, and state those Ultimate Principles which, in order to the logical application of the above-stated Proximate Principles, must be 'received without proof, as underivable, undeducible, undemonstrable.'[1] But how shall we proceed in our endeavour to discover and define such principles? The method of arriving at, developing, and verifying the principles of a method should be itself an illustration of those principles. Now, the first of the Proximate Principles of our Method requires that our general conceptions be formed by induction from actual and progressively more complex relations; hence we endeavoured to discover these proximate principles in the investigation of the actual processes of Thought, both individual and historical; and these principles were stated as inductively obtained, but still merely hypothetical generalisations. By the second of these Proximate Principles, we are required to develop Hypotheses of Thought by progressive differentiations and integrations. And, hence, to illustrate this—the central principle of our New Method—the result of its application, as limited and defined by the two other principles of our Method, was, in the foregoing Classification, stated, of the Sciences and the Arts. But the third of our Proximate Principles of Method requires that our general conceptions, thus developed, be verified by deduction. Apply this to the attempt fully to discover and state the Principles of our New Method, and it will be evident that, with respect to them, this opera-

[1] Bain, *Logic*, vol. I. p. 266.

tion of deductive verification has still to be performed. It is in this operation, therefore, that we must seek to discover and state some Ultimate Principles of Investigation. There are, however, two kinds of Deduction, distinguished by Mr. Mill as respectively Direct and Inverse. 'Instead of deducing our conclusions by reasoning, and verifying them by observation, we in some cases begin by obtaining them conjecturally from specific experience, and afterwards connect them with the principles of human nature by *à priori* reasonings, which reasonings are thus a real Verification.'[1] It is the latter of these two kinds of verifying Deduction that we shall here have to adopt. And, starting from those generalisations obtained from investigation of, and reflection on the actual processes of Thought, and then stated as the Proximate Principles of our New Method, we shall endeavour from these to reason to those which they imply as the logically undeducible, and therefore Ultimate Principles of Investigation.

3. Adopting, then, that Inverse Deduction which we thus see to be that required for the verification at once of our Proximate, and the discovery of our Ultimate Principles of Investigation, we start from that inductively obtained general conception of Method which is stated in our First Proximate Principle, namely, Knowledge is to be sought in the Induction of Hypotheses of Thought from the simpler Relations of Things. Now, endeavouring to work up from this derivative empirical generalisation to the ultimate rational principle underlying it, we ask, What is the

[1] *System of Logic*, vol. II. p. 483.

nature of the propositions which satisfy that generalising effort, the recognition of which has led us to state the above as our First Principle of Method? What, in other words, is the conception of Truth implied in such a principle as the above? What is that quality in propositions which satisfies the mind that, in stating them, it has accomplished its aim in forming general conceptions from its perceptions of the relations of things? Consider the earliest conceptions which are formed by the child, or by the savage, and the propositions in which they are expressed. Or take, not such first conceptions of things as these, but those grander generalisations from which, as Hegel has shown,[1] the whole of Western Philosophy has been, with, on the whole, a wonderfully logical sequence, developed. Consider the hypotheses of Thales, of Anaximenes, and of Diogenes (of Apollonia) concerning the Beginning.[2] From Water, according to the first; from Air, according to the second; from Intelligence, according to the third, all was generated.[3] These were all Inductions in the strict sense of the term; generalisations, that is, formed by reflection on observed facts. What was it that satisfied Thales with the hypothesis that ὕδωρ εἶναι τὴν ἀρχήν;[4] dissatisfied Anaximenes with it; and,

[1] *Geschichte der Philosophie. Werke*, b. xiii.

[2] In thus connecting these three philosophers, I follow Ritter, *History of Ancient Philosophy*, vol. I., whom Mr. Lewes has also in his *Biographical Hist. of Philosophy* followed. Hegel gives no account at all of Diogenes, and Tennemann places him after Pythagoras.

[3] With these theories compare that of Spiller, with respect to an unconsciously intelligent æther as the cause of all things. See *Gott im Lichte der Naturwissenschaften; Studien über Gott, Welt, Unsterblichkeit.*

[4] Aristotle, *Metaph.* l. I. c. iii.

again, with the substituted hypothesis of Anaximenes, dissatisfied Diogenes, and led to a more general hypothesis than either? What was it, in the first case, but an apparent accordance with the facts of things; in the second, discordance with them; and, in the third, the greater apparent accordance of a more abstract hypothesis with a more accurate observation of things and their relations? And is not, then, what that quality is in propositions which makes them appear true, and hence what must be, at least, our first definition of Truth, clear? Truth is the accordance of an expression of subjective Thought with the present-discovered relations of objective Things. But this cannot be an Ultimate Principle. For, even admitting that such a statement accurately defines the general aim and conception of Truth implied in Inductive Generalisation; we shall find, on reflection, that such an aim of research, and conception of Truth implies a still deeper principle; and that such an aim, and such a conception, must itself have a postulate. What, then, is this? Consider it. Suppose there were no sort of uniformity in the successions of phenomena, what would be the good of trying to bring our conceptions into accordance with what had no accordance with itself? Suppose that fire sometimes followed the rubbing of two sticks together, and sometimes some utterly different phenomenon, as, for instance, the transformation of the two sticks into little rods of iron, or their sudden disappearance altogether, what motive could there be for, or possibility of inductive generalisation? Suppose that there were no such thing as a more or

less regular sequence; how could it ever have entered into the minds of men to speculate on the Beginning? Evidently the postulate of all Inductive Enquiry—the First, at least, of the Ultimate Principles of Investigation, and the fact, or assumption which justifies our First Proximate Principle is—*Nature, in the sequences of similar coexistences, is uniform.*

4. But, in our inductive working out of the Proximate Principles of Investigation from the observed facts of the processes of Thought, individual and historical, we arrived, secondly, at the principle which we thus stated: Hypotheses of Thought are to be developed by progressive differentiations and integrations of Thought. And now, in endeavouring to discover what is the postulate which is the ultimate basis of such developments, we ask, first, as in the preceding investigation, what the conception of Truth is, that is implied in such mental activity as that from the distinguishing of which this Second Proximate Principle of investigation is drawn? Consider, then, generally any system of purely Speculative Reasoning —reasoning which, starting from certain premises or assumptions, develops a set of mutually dependent propositions. What is it that, in such developments—whether resulting in systems of mathematical, of theological, or of metaphysical propositions—satisfies the mind with the propositions which it thus developes? Consider, more particularly, any coherent system of theological propositions, as, for instance, Papism or Calvinism. What is the conception of Truth implied in a clear and intelligent acceptance of any proposi-

tion of such a system? I think that, if one impartially studies the history of those theological opinions which have got themselves established as 'orthodox,' one will find that they deserved this distinction by their greater logical coherence; that those opinions stigmatised as 'heresies' were, and are, however commendable otherwise, blind incoherencies, sooner or later landing in manifest self-contradictions; and that, in adjudging certain propositions to be 'orthodox,' and certain others 'heterodox,' there was, for the most part, true insight into their respective accordance, or non-accordance with the general system of propositions, its axioms and postulates. But in this consideration of the intellectual causes which lead to the acceptance, or rejection of theological propositions, we take but a more concrete and familiar illustration of those intellectual judgments which lead to the acceptance, or rejection of mathematical, and of metaphysical propositions. And what the conception of Truth is, in Speculative Reasoning generally, is now clear, and we are led to a second definition of Truth in these terms: Truth is the accordance of an expression of subjective Thought with another, or other expressions of subjective Thought. This is the conception which underlies those maxims of Consistency, entitled 'Laws of Thought,' the principles of Identity, Contradiction, and Excluded Middle. But this conception itself is not ultimate. For, just as that conception of Truth which we found implied in Inductive Generalisation had itself a postulate, so has this, that is implied in Speculative Reasoning. What, then, is

this postulate? Now as, in considering what would be the result, in relation to Inductive Generalisation, were Nature otherwise than it is, we were led to the postulate of such generalisation, in stating the most general characteristic of Nature; so, in considering now what would be the result, in relation to Speculative Reasoning, were Thought otherwise than it is, we may be led to the postulate of such reasoning, in stating the most general characteristic of Thought. What, then, is Thought's most general characteristic? Consider what would become of reasoning—if we could not recall formerly-stated propositions, and recall them with some assurance that they came to us in the shape in which they seemed then best to express the conclusions we had arrived at—if, in a word, Memory were utterly fallacious, and in no way to be depended on. How, if Thought had no tendency, at least, to be consistent with itself, could such a conception of Truth ever have been formed, as that which we have found to be implied in speculative reasoning, and to be our guide in the acceptance, or rejection of the propositions which are thus developed? Manifestly the postulate of all Speculative Reasoning, the Second of our Ultimate Principles of Investigation, and the fact or assumption which, by deductive verification, justifies our Second Proximate Principle is—*Thought, in its differentiating and integrating activity, tends to Self-consistency.*[1]

[1] Dr. Bain makes Consistency his first postulate (*Logic*, vol. I. p. 272). But I would submit that it is more logically to be considered as but a maxim derived from this postulate as to the nature of Thought, or as the equivalent of his second postulate. And thus, for speculative reasoning,

5. Our investigation, however, of, and reflection on, the logical processes of Thought, individual and historical, led us to a Third Proximate Principle of Method, which we stated in these terms: Knowledge is to be verified in the Deduction of the Relations of Things from the developed Hypotheses of Thought. And we have now to enquire what that ultimate fact is which must be postulated as the undemonstrable basis of such a principle of demonstration. Let us approach this question, as in the previous similar cases, in endeavouring, first, to define the conception of Truth that is implied in such a principle of Method. Now it is, in the first place, evident that there is implied in this Third Principle of Investigation a conception of Truth that partially, at least, negatives that which we found to be implied in our second principle. It is, indeed, unquestionably the fact, that we consider a proposition to be true, if it is seen to be in clear accordance with a related set of propositions. But it is unquestionably, also, the fact that we now, at least, consider such accordance with other propositions as giving to any stated proposition a merely subjective kind of Truth. And that this is not the kind of Truth which satisfies the modern scientific intellect is most instructively shown by the history of the modern criticism, not only of theological and of metaphysical, but also of mathematical propositions. Given the postulates of such theological systems as Papism or Calvinism, or

we have a postulate as to the general characteristic of Thought, corresponding with that postulate as to the general characteristic of Nature, which is the basis of inductive generalisation.

of such metaphysical systems as Spinozism or Hegelianism, and the propositions therefrom developed may (speaking generally) be no doubt considered in relation to each other, and to their postulates, to be as true as the mathematical systems of Euclid, or of Lagrange. But the profound suggestion that has arisen in the criticism of the bases of Mathematics, the suggestion that our three-dimensioned space may not be really a homoloid, as it is assumed to be, the suggestion of a curvature of space,[1] seems to me—even if it is regarded as a mere suggestion which there is no possibility of verifying—to have the most important bearings on our conceptions of Truth. For if so, then, though the propositions of Mathematics may be considered, for all practical purposes, to have an objective, yet they may possibly have only a subjective validity. And if the necessity of deductive verification is even suggested, in order to the acceptance of the propositions of Mathematics, as expressions of objective reality, *à fortiori* must such verification be necessary in order that we may regard the propositions of Theology, and of Metaphysics, as anything better than the mere subjective results of a disciplinary mental gymnastic. Is not, then, that final conception of Truth, which defines the aim of the distinctive principle of modern scientific investigation, thus made clear? Truth is the accordance of an expression of subjective Thought with future-discovered relations of Things. But as we found that that conception of Truth which defined the aim of our

[1] See Riemann and Helmholtz as cited above, Subsect. II.

principle of Inductive Generalisation, begs, as its postulate, a certain general characteristic of Nature; and as we likewise found that that conception of Truth, which defines the aim of our principle of Speculative Reasoning, begs, as its postulate, a certain general characteristic of Thought; so we shall, I think, now find that that conception of Truth which defines the aim of our principle of Deductive Verification begs, as its postulate, a certain reciprocal relation between Nature and Thought. Consider it. If there were *identity* between Thought and Nature, there would evidently be no need of deductive verification. For, in that case, if a thing were true in logic, it would be true also in fact. And evidently, also, if there were *no* reciprocity between Nature and Thought, and if Mind were simply the passive recipient of the impressions of Nature, there would then be no use of that development of Hypotheses, which, as we conceive it, is an essential preliminary of the process of Deductive Verification. For, in that case, as there would, *ex hypothesi*, be either no spontaneity in the activity of Thought, or no relation between that activity and the activity of Nature; there would be either no possibility of a deduction of relations of Things to be in the Future discovered; or no hope that relations of Things in the Future discovered would accord with the results of the deductive activity of Thought. The postulate, therefore, of Deductive Verification, the Third of our Ultimate Principles of Investigation, and the fact or assumption which can alone justify our Third Proximate Principle, is—*There is a Correlation between*

the coexistences of Nature and the sequences of Thought.[1]

6. Such, then, are the three Ultimate Facts, or, at least, assumptions of fact, or Postulates, of our New Philosophical Method. Yet, that they are not three independent facts, but stand to each other in a mutually implicating relation, will, I think, be evident to the reflective student. Omitting, however, the abstract considerations that would be involved in demonstrating this, I can here merely point out the strong ground of hope which the application of the Method founded on these Postulates to a Classification of the Sciences seems to afford that our New Method will be successful in its great aim of fundamental reconciliation, and true synthesis. For nothing can more decisively mark the character of a Philosophy than its Classification of the Sciences. Compare then, first, with the above Classification of the Sciences, as an application of the principles of a method seeking to reconcile Idealism and Materialism, the classifications of the other recent methods which, though with the same aim, have, as their systems of the sciences very strikingly show, been unable to get beyond the charmed circle either of

[1] The following remarks of Ueberweg appear to me to have great significance with reference to the enunciation of such an Ultimate Principle as this:—'The subjectively-formal Logic—that promulgated by the schools of Kant and Herbart—puts the forms of Thought out of all relation to the forms of Existence. Metaphysical Logic, on the other hand, as Hegel constructed it, identifies the two kinds of forms, and thinks that it can recognise, in the self-development of Thought, the self-production of Existence. Aristotle, equally far from both extremes, sees thinking to be the picture of Existence, a picture which is different from its real correlate, and yet related to it, which corresponds to it, and yet is not identical with it.'—*System of Logic*, Preface to First Edition, p. xi.

Idealism or Materialism. Compare with the above the classifications of Hegel, and of Comte; of Mr. Spencer, and of Mr. Hodgson. The classification of Hegel determines the order of the subjects treated in the 'Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften;'[1] and that of Comte equally determines the order of the subjects treated in the encyclopædic 'Philosophie positive.' The system of each philosopher is, as we might expect from the general law of Thought, threefold. But with Hegel, the great divisions of the sciences are 'Logik,' 'Naturphilosophie,' and 'Philosophie des Geistes.' With Comte, the cardinal sciences are 'Mathématiques,' 'Science des Corps bruts,' and 'Science des Corps organisés.' Could anything more distinctively mark the exclusively subjective point of view of the one; the exclusively objective point of view of the other; and hence, make manifest that by neither has the reconciliation of that antagonism been effected which characterises the modern period of Philosophy, opened by Bacon and Descartes? The phenomena of Nature are, indeed, considered by Hegel from such a purely subjective point of view, that even so strenuous an advocate as Dr. Stirling is driven to confess that 'it is dangerous to read here if one would preserve one's respect for Hegel.'[2] And, on the other hand, the phenomena of Mind are considered by Comte from so exclusively objective a point of view, that the most illustrious of his disciples thus writes:—'A mon gré, il

[1] *Werke*, b. VI. to b. VII.

[2] *Secret of Hegel*, vol. II. p. 523. Compare also Dr. Stirling's edition of Schwegler's *History of Philosophy*, pp. 437 and 475; Hodgson, *Time and Space*, p. 393; and Tait in *Nature*, vol. I. p. 89 (Dec. 1, 1870).

existe dans la philosophie positive trois lacunes essentielles, à savoir : l'économie politique, la théorie cérébrale, et ce que, faute d'un nom qui convienne, j'appellerai théorie subjective de l'humanité . . . qui comprend . . . la morale, l'esthétique, et la psychologie.'[1] Yet such a completion of Philosophy as M. Littré has admirably indicated[2] has not as yet, so far as I am aware, been accomplished. For, proceeding to the consideration of the philosophies of Mr. Spencer and of Mr. Hodgson, we find that the 'System of Philosophy' of the former is no less distinctly marked as materialistic by his 'Classification of the Sciences' than is Comte's 'Philosophie positive' by his 'Tableau synoptique.' With Comte, mental phenomena are considered only in sub-sciences of the general science of Organic Bodies. And so, with Mr. Spencer, they are made the subjects of but sub-sub-divisions of the science of 'the laws of the redistribution of Matter and Motion.'[3]

[1] Littré, *A. Comte et la Philosophie positive*, p. 674.

[2] He thus proceeds:—'Dans l'ordre de la méthode positive, c'est d'abord par l'objet que se construit le savoir humain; et l'on termine par le sujet. La théorie subjective de l'humanité a donc, dans la philosophie positive, un lieu tout assigné. . . . Tant qu'elles (la morale, etc.) ne sont pas constituées, une foule de notions vraiment philosophiques restent déclassées, sans lieu certain, sans liaison, sans ensemble. La théorie du sujet est le complément indispensable de la théorie de l'objet.'—*Ibid.* p. 677. See also his criticism of Comte's later *Méthode subjective*, pp. 527–37, and particularly his distinction between the deductive and subjective methods. p. 532. Compare Mill, *Comte and Positivism*, pp. 51, fig., and Hodgson, *Theory of Practice*, vol. II. pp. 488–9.

[3] The derivative relations of Psychology and Sociology, according to Mr. Spencer's scheme, may be thus exhibited. (See *Classification of the Sciences*, p. 25.)

1. Geogeny { (1) { 1. Mineralogy; 2. Meteorology; 3. Geology
   (II) { 4. Biology { (1) Morphology
   (2) { a. Physiology { (a) { α.
   b. Psychology { (b) { β. Sociology.

Nor is the system of Mr. Hodgson less distinctly marked as idealistic by his classification of the sciences than is the system of Hegel; and that, though he is fully aware that the task at present set to philosophers is, not only 'to give unity to all branches of knowledge, as the basis of action;' but, more particularly, 'to combine the two contradictories' presented by the systems of Hegel and Comte 'in a system that shall be the truth of both.'[1] Yet, just as Hegel begins with Logic, so does Mr. Hodgson begin with Metaphysic, placing it 'at the head of both the objectively, and the subjectively treated series'[2] of the Sciences. And from this run out two branches, Mathematic being the first, or highest science in the objective series. But the connection of this series with Metaphysic is confessedly artificial, compared with that of the other or subjective series. Contrasting, however, with these various systems the above-stated Classification, have we not good ground to hope that a Method which begins with the correlation of Physics and Metaphysics will end with the reconciliation of that antagonism which has been

Compare the adverse criticisms of Littré, *Op. cit.* pp. 284–309; Mill, *Comte and Positivism*, pp. 41–7; and Bain, *Logic*, vol. I. pp. 232–41. The only important point with respect to classification in which I can agree with Mr. Spencer is his protest against a purely sequential order. See his *Principles of Biology*, vol. I. ch. xi. pp. 292–310. It would be interesting to point out how such a Classification of the Sciences as Mr. Spencer's logically follows from his General Method, and 'Universal Postulate,' just as the Classification, in the foregoing subsection set-forth, follows from such postulates as those just enunciated. But I can here, with reference to this 'Postulate' of Mr. Spencer's, again only refer the reader to the adverse criticisms, more particularly, of Mill, *System of Logic*, vol. I. bk. (II.) ch. vii., and Bain, *Logic*, vol. I. Ap. D.

[1] *Theory of Practice*, vol. II. pp. 500–1.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 486 et seq.

marked by the independence of these sciences? May we not hope that, distinguishing thus, and correlating Physical and Metaphysical phenomena, we shall be led to complementary theories of objective and subjective Causation? May we not hope that, placing thus the obscurities of Metaphysical phenomena in apartments, as it were, flooded with a new and intense light from the lamps of physical science, we shall master at length the dark problems in the mysterious, because as yet so dimly lighted, caverns of ourselves?

7. In opening this Subsection, I remarked that a statement of the conceptions of Truth and Ultimate Postulates that underlie our New Method was especially incumbent on us, because our denial of the truth of the Christian theory of History implies nothing less fundamental than a denial of the truth of accepted conceptions of Truth, and hence a rejection of the Postulates that underlie these. And I would now, in concluding this Subsection, point out that what we conceive to be Truth, and what we submit to as Authority, are ever essentially the same principles in correlative statements; and hence that, from new Postulates of Truth, there must, either directly or indirectly, follow new Principles of Authority. Consider it, then, and we shall see how close is the connection between the question of the Roman Governor and that of the chief priests and elders of the people; and, further, that, no less directly to the heart of Christianity than the question of the former—Τί ἐστιν ἀλήθεια; What is Truth?—goes the question of the latter—Ἐν ποίᾳ ἐξουσίᾳ ταῦτα ποιεῖς; καὶ τίς σοι ἔδωκε

τὴν ἐξουσίαν ταύτην;[1] 'By what Authority doest thou these things, and who gave thee that Authority?' The one question applies more particularly to the Doctrines, the other to the Action of Christianity, and the rules it lays down for Conduct. Christianity intrudes into Philosophy with its theories. But—'What is Truth?' Answer first that, and let us see if we agree on that fundamental question. For, if we should chance to have different conceptions of what Truth is, your theories can be for me but mere hypotheses, waiting for judgment, if they have not, indeed, already been pronounced false. Into Legislation Christianity intrudes with its Laws. But—'By what Authority doest thou these things, and who gave thee that Authority?' Answer first that question, and without the evasion to which he had recourse[2] to whom it was so pertinently put by the chief priests and elders of the people. For if we should chance to acknowledge some different kind of authority, and to appeal to quite other sanctions, then your laws will have still to justify themselves, if they have not, indeed, already been condemned as unjust, and your rules, even if they should be approved, will have to be quite otherwise sanctioned. Nor is it a mere fancy the putting to Christianity of these two crucial questions, which were, the one unanswered, the other evaded by Christ. For if Modern Metaphysics has, as I have above pointed out, arisen from doubt of the Christian conception of Truth, and has, in its characteristic critiques and inquiries, had for its aim the establishment of a new doctrine of

[1] Matt. xxi. 23. [2] *Ibid.* 24–27.

Truth, Modern Ethics has arisen from dissatisfaction with the Christian principle of Authority, and has had for the aim of its characteristic theories the establishment of another principle of Authority than the Christian.[1] But whence this dissatisfaction? It arose simply from this, that the principle of Authority, or Ethical Standard of Christian Philosophy, was one which doubt of the Christian theory of History, and of the truth, therefore, of the Christian conception of Truth, utterly undermined. And hence, in discovering and defining those postulates of Truth, which are the Ultimate Principles of our New Method, our work has been of a character neither more nor less profoundly practical than the discovery and definition of postulates from which will be derived new Principles of Authority.

[1] 'Another,' I do not say a principle opposed to that of Christianity. For, as Mr. Mill remarks, 'with regard to the religious motive, if men believe, as most profess to do, in the goodness of God, those who think that conduciveness to the general happiness is the essence, or even only the criterion of Good, must necessarily believe that it is also that which God approves.' (See *Utilitarianism*, p. 41.) And so Mr. Austin makes the 'theory of general utility' an 'index to the tacit commands of the Deity.' (See *Province of Jurisprudence*, vol. I. pp. xlii. fig.) But evidently it may be found that the natural sanction is enough, without the hypothesis of its being but an 'index' to an hypothetical 'command;' and enough may 'conduciveness to the general happiness' be found to be, without the hypothesis of a supernatural 'approval.'

SECTION III.

THE DISCOVERY OF THE ULTIMATE LAW OF HISTORY.

'Das verschlossene Wesen des Universums hat keine Kraft in sich, welche dem Muthe des Erkennens Widerstand leisten könnte; es muss sich vor ihm aufthun, und seinen Reichthum und seine Tiefen ihm vor Augen legen, und zum Genusse bringen.'

HEGEL, *Encyklopädie, Anrede.* *Werke*, b. VI. s. xi.

SUBSECTION I.

The Inductive Generalisation of the Law of History.

1. I WOULD now proceed to state, with the summary brevity here necessary, the first general results of the application of the principles of our New Philosophical Method. For we have seen, in our first section, that, a New Philosophy of History having sprung up which rendered utterly incredible that system of Christian dogma which is, in fact, another philosophy of History; there is an urgent needfulness for the completion of this New Philosophy by the discovery of an Ultimate Law which may be the basis of that reconstruction, rendered necessary by the destruction of that Christian Philosophy of History which is, or from which is derived, the basis, not only of the existing Religious Ideal, but also of the established Social Polity. Further, in summarily reviewing the development hitherto of the New Philosophy of History, we found that any hopeful attempt at discovering that Ultimate Law, which will be at once the completion of the New Philosophy, and the basis of the reconstruction of the Ideal, and

of Polity, must be itself based on a reconciliation of those antagonistic Causation-theories of Idealism and Materialism, to which is owing the imperfect statement, discordance, and incomplete verification which characterise those historical Laws in which the New Philosophy has as yet issued. But such a reconciliation can be accomplished only by a truly synthetic method. In our foregoing Second Section, therefore, we set forth the principles of a New Method which we trust may be found to be, in the logical results of its fundamental principles, thus truly synthetic. And I would now state what the general results have actually been of the application of this method to a new inquiry into Causation. For we shall find that these general results lead us up directly to a Law of History, and thus justify our hope that we might find this new inquiry into Causation to be, not only a necessary preliminary of any further attempt at, but the most direct road to the discovery of, that great Law of which we are in quest. But one cannot set out on an inquiry without some presupposition which will more or less affect the application of, and the results obtained from, even a new method. Now the conception of Causation which happened to be my historical inheritance was that defined by the great founder of the Scottish School,[1] with whom I would still naturally desire more particularly to connect myself. A Cause was defined by Hume 'an object followed by another whose appearance always conveys the thought to

[1] As to Hume, and not the worthy divine, but quite mediocre philosopher, Dr. Reid, being the true founder of the Scottish School, see above, sect. I. p. 17.

that other.'[1] And by Mill, the (alas! just-departed) head of that school,[2] and who has in so many directions, and with so great originality, worked out the thoughts both of Hume and of Adam Smith, Cause, as Hume interpreted it, is affirmed to mean the 'invariable antecedent,' and we may therefore, he says, 'define the cause of a phenomenon to be the antecedent, or the concurrence of antecedents, on which it is invariably and unconditionally dependent.'[3] I now think with Dr. Stirling, that this is a misrepresentation of Hume's doctrine, and that 'Hume, in custom, argued, *in effect*, for the variability of Causality.'[4] It was, however, with the notion of Cause as 'the invariable antecedent' that I started on my new inquiry. But so starting, I proceeded to ask, 'Is it possible to generalise the invariable antecedent of Changes? What is, in general, the nature of such antecedents? Or, what are the general conditions of Changes? Thus

[1] *Inquiry concerning Human Understanding. Philosophical Works*, vol. IV. p. 90.

[2] M. Taine, indeed, in his two essays on Mr. Mill and on Mr. Carlyle, calls the former the representative of 'Le Positivisme anglais,' and the latter of 'L'Idéalisme anglais.' But they, in fact, represent two currents of Thought, which have been characteristic of the Scottish School throughout its history. And Mr. Spencer, rather than Mr. Mill, should be named as the representative of 'Le Positivisme anglais,' though it is indeed with Sir W. Hamilton, and not with any English philosopher, that even he more particularly connects himself.

[3] *System of Logic*, vol. I. p. 377.

[4] 'This was his express sceptical object indeed; and it was not the *invariability* which Hume saw in Causality that Kant contested, but, on the contrary, the *variability*,—the variability, that is, which Hume, as it were, sought sceptically to insinuate into Causality by resting the (supposititious) necessary connection which its idea seemed to involve on habit, custom, and the resultant subjective expectation.' See *Annotations* to Schwegler, *History of Philosophy*, p. 455.

stating the problem of Causation, and with such conceptions of philosophical method as those formulated in the foregoing section, our first step was that analysis and classification of relations, whence our classification of the Sciences arose. And as this Classification, advancing from the conception of formal relations of Position to that of casual relations of Motion, distinguishes, as the simplest of these, the causes of translation, it was with the investigation of these simplest relations of things that, by the first principle of our method, we began.

2. Thus beginning our new inquiry into Causation with the investigation of the phenomena of Motion, and first, of those simplest of them studied in Energetic, we inquire into the causes of Translation in its three forms, successively, of Simple Translation, Rotation, and Compound Translation-and-Rotation. Now we find, first, that, except in those translations attributed to 'Attractions' and 'Repulsions,' the 'invariable antecedent' may be generalised as *a Differential Relation between Coexistent Pressures.* This may not be at once so evident in Translations of the second and third, as in Translations of the first class; but we presently find that, in all cases at least, in which the assigned causes of Rotation and Compound Translation-and-Rotation are verifiable, these causes, as objective conditions, are reducible to Differential Mechanical Relations. But if so, if all the motions, of which we know certainly the conditions, arise from a differential relation between the pressures acting on the body in which the change from rest to motion appears; then the remark occurs

that those motions which we attribute to 'Attractions' are either due to causes of an utterly different kind from those of ordinary motions; or are really, though not apparently, due also to such differential relations between pressures as we know to be the causes of ordinary motions. That there should be commonly acknowledged, even in our first simplest science of Energetic, two kinds of causes so utterly different as Differential Relations of Pressure, on the one hand, and 'Attractions and Repulsions,' on the other, naturally and rightly excites to the effort to show that the motions attributed to these hypothetical 'Attractions and Repulsions' are, in reality, due to the very same kind of causes as ordinary motion.[1] But in considering the problem of explaining, by Differential Relations of Pressure, the motions attributed to Attractions and Repulsions, it is very soon found that, as the current notion of the causes of gravity, magnetism, affinity, &c. rests on a certain hypothesis, or rather class of hypotheses having a certain common characteristic, with respect to the nature of Matter; a theory of these phenomena which would give a purely mechanical theory of their causes, and thus correlate them with ordinary motions, must be founded on a new and verifiable hypothesis of Atoms. In the current hypotheses, Atoms are conceived as little isolated bodies, with certain 'essential' forms, and 'absolute' qualities, 'endowed' with certain 'inherent

[1] Even Helmholtz, however, thus still writes:—'Enfin, le problème des sciences physiques consiste à ramener tous les phénomènes naturels à des forces invariables, attractives et répulsives, dont l'intensité dépend de la distance des centres d'action.'—*Conservation de la Force.* Traduit par L. Pérard, p. 62.

virtues,' of 'attraction,' for instance, or 'repulsion,' or acted on by certain 'ethers,' 'subtle fluids,' &c. But quite a different hypothesis with respect to the nature of matter suggested itself as an inductive generalisation from those new facts especially which Faraday's experimental researches revealed to us; facts which led that great discoverer, also, to the rejection of the ordinary conception of matter. Among such facts may be instanced those which led to the abandonment of the Contact-theory of the Voltaic Battery; those which established such a correlation between Electricity and Magnetism as showed that the existence of the one implied that of the other, and that they might be defined as Lines of Force at right angles to each other; and such facts, more particularly, as those which proved how entirely the magnetic and diamagnetic properties of a body depend on its coexistent, the medium in which it is placed. Such were some of the principal facts that suggested to me the possibility of explaining by ordinary mechanical causes, or differential relations of pressure, those motions of approach and recession, commonly attributed to occult forces of 'attraction' and 'repulsion'—*if*, as in the hypothesis which I proposed in 1859[1] as the basis of a general mechanical theory of Physics, Pressure is conceived with perfect generality as 'every kind of force which

[1] See *Reports of British Association* (1859), *Physical and Mathematical Section*, p. 58. See also for a fuller, but still very inadequate statement of the hypothesis and resulting theory, my papers in the *Philosophical Magazine* for 1861. But these papers and some others on the same subject I hope soon to be able to present in a somewhat less inadequate form under the title of *Mutually-determining Atoms, or the Inductive Basis of the New Philosophy.*

acts between elastic bodies, or the parts of an elastic body, as the cause or the effect of a state of strain, whether that force is tensile, compressive, or distorting;[1] if elasticity is considered as 'une des propriétés générales de la matière;'[2] and if Atoms are conceived as Centres of Pressure, transmitted in mutually-deflectable Lines of Motion, and so, defined as *Mutually-determining Centres of Pressure.*

3. Such being our inductively suggested hypothesis, we proceeded next, in accordance with the principles of our New Method, speculatively to develop it as a general theory. For if, as Science postulates, there is an essential oneness under all the apparent diversity of Nature; if, as Aristotle said with such fine wit, οὐκ ἔοικε δ' ἡ φύσις ἐπεισοδιώδης οὖσα ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων, ὥσπερ μοχθηρὰ τραγωδία; if Nature is not episodic in its phenomena, like a bad tragedy, then that fundamental conception of Atoms, by which we would explain the mechanical phenomena of Bodies, can have no actual truth, except it is in accordance with that by which the chemical phenomena of Substances, and with that also by which the biological phenomena of Organisms are explained. Now, for Chemic, there has not as yet, so far as I am aware, been stated a fundamental conception with which that of Atoms, as above defined, might be brought into relation. But the whole tendency, both of experimental discovery and of theoretical speculation in this Science, is cer-

[1] Rankine, *Cambridge and Dublin Mathematical Journal*, 1851, vol. II. p. 49.

[2] Lamé, *Théorie mathématique de l'Élasticité des Corps solides*, p. 1.

tainly towards the formation of a conception of chemical elements as systems of molecular motion, and of chemical qualities as depending on differences in such systems of Motion. I have ventured, therefore, to name the elements of Matter, conceived as Chemical Substance, Equivalents; and to define these, *Interchangeably Equilibrating Systems of Motion.* As to the fundamental conception of Organic, it is evident that the conception of Cells is in general accordance with that of Atoms. For the common characteristic of both conceptions is the notion, not of independent, but of codependent existence; of existence, that is, *in a system*; and of dependence, therefore, on the conditions of coexistence. Not content, however, with this general accordance, I have thought that the facts and generalisations of that later biological Science of which the boast is to be 'mechanisch begründet,' justifies a definition of Cells which would bring the conception of them into more immediate relation with the fundamental conception of mechanical Science as above defined; and Cells I have therefore ventured to define as *Systems of inner and outer Systems of Motion in unstable equilibrium with a System.* By this speculative development of our conception of Atoms,—in thus comparing our inductive generalisation from material phenomena in those simplest relations which we distinguished as mechanical, with our inductive generalisations from such phenomena in those more complex relations which we distinguish respectively as chemical and biological,—our conception of Atoms is, in such differentiation and integration, at once defined and

generalised. And the result of the comparison, finally, both of the current and of the proposed new conception of Atoms with the most general principle hitherto established of Physical research—the principle of the Conservation of Energy, and the Equivalence of Transformation—seems to justify us in stating, as the basis of a general mechanical theory of Physics, our hypothesis of Mutually-determining Atoms.

4. But next, by the third rule of our New Method, comes that verificative deduction which can alone establish our hypothesis, not merely as a theory, but as a principle. In the general science of Mechanic, or, as we name it, Energetic, there will be three lines of direct Deduction. For, in the first place, in that first subscience of Energetic which I have distinguished as Molar Energetic—as the conception of Atoms is perfectly general, and equally applicable to all bodies in mechanical relations to each other, and whatever their size or composition; and as this conception of Atoms in fact implies, as will presently be clear, a new theory of the *origin of Motion*;—the first deduction from it will be a new theory of the origin of our solar system, or a new theory of nebular Evolution.[1]

[1] For in accordance with this conception of Atoms, the motions of the original Nebula must be conceived as determined by its relations to other stellar systems. Would not, then, an extension of Plateau's experiments lead to some verifiable hypothesis with respect to these relations? Or, attacking the problem from another direction, can nothing towards a solution of it be deduced from the relations of the distances, and of the revolutional and rotational velocities? Such were the questions over which I have again and again spent, with but very meagre results, months of labour. The problem was too fascinating, and I refused at once to acknowledge the inadequacy of my mathematical resources.

'Malo me Galatea petit, lasciva puella,
Et fugit ad salices, et se cupit ante videri.'

Secondly, in Molecular Energetic, those general explanations of magnetic attractions and repulsions, by differential relations of pressure, which I first suggested in 1859, will have to be worked-out in a detailed mathematical theory, to which, however, various series of researches since that time have greatly contributed.[1] And, thirdly, in that third subscience of Energetic which I have distinguished as Correlational Energetic, it will have to be shown that that mechanical explanation of the *cause* of gravity which is at once given by the conception of the parts of Matter as Centres of Pressure transmitted in mutually-deflectable Lines of Motion,[2] brings into accordance with each other and with this mechanical explanation of gravity, the mechanical explanation of all other 'attractions' and 'repulsions,' as, like ordinary motions, due to differential relations of Pressure. Such would be the direct deductive verification of our theory of the parts of Matter as mutually-determining. Frankly, however, it must be confessed, that my skill in Mathematics has been too inadequate to enable me to do much, or indeed, I may more truly say, anything, towards such a direct deductive verification of this hypothesis and general theory of Atoms, as the present magnificent development of mathematico-physical research would require. But an inverse deductive

[1] See Maxwell, *Electricity and Magnetism.*

[2] For evidently, in a System of Bodies thus conceived, the opposing lines from any two being deflected in directions of less resistance, the bodies will approach; and *perturbation*, or the approach of one of these bodies to another than that to which it is principally attracted, will be the analogue of *repulsion* in electric and magnetic phenomena.

verification of it may, as it appears to me, be found in the consideration of the most general of the results of modern research—the Principle of the Conservation of Energy, or the Law of Equivalent Transformation. If a new force appears, we are, by this Law, assured that an equal amount of force in some other form has preceded it, and we are assured that the new force has no absolute quality, but stands in a definite quantitative relation to pre-existing forces; we are, in a word, assured that we have before us, not a creation, but a transformation. But from such a consideration of the principle of Conservation as a Law of sequential and quantitative relativity, the presumption will logically arise that, as Forces considered as *Sequences* are *quantitatively* related to each other, Forces considered as *Co-existences* are *qualitatively* related to each other. Investigating the origin of any new form of Force, we find that there is no *creation* in respect of *quantity*; and we put to ourselves the question whether, were we to investigate the conditions of the action and continued existence of any particular form of Force, we should not find that there is no *independence* in respect of *quality*. We know that *quantities* are *relative*, depending on *pre-existing* conditions, and we ask whether *qualities* may not be *correlative*, depending on *co-existing* conditions. Thus, as the accepted Law of quantitative relativity, gives the conception of a SERIES equivalent in its successions; does not the Law of qualitative relativity, which would appear to be logically thence derivable, give the conception of a SYSTEM mutually determining in its co-existences? But such

a deduction evidently not only accords with, but—as indeed a verifying deduction ever does—enables us at once to state as a general principle our inductive hypothesis of mechanical Atoms, and thence-developed theory of chemical Equivalents, and organic Cells. For, as the Sequential Relativity of Forces may, in accordance with accepted formulas, be expressed in some such terms as these: Every Existence is an Equivalent Transformation of a Pre-existence; by such considerations as the preceding, we are led to a Law of Systematic Relativity, which, in such a proposition as the following, may be enunciated: Every Existence has a determined and determining Co-existence; or, more fully and accurately, *Every Existence is a System (of Motions) in a determined and determining System of Co-existences.*

5. Passing now over from Physics to Metaphysics, not merely as to a more complex, but as to a correlative Science; it is first of all clear that, if such a principle as this of Co-existence is, indeed, the ultimate generalisation of physical research; and if, therefore, the conception of Matter must be characterised by such a *systematic relativity* as I have just endeavoured, in accordance with the most general results of our later knowledge, to express in my definitions of Atoms, of Equivalents, and of Cells, a similar relativity must also characterise the conception of Mind. As against the Materialists, Mind must therefore be considered as possessed of a certain definable spontaneity; as against the Idealists, however, this spontaneity cannot be truly conceived as possessed of any determinate qualities

per se, or independent 'Innate Ideas;' and hence, the spontaneity of Mind must be definable as a Tendency only, or, in its subjective aspect, a Want, and a Want implying something out of the Mind, in the same way as the physical notion of Pressure implies another than the body exerting pressure. What, then, is the fundamental Tendency, or Want of Mind? This, evidently, we can discover only by analysing the results of the activity of Mind. Consider, then, such conclusions of psychological analysis as the following. Every, even the simplest sensation is a unity, totality, or oneness of elementary sensations, very numerous, and very brief, of which the rhythm corresponds (speaking generally) with that of an external event.[1] Two sensations may appear to consciousness irreducible, and possessed of absolutely different qualities, and yet be really of the same nature, differing only in the size, order, and number of their elements.[2] And thus our various special sensations are seen to be simply different, but correlative totals or onenesses of the same, or similar elements—in a word, correlative Forms of Oneness. But further. The sensations through which we have direct or immediate presentations of objects are all accompanied by Revived Sensations, or Images, through which we have indirect, or mediate representations of previously-presented objects. It is in this way that we distinguish the special character of a sensation. And we thus see here again that mental activity consists in the integration of correlative

[1] Compare Taine, *De l'Intelligence*, t. I. p. 230.
[2] *Ibid.* pp. 275–278.

elements—in this case, impressions, and their accompanying revived-impressions. Yet further. If we compare the related states of dream, hallucination, and illusion[1] with what we distinguish as the rational waking state, we find that they differ simply in this—that, whereas the former states consist in an uncorrected exteriority of images, the latter state consists in the equilibration and mutual determination of images and sensations.[2] And hence, whether we consider the action which gives us a sensation in its simplest form, or the action through which any given sensation is known for the sensation which it is, or the action which distinguishes the waking from the dreaming state, we find that it is a totalising, equilibration, or integration of correlative elements. We conclude, therefore, from our psychological analysis that the fundamental spontaneity of Mind must be characterised as a Tendency to Integration, or Want of Oneness. But such a spontaneity as this cannot work *in vacuo*, any more than can that spontaneity which we cha-

[1] See Maury, *Du Sommeil et des Rêves*; Griesinger, *Traité des Maladies mentales*; and Macnish, *Philosophy of Sleep*.

[2] Compare Taine, *De l'Intelligence*, t. I. pp. 400 flg. And hence, it may be added that the question, whether our waking state may not be a dream, is an entirely inaccurate, though poetic fancy. You may, indeed, if you will, call our waking state also a dream. But it is a state of an utterly different character from that usually distinguished by the name of dream. For in that sense-awake life sometimes by poets called a dream, there is, as stated in the text, such a mutual determination of two sets of elements as there is not in that sense-closed life, usually distinguished as a dream. Compare the lines of Euripides, quoted by Sokrates in the *Gorgias*—

τίς δ' οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν, κ.τ.λ.

with those of Shakspeare in the *Tempest*—

We are such stuff, &c.

racterise as Pressure. A material body, or Atom, conceived as a Centre of Pressure, implies determined and determining Centres of Pressure. And so, a mental state or Mood, conceived as a Want of Oneness, implies determined and determining Forms of Oneness. Such Forms of Oneness are Sensations, Images, and Ideals—themselves the results of the Mind's integrating activity. And thus, finally, we obtain a conception as fundamental for Metaphysics as that above-defined of Atoms for Physics, and define Moods as *Wants of Oneness determining and determined by correlative Forms of Oneness.* But, as our inductively arrived-at hypothesis of Atoms and the thence-developed general theory of Material Elements—Atoms, Equivalents, and Cells—was ultimately generalised in a principle of Co-existence, so will this hypothesis of Moods and the thence-developed general theory of Mental Elements—Moods, Emotions, and Volitions—be found ultimately generalisable in a principle of Sequence. For if Moods, or the integrating Activities of Mind in the simplest of their subjective aspects, are to be defined as just stated; then, New Integrations will be definable as satisfactions of correlatively-determined Wants of Oneness. But New Integrations are simply new states of consciousness, or, as it may be etymologically defined, together-knowing. And new states of Consciousness are Sequences of Thought, or we may say, simply Sequences. For, if we consider it, we shall see that there would be no sequence, if there were not Thought. Or, do you ask, 'Would not the ticks of the watch on the stand before me on the desk, succeed

each other independently of Thought?' Nay, except some mind *attends*, or imagines some mind attending, there is no *sequence* in the ticks. For what is succession but the *connection* of a number of events? Where would be the connection without Thought? Or how could the events be in a *series* without integration? Sequence, then, is of the very essence of Thought. Just as Matter is Co-existence; Thought or Mind is Sequence. Matter is indeed but the Space-aspect of Thought; Mind, the Time-aspect of Matter. Without Thought there would be but the chaos of an eternal, and—as undefined by Past and Future—absolutely unthinkable Now. And we may, therefore, in enunciating our general principle of Sequence, say, not Every Sequence of Thought, but, simply, *Every Sequence is the Satisfaction of a correlatively determined Want of Oneness.*

6. I would now, in this rapid summary of the results of our new inquiry into Causation, proceed to state that Ethical principle of Co-oneness which was at length arrived-at as the integration of those conceptions of Relativity just defined in the physical principle of Co-existence, and the metaphysical principle of Correlation. We have found then, in our general study of physical phenomena, that three kinds of Existences must be distinguished:—Mechanical Bodies, Chemical Substances, and Biological Organisms; and in our correlative study of metaphysical phenomena, we found that we had similarly to distinguish three kinds of Sequences, namely: Sensations, the subject of Animastic; Images, the subject of Ideatic; and Ideals, the subject

of Noetic. And as, in Physics, we defined the Elements of Bodies, of Substances, and of Organisms, as, respectively, Atoms, Equivalents, and Cells; so in Metaphysics, the Spontaneities which underlie Sensations, Images, and Ideals, we have defined as, respectively, Moods, Emotions, and Volitions. Such categories, first suggested in our experimental study of Physics, were finally carried over into Ethics. Its general conception, evidently integrating those of Existence and of Sequence, is Will. Just as Existences and Sequences, so are Wills or the Embodiments of Will, found to be of three kinds, which may be distinguished as Persons, Neighbours, and Citizens; and hence arise the three Ethical Sciences of Orectic, Deontic, and Juridic. And further, as the Ethical correlates of the physical Elements, distinguished as Atoms, Equivalents, and Cells; and of the Metaphysical Spontaneities, distinguished as Moods, Emotions, and Volitions; we distinguish Motives, Consciences, and Characters. Motives, then, we make the fundamental conception of Ethic, and define Motives as *Mutually determining Aims at Oneness.* And just as we show in Physic, that, if Pressures are conceived as mutually determining, there necessarily arise antagonistic 'attractive, and repulsive forces;' so, in Metaphysic, we would show that, if Wants of Oneness are conceived as correlatively determined, there necessarily arise antagonistic Wants, corresponding to these physical Forces of so-called 'Attraction' and 'Repulsion;' and hence we would show in Ethic that Motives are to be further and more particularly distinguished as Aims at Self-oneness, at Oneness-over-Others, and at Co-oneness. But further.

As in Physic, we were led to a generalisation of our conception of Atoms in the principle of Co-existence; and in Metaphysic to a generalisation of our conception of Moods in the principle of Correlation; so, in Ethic, we are led to a generalisation of our conception of Motives in a principle which we may name that of Co-oneness, and define in some such terms as these: *Every Will is a System (of Aims at Oneness) determining and determined by other Wills to Co-oneness.*

7. But let us now consider that general notion of which these principles of Coexistence, of Correlation, and of Co-oneness, the results of our new enquiry into Causation, are but the variously explicating expressions. Evidently the general notion common to all these principles is that of MUTUAL DETERMINATION; and these principles are but expressions of this general notion in its objective, subjective, and objectivo-subjective aspects. But what is this notion of Mutual Determination thus explicated but a conception of Causation; a new conception of it; and a conception derived, as certainly every true conception of Causation must be, from general results as to the *nature* of Things—results themselves derived from investigation of the actual relations of Things? Distinguishing Things as Existences, Sequences, and Wills, and arriving at such conceptions of the nature of Existences, of Sequences, and of Wills as those defined in the above-stated general Principles, we are at once given three different, but mutually-implicating conceptions of Causation. Consider, first, the conception of Existences given by our general Physical Principle, and the conception, thence

resulting, of Causation in its objective aspect. If, in order that our general conceptions may accord with the experimental results of our later knowledge; if Atoms, if Existences generally, must be conceived—not as independent 'entities' which have been 'endowed' with certain 'virtues' of 'attraction,' 'repulsion,' or what not—but be conceived, on the contrary, as not existing *save in coexistence*, and as having no qualities whatever save such as are expressions of relations of coexistence; then, from such a conception of the *nature* of Existences, quite a new conception follows of the *causes of change* in Existences. For, if every Existence is a System (of Motion) in a determining and determined System of Coexistences; then Causes must be defined as *Relations, differential or equilibrate, between (the Motions of) Coexistents.* But as Existences are but one aspect of Things, and only the objective or physical aspect of them, we have, in the conception of Causes, derived from our conception of Existences, but one aspect of Causation, and only its objective aspect, as *Physical Condition.* Let us, then, consider next the conception we have arrived at of Things in their subjective, or Metaphysical aspect, as Sequences, and what the conception is which thence follows of Causation, as *Metaphysical Spontaneity.* Now, we expressed our general result as to the nature of Sequences—as to the nature, that is, of Mental States as distinguished from Material facts—in these terms: Every Sequence is the Satisfaction of a correlatively determined Want of Oneness. But if so, then, manifestly, Causes, from the internal or subjective point of view at which, in Meta-

physic, we place ourselves, must be defined as *Correlatively determined Wants of Oneness.* Not yet, however, is the conception of Causation which is the result of our new enquiry fully defined. In our general analysis of Things, we distinguished not only Existences and Sequences, but also, as the integration of these, Wills. And if the result we arrived-at as to the nature of Wills be admitted, namely, that every Will is a System (of Aims at Oneness) determining and determined by other Wills to Co-oneness; then Causes, in the conception of them hence-derived, must be defined as *Relations of Accordance between Subjective Aim at, and Objective Result in Co-oneness.* And such, therefore, becomes the definition of Cause as *Ethical End.* Three conceptions of Causes we thus see to be the result of our general investigation of Things in their three great categories as Existences, Sequences, and Wills. But these three conceptions of Causes are manifestly but expressions, from different, but related standpoints, of the same new conception of Causation as Mutual Determination. And this threefoldness of expression is rendered necessary not only by that threefoldness of Things which analysis reveals, but by that threefoldness of Thought which, as we shall in the next subsection see, is its Ultimate Law. Away is thus finally swept, not out of Physics only, but out of Metaphysics, and out of Ethics, the mere sequence-conception of Causes, either as independent Agents acting from without, or as absolute Forces acting from within. *Causation*, as we now see, implies, not merely sequence of Events, but reciprocity of Existence;

Causes, therefore, are not entities, but systematic relations; the *Unconditional Antecedent* is not a onesided and direct, but a twofold and differential action; *Changes*, therefore, are conditioned by systematic relations; and *Forces* are definable as elements of that reciprocal relation which we name a Cause.

8. See, now, the reconciliation which this new conception effects of the antagonistic Causation-theories of Idealism and Materialism, and hence the achievement, at length, of the more immediate aim of our new enquiry. There are, however, strictly speaking, three sets of antagonistic Causation-theories which we must show this new conception of Mutual Determination to be capable of reconciling. And though we may excusably use the terms Idealism and Materialism to designate these antagonisms generally, these terms are more properly restricted to denote the antagonism of the existing theories of Metaphysics. First, then, as to the reconciliation of that antagonism of Causation-theories which we find in those general Physical Theories distinguishable as Dynamism and Atomism, and of which the object is to explain the origin of Motion. In the one class of theories, Forces are supposed to emanate from Matter, or Matter is resolved altogether into Forces; in theories of the other class, Forces are supposed to act on Matter, which is itself conceived to be made up of absolutely hard particles of a determinate form. But without entering into detailed criticism of these theories, it must here suffice to point out that both are equally wanting in *relativity* of conception; to submit that it is from this common cha-

racteristic that the difficulties of each of these sets of theories arise; and to suggest that these difficulties will, and indeed only can, disappear on such a relative conception at once of Matter *and* of Force as that given by our New Principle of Coexistence, and the thence-deduced conception of Cause as Physical Condition. Secondly, as to the reconciliation of that antagonism of Causation-theories which we find in those general Metaphysical Theories of which the aim is the explanation of the Origin of Knowledge, and which are distinguished as Idealism and Materialism. The reconciliation which seems to me to be effected of these antagonistic theories by our New Principle of Correlation, and the conception hence-derived of Cause as Metaphysical Spontaneity, may, perhaps, be most clearly and briefly shown in its relation, more particularly, to the theory of Kant. Now, while Kant denied to the Mind any sort of Knowledge antecedent to, or independent of, Experience, he still maintained that the Mind possesses certain 'Forms' destined to enfold, though requiring to be supplemented by the 'Matter' of Experience. In opposition to this, it would, from the above principle, follow that the Mind is to be conceived as, not only in its *knowledge*, but in its *constitution*, dependent on the World; that this constitutional dependence, however, is not, as with the Materialists, a contingent and sequential relation; but such a necessary and systematic *correlation* that, not only our Cognitions, but our Faculties would not be such as they are, were not the World such as it is. 'Thus,' it is said, 'things appear to us, but as they are

in themselves we can never know.' But I ask, Why should we assume that there *are* 'things in themselves?' For what are Noumena but Things conceived as unqualified? And what is this but the conception of Things as not in relation to other Things? But I deny that there is any Thing not in relation to other Things, and hence I conceive Things and the Cognitions of Things to be, not arbitrarily related, and standing, as it were, only side by side, but mutually related. Thought and Existence are thus conceived as neither independent, as the Materialist maintains; nor identical, as the Idealist contends; but correlative. Otherwise to express the same conception, Time and Space are conceived as neither, on the one hand, in us, and projected on the World; nor as, on the other hand, in the World, and hence reflected in us; but as correlative results of an interaction, neither element of which is, in fact, independent of, nor, in thought, conceivable without the other. And just as, according to our fundamental physical conception, a particle of matter exists as it is only through its coexistents; so, by our fundamental metaphysical conception, neither of the great correlates, the World and the Mind, would, without the other, be anything finite, definite, or definable. But thirdly, in this brief summary, as to the reconciliation of that antagonism of Causation-theories which we find in those general Ethical Theories distinguishable as Intuitionalism and Utilitarianism, and of which the object is to explain the origin of Conscience. In the one class of theories, the Forces that determine Action, or Motion in its objectivo-

subjective aspect, as right or wrong, are conceived as innate; in the other, as derived; and these two classes will be found to be strictly analogous to the classes, above distinguished, of Physical Theories with respect to the Forces that determine motion in its merely objective aspect. But, as in the case of the theories of Dynamism and of Atomism, I must here confine myself to pointing out the radical vice of want of *relativity*, in the conceptions both of the Intuitional, and of the Utilitarian School; and, as the Intuitionalists seem now driven to admit that the forms of Moral Principles are externally determined, I would submit that the Utilitarians can complete, and, in completing, transform their theory only by admitting that Experience could never give rise to any Moral Principles whatever, save in the *interaction* between its memories and systems of spontaneous Moral Want, or Wills, defined as in our principle of Co-oneness, and in the conception thence-deduced of Cause as Ethical End. In conclusion, with reference generally to that reconciliation which seems to me to be effected by the conception of Mutual Determination, as explicated in our New Principles of Co-existence, Correlation, and Co-oneness, I would remark, that, only in a partial conception of Relativity, and hence of Law, has the dispute as to Freedom and Necessity any standing-ground. For, if what Law really is, and what Causation truly means, is *Mutual* Determination; then, evidently, neither Freedom nor Necessity can be absolutely predicated either of Physical Motions, or of Ethical Actions; and, if used at all, these terms can be rightly used only to denote the

character of phenomena from correlative inward, and outward stand-points. And the view thus given, not only of Moral, but of Natural Phenomena; the sublime view, by this fuller development of the conception of Law, given us of *Conditioned Spontaneity*; the view thus given of the Universe, no more as, from without it may appear, a mere mechanism, and necessity of sequence, but as, from within it is seen to be, a divine Life, and freedom of Coexistence—will have, it may safely be predicted, results altogether incommensurable.

9. But the reconciliation of the antagonistic Causation-theories of Physics, of Metaphysics, and of Ethics, was but the more immediate aim of our new inquiry. Its remoter, but never-despaired-of aim, was the discovery of the Ultimate Law of History. For, as I have already in the first Section noted,[1] on recognising Hegel's Rational Law of History, and Comte's Empirical Law of History to be the outcome respectively of an Idealist, and of a Materialist theory of Causation, and hence of Method; it became clear that a new inquiry into Causation was the necessary preliminary to any further attempt at a development of the Philosophy of History. When, even in the first months of this new inquiry, it was seen that a new definiteness had been given to the conception of law by the great principle of the Conservation of Energy, and the Equivalence of Transformation; it was hoped that a new inquiry into Causation would be found not only the necessary preliminary, but the most direct course

[1] Pp. 57–9.

of research that could be entered on with a view to the discovery of an Ultimate Historical Law. And this probability seemed strongly confirmed by those general historical considerations which led me to believe that the revolution, in the midst of which we at present are, is, in its inmost meaning, *a change in men's notions of the causes of change.* Have these anticipations of the remote, been justified by the proximate result of our new inquiry into Causation? Have they not? Have we not thus caught the skirts at least of a form which may, if held fast, reveal itself, at length, as that very Ultimate Law, the aim of all our researches? For when Causation, as all our later knowledge leads us to conceive it, is clearly seen to be definable as Mutual Determination; clearly seen it must also be that Causation, as in the earlier stages of knowledge conceived, is to be defined as Onesided Determination. In the later stages of knowledge we should seem required to conceive Causes as Relations; in the earlier stages of knowledge Causes are unquestionably conceived as Agents. Reciprocal Action is the conception, in which all our later knowledge of Causation seems to be generalised; but this only makes it clear that but more or less gross or refined expressions of that conception of Onesided Action, formed by primitive ignorance, are the Fetiches of the Savage, the Gods of the Theologian, and the Entities of the unscientific Metaphysician. Is there not, however, thus defined for us that first stage in the conception of Causation pointed-out by Hume? Starting from his general theory of Causation, in our systematic inquiry, have we not been

thus suddenly brought to a great historical result? And are we not thus able to characterise in their inmost nature those two great stages in the natural history of Religion, which were but in their outward form characterised by Hume? Combining our two great inductions, the one of which defines the later conception of Causation as Mutual Determination; while the other defines the earlier conception of Causation as Onesided Determination; we state the general fact, or Empirical Law of Man's History to be *Advance from the conception of Onesided Determination to the conception of Mutual Determination.*

SUBSECTION II.

The Speculative Development of our Hypothetical Law.

1. Such, then, is the historical Hypothesis to which we have at length been led by our new inquiry into Causation. And with reference to such a result, the whole of our inquiry hitherto assumes quite a new aspect; and an aspect which seems strikingly to illustrate the complete relativity of scientific conceptions. Considered in reference to its immediate aim, the discovery of a more complete theory of Causation, and one reconciliative of the antagonisms of the current Causation-theories, all the three processes of scientific research may be said to have been already illustrated: Inductive Generalisation, in that physical inquiry which gave, as its result, the hypothesis of Mutually-determining Atoms; Speculative Development, and Deductive Verification, not merely in the establishment

of that hypothesis as in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the foregoing Subsection stated; but Speculative Development and Deductive Verification in the higher spheres also, first, of the development of Metaphysical and Ethical principles corresponding to that Physical Principle in which our Hypothesis of Atoms was generalised; and secondly, of the verification of these principles, not only severally, but jointly, in the reconciliation which they are shown to effect, by their more complete relativity of conception. But, considered in reference to its remoter aim, the discovery of the Ultimate Law of History, all the foregoing processes of research assume but the aspect of one prolonged and complicated process of Inductive Generalisation. For the Historical Law, to which we have just been led, though a higher result than that to which we were previously led—the definition of Causation as Mutual Determination—is yet, in itself, of a more incomplete and hypothetical character. With respect, therefore, to a result thus higher, but more incomplete, both the great processes of Speculative Development and Deductive Verification still lie before us. And, that this must be so, will be evident on remarking that the above-stated law, even if true, states the character only of the primitive, and of the ultimate stages of Intellectual Development. But we can have no working Law of History; no law by which its beginning and end can be brought into relation, and thus its whole course illuminated; no such law shall we have, except we can, in some definite and verifiable manner, generalise the *method* of the advance from the earlier to the later mode of conceiving Causation. It

is evident, therefore, that, in the above-stated law, we have made but the first step towards the discovery of the Ultimate Law of History. The above statement must be considered as but the hypothesis which has been the result of a process (sufficiently prolonged, certainly, and complicated) of Inductive Generalisation. And to the Speculative Development of this hypothesis—the second process in the hoped-for discovery—we have now, in this subsection, to apply ourselves.

2. But how shall we start in beginning such a development of our Hypothetical Law? Consider it. Would it not be well further to examine the principles of the Method itself which has led to this provisional generalisation, and now requires its speculative development? Only the result of acting upon it can decisively justify such a suggestion. It does, however, appear to be thus justified. For, as the Empirical Law of History, which we have already obtained, is really a statement of a certain general change in the outward forms of Thought; and as an Ultimate Law of History, if discoverable, can be nothing else but a concrete statement—a statement immediately applicable to actual historical facts—of some general Law expressive of the inmost nature or essential movement of Mental Development;—it obviously follows that, in order to develop our Empirical into an Ultimate Law of History, we must find, compare, and integrate with it some most general fact characteristic of, or abstract law characterising Thought in its inmost nature, and essential movement. But, further reflecting on the above-stated principles of our New Method; and particularly on the

second both of our Proximate, and of our Ultimate Principles of Investigation; we see that it is in fact just a Law of Thought that is the implicit basis of our New Method. For, in endeavouring to define the principles by which we should guide our philosophical researches, we enquired what, as a matter of fact, the general processes are of the Mind in its search for Truth. And this, because of our assurance that, if a better philosophical method than those hitherto followed could be discovered, it would be but the result of a more complete, and systematic recognition of mental processes. Thus proceeding, the principles, at length defined, of Philosophical Investigation, were founded on the observation of what appeared to be three distinct, but related processes of logical Thought. Reflecting, now, on these processes, we think that we can distinguish in them a movement, the generalisation of which will at once constitute a Law of Thought of the profoundest character. For that first process of Thought, on which is founded our first Proximate Principle, and that first conception of Truth which implicitly or explicitly defines the aim of our first process, and so makes clear to us the Postulate which is our first Ultimate Principle, is marked by a certain undistinguishing generality and outwardness. In relation to this first process, and its aim, the second process of Thought, and corresponding conception of Truth, is distinctly marked by particularity, and inwardness. And the third process of Thought, and corresponding conception of Truth, is marked by a concreteness in which there is a return, but—through the differentiation accomplished in the

second process and conception—a return, in a higher stage, to generality and outwardness. Such is the apparently Ultimate Law of Thought which generalises the facts from which are drawn the principles of our New Method, and the Law, therefore, which is the implicit basis of that Method. But if the movement of Thought really follows such a Law, it will accord with, and thus not only itself be verified in, but complete the expression of, and convert into an Ultimate Law that Empirical Law in which we have generalised the history of Intellectual Development as an advance from the conception of Onesided, to that of Mutual Determination. And that such a movement from Objectivity to a differentiating Subjectivity, and hence to an integrating Objectivity, does really generalise, though in a highly abstract form, the facts of historical development, seems already, by the accordance which we have found to subsist between our dialectical, and the actual historical development of the Sciences, to be made, at least, highly probable.

3. We must, however, endeavour further to make clear to ourselves that Law of Thought which seems thus to have been discovered in reflection on the processes and aims, the consideration of which, in the facts both of our own individual, and of Mankind's historical development, led us, in the foregoing section, to the definition of the principles of our New Philosophical Method. Compare then, first, with the generalisation to which we have ourselves been led, that Law of Thought which Dr. Stirling, more clearly than any other commentator, has revealed as the great discovery of

German Philosophy, and the core, particularly, of the system of Hegel. For, as he has shown, Hegel, deriving his views mainly from a profound study of the Kantian Categories, and asking whether, 'in ultimate generalisation, there might not be anticipated a category that should be the category of categories, or notion of notions,'[1] in effect stated, in his theory of the *Begriff*, or Notion, an Ultimate Law of Thought. In the words of Dr. Stirling, 'the three moments' (of the notion) 'are always interconnected as Yes, No, and Both. . . . The movement plainly is one of identity, opposition, and reconciliation of both in a new identity. This movement, then, name it as we may, is the Notion of Notions, or *the* Notion.'[2] 'Thought's own nature is, first, position; second, opposition; and third, composition.'[3] 'The connection, perhaps, is best seen in the German words for the objects of those three departments (which together constitute the whole) of Technical Logic—*Begriff*, *Urtheil*, *Schluss*. The *Begriff* is the notion yet in its entirety, in its unity, in its identity, as begripped, begriped, or begrasped together. (*An sich.*) The *Urtheil* is the *Ur-theil* (ordeal in English; compare *theil*, *deal*, and the French *tailler*), the primitive or first parting, the judgment, which is a dis-cernment, that is, both a separation and an elevation into special notice of a *part*. (*Für sich.*) The *Schluss* is the shut, the close, the return of the movement to unity.'[4] (*An und für sich.*) 'The δύναμις, ὕλη, and ἐντελεχεία of Aristotle amount

[1] *Secret of Hegel*, vol. II. p. 25. [2] *Ibid.* p. 29.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 88. [4] Stirling, *Secret of Hegel*, vol. I. p. 247.

precisely to the *Begriff*, *Urtheil*, and *Schluss* of Hegel.'[1] 'In short, Thought is what is, and its own inner nature is to be as itself against its other, while its life, or progress, is to overtake and overpass this other, and reidentify it with its own self, but ever with a rise, or increase. This will be found accurately to express the history of Thought; this will be found accurately to express the history of the World.'[2] 'Now this is the whole of Hegel, and this is his ultimate secret. These are the three steps—*An sich*, *Für sich*, *An und für sich*. They have analogues in Aristotle and elsewhere; but unless they be regarded simply in their derivation from Kant they will be misunderstood.'[3] Such, then, according to Dr. Stirling, is the Hegelian System, 'in origin, principle, form, and matter.'[4] Nowhere, however, has Hegel deigned himself to formulate in a clear and verifiable shape the Law or General Form of Thought, which he certainly discovered. But the following sentences have appeared to me more clearly perhaps than any others to express, in his own words, his discovery: 'Das spekulative Denken . . . hat eigenthümliche Formen, deren allgemeine der Begriff ist.'[5] And, 'Die logischen

[1] Stirling, *Secret of Hegel*, p. 204. [2] *Ibid.* vol. II. p. 154.

[3] *Ibid.* vol. I. p. 248.

[4] As to its method, Ueberweg has the following remark—'The truth which lies at the basis of the dialectical method (of Hegel) is the teleological consideration of nature and mind (*Geist*), according to which both, advancing by means of the strife and change of opposites, are developed from the lower to the higher stages, by a necessity conformable, to reason, dwelling consciously or unconsciously in them.' *System of Logic*, p. 69 (Eng. Trans.).

[5] *Encyklopädie. Die Logik. Werke*, b. VI. s. 15.

Formen . . . sind, als Formen des Begriffs, der lebendige Geist des Wirklichen.'[1]

4. Compare now, in chronological order, the various later statements of a similar generalisation. Mr. Boole states the most general law of Thought as a 'Law of Duality,' from which, as expressible by an equation of the second degree, namely $x^2=x$, it follows as a consequence 'that we perform the operation of analysis and classification by division into pairs of opposites, or as it is technically said, by *dichotomy*.'[2] And Mr. Boole further points out the analogy 'of the laws of thought, in their scientific expression, to the actual forms which physical speculation in early ages, and metaphysical speculation in all ages, have tended to assume.'[3] Secondly, compare with the *Begriff* of Hegel, considered as the most general of mental laws, the result of Mr. Spencer's analysis of Reasoning, Perception, and Consciousness in general. It is thus stated: 'All mental action whatever is definable as the continuous differentiation and integration of states of Consciousness;'[4] and further, 'as in two senses,' (in an individual, and in a general sense), there is a continuous differentiation and integration of Being; so, 'in two senses, there is a continuous differentiation and integration of states of Consciousness.'[5] Compare, thirdly, the conclusion to which the consideration of 'the phenomena of human reason and will' has led Mr. Neale as to the nature of Cognition. 'The action of Thought consists in the

[1] *Encyklopädie. Die Logik. Werke*, b. VI, s. 319.
[2] *Laws of Thought*, pp. 50–1.
[3] *Ibid.* pp. 410–11.
[4] *Principles of Psychology*, p. 333.
[5] *Ibid.* p. 334.

production of unities out of the distinction of opposites which are conceivable only when thought of as united.'[1] This he maintains to be the Law of Thought; what Hegel meant by the *Begriff*; and 'the νόησις νοήσεως of Aristotle.'[2] And he endeavours to show that this Law of Thought is 'discernible beneath the flood of metaphysical systems, and that its discovery furnishes us with a new, and most valuable instrument of research into the mysteries of Nature.'[3] Fourthly, compare with the above-explained *Begriff* of Hegel, the following observations of Mr. Hodgson: 'Every moment of Thought is identity as movement, and difference as result; the two things are inseparable, exist in every movement of Thought; that is, contradiction is the movement of Thought.'[4] Further, 'progression by triplets in all reasoning has been shown to depend on the will first setting, and then overleaping a bound, whereby a second object is distinguished from a first, and then seen to have something in common with it, the result being the concept-form, the form of all reasoning. This Law was Hegel's discovery.'[5] And Mr. Hodgson, like Mr. Neale, and their common master, endeavours to apply this law to the explanation of History.[6] Compare, fifthly, that 'axiome de raison explicative,' to which M. Taine has been led as the conclusion of his inductive investigation of the phenomena of intelligence: 'Soit un couple quelconque de

[1] *Analogy of Thought and Nature*, p. 35.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 87.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 122.
[4] *Time and Space*, p. 383.
[5] *Ibid.* p. 400.
[6] *Ibid.* p. 539.

données quelconques ; sitôt qu'elles sont effectivement liées, il y a une raison, un *parceque*, un intermédiaire qui explique, démontre, et nécessite leur liaison.'[1] 'The relation which this axiom establishes between every general character and a general condition is the résumé of all the relations which we encounter, or can encounter in nature. But we must always remember that it affirms no existence, that it does not posit, but suppose a general character, which it confines itself to enouncing as the necessary accompaniment of the general character supposed.[2] Such an axiom should seem, indeed, to be more immediately comparable with those principles in which we have above endeavoured to explicate the notion of Mutual Determination ; but M. Taine himself brings it into direct comparison with the law of Hegel.[3]

5. But let us compare with these statements of the Law of Thought, and, more particularly, with those statements of it by that great German School of Philosophy which culminated in Hegel, the statements with respect to the nature of Thought which we find in that other great School of Philosophy which, in clear logical development, and general European influence, can alone compare with the contemporary German,—the Scottish School.[4] The fundamental doctrine of this

[1] *De l'Intelligence*, t. II. p. 463.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 491. [3] *Ibid.* pp. 491-2.

[4] Both English and French Metaphysicians, almost without exception, now derive from, and affiliate themselves to, the Scottish School. Mansel, for instance, (see *Prolegomena Logica*), and Spencer (see *Classification of the Sciences*, cited below, § 6 *n.*), avowedly found on Hamilton ; Comte, (see *Philosophie positive*, t. VI. p. 319), so far as he recognises Metaphysics at all, on Hume ; and Taine (see *De l'Intelligence*) on Bain and Mill. The

School with respect to the nature of Thought is known as the theory of the Relativity of Knowledge. And in the form in which this variously-understood doctrine and variously-expressed theory[1] has been universally held by Scottish philosophers, it is characterised by Mr. J. S. Mill as the 'important law of our mental nature, that we only know something by knowing it as distinguished from something else; that all consciousness is of difference; that two objects are the smallest number required to constitute Consciousness; that a thing is only seen to be what it is by contrast with what it is not.'[2] As the initial principle of Professor Ferrier's Metaphysical System, the doctrine is thus enunciated: 'Along with whatever any intelligence knows, it must, as the ground or condition of its

influence of the earlier Scottish on the earlier French School is well known. Scotland and Germany seem thus to have succeeded England and France—why, it would be highly interesting to inquire—as the seats of self-developing Philosophical Schools. But certainly, that Scottish School founded by Hume, great and fruitful as it has been, can in no way boast itself over that English School of which Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke, are only three of the greater names.

[1] When knowledge is considered as relative, not to something else known, but to the mind knowing, Mr. Mill calls the principle Metaphysical, and thus distinguishes its various subordinate forms:

I. The Ego and Non-Ego, but a formal distinction between two aspects of the same reality.

II. The Ego and Non-Ego, two self-existent and independent realities:

(I.) Innate Forms of Thought.

(II.) Conceptions derived from Sensations by Laws of Association. *Examination of Hamilton*, pp. 6–16. Compare Hamilton's analysis of Theories of Perception, *Reid's Works*, note C. pp. 817 fig.

[2] *Examination of Hamilton*, p. 6. Mr. Mill afterwards (p. 48) remarks that this 'is one of the profound psychological observations which the world owes to Hobbes; it is fully recognised both by M. Cousin and by Sir W. Hamilton; and it has more recently been admirably illustrated and applied by Mr. Bain, and by Mr. Herbert Spencer.'

knowledge, have some cognisance of itself.'[1] And Professor Bain objects to this statement only as being limited to what he maintains to be but one class of our cognitions. 'There is no property that is not finally attached either to the subject or the object divisions of our universe; still every property has many other contrasts, whereby it becomes knowledge, out of that connection.'[2] Hence he would give this 'different form to the wording of Mr. Ferrier's first proposition . . . Along with whatever any intelligence knows, it must, as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some cognisance of a quality in contrast with what is known.'[3] But does not this Scottish doctrine of the relativity of Thought really imply, and may it not, indeed, be derived from that German doctrine of the 'Synthetical unity of Apperception' which is at the root of the Hegelian theory of the *Begriff*?[4] And is the theory of the *Begriff*, in fact, so very different, as ordinarily supposed, from that theory of Association on which, in the Scottish School now, the exposition of the intellect entirely proceeds, the subdivision into 'faculties' being quite abandoned?[5] But what does either theory state, essentially, but a law of the relations

[1] *Institutes of Metaphysics*, p. 79.

[2] *The Emotions and the Will*, p. 645.

[3] *Ibid.* Compare Mill, *Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy*, chaps. ii. and iii.

[4] Compare Mahaffy, *Kant's Critical Philosophy*, p. 99. 'The association postulated as an ultimate principle . . . really results from, and is dependent upon the synthetical unity of apperception.'

[5] 'In treating of the Intellect, the subdivision into faculties is abandoned. The exposition proceeds entirely on the Laws of Association.' —Bain, *The Senses and the Intellect*, Preface, p. vi. Compare Spencer, *Principles of Psychology*, p. 585.

of the sequences of Thought, and a law necessarily founded on the assumption of the relativity of Thought? According to the theory of the *Begriff*, stating it in the most general terms, Thought proceeds from an undistinguished unification, by way of differentiation, to a conclusion which is an integration of distinguished elements. And according to the theory of Association, the sequences of thought are determined by a law of Contiguity, a law of Similarity, and a law of Construction,[1] by which new combinations are formed in accordance with these elementary laws. But are not these three laws clearly distinguishable as, the first, an objective; the second, a subjective; and the third, an objectivo-subjective law?[2] What are the laws of Contiguity and Similarity but simply inductive generalisations of the conditions of Differentiation? And what is the Law of Constructive Association but a recognition of the power of Integration? In the results, therefore, of the inductive researches of the Association School, we seem to have but an analytical statement of that very Law of Thought which Hegel presented in the obscure metaphysical shape of the *Begriff*. And great as are the differences between the theory of the *Begriff* and the theory of Association; what it concerns us here to note is that, as to the general nature of Thought, and character of the successions of Thought, the respective partisans of these as-hitherto-regarded anta-

[1] Compare Dr. Bain's 'Law of Compound Association' and 'Power of Constructive Association.' *The Senses and the Intellect*, pp. 545–71.

[2] Compare Mervoyer, *L'Association des Idées*, p. 18.

gonistic theories do but confirm each other's conclusions. The very statement of the theory of Association, in its three mutually-implicating laws, is, indeed, at once an illustration and proof of the theory of the *Begriff*. And the historical applications of the theory of the *Begriff* suggest that, with similar applications of it, we should have new illustration and proof of the theory of Association.

6. See, now, the magnificent unity of modern research, and its results with respect to the nature of Thought. As we have already remarked, distinctively an age of thought respecting Thought has been that Modern Era of Western Philosophy which was opened by Bacon and Descartes. By Hume and Kant, the founders of the two great Schools which have dominated the second period of that Era, not only new inquiries into the nature of Thought, but new speculations with respect to the history of Humanity were initiated. Little connection may, even to their authors, the systematic inquiries and critiques, which were their great works, have seemed to have with their Historical Essays; yet, see how indispensable each of the two courses of research thus initiated has been to the other. Without the historical, the systematic inquiries would not have had defined for them the great aim which gives them their practical importance—interpretation of the Past, and prediction of the Future of Humanity—and, without the systematic, the historical inquiries would never have had even the possibility before them of discovering the Ultimate Law of History. And see the unity of

the results. The researches, both of that great Scottish School of Philosophy founded by Hume, and of that great German School founded by Kant, have resulted in at least general conclusions essentially similar. According to both, Thought is in its nature relative, and the laws of its sequences are Laws of Differentiation and Integration. And this similarity of general result is the more remarkable as it has been, for the most part, attained either in antagonism to, or in ignorance of, what has been effected by others. How singular, for instance, it is that Mr. Spencer, not only without any knowledge of Hegel, and with inaccurate knowledge even of Kant,[1] but working on a totally different method, and chiefly influenced in the development of his philosophical system by the biological conceptions of Wolff, Goethe, and Von Baer,[2] should have arrived at conclusions with respect to the differentiative and integrative character of the activity of Thought in such clear general accordance, at least, with the theory of Hegel! It would be irrelevant to our immediate purpose specially to remark on the suggestiveness with reference to our Postulate of

[1] I would venture to recommend the passages respecting Kant, which will be found even in the stereotyped edition of Mr. Spencer's *Principles of Psychology*, to the criticism of such Kantians as my friends Dr. Ingleby and Dr. Stirling.

[2] 'And now let me point out that which really *has* exercised a profound influence over my course of Thought. The truth which Harvey's embryological inquiries first dimly indicated, which was more clearly perceived by Wolff and Goethe, and which was put into a definite shape by Von Baer—the truth that all organic development is a change from a state of homogeneity to a state of heterogeneity—this it is from which very many of the conclusions which I now hold have indirectly resulted. The formula of Von Baer acted as an organizing principle.'—*Classification of the Sciences*, &c., p. 46.

the Correlativity of Nature and of Thought, the profound suggestiveness of this unity of result, whether we proceed from the investigation of Nature to the analysis of Thought, or from the analysis of Thought to the investigation of Nature. We must here confine ourselves to pointing out merely the fact that there is such a general consensus in the results of all those various researches with respect to the nature of Thought, which have distinguished the Modern Era, as does not appear hitherto to have been duly appreciated, such an agreement, and an agreement with such a practical issue, as may well shame those who, with so impudent an ignorance, represent Philosophy as a mere chaos of conflicting and unpractical opinions; such an accordance as here, in the Speculative Development of our Hypothetical Law of History, justifies us in considering it a clearly established fact, that Thought has a general Method, and that the sequence of Thought, both in the general history of Humanity, and in the particular history of the individual, is marked by progressive differentiations and integrations, determined by definite laws.

7. Such, then, is that general result with respect to the nature of Thought, which we must endeavour to integrate with the above-stated Empirical Law, and so develope it into an Ultimate Law of History. Now we have found, as the result of our new inquiry, that all our later knowledge leads us to the conception of Causation as Reciprocity, Mutual Determination, or Reciprocal Action; to Principles of Co-existence, of Correlation, and of Co-oneness explicative of the con-

ception of Mutual Determination, in the three great related spheres of Physics, Metaphysics, and Ethics; and thus, to the definition of Causes as—whether conceived as Physical Conditions, as Metaphysical Spontaneities, or as Ethical Ends—ever *Relations.* But in clear antagonism to this scientific conception, we have found that Causes are, in the earlier stages of Culture, conceived as Agents; in the earlier stages, even of scientific investigation, as Entities; and hence that, in both cases, Causation is conceived, not as a Mutual, but as a Onesided Determination. Combining these two inductions—the induction, first, as to the character of the later stage of the conception of Causation, an induction drawn from investigation, not only of the actual relations of Things, but of the general results of Thought; and the induction, secondly, as to the character of the earlier stage of the conception of Causation, an induction drawn from investigation of the mental representations actually characteristic, not only of primitive culture, but of popular theories generally, and even of rudimentary science;—combining these two inductions, we stated the law of the development of Human Consciousness as an *Advance from the conception of Onesided, to that of Mutual Determination.* But we immediately pointed-out that, in order to complete the enunciation of this Law of Development, it would be necessary to state how this Advance is effected; and further, to state this in such a way as to connect this Empirical Law with a General Law of Thought, and so convert it into an Ultimate Law. This we are, at length, prepared to do by our

consideration of the general nature, and method of Thought. We have found that it is a differentiating and integrating activity, and that the method to be discovered in its sequences is a procedure from simpler, to more complex unities by way of differentiation. By differentiation, therefore, Thought must have proceeded from its earlier and simpler, to its later and more complex conception of Causation. How, then, is the Differentiation to be defined, by which the Human Consciousness rose from the conception of Onesided to the conception of Mutual Determination? The *à priori* suggestion is, that it has been by a Differentiation of Objective and Subjective that that Advance, which should seem to characterise the mental history of Mankind, has been effected. That this has actually been the case, it will be for our Deductive Verification to prove, in showing that the conception of Onesided Determination is really marked by, and arises from, an undistinguishing generality of conception, and non-differentiation of Inward and Outward, of Subjective and Objective;[1] in showing, on the other hand, that the conception of Mutual Determination is due to the distinction and correlation of Inward and Outward, of Subjective Forces, and Objective Conditions; and in showing further that that great intermediate stage of Mental Development which separates the earlier from the later mode of conceiving Causation is actually found to be, when considered in its most general and profoundest aspect, marked by a varied Differentiation of Subjective and Objective. It is, however, enough

[1] See below, B. I. ch. ii. sect. ii.

for us, at present, in the speculative development of our Historical Law, to introduce in the statement of it this suggested generalisation of the great Middle Age of Human History. But yet a further remark has to be made, and, though it is the last, it is not the least important. Not *absolutely* as the *Idee* of Hegel; but *relatively* must the activity of Thought be conceived. For, by our fundamental principle of Correlation, the results of that activity are results of an *interaction*, neither of the elements of which is independent of, or, indeed, conceivable without the other; and hence, the development of Thought must be stated as relative to Terrestrial Conditions.[1] Combining, now, these various considerations, we finally enunciate the Ultimate Law of Man's History in these terms,—*Thought, in its Differentiating and Integrating Activity, advances, under Terrestrial Conditions, from the conception of Onesided Determination, through the Differentiation of Subjective and Objective, to the conception of Mutual Determination.*

[1] I admit, therefore, that, even 'if we discovered the course of the development of character down to the most minute changes, if we discovered the law which governed these changes so far as they depended on human feeling and thought, we should still have a science of History conditionally only, on the condition of physical phenomena continuing to follow a normal course.' (Hodgson, *Theory of Practice*, vol. II. pp. 466–7.) But though this may be admitted generally, yet as all our geological knowledge leads us to believe that great changes of the Earth are separated from each other by millions of years, while we know that great revolutions of Humanity are separated from each other by millenniums only; Terrestrial Conditions may, with reference to such changes, be considered as, approximately at least, a constant quantity. And hence I cannot agree with Mr. Hodgson in thinking that 'the physical branch of History is the one which appears the greatest obstacle to its ever ranking as a science of prediction.'

8. I venture to offer this to deductive verification as the Ultimate Law of History, and as a Verifiable Ultimate Law. Ultimate: because it not merely states the fact of such successive periods, or states of Mental Development, as those first adequately distinguished by Hume, and afterwards by Comte; but refers them to a property of Thought, similar in ultimacy to that supposed by Newton in Matter, in order to account for the empirical laws of Kepler. And Verifiable: because it not only states, as did Hegel, in his theory of the *Begriff*, a Law of Thought; but, *in accurately defining the character of the most general primitive and ultimate conceptions of Thought*, makes it possible immediately to apply, and clearly to prove, or disprove the accordance of this Law with the facts of History. We should therefore find the law of the Three Periods which Comte simply stated as a fact, just as Kepler stated his laws of the Planetary Orbits,—each being prevented by false views of Causation from going further in a right direction[1]—deducible from this historic Law of Thought, just as were Kepler's Laws from the systematic Law of Matter discovered by Newton. Just as the Keplerian Orbits may not only be deduced from, but have new correctness given to them by the Law of Matter; we should also find that the Comtean

[1] See on the views of Causation of both, Mill, *System of Logic*, vol. I. pp. 380–1; and more particularly with reference to the views of the latter, *A. Comte and Positivism*. 'He sees no difference between such generalisations as Kepler's laws and such as the theory of gravitation. He fails to perceive the real distinction between laws of Phenomena, and those of the action of Causes; the former exemplified by the succession of day and night; the latter, by the earth's rotation which causes it.' (p. 37.)

Periods may not only be deduced from, but have new correctness given to them by this Law of Thought. And as—though long before Newton, it had been surmised that the phenomena of the system of Nature might be all explained by some general Law of Matter[1]—the notion of Universal Gravitation acquired a scientific form only when Newton stated the law of its variation at once definitely and verifiably; so—although there have already been many attempts to explain the phenomena of the development of Consciousness by some general Law of Thought[2]—only in the definite, verifiable, and hence scientific form, now given to the notion of an Ultimate Historical Law, does it appear to have a similarity to the systematic law of Newton. Yet further: as the Law of Matter revealed to us the system of Nature, so ought the Law of Thought, as interpreter of the Past, and prophet of the Future, to illuminate for us the history of Consciousness. And finally, as this Law of History, if indeed ultimate and verifiable, should be seen, not in the relations only of the larger Cycles and Ages, but in the relations also of the lesser Eras and Periods of the world-consciousness of Humanity; and not in these only, but in the relations also both of the larger and of the lesser sequences of the individual Consciousness; as, in a word, this Law should be seen in the maxima and minima of Thought, even as the Newtonian Law is in the maxima and minima of Nature; it should lead

[1] As, for instance, by Copernicus.

[2] See, for instance, Littré, *Paroles de Philosophie positive*, pp. 71 flg. and Mill, *Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy*, pp. 306–7.

to such exhaustless discoveries of Oneness in forms infinitely various, yet all interrelated, as, in the satisfaction thus given to the divine thirst of the human intellect, will be a new source of entrancing delight.

9. But before proceeding to state those general deductions from this Law which we should find verified in the facts of History, it will be desirable to complete these remarks on the speculative development of it in pointing-out the relation of the historical theory of Hume to that of Hegel on the one hand, and to that of Comte on the other; in showing that the law above-stated is but a development of the generalisations of Hume, by an integration of the conceptions of Hegel and of Comte; and hence that, in the development of the Law itself, is to be observed that action which it states to be a universal fact of Thought. In the case of my individual Thought, this will, I trust, already have been evident from the method of this exposition;[1] but in the facts also of its historical development I

[1] But reflection in the course of my individual development of this Law leads to the observation that the *third movement* of Thought gives by no means necessarily a highest, but, it may be, only an intermediate term. For there was first, as the general result of physical studies, the clear conception of Mutual Determination as what Causation really is. Instantly then came the antithesis of Onesided Determination as defining the unscientific conception of Causation. And not till long years after did I get that third term which, in *connecting* the two terms already obtained, gave at length the Law above stated. The third movement, then, of Thought integrates *either* as a culminating, or as a mediating term. What the laws are of this variation will hereafter have to be inquired into. Here I can only remark that the views of Plato and of Hegel, with the former of whom τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν μικτόν was an intermediate, with the latter, a higher element, seem thus to be reconciled. See Ueberweg, *System of Logic*, pp. 179-80; *Phileb.* 23 and *Tim.* 35A, as there cited: and generally, Vera, *Platonis, Aristotelis, et Hegelii, de Medio Termino Doctrina.*

would now point-out that this Law may be seen exemplified. First, then, as to Hume's general theory of History: it may be thus briefly summarised. To 'a barbarous, necessitous animal (such as a man is on the first origin of society),'[1] . . . . '*unknown causes* become the constant objects of hope and fear; and while the passions are kept in perpetual alarm by an anxious expectation of the events, the imagination is equally employed in forming ideas of those powers on which we have so entire a dependence.'[2] Hence Polytheism, which, in its 'vulgar' form, 'deifies every part of the universe, and conceives all the conspicuous productions of Nature to be themselves so many real divinities.'[3] 'But the same anxious concern for happiness, which begets the idea of these invisible intelligent powers, allows not mankind to remain long in the first simple conception of them as powerful but limited beings, masters of human fate, but slaves to destiny and the course of nature. Men's exaggerated praises and compliments still swell their idea upon them; and elevating their Deities to the utmost bounds of perfection, at last beget the attributes of unity and infinity, simplicity and spirituality.'[4] Thus is the Primitive, or Theological Stage of our conception of Causation, in its three sub-periods, Pantheism (distinguished by Hume as 'Vulgar Polytheism'), Polytheism, and Monotheism, clearly distinguished and described. Nor less clearly does the last paragraph

[1] *Natural History of Religion. Phil. Works,* vol. IV. p. 439.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 445, and compare p. 461.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 458.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 472.

of the 'general corollary' characterise, in a negative manner, at least, the Scientific, or Ultimate Stage of our conceptions of Causation, in the 'deliberate doubt' which is then maintained respecting all causes beyond those which are found in the 'steady, inviolable laws' by which 'everything is surely governed.'[1] 'The whole is a riddle, an enigma, an insuperable mystery. Doubt, uncertainty, suspense of judgment, appear the only result of our most accurate scrutiny concerning this subject. But such is the frailty of human reason, and such the irresistible contagion of opinion, that even this deliberate doubt could scarcely be upheld; did we not enlarge our view, and opposing one species of superstition to another, set them a-quarreling; while we ourselves, during their fury and contention, happily make our escape into the calm, though obscure, regions of philosophy.'[2]

10. From Hume, the modern period of European Philosophy took, as I have already pointed out,[3] a new start. But it is not enough, for my present purpose, to point-out that the chiefs both of the Idealist and Materialist Schools, that mark this second period of Modern Philosophy, equally acknowledge their obligations to Hume as the initiator of a new movement; and that, in the philosophy of Hume, both the idealism and the materialism of the period which he initiated were, in fact, implicit. I must also show more particularly that those greatest results hitherto of

[1] *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. Phil. Works*, vol. II. p. 480.
[2] *Natural History of Religion. Phil. Works*, vol. IV. p. 513.
[3] Above, Sect. I.

European speculation, Hegel's theory of the *Begriff*, and Comte's 'Law of the Three Periods,' are, different though they are, both directly traceable to the speculations of the great Scottish thinker, and such as to exemplify our general Law of Mental Development. Now, first, as to Hegel. It is notorious that it was the speculations of Hume that urged the Scottish-descended Kant to his 'Critique of Pure Reason.' And a thorough study of this second period of Modern Philosophy shows clearly that the Notion or *Begriff* of Hegel was but a development, through the transitional steps made by Fichte and Schelling, of that conception of Reciprocity into which, implicitly at least, Hume's conception of Causality had been transformed by Kant.[1] The *Begriff* of Hegel, as we now see, is, in fact, but a way of presenting that very conception of Mutual Determination which, in the investigation of physical phenomena, and in the development, particularly, of the principle of the Conservation of Energy, we have ourselves arrived-at as the true, and, as it would appear, ultimate conception of Causation. And the speciality of the way in which Hegel presents this conception of Reciprocity consists essentially but in its dynamical or historical form, and what is implied in that. But this historical form of the conception of Reciprocity is just what was required to give us the law of the process of that fundamental change in our conceptions, on the hypothesis of which is founded Hume's theory of 'the Natural History of Religion.' And in this conception of Reciprocity, or

[1] See Stirling, *Secret of Hegel*, vol. II. pp. 514-16.

Mutual Determination, the scientific mode of conceiving Causation, or of thinking of the causes of Things, is defined in a much more truly positive manner than in Hume's above-cited characterisation, in one sense, indeed, 'positive,' but much more truly negative.

11. So far, then, as to the relation of the theory of Hume to the *Begriff* of Hegel. Consider now its relation to the Law of Comte. The famous Law of the Three Periods will hardly, I think, now appear to be, so far as it is true, very much more than a formulising of the profound generalisations of Hume. 'Cette loi,' to take Comte's own statement of it, 'cette loi consiste en ce que chacune de nos conceptions principales, chaque branche de nos connaissances passe successivement par trois états théoriques différens: l'état théologique, ou fictif; l'état métaphysique, ou abstrait; l'état scientifique, ou positif. En d'autres termes, . . . d'abord, la méthode théologique, ensuite, la méthode métaphysique, et enfin, la méthode positive. De là, trois sortes de philosophies, ou de systèmes généraux de conceptions sur l'ensemble de phénomènes, qui s'excluent mutuellement.'[1] Such was the law which Comte refers to as 'la grande loi philosophique que j'ai découverte en 1822,'[2] which directed all the future course of his speculations,[3] and which is now very generally accepted as, at least, approximately true.[4] But compare the above statement with that

[1] *Philosophie positive*, t. I. pp. 3, 4.

[2] *Ibid.* t. IV. p. 653. [3] *Ibid.* t. VI. p. 319.

[4] See, however, Spencer, *Reasons for Dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte*; in answer to objections, see Mill, *A. Comte and Positivism*; and compare Hodgson, *Theory of Practice*, vol. II. p. 465.

which I have just given[1] of Hume's Theory. I think it will then be admitted that, nearly three-quarters of a century before Comte,[2] the Theological Period of our conception of Causation, and its three sub-periods had, by Hume, been clearly distinguished and described; and no less clearly characterised in a positivist sense that Scientific Period which Comte maintained to be 'l'état fixe et définitif de l'intelligence humaine.' One is, therefore, surprised to find that M. Littré,[3] while giving all due credit to Turgot, Kant, and Condorcet as partial precursors of Comte, in his conception of Human Development, should have omitted altogether to notice Hume, the most important of them all. For not only the notion of Comte's law of the Three Periods, but the notion also of such a System of the Sciences as is Comte's other chief title to fame, is to be found in the works of the thinker whose influence Comte himself candidly acknowledges to have been, with that of 'son immortel ami Adam Smith,' 'très-utile à ma première éducation philosophique.'[4] 'There is no question of importance,' says Hume, 'whose decision is not comprised in the "Science of Man;" and there is none which can be decided with any certainty before we become acquainted with that Science. In pretending, therefore, to explain the principles of Human Nature, we in effect propose a complete *System of the Sciences*, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any

[1] Above, pp. 195–6. [2] 1757. See Burton, *Life of Hume*, vol. I. p. 266.

[3] *Auguste Comte et la Philosophie positive.* Première partie, chap. iii. and iv. And see above, Sect. I. Subs. ii. § 4 *n.*

[4] *Philosophie positive*, t. VI. p. 319.

security.'[1] These sentences occur in the very work in which that theory of Causation is elaborated, of which Comte says that 'malgré toutes ses graves imperfections, ce travail constitue, à mon gré, le seul pas capital qu'ait fait l'esprit humain vers la juste appréciation directe de la nature purement relative propre à la saine philosophie, depuis la grande controverse entre les réalistes et les nominalistes.'[2] And what is that historical hierarchy of the Sciences which is put forward as, next to the Law of the Three Periods, Comte's greatest achievement, but a working-out, and, (as I trust that the New Classification of the Sciences which, in the foregoing Section, I have set forth, will practically have demonstrated,) but a very partial, and onesided working-out of the great Scottish thinker's profound conception of 'a complete System of the Sciences founded on the principles of Human Nature'? Let me not, however, be understood as denying the originality, as well as breadth and vigour, with which the ideas of Hume were conceived, and elaborated by Comte. My object here is only to point-out the important historical fact that Comte's chief scientific ideas were *in* Hume. Whether these ideas were drawn by Comte *from* Hume is a question of mere biographical interest into which I do not care to enter.

12. But, further, with reference to the general speculative development of our Ultimate Law of History, I would point out that, in the above statement of it, the theory of Hume is completed through

[1] *Treatise of Human Nature. Phil. Works*, vol. I. p. 8.
[2] *Philosophie positive*, t. VI. p. 319.

an integration of the conceptions of those illustrious thinkers with whom closed the Thought-period initiated by him and Kant. For the assertion by this Law of an advance from the conception of One-sided, to the conception of Mutual Determination is evidently but a new expression, at once more general, and more definite, of that great fact of *a change in our notions of the causes of change* first stated by Hume, afterwards formulised by Comte, and more lately verified by vast collections of evidence with respect to 'Primitive Culture.'[1] Evidently, also, the further assertion made by the above-stated law, namely, that this change is effected by a Differentiation of the Subjective and the Objective, is in accordance with that Law of Thought first presented in the *Begriff* of Hegel, and verified, as we have seen, by the general results of modern thought respecting Thought. But not only does this new Law thus integrate what is true in the theories and laws of Hume, of Hegel, and of Comte, but it gives to the truth contained in these theories and laws a more complete and accurate expression. The Transitional or Metaphysical Stage of Comte, in particular, this new Law far more broadly and accurately generalises as that great Intermediate Age of the Differentiation of the Subjective and Objective necessary to the development of the true conception of Causation as Mutual Determination—an Intermediate Age, of which the beginning must, as we shall presently see, be dated from a vastly more remote century than that from which Comte dates his Transitional or Meta-

[1] See the admirable compilations of Sir J. Lubbock, Mr. Tylor, &c.

physical stage. And the Law of the Three Periods, as a whole, the integration by this new Law, of a Law of Thought, converts from an Empirical into a Rational or Ultimate Law. Nor is this new Law of a less completing character in its relation to the Law of Hegel, though in a converse fashion. For the primitive and ultimate stages of the conception of Causation, either vaguely or inaccurately generalised in the theory of the *Begriff*, are by this new Law clearly and verifiably defined. And as the process of Thought, absolutely conceived in the Hegelian theory, is, in that synthetic theory of Mutual Determination which led to this new Law, relatively conceived; the history of Thought is, in this new Law, expressly stated to be determined, in its manifestations, by terrestrial conditions. This new Law, therefore, is thus seen to be an integration of those Causation-theories, systematic and historic, into which the Causation theory, systematic and historic, of Hume was differentiated—an integration resulting in a Law, at once rational as a Law of Thought, and empirical as a Law of Facts—a verifiable Ultimate Law.

13. Finally, this Law it is which, though not improbably in some more accurate statement of it, must, as I venture to think, be made the basis of that Reconciliative Philosophy, the elaboration of which is the great task of the third era of Modern European Speculation—that on which we have now entered. This New Philosophy, of which the fundamental historical Law is derived, as I have shown, from the true founder of the Scottish School, may still have applied to it the name

distinctive of Scottish Philosophy, and be called the 'Philosophy of Common Sense.' But 'the truth of knowledge and the morality of actions,' will now be tested by accordance with Common Sense, not as meaning 'the complement of those cognitions or convictions which we [*primitively*] *receive* from Nature,'[1] but as denoting 'the complement of those cognitions or convictions,' which we *ultimately win* from Nature. And the Principles of Common Sense, or rather, as it may now appear more accurate to say, the Principles of *the* Common Sense, to which appeal is made are, therefore, now, generalisations of the common Consciousness—of the Consciousness of the objective world which is *common* to all of us—conclusions whereon the methods of Logic give us the means of general agreement. Of these generalisations, certainly the greatest is that *fact* of the historical development of Consciousness, of the ultimate *law* of which I have above endeavoured to give what I trust may be found to be, at least, an approximately true expression. And hence, the appeal to the Common Sense will now be an appeal, first, of the individual to the Community; then, of the temporary, to the progressive Consciousness; and hence, of the man to Humanity. And defining our position thus in its relation to the Scottish; to define it also in its relation to the German School. As Kant compared[2] his Critical Philosophy to that Copernican Astronomy which had asked whether the phenomena

[1] Hamilton, *The Philosophy of Common Sense, Reid's Works*, pp. 756–7. Compare *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. II. p. 16.

[2] Second Preface to the *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft.*

of the heavens would not be better explained if, instead of supposing the starry host to circle round the spectator, the spectator were supposed to move, and the stars to remain at rest; so, I would compare this Synthetic Philosophy to that Newer Astronomy, which supposes both spectator and stars to move; and, in the solution of such a more complicated problem as this, endeavours to explain the supremer phenomena of the Stellar Universe. For, in our theory of Knowledge, the two great correlates, the World and the Mind, are conceived as so determining each other that neither would be as it is, were not the other as it is; and, in our theory of History, the Individual and Humanity are similarly conceived to be mutually related; and hence the truth of individual conceptions with respect to such supremer phenomena as are, for us students of History, the great religious ideas of Immortality, Incarnation, and God, is determined by their relation to the fact of a great historical movement in Consciousness, a movement which enables us to interpret their past changes, and to forecast their future transformations, and even such a movement as is now known to comprehend the whole system of those starry spheres which alone parallel in sublimity the phenomena of the history of Man.

SUBSECTION III.

The Deductive Verification of the Law of History.

1. But, if I have thus ventured boldly to state what such a Law as that which we have speculatively

developed from our inductively obtained hypothesis, would be;—if I have ventured to say that it would be the foundation and warranty, not of a New Philosophical Synthesis only, but of a New Synthesis, Religious also, and Social; if I have ventured to announce it as the complete development of the theory of Hume, by integration of the Laws of Hegel and of Comte; and if I have ventured further to compare it, in ultimacy and incommensurable results, with the Newtonian Law of Gravitation;—I have done so only in order that both I myself and my readers might be adequately impressed with the necessity of the widest and most manifold deductive verification of such a Law. For not the speculative suggestion merely, but the actual verification of a Law is its *discovery*. And the boldness, therefore, with which I have stated what such a Law of History as that above-enunciated would be, can be justified only by an equally unflinching statement of those immediate deductions from it which, if the Law has any reality at all, we should find to be in as complete accordance with the facts of History, as the deductions from the Law of Gravity have been found to be with the facts of the Universe. Let me then, proceed now to state what those immediate deductions from our Ultimate Law are, which we should find verified in the facts of History. Now, the first deduction from such a Law as that above-stated, as the Ultimate Law of Human History, evidently is, that the history of Man, or some part of it, can be truly regarded as, essentially, a history of Thought; that, as such a history, it had an assignable beginning, and that, re-

garded as a history of Thought, it constitutes a definable unity. In general verification of such a deduction, I would state three sets of facts, or, at least, verifiable affirmations. In the first place, we find that two great Cycles of Human Life have preceded that from the beginning of which we would date the origin of Humanity, and Cycles of such a character as to give to the term 'Humanity' a definite historical significance. For the First Cycle of Human Life, that Cycle of which we find relics so profoundly interesting in the Fossil Men of the caves of Neanderthal and of Engis, we may—not only because of the comparatively unintellectual character then of Man, but because this Cycle was occupied in a struggle with, and ended in a triumph over Animals of almost incomparably greater physical powers than himself—distinguish, with a proud humility, as the *Cycle of Animality*. The Second—the transitional Cycle—of which that great cataclysm in Central Asia recorded in the traditions of the Deluge, and probably about 10,000 B.C., may have been but the central event—this Cycle of the formation of the Races and Languages of Civilisation —may, if we duly consider the prodigious force of originating spontaneity implied, not only generally, in the discovery of Words, and the logic of Grammar, but in the formation, particularly, of the more highly organised Languages, fitly, I think, be distinguished as the *Cycle of Creativity*.[1] Now, to the end of this Cycle, and the beginning of the *Cycle of Humanity* we

[1] Compare Bunsen, *Egypt's Place*, vol. IV., *Synopsis of the Ages of the World*, pp. 485 flg.

can assign a distinct date. For the second class of facts which we have to note are those which establish an extraordinary synchronism in the beginnings of Civilisation—in the formation, that is, of at least rudimentary systems of Thought, of Worship, and of Polity. Independent Indian, Assyrian, and Egyptian researches all carry, or tend to carry the Civilisation of the great river-valleys of the Indus, the Euphrates, and the Nile, back to the same Sixth Millennium B.C. And the third fact which we seem to be justified in affirming is that our present systems of Thought, of Worship, and of Society have a distinctly traceable connection with these synchronistic beginnings of Civilisation. Considering, then, these three Cycles of Human Life in their relation to each other, the term 'Humanity' assumes a distinct historical significance, and we define it, not merely as an equivalent of 'Human Race,' or of 'Mankind,' but as the *Progressive Unity of Recorded Thought.* That New Human Development, therefore, the Law of which is expressed in our Ultimate Law of History, is thus, in accordance with our first deduction from that Law, found to have a clear historical definition, and an, at least, approximately assignable date of origination. And we may further remark that, in these three great Cycles of Human Life—these Cycles of Animality, of Creativity, and of Humanity—we see on a new and still grander scale that same Law of Unification, Differentiation, and Integration, or of Objectivity, Subjectivity, and Subjectivo-Objectivity, which we are now endeavouring to verify in the successive Ages of Humanity; that same

Law which we found in those processes of logical Thought from which we deduced the principles of our New Philosophical Method; that same Law of Thought which, like the Law of Gravity, we find equally manifest in sequences of the smallest, as of the largest scope.

2. But further, if our Ultimate Law is really verifiable, a Revolution should be discoverable in the general history of Mankind, to which, and to the great historical period of Transition, or Middle Stage of Mental Development which it initiated, no other general interpretation can, with full recognition of all the facts, be given, than that of a Differentiation of Subjective and Objective. Now I am aware that these terms may, for some readers, be too general to convey any precise meaning. But if one conceives the distinction of Subjective and Objective as, generally, but a short way of indicating the distinction between consciousness of Oneself and consciousness of what is not Oneself; between the Internal World of our own thoughts and emotions, and the External World of those Persons and Things that excite thought and emotion; between reflection on Ourselves—the sequences of inward want and satisfaction, of pain and pleasure that constitute our own solitary selves—and reflection on the coexisting phenomena of Outward Objects,—I think that no difficulty should be found in attaching a perfectly clear and definite meaning to the distinction of 'Subjective and Objective.'[1] And as to Differentiation. Just con-

[1] It must, however, be noted that these terms have another derivative, and more important sense. As above distinguished, *both* the sensational and the intellectual elements of cognition would be named *subjective*. But in the sense which the terms *subjective* and *objective* seem first to

sider the mental state of a child, and more particularly of an infant. Look at the little creature. It simply feels pain and pleasure; itself and the world are undistinguished, as yet, in its consciousness; there is no reflection as yet on itself as a distinct personality; itself and the world are, in a sense, One; and yet not truly *One*, for there seems hardly as yet to be a consciousness of *difference*. Look at it, as its eye meets yours with a great blank stare utterly wanting in self-consciousness. This example of the non-differentiation of Subjective and Objective may help us clearly to understand what is meant by their differentiation. Contrast, then, with the undistinguishing consciousness of the infant that of a person after puberty. There are now, not merely feelings, but distinctions of the sources of feeling; Self is now very clearly differentiated from Not-Self; Oneself is reflected on as a distinct personality; the oneness felt, when it is felt, between Self and Others, is now the oneness of two distinctly different beings; and, in relation particularly to certain Others, there is now a very marked Self-consciousness. Now, as I have already said, the Ultimate Law of History is in this like the Ultimate Law of Nature, that the facts of which it is a general expression are to be found in spheres of every conceivable degree of magnitude and minuteness. And the second deduction from our Ulti-

have taken in Kant's *Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft*, and in which they were afterwards generally used by Hegel, the sensational elements only are considered strictly *subjective*, as being incapable of comparison between subject and subject; while the intellectual elements, as the same in each of us, and common to us all, and hence capable of comparison, are considered as *objective*. See Stirling, *Secret of Hegel*, vol. I. p. 229 *n*.

mate Law of History is nothing more than that in the history of the Consciousness of Mankind there is discoverable an Age which can no otherwise be truly and generally characterised than as such a differentiation of Subjective and Objective as it will now, I think, be admitted that we find in the history of the Consciousness of Individuals; and further, that, as usually in the history of the individual Consciousness, so, in that of the general human Consciousness, the passage into this Second Age was marked by a revolutionary era; an era in which there was a consciousness of restrictions, slaveries, and miseries never hitherto felt in external circumstances; a consciousness, not only of shortcoming in conduct, but of unworthiness in motive; and a consciousness of new uneasy desires of freedom, of moral perfection, and of love. Is such a Revolution, then, actually discoverable? This is, for our Law, the crucial question. We venture to put it forward, not only as integrating what is true in the Laws of Hegel and of Comte, but as developing what is true in these Laws in such a more complete and accurate expression of the Law at once of progressive Thought, and of historical Fact, as to entitle it alone to be called a verifiable Ultimate Law of Man's history. More explicit, therefore, if our Law is in its statement than are the Laws of Hegel and of Comte; more definite also must be its verification. No such general views merely of Man's history as are given us by Hegel,[1] and by

[1] *Werke*, b. IX., *Philosophie der Geschichte*; b. X. th. 1 and 2, *Aesthetik-Entwickelung des Ideals zu den besonderen Formen des Kunstschönen*; and bb. XIII., XIV., and XV., *Geschichte der Philosophie*.

Comte,[1] will now suffice. As the essential condition of the verification of our Law, we must show that such a special fact as the Revolution, which is the most important deduction from it, is actually found recorded, though not hitherto remarked, in the history of Humanity. Can such a condition of the verification of our Law be fulfilled? It can. Such a Revolution as we deduce from it did actually take place in the Sixth Century before Christ. And if, though all the facts which we shall cite in proof of such a Revolution are, and have long been known separately to every historical student, nay, very many of them to every tolerably educated person; if they have not hitherto been brought together, and shown to constitute a great Humanitarian Revolution, a Revolution occurring, in one and the same extraordinary century, among all the civilised Races of the Earth, from Japan and China to Egypt and Europe; if, though thus *separately* known, these facts have not hitherto been stated as what they really are, but facets of one great fact, this affords but an illustration of the impossibility of seeing aught as it truly is without bringing down upon facts the theories of that sublime integrating activity of Mind which is the reflex of, and tends more and more to correspond in the ideal Oneness which is its result, with that actual Oneness which constitutes the sublimity of That which is the object of Mind.

3. Anything like complete proof of a Revolution of

[1] *Philosophie positive*, tt. IV., V. and VI., but particularly t. V., *La Partie historique de la Philosophie sociale; Politique positive*, t. III., *Traité générale du Progrès humain*; and t. IV., *Tableau synthétique de l'Avenir humain.*

such a mental character as we should deduce from our Ultimate Law, having actually occurred in the Sixth Century B.C. cannot of course here be given. For our main purpose here is but to state some of the larger deductions from this Law, and we can refer, in but the most summary manner, to the facts by which we believe that these deductions will be found verified. This being understood, I would now proceed summarily to state, in the classes into which they naturally fall, some of those more important synchronous events of the Sixth Century B.C.,[1] which appear to me to imply a new mental development, constituting, in fact, such a Revolution, as we have above deduced from our Ultimate Law. Now, corresponding to the intellectual, moral, and practical aspects of mind, the exhaustive categories of historical facts are Philosophy, Religion, and Polity. Under these three heads, therefore, we shall summarise the events which make of the Sixth Century B.C. such an era of Revolution, intellectual, moral, and social, as would appear to be unsurpassed in the recorded annals of Humanity. Note, then, first, as illustrative of the *Intellectual Revolution* of this Century, three great general facts. Throughout the civilised world, in Japan (?),[2] China, India, Persia,

[1] Of course, in speaking of events of a highly general character hardly any of which either are, or can, properly speaking, be indubitably assigned to any one particular year, we shall consider ourselves justified in using the term *Sixth Century* to mean, not only the years between 500 and 599 B.C., but the later years also of the Seventh, and the earlier years of the Fifth Century.

[2] But Mr. Goodwin altogether doubts the early date usually assigned to the beginning of Japanese history, and has kindly referred me to his paper on the *Early History of Japan. Notes and Queries for China and Japan*, 1870, p. 20.

Judæa, Greece, and Egypt, we find a new intellectual activity in collecting, editing, and for the first time writing down in alphabetic characters the Literature of the preceding centuries.[1] It is only in this century that a Profane, as distinguished from a Sacred Literature arises; only from this time forth that, speaking generally, we have independent and nameable individual authors; and only now that, in the speculations of Thales, philosophical, as distinguished from religious Speculation, begins. And further, it is to this century that is to be traced, in the down-writing of the Ormuzd-and-Ahriman Creed of the Persians[2] and the new development of the Messiahism of the Jews,[3] the first beginnings of general reflection on the Past, and speculation

[1] This is clear with respect to China, India, Persia, and Greece. See Pauthier, *Quatre Livres Sacrés de la Chine*; Müller, *History of Sanscrit Literature*; Spiegel, *Avesta*; Grote, *History of Greece*, vol. VI. In Judæa, however, and in Egypt, we find partial exceptions to this generalisation. For though by far the greater part of the Hebrew Literature owes, if not its substance to writers, at least its form, to editors of the Sixth and later centuries; still, certain prophecies, those at least of Joel and of Amos, would appear not only in their present shape to belong to, but to have been *written* by nameable authors of the eighth or ninth century. See Davidson, *Introduction to Old Testament*, and compare Ewald. As to Egypt the exception lies in this, that we have hieroglyphic and hieratic Papyri of an immensely earlier date. But the generalisation still holds in this, that it is only to the Sixth Century that the demotic or popular form of writing can be traced. See Goodwin, *Hieratic Papyri, Cambridge Essays*, 1858.

[2] 'Wir dürfen . . . als das Ergebniss unserer Untersuchungen ansehen, dass der Gehalt der älteren Schriften des Avesta über die historische Zeit hinaufgehe; die Niederschreibung desselben aber spätestens zur Zeit des Artaxerxes II. stattgefunden habe, zum Theile auch früher.' Spiegel, *Avesta*, b. I. p. 14.

[3] The writings of unknown authorship usually cited as *Isaiah* chaps. xl.—lxvi. are now acknowledged to belong to this period. See Ewald, *Die Propheten des Alten Bundes*, b. II. pp. 403 flg., and compare Davidson, *Introduction to Old Testament*, vol. I. p. 209.

on the Future of Mankind; the first beginnings, therefore, of Universal, and Philosophical History; the first beginnings of such reflection and speculation as that with which we are ourselves now occupied. Such are the three great general facts which will, I think, be acknowledged as marking the Sixth Century B.C. as an Era of immense Intellectual Revolution. But far more extraordinary still will this Century be found as an Era of Religious Revolution. Independent investigators of the history of Japan (?), of China, of India, of Persia, of Assyria, of Judæa, of Greece, and of Egypt have found that the Religion of each of them underwent a great moral change or transformation in the same Sixth Century B.C. In Japan (?), there then arose the religion of Sinto; in China, that of Confucius; in India, that of Buddha.[1] If the Polytheisms of Assyria, of Greece, and of Egypt did not, like that of India, give birth in this century to a distinctly new religion, to this century we trace a profound disorganisation of them, and change in their spirit. And the Aryan and Semitic Monotheisms of Persia and of Judæa, Mazdayaçnianism and Jehovianism, came now, at Babylon, into contact, and, in the new enthusiasm of the Messiahism of the one, and the World-conquest of the other, exercised the most profoundly revolutionary effects on the creeds and institutions of Mankind. Such were the revolutions accomplished by that vast tidal wave of new religious emotion which, in the Sixth Century B.C., swept round the whole globe of Humanity, from Japan

[1] For a discussion of the date of Chandragupta, the basis of Indian Chronology, see Muller, *History of Sanscrit Literature*, pp. 242–300.

and China to the European shores of the Mediterranean. But, just as there can be no important change in a man's opinions and beliefs without a change in his conduct; so, on the great stage of History we shall find that the great Intellectual and Religious Revolutions of the Sixth Century B.C. were accompanied by a correspondingly great Social Revolution. Note, as illustrative of such a Revolution these three great general facts. First, then, we find this Century socially marked in the Further East by the drawing together of small communities into great states;[1] and, through the conquests of Cyrus and Cambyses, in Central Asia and the Mediterranean East, the establishment of the first World-empire. Secondly, it is now, and not, as is often so ignorantly or dishonestly affirmed, on the five-hundred-years-later preaching of Christianity; it is now that we first find, and in the Literature of all the civilised peoples of the Earth, maxims of Neighbourly Love, Equality, and Universal Brotherhood;[2] nor this only, which would be but a Literary, and not a Social Fact; but a complete disorganisation of previously existing polities directly traceable to the feelings expressed in such maxims; and in India, more particularly, a revolution which aimed at, and for a time accomplished the utter annihilation of Caste. And thirdly, we have to note the foundation in this Century of European Republicanism by Greece and Rome.[3] A Social Revolution, therefore, I think we must, in this

[1] See Lafitte, *Civilisation chinoise.*

[2] See the Confucian *Quatre Livres Sacrés* (Pauthier); the Buddhistic *Lotus de la Bonne Loi* (Burnouf); and below, bk. I. ch. iv.

[3] See Grote, *History of Greece*, and compare Mommsen, *History of Rome.*

Sixth Century, acknowledge of the greatest magnitude. And combining in one view all these various facts, intellectual, religious, and social, and comparing the dates established by so many independent researches; I think it must be allowed that, in the Sixth Century B.C.—though the races to the east and west of the Indus hardly then even knew of each other's existence—great, and similar revolutions took place among every one of the civilised peoples of the earth; and hence, that that century was an era of one universal revolution in the intellectual activities, religious aspirations, and social institutions of Humanity. Nor this only. For if we reflect on the essential meaning and significance of such facts as those above stated in illustration of the character of the Sixth Century Revolution, I think it will be found that, as clearly as any facts in the history of the individual consciousness, these facts in the history of the general human consciousness bespeak, or may be generalised as, a differentiation of Subjective and Objective. I can here, however, only suggest for special consideration the central, most general, and largest fact of all—the rise of New Religions; the distinctively moral character of these Religions; and the subjective nature of their chief determinants—the reflections of great prophets on human depravity, idolatrous worship, and social misery.

4. We shall hardly, however, clearly see the full meaning of the Differentiation of Subjective and Objective, as a generalisation of historical phenomena, until we consider the facts verificative of the third great deduction from our Ultimate Law. For, if the

second deduction speculatively developed be, that there should be found in the history of Humanity a great Revolution clearly generalisable as a Differentiation of Subjective and Objective; the third deduction will manifestly be that three distinct Ages are discoverable in the history of Humanity, and Ages distinguished as follows: a First Age, distinguished not merely by the general conception of Causation as One-sided Determination, and by all the moral and social concomitants and consequences of such an intellectual conception, but distinguished also by an undifferentiated Objectivity; a Second Age, that initiated by the great Sixth Century Revolution, distinguished by a Differentiation of Subjective and Objective, which explains the origin of all the greater phenomena of the Centuries since then, and brings them, in all their exuberant variety, into manifest correlation; and a Third Age—its flower, no doubt, in the future, but its germ, perhaps, in the present—distinguished not only by the general conception of Causation as Mutual Determination, and by all the moral and social concomitants of such an intellectual conception, but distinguished also by a differentiation, at once, and integration of all those elements of Thought, directions of Research, and aspects of Consciousness distinguishable as Subjective and Objective. Such is the third great deduction from our Ultimate Law of History. And with reference to it, I would first point out that, in the First Age of Humanity, the First Age of that progressive Unity of Recorded Thought, which, as we now see, may be chronologically defined as extending from the Sixth

Millennium to the Sixth Century B.C.,[1] we find a Philosophy, a Religion, and a Polity which may be respectively distinguished as *Spiritism*, *Naturianism*, and *Customalism*; that, pervading all these three spheres of intellectual, emotional, and practical life, there is to be found the conception of Onesided Determination; and that all these three spheres are likewise marked by an undifferentiated Objectivity. Philosophy is the explanation of Things, by referring them to their Causes; and a referring of Things to their Causes is, and can only be a connecting of them with Other Things—Ultimate, or supposed Ultimate Facts. Now, unques-

[1] The greater events of the first half of this Age with their approximate dates may be thus tabulated:—

Formation of Aryan kingdoms in Central Asia	5000
The Aryans migrate into the Indus country	4000
Beginning of Chaldean series of kings in Southern Babylonia	3784
Menes, king of all Egypt, and Osiris, the general object of worship	3623
Egyptian Pyramids of the First Dynasty built	3460
Improvement and establishing of Writing in Egypt, and beginnings of the Sacred Literature of the Indians, the Persians, and Egyptians	3400
Building of the largest Pyramid, and of the city of Babylon	3280
Abraham born in Ur of the Chaldees	2927
Beginning of the Tyrian Chronology	2700
Sesurtesen I. (Sesortôsis or Sesôstris), and Joseph viceroy	2755
Beginning of the Hyksos rule in Egypt	2547
Beginning of Chinese history and chronology, and the reign of Yü	2000

Compare Bunsen, *Egypt's Place*, vol. IV. pp. 490–92, and vol. III. pp. 405 fig., and pp. 455 fig.; and see also Müller, *History of Sanscrit Literature*, p. 572. I see no ground for the supposition on which the low dates assigned by Mr. Müller to the origin and periods of Vedic Literature are based—'the supposition that during the early periods of History the growth of the human mind was more luxuriant than in later times, and that the layers of thought were formed less slowly in the primary than in the tertiary ages of the world.'

tionably, the Other Things to which Things are referred as to their Causes are, in the First Age of Philosophic Thought, conceived as Spirits, or a Spirit. These Spirit-causes may be conceived either as undistinguished from Things; or, distinguished from and individually connected; or, distinguished from and universally connected with Things. But, however Spirit-causes are conceived, such Other Things being conceived as *not equivalently reacted upon*,—we define this conception of Causation as a Onesided Determination. But these Spirits or Powers are, as Ultimate Facts, or Causes, conceived either as regular or as irregular in their action. Conceived as regular in their action, we have that beginning of Science, or of the forecasting and determination of events, through knowledge of their Causes, or supposed Causes, which is Witchcraft.[1] Conceived as irregular in their action, we have that beginning of Theology, or of the forecasting and determination of events, through sacrifice to, and invocation of, their supposed Causes, which is Superstition. For Science, in its command of Nature, is ever essentially Craft, if not Witchcraft; and Theology, in its fear of Nature, is ever essentially Superstition. In Witchcraft, indeed, as in Superstition, Causes are conceived, not as Relations, but as Powers; yet there is this prodigious difference, that, in Witchcraft, they are conceived as subject; in Superstition, only as invocable Powers. Religion, as distinguished from Philosophy, and particularly from that species of it—that class of theories respecting the causes of events,

[1] See a suggestive paper by Mr. Lyall, *On Witchcraft in relation to the Non-Christian Religions*, in the *Fortnightly Review* for April 1873.

and the modes of influencing them, called Theology—Religion I would define as the emotion excited by the Causes of Things, however these are conceived.[1] Now, corresponding to the different modes in which, as above noted, a Spirit, or Spirits, is or are conceived as the Cause or Causes of Things, we find in this Age three classes of that order of Religions, which is the correlate of Spiritism, and which we have distinguished generally as Naturianism; to wit, *Pantheism*, *Polytheism*, and *Monotheism*. Pantheism, or the emotion excited by, and worship of Things conceived as indwelt by anthropomorphic Causes, is found historically distinguishable as Fetichism, Ancestralism, and Astralism. Polytheism, or the emotion excited by, and worship of anthro-

[1] Definition belongs to that Second Department of Logic which we have termed Dialectic. And according to our general logical principles, a *true* definition will be one which, framed in relation to other definitions, not only brings the phenomenon defined into relation with other phenomena, but is verifiable as a generalisation, at once the most comprehensive and the most accurate that can be arrived at. With respect, therefore, to the most contested, perhaps, of all definitions in these days, the definition of Religion, the appeal is to that most general fact, which analysis finds to be common to all those historical and psychological facts to which the name of Religion has ever been applied. And thus defining Religion as a fact as general as, and one that must be correlated with those of Philosophy, and of Polity, and testing our definition by the results of the most comprehensive possible historical survey, we find such definitions as that of Mr. Arnold—'Religion is morality touched with emotion' (see his *Literature and Dogma*, and compare Huxley, *Critiques and Addresses*, p. 48)—individual and subjective, rather than historical and objective. Anterior to the Sixth Century, and to the New Religions of the Second Age of Humanity, Religion had no specially moral character. (See Burnouf, *Science des Religions: Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1864.) The definition in the text would, as I think that History requires that it should, make the term Religion equally applicable to the emotion excited by a personal Being and an impersonal Ideal. I need here only allude to the opposed Ciceronian and Lactantian derivations—*ex relegendo*, and *a religando*. See Facciolati, *sub voce*.

pomorphic Causes, separate from, but presiding over every class of a vast classification of Things, is found also to be of three kinds, which may be distinguished by the names of the three most highly organised, and hence representative forms of Polytheistic Religion —Brahmanism, Osirianism, and Olympianism. And Monotheism, or the emotion excited by, and worship of one anthropomorphic Cause, separate from, but universally acting upon Things, is likewise found not only to belong to this First Age of Humanity, but to be historically distinguishable as Universalism, Mazdayaçnianism, and Jehovianism. The first, the high and pure Monotheism of thinkers, as likewise probably of all those initiated into the Higher Mysteries[1] of the Polytheistic Religions; the second, the Aryan popular Monotheism of the Persians; and the third, the Semitic popular Monotheism of the Hebrews. And it is to be noted that Mazdayaçnianism and Jehovianism were, in this First Age, more strictly Monotheistic than in the Second Age; for there began then a moral development, and therewith consciousness, that, in a single Spirit, conceived as an Almighty Person, men were worshipping a Fiend; and hence there was created another great Spiritual Person, expressly to find him guilty of evil, and so acquit Ahura-Mazda and Jehovah, whitewashed. Finally, to characterise the Polity of the First Age of Humanity. Polity, defined generally, and in its relation to Philosophy and Religion, is the realisation in social relations of the intellectual conception of Causes. And, just as in the Naturianism, the

[1] See below, chap. iv.

Religion of the First Age, so in its Polity, Customalism, we find classes of Polities corresponding to the different modes in which a Spirit or Spirits is, or are conceived as the Cause, or Causes of Things. The first general form of Customalism, or first class of the Polities which may be thus generally characterised, may be named Clanism; the second, Castism; and the third, Monarchism. These Polities will, I think, be found to be generally the coexistents and correlates respectively of Pantheistic, Polytheistic, and Monotheistic Religions. And in all we shall find the character of the social Authority submitted-to, of such a purely external, and therefore onesided type, as, in the most remarkable way, to accord with the general intellectual conception of Causation as a Onesided Determination. But in order to the verification of the second deduction from our Ultimate Law, it has not only to be shown that the conception of Onesided Determination pervades, in the First Age of Humanity, all the three spheres of intellectual, emotional, and practical life, but that all these three spheres are likewise marked by an undifferentiated Objectivity. This, however, will be shown in pointing to the facts which distinguish that Second Age of Humanity initiated by the great Revolution of the Sixth Century B.C., as distinctively an Age of the differentiation of Subjective and Objective. And to a survey, therefore, of that Second Age we now proceed.

5. The general facts which verify our deduction of a great Revolution, closing what we must consider as the First, and initiating what we must regard as the

Second Age of Humanity, have been already summarily stated. And we have now briefly to refer to some of the more general facts which verify the conception, by an Ultimate Law, given of the character of this Second Age. Now, if we consider as one great historical Age the two thousand four hundred years extending from the Sixth Century before to our own Nineteenth Century after Christ, we shall, I think, find its various phenomena with wonderful clearness generalised as a manifold Differentiation working up to such an Integration as, according to our Ultimate Law, will, in the variously outwrought conception of Mutual Determination, mark that Third Age of Humanity towards the opening of which, in the establishment of a New Synthesis, Philosophical, Religious, and Social, we should seem to be approaching. This Second Transitional or Middle Age of Humanity we shall find to fall naturally into five Periods of about five centuries each. The First, which may be distinguished as the Classical Period, extends from the Sixth to the middle or end of the First Century B.C. The Second Period, extending from the First to the Fifth Century A.D., may, as that, first, of the sole Empire of Rome, and then of the Confederate Empires of Rome and of Byzantium, be named the Imperial Period. The Third Period, from the Sixth to the Tenth Century, may be distinguished as the Barbarian Period. The Fourth is the great Feudal Period, extending from the Eleventh to the Fifteenth Century. And the Fifth is that Transitional Period in which our own lives are cast, which has extended from the Sixteenth, and will probably

extend, at least, to the close of the Twentieth Century. Now, throughout the whole of this Second Age of Humanity, we find Causation still conceived as a Onesided Determination; but this, in a far more abstract form than in the First Age. Causes are now, in philosophical speculation, not Spirits, but Entities. And the Philosophy, therefore, generally, of the Second Age of Humanity, we may name *Entitism*. Corresponding herewith, we find the religions of this Age of a far more abstract character. They are also, though in one aspect certainly, great social growths, yet in such a way as we find no example of in the previous Age, founded by individual Moral Teachers, after whom these religions are called Buddhism, Christianism, and Mohammedanism. And hence we distinguish the Religion generally of this Second Age as *Prophetianism*. But different as these Religions were from the Pantheistic, Polytheistic, and Monotheistic Nature-worships of the First Age, there was no break of continuity, and, as we shall later see, the development of Buddhism was most importantly influenced by the Pantheism; of Christianity, by the Polytheism; and of Mohammedanism, by the Monotheism, characteristic of the preceding Age. Various are the Polities of this Second Age, and it seems at first almost impossible to name any principle common to them all. Yet, when we compare the Polities of this Second with those which we find in the First, and may expect in the Third Age of Humanity, they do seem to have a general characteristic. And as we name the Philosophy of this Second Age, Entitism, and its Religion

Prophetianism, we name its Polity *Individualism*. But the great point to establish with respect to this Second Age as verifying, in its general character, our Ultimate Law, is a new manifoldness of Differentiation. Observe, then, that it is from the Sixth Century only that dates the antagonism between Philosophy and Theology, and that such an antagonism has been characteristic of the whole of this Second Age. Then in Philosophy, we have the antagonism between Physics and Metaphysics, between the Methods and Sciences of Nature and of Mind; and yet again, in Physics, in Metaphysics, and in Ethics, we have the opposed schools which may be generally designated as those of Idealism and Materialism. In the history also of the Religions of this Age, antagonistic theological and hence religious Sects are to be found corresponding to the antagonistic Schools of Philosophy. And in the history of the Polities of this Second Age, we find struggles, of which the principles are essentially similar to those of the antagonistic Schools of Philosophy, and Sects of Religion. Now, in order to the verification of our Ultimate Law of History, we should be able to show that, at the root of all these antagonisms, there are, and have been, antagonistic conceptions of Causation; that these conceptions were antagonistic because equally, though differently incomplete; and that the common incompleteness of these antagonistic conceptions consisted in each being a conception of Causation as a Onesided Determination, while the general difference consisted in Causes being viewed by one School, Sect, or Party, as Internal Forces, and by the Other as

External Agents. Adequate proof of so large a generalisation, with all the necessary qualifications of it as thus roundly stated, cannot, of course, be here even approximately given. But, in general verification of it, I would point out that great fact of the development, in the body politic, of the Individual; and in the individual, of Conscience, which is so marked a characteristic of the Sixth Century Revolution, and of the whole of that Second Age of Humanity which it initiated. As illustrative of the development of the Individual, note the abolition of Caste, and the formation of Republican Governments in the First Period of this Age; of Representative Governments in its present Fifth Period; and how, in different ways, the intervening Imperial, Barbarian, and Feudal Periods contributed to the development of the Individual. And more particularly note how the Progress of Positive Law has been towards limitation of the individual's right to private property—towards the limitation of objects from individual dominion.[1] For this will be found equivalent to the *general* realisation of the freedom of the Individual. As illustrative of the development of Conscience, note the distinctively inward and subjective character of the Religions of this Second Age, and particularly of Buddhism and Christianism. Note particularly the character of the Literature of this Age, and the expression given in it to such conceptions of Love, Universal Brotherhood, and Humanity, as we find scarce the germs of, in the genuine Literature of the preceding age. For there

[1] See Lassalle, *Erbrecht*; and Stirling, *Philosophy of Law*, pp. 58–60.

arose thus a new conception of Morality, as not merely an accordance with external custom, but purity of internal motive. But if the growth and development, in this Second Age, of the Individual and of Conscience, are admitted as historical facts readily verifiable; then, I think, we shall see that, in Philosophy, there *must* have been such opposing Schools as we actually find that there were. For such schools we shall thus see to have been—while the general conception of Causation as Onesided Determination remained unchanged—the necessary result, or rather coexistent (for to which priority should be assigned it were impossible to say), the necessary coexistent of such a new development of the Individual in the State, and of Conscience in the Individual. But seeing this, we shall admit, or be prepared, at least, to admit, the verification of our Ultimate Law in its representation of the Second Age of Humanity as, in its mental aspect, a development, through the Differentiation of Subjective and Objective, of the conception of Causation, received from the preceding Age.

6. According to this view of the Second or Transitional Age of Humanity, our present Historical Period is but the close of it, and not yet the beginning even of the Third Age. How different a view is thus given of the Transition from the earlier to the later mode of conceiving Causation—how different a view from that of Comte, who dated the beginning of his Transitional Age but from the first decadence of Feudalism,[1] towards

[1] '... au commencement du quatorzième siècle.'—*Philosophie positive*,

the end of what we consider but the Fourth Period of the great Transitional Age of Humanity, need here be only briefly pointed out. For one of the main purposes of the present work is to show that only through a far larger conception of this Transitional Age can a scientific explanation be given of its greater phenomena, and particularly of those presented in the origin and transformation of Christianity. And we proceed, therefore, to that characterisation of the Third Age of Humanity which is to be deduced from our Ultimate Law. Now, if Causation is finally conceived as Mutual Determination, then, as has been said, Causes are conceived as *Relations*; and hence we may distinguish the Philosophy of the Third Age of Humanity as *Relationalism*. But if so, see how the conflicts of the Schools of Philosophy and the varied antagonisms of Idealism and Materialism during these past two thousand four hundred years—conflicts and antagonisms that have been so often represented as mere puerile logomachies —have a sublime reasonableness given to them as the continuous, and progressive outworking of the conception of Reciprocal Action, Reciprocity, or Mutual Determination. Then, as to the Religion corresponding to the Relational Philosophy of the Third Age of Humanity, Religion we have defined as the emotion excited by the Causes of Things, however conceived. In the New Philosophy, the Causes of Things are found in the System itself of Things. Religion will, therefore, now be the emotion excited by that Oneness of Things

t. v. *Appréciation générale de l'état métaphysique des Sociétés modernes*, p. 509.

which Science more and more clearly reveals; that Oneness, both systematic and historic, of Nature and of Humanity, the unutterable wonder and beauty of which, as Science presents it amid the infinities of Space and the eternities of Time, will be a perennial source of intellectual joy, and of moral purification; that Oneness, which Science reveals, of the Individual with the Race, which, as every ideal of Oneness with Others does, thrills with the rapture, and inspires with the heroism of Love. This higher and nobler emotion, which gives to Religion its completing development, may, as distinguished from the Naturianism of the First, and the Prophetianism of the Second Age, be named *Humanitarianism*. And as in the development of the New Philosophy of Relationalism, so in that of this new Religion of Humanitarianism, we see reason given by it to the whole previous course of the history of Religion. Finally, as to the Polity of the Third Age of Humanity. As we have found, in each of the two preceding Ages of Humanity, a Polity in which the forms of social relations singularly correspond, first with the more concrete, and then with the more abstract conception of Causation as Onesided Determination; so, assuredly, will there, with the establishment of the conception of Causation as Mutual Determination, arise a new Polity in accordance therewith. Such a Polity, not of Customal, nor of Individual Government in any form, but of organised Reciprocity of conscious Rights and Duties, I would name *Socialism*. And in the reorganisation, in such a Polity, of the fundamental institutions of Society—Marriage, Property, and Government

—on the new principles respectively of Co-equality, Co-operation, and Co-fraternity—principles derived from the general principle of Co-oneness, in which that of Mutual Determination has its ethical expression—reason will be found to be given to the whole course of the development of these Institutions.[1]

7. Such, then, are the general outlines and characteristics of the Philosophies, the Religions, and the Polities of the three Ages of Humanity, as we would deduce these from our Ultimate Law of History. No such general facts, however, as those alluded to in characterising these different Ages can suffice as a verification in any degree adequate of generalisations so large. History presents phenomena so various that, for almost any theory of it, a certain number of apparently verifying facts may be found. But general historical theories thus loosely verified only bring discredit on the Philosophy of History. A Law so general as that which we have ventured to state as the Ultimate Law of History will require a very special verification. And this verification will be by no means only historical. In every series of events, it is only when one sees the *end*, that one sees the *reason* of the series. And as it was that conception of Causation as Mutual Determination to which we were led by study of the results of our later more accurate knowledge of the relations of things that threw back a sudden

[1] And thus, in showing Positive Law to consist of but successive historical transformations of Natural Law, we should, at length, have a true *Philosophy of Law*. See Lassalle, *Das System der erworbenen Rechte, eine Versöhnung des positiven Rechtes und der Rechtsphilosophie.*

light on the whole course of History, and gave us, at length, our Ultimate Law; so, one of the chief verifications of that Law will be found in the confirmation which may be afforded of it by further researches similar to those by which it was suggested. For in showing Mutual Determination to be the true conception of Causation, and hence the character of the Third Age of Humanity to be such as we have affirmed it to be, there will, in the mere fact of the magnificent unity thus given to the succession of events constituting the two preceding Ages, be an immense verification of our Law. Yet, the verification thus arising from the results of general systematic enquiries into Causation as our later knowledge leads us to conceive it, will not in itself be sufficient. These must still be complemented by the results of general historical enquiries into Causation—enquiries, that is, into the Causes of historical Origins. And thus we see that, in this great argument, systematic and historic enquiries into Causation must be taken up alternately. If, from our historical enquiries, it results that the character of the First and Second Ages of Humanity is such as we have affirmed; then, it will follow that the final conception of Causation will be such as we suppose. And if, from our systematic enquiries, it results that the true conception of Causation is that of Mutual Determination; then, the character of the Third Age of Humanity being thus determined, our historical conclusions with respect to the character of the two preceding Ages will be immensely confirmed.

8. It is, however, with the historical division of our argument that we are here occupied. And I would

now proceed to point out that, if we would historically verify our Ultimate Law of History, it must be through the verification of much less general, much more special deductions from it than any of those as yet stated. And just as Newton, for the verification of his Ultimate Law of Nature, chose the motions of the celestial object nearest and best known; so must we, for the verification of our Ultimate Law of History, choose an origin, and a transformation, the nearest and best known of all those of a larger, or celestial character. What shall this be? Consider what our deductions thus far from our Ultimate Law of History have been. First, it was argued that if this were a verifiable Law, we should find that the history of mankind, or some part of it, could be regarded as essentially a history of Thought; and hence that, to such a term as 'Humanity,' a definite and distinctive signification could be given, and, to the beginning of the history of 'Humanity' an, at least, approximate date assigned. Then, the second deduction from our Ultimate Law was that, in the history of Humanity there should be discoverable a great and universal Revolution, no otherwise generally characterisable than as a Differentiation of Subjective and Objective. And our third deduction was, that we should find the history of Humanity divisible into three great Ages, characterised respectively, as just stated. These deductions are evidently marked by an increasing particularity; and more special still must be our next deduction. Now, if, so far as our Ultimate Law has, as yet, been found verifiable, the whole history of Humanity of which we have any full and particular

records, must be considered as belonging to what we have characterised as that Transitional Age, the beginning of which is to be dated from the Revolution of the Sixth Century, B.C., and the close of which we are only now approaching; then, evidently, any special phenomenon by the verified deduction of which we would endeavour to verify our Ultimate Law, must be taken from this Transitional Age, as only of this Age have we a knowledge adequate to the verification of a deduction of special phenomena. The fourth deduction from our Ultimate Law of History, therefore, is that, in the theory it gives of the Transitional Age of Humanity, will be found the explanation of the chief phenomena of that Age. Of these phenomena, the first unquestionably is—Christianity. And hence the problem of the origin of Christianity becomes for us a problem similar to that which the explanation of the Moon's motions was to Newton. For, as its existence has been the central phenomenon of the Second Age, we shall find, in the attempt to establish a true theory of its origin, the most effectual test of the truth, and hence the most effective means of the verification of our Ultimate Law of History. Great then, as, even from the ordinary point of view, is the importance of the explanation of the origin of Christianity, still greater will it now be seen to be when we regard it as the most definite means of verifying our general deduction of the Three Ages of Humanity. And thus only, it may be added—only as the verification of a general historical Law—can the origin of Christianity be fully and scientifically explained. Hence, if this mode of conceiving

the problem be opposed to the ordinary theological conceptions of it; no less definitely is it opposed to those but partially scientific conceptions which take it up as if its solution were chiefly, or even wholly[1] to be found in the consideration merely of the life of Christ. And one has the less hesitation in affirming this, as those great critics who have done most towards solving the minor, and therefore more difficult problem, have made it the scientific object of their Lives of Jesus rather to show what manner of man he may have been,[2] than what his life actually and certainly, not only in its spirit, but in its social incidents, and in its mental development, was. More, from narratives so meagre as that of Matthew, so fragmentary as that of Mark, so mythological as that of Luke, so mystical as that of John, it were impossible scientifically to attempt. These records are too scanty, and too imperfect to permit of the life of Jesus being *inductively* reconstructed from them. It must be *deductively* reconstructed, if at all, from our general theory of the origin of Christianity. No doubt this general theory must include among its elements the influence of a great, and strongly marked individuality. But the facts which it requires to have previously established with reference to such an in-

[1] Even Mazzini, for instance, thus writes of Christ: 'He bent over this corpse-like world, and murmured a word of faith. He took this clay, which had no more of man than the features and the movement, and pronounced over it some words till then unknown (?!) *love, devotion, celestial origin*, and the corpse rose up.' Better have out-and-out supernaturalism, than such a sentimental fancy as this, of a necromancer muttering an incantation!

[2] See the Prefaces to Renan's *Vie de Jésus*, and Strauss's *Nouvelle Vie de Jésus*.

dividuality are only of the most general character; and from its own resources, or from allied general theories, special facts of opinions and of development will afterwards be more surely deduced, than, from such narratives as those of the Evangelists inductively arrived at.[1] The explanation, therefore, of the origin of Christianity must take a new turn. Not the Life of Christ, but such a general Law of Mental Development, as that which we have, in our Ultimate Law of History, stated, must henceforth be their starting-point.

9. Only, then, in studying the Christian Revolution as part of a still greater Revolution; only in studying the Christian Development of Religion as part of a general Subjective Development of Humanity; only in thus studying the problem of the origin of Christianity in a thoroughly relative manner, can a truly scientific explanation be obtained. But there is still another, a fifth deduction, from our Ultimate Law of History to be stated. For the origin of Christianity is not the only chief phenomenon of the Transitional Age of Humanity; not the only phenomenon, therefore, the explanation of which is demanded for the verification of our Ultimate Law, and the great general deductions from it. There is yet another, and very closely connected phenomenon—the Transformation of Christianity. And the explanation of this must be further deduced

[1] And in fact many of the most important conclusions, both of Strauss and of Renan, are deductions rather than inductions. The only material objection to be made to them is, that the theories from which they are drawn do not yet belong to fully constituted Sciences. Hence, therefore, the necessity of giving up the attempt to write more Lives of Jesus till the Mental Sciences generally are further advanced.

from our Ultimate Law. For that such a transformation is now taking place—that a transformation of Christianity in the full historical sense of the term, as denoting, not only a certain religious system, but as denoting also a certain philosophical, and a certain social system, is now, and has, since the opening of our present historical period with the Reformation of the sixteenth century, been taking place—none competent to pronounce an opinion on the subject will, it may confidently be asserted, venture explicitly to deny. No less necessary, therefore, to the verification of our Ultimate Law of History, than the explanation of the origin of Christianity, as a deduction from this Law, is the explanation, as a similar deduction, of such a phenomenon as this of the transformation of Christianity. We do not, then, seek to disguise the true scope of the following enquiry. The immortal author of that great history which, in recounting the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, connects the Classic with the Modern Period, and is, in fact, a history of the Christian Age of European Civilization—Gibbon was, by the fanaticism and intolerance of Christianity still powerful, obliged to have recourse to a dexterous insinuation only of his opinions respecting its origin; and this, though we must excuse, we cannot very highly respect, however much we may admire the ironic satire with which it was edged.[1] 'Obvious,' he says, 'and satisfactory,' it is to affirm that the triumph of Christianity 'was owing

[1] It must be confessed, however, that the sarcasm of his text is not half so effectual in an 'infidel' direction as the feebleness of the notes of Christian apologists in the fortunately standard edition of Dr. W. Smith.

to the convincing evidence of the doctrine itself, and to the ruling providence of its great Author.' Still, he continues, 'we may be permitted, though with becoming submission, to ask, not indeed what were the first, but what were the secondary causes of the rapid growth of the Christian Church?'[1] And these he then proceeds to set-forth. But the progress of that Revolution to which his great work so much contributed may be judged from this, that Science now fronts first causes; that it dares to ask, not merely what were the circumstances that contributed to the triumph, but what were the conditions that determined the origin of Christianity. Nay, more, it takes the historical transformation of Christianity to be as incontrovertible a fact as its historical origin; this fact also, in all its breadth, Science would explain, and, in its vast issues, forecast; and, in all this, with shame is now spurned a mere dexterous insinuation of conclusions. For the freedom, however, which has nurtured this nobler spirit, Science has chiefly to thank Gibbon, and his,[2] and our master—Hume.

1. Concluding these preliminaries, which seemed necessary to make clear the views with which we undertake a journey in the birth-countries of Christianity, let us now embark—and if with some degree

[1] Opening of the fifteenth chapter.

[2] 'The authority of my masters, of the grave Thuanus and the philosophic Hume.'—*Memoirs of My Life and Writings*, p. 4. And in note 3 to chap. ii. of the *Decline and Fall*, Gibbon specially refers to Hume's *Natural History of Religion*.

of enthusiastic expectation, it may be pardoned. In the discovery of the Ultimate Law of Man's History, we have obtained the word which will both throw-open, and illuminate those most secret recesses of man's nature, in which are to be found the deepest springs of historical phenomena. And if the discovery of the natural origin of these phenomena divests certain of them of their supernatural pretensions; amends will more than be made by such an historical insight into, through realising sympathy with the forces of their true origin, as will make us feel, not merely a physical, but an intimate spiritual kinship with fellow-men in ages the most remote, and under conditions of life the most different.

2. And is this not worth something? Are we not thus indeed given, but in a higher form, what is offered to us in the Christian theory of History? For in what consists the moral worth of that theory save in its giving, to ever-craving Love, an object? Let the history of Man be conceived as by Christianity, and there is seen in it the action of a Personal Being, towards whom, though supernatural, Love can go forth. Let this theory be discredited, and no insight as yet obtained into the internal forces of human phenomena; and History is deprived of all real moral worth and significance. But let an Ultimate Law of History be discovered; and hence, let not only the thoughts be known, but the very emotions be realised from which the great phenomena of Man's history have sprung; and again that diviner Love, which is at once the glory and the misfortune of all noble souls, has an object. For

human beings are great in proportion to the largeness, and the depth of their love. And though women more easily blind themselves to realities, rarely fortunate is the man, with such largeness and depth of passion, who finds satisfaction in individual affection. Or unfortunate. To have such good fortune is to have the ill fortune of lacking that to which probably most great works are owing. For Want, unsatisfied Love is the great Creator. But whither—when the merely superficial character of all that ordinarily goes by the name of friendship and of love is once for all clearly seen, and calmly accepted—whither is then all the deeper passion of the heart to turn? Whither, when altogether doubtful has become the reality of those divine Persons—that Father, that Mother, and that Son —to whom Christianity has pointed as the true objects of the deeper cravings of the human soul? Whither, when heaven is empty, and there has not yet been revealed on earth a Spirit of larger form than those individual souls from any profound union with any one of whom we are almost certainly shut-out by the fatalities of human existence?

3. To Nature we go. In that infinite and eternal Presence, which the science of the Heavens has learned us to know in something of its unutterable sublimity, all fretfulness is stilled, and made to cease. Earth, in that ever-changing, magical, endlessly-productive beauty which the science of it gives us more and more clearly to see, fills us with joy. There is, however, still a something wanting. But between Earth and the Heavens is Humanity. And it is in work that, in

its self-devotion, is a conscious association of one's individual life with the collective life of that greatest of the Earth-spirits, which the scientific study of the history of Man reveals, that the craving heart finally finds peace. For equally original with those wants and tendencies of our nature which find their satisfaction in the realisation of Self-oneness, would appear to be those wants and tendencies which are satisfied only in the realisation of Oneness with Others. To the class of minds, no doubt, in which the desire of the completeness, masterfulness, and power of the individual self, is supreme, that Want of Oneness with Others, that Love, in the true sense of the word, which is supreme with the other class of minds, may be altogether incomprehensible, and hence, either uncredited or contemned. But the facts and general principles which constrain us to acknowledge the equally original character, reality, and importance of both these directions of Want, are fundamentally the same as those which make either materialism or idealism appear inadequate, and urge us to our attempt to include the facts, and reconcile the principles of both in a higher synthesis. And in nothing, as I shall endeavour to prove, has Christianity, or rather that general Subjective Differentiation of which, as we shall see, Christianity was but the Western culmination and flower—in nothing has Christianity more highly contributed to the development of mankind than in the passion it has given to the nobler direction of Want; the purification it has effected of Love; the infinity it has given to the thirst of Oneness with Others, henceforth—I had almost said—for ever unsatisfiable,

but at least I may say, scarcely to be satisfied in mere individual affection. On a large survey of History, it will, I think, appear that the idea of Christ though, as we shall see, later conceived than that of Humanity, has, as a more womanlike younger brother, prepared the way for the triumph of the elder, and more manly one. The love of Christ has made the heart unappeasable by lesser loves. What friendship or love of earth, so seldom utterly to be confided-in save by inexperience, can satisfy one to whom Christ has been, in very fact, and not in mere profession, a living Redeemer, a Brother, and ever-present and immortal Friend? And thus has the love of Christ made the love of Humanity possible, not as a mere sentiment only, but as a constraining moral power.

4. Let us then embark. It is at Midnight, and for the Morningland. And our endeavour, in this journey, not only to inform ourselves of the thoughts, but sympathetically to realise the very emotions also which have been the creative forces of great religions and civilisations, is now, I trust, seen to have for its object the satisfaction, not of a desire merely of the intellect, but of a craving of the heart. It is now seen also, I trust, that, just as the supernatural theory of Man's history, given by Christianity, has been a means of religious education; such likewise may the natural theory of Man's history, given by Science, become, if we not only acknowledge the fact of its phenomena being determined by internal forces, as well as by external conditions; but endeavour in our own experience to realise these internal forces, and thus be

drawn out of ourselves in sympathetic communion with others. And thus, vulgarised as it, at present, is, the Eastern Tour—Egypt, Arabia, and Syria—will, in a nobler age, an age in which a higher and truer Faith has taken the place of superstition, of unbelief, and sham-belief, become a religious pilgrimage; a pilgrimage, not indeed of idolatrous adoration, but of educating sympathy. With the grandest of all the civilisations of the First Age of Humanity, and with a religion that, as we shall see, indirectly and directly exercised the most important influence on Christianity, the greatest of the religions of the Second Age of Humanity, Egypt brings us in contact. The sublime solitudes of Arabia have nursed the ideal enthusiasms, and are still consecrated by the shrines, of most of the greater religions, both of the First and Second Ages of Humanity. And to Syria and its Palestinian province have come streams from all the countries of the further Orient; thus receiving from the East, it has dispensed to the West; from Palestine have flowed the chief moral sources of all the progress of modern times; and it is no meaningless myth that the navel of the earth is a spot within the Church of the Holy Sepulchre;[1] for central as Syria among the historic countries of the Earth, is Christianity among the historic revolutions of Humanity.

[1] The tradition is as old as the eighth century; and Sæwulf (1102) assures us that 'not far from the place of Calvary is the place called Compas, which our Lord Jesus Christ Himself signified and measured with His own hand as the middle of the world, according to the words of the Psalmist, "For God is my king of old, making salvation in the midst of the earth."'—*Early Travels in Palestine*, p. 38.

5. But now the anchor is up; the final adieux to the sister who had accompanied me thus far on my journey, and to the old college-friend whom I had found a military chaplain here, are said; and, eastward ho, bound for the Morningland; and bidding final adieu to the west-eastern islet of Christian Orthodoxy, we are under weigh, steaming-out, amid the leading-lights of the Quarantine Harbour of that many-strataed historical rock where we have, for these three weeks, sojourned —the Rock of Malta.

BOOK I.

ON THE RIVER OF EGYPT.

'As the Causes which bestow happiness or misery are in general very little known and very uncertain, our anxious concern endeavours to attain a determinate idea of them; and finds no better expedient than to represent them as intelligent voluntary agents, like ourselves, only somewhat superior in power and wisdom . . . Men's exaggerated praises and compliments still swell their idea upon them, and, elevating their Deities to the utmost bounds of perfection, at last beget the attributes of unity and infinity, simplicity and spirituality. Such refined ideas being somewhat disproportioned to vulgar comprehension, remain not long in their original purity, but require to be supported by the notion of inferior mediators, or subordinate agents, which interpose between mankind and their supreme Deity.'

HUME, *Natural History of Religion.*
Phil. Works, vol. IV. pp. 461–72.

THE ORIGIN OF THE MYTHS OF CHRISTIANITY.

CHAPTER I.

AT THE CAPITAL OF NEO-PLATONISM.

'Omnibus hominibus vitæ finis est mors. Superstitioni ne ea quidem; profert enim hæc suos terminos ultra vitæ exitum, metumque vitæ diuturniorem facit, annectitque morti malorum cogitationem immortalium; etiam tum cum solvitur malis, ingredi se putans in mala nullum habitura finem. Orci nescio quæ portæ aperiuntur profundæ, et fluvii simul ignis, Stygisque panduntur rivi, tenebræque obducuntur visis multis refertæ simulacrorum adspectu terribilium, ac voces horrendas emittentium; tum judices et carnifices, hiatusque et penetralia malis infinitis plena. Ita infelix Superstitio id ipsum quod non patiendo effugit, expectando sibi calamitosum reddit?'[1]

PLUTARCH, *De Superstitione*, IV.; *Moralia*, vol. IV. pp. 197–8.

THE CHRISTIAN REVOLUTION IN ITS INTELLECTUAL ASPECT.

At the Capital of Neo-Platonism, Alexandria, the intellectual capital of the world during the great age of the establishment of Christianity, the considerations that suggested themselves on the relation of Neo-Platonism to Olympianism; on that development of the

[1] *Πέρας ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὁ θάνατος· τῆς δὲ δεισιδαιμονίας, οὐδ' οὗτος· ἀλλ' ὑπερβάλλει τοὺς ὅρους ἐπίκεινα τοῦ ζῆν μακρότερον τοῦ βίου ποιοῦσα τὸν φόβον, καὶ συνάπτουσα τῷ θανάτῳ κακῶν ἐπίνοιαν, ἀθανάτων· καὶ ὅτε παύεται πραγμάτων, ἄρχεσθαι δοκοῦσα μὴ πανομένων. Ἅδου τινὲς ἀνοίγονται πύλαι βαθεῖαι καὶ ποταμοὶ πυρὸς ὁμοῦ καὶ στυγὸς, ἀπορρῶγες ἀναπετάννυνται, καὶ σκότος ἐφήπλωται πολυφάντασμον εἰδώλων [τινῶν] μὲν χαλεπὰς ὄψεις, οἰκτρὰς δὲ φωνὰς ἐπιφερούντων, δικασταὶ, δὲ καὶ κολασταὶ, καὶ χάσματα καὶ μυχοὶ, κακῶν μυρίων γέμοντες. Οὕτως ἡ κακοδαίμων δεισιδαιμονία, καὶ ὃ τῷ μὴ παθεῖν ἐκπέφευγεν, ἀφύλακτον τῷ προσδοκᾶν αὐτῇ πεπυίηκε.* (Ed. Dübner.)

notion of Miracle which is the most distinctive feature in the intellectual aspect of the Christian Revolution; and on the relation of modern Broad-churchism, or Latitudinarianism, to ancient Neo-Platonism, were such as, in a brief record of them, as developed by subsequent study, to form, perhaps, the most fitting introduction to an examination of the origin of the Myths of Christianity.

Three bright days had passed, since leaving Malta, in slipping swiftly through the calm waters of the great Midland Sea,—thought chiefly occupied with speculation on the Future,—when, on the morning of the fourth day, there was an almost startlingly sudden apparition of clamorous life in the Present, as we dropt anchor amid the numerous shipping in the Old Harbour of Alexandria. It is the westward of the two bays formed by the ancient Heptastadeum and the modern town, running out to connect with the mainland the Homeric[1] island of Pharos. From the quarterdeck one looked down on the short green waves on which, all round the ship, boats were tilting about, with rowers jabbering and bargaining in a state of humorously earnest excitement. Shortly after, from the balcony of the hotel, one looked out on the dozen nations thronging the great Square—where the docks of the ancient city were—filling it with the colours of their various costumes, and the cries of their various languages to each other, to horses, donkeys, buffaloes, oxen, dromedaries, and camels. Nor was the strange effect lessened on coming into closer contact with these new phenomena of life

[1] *Od.* IV. 355.

in the donkey-ride to Diocletian's (Pompey's) Pillar, and the obelisk, removed by one of the Cæsars from Heliopolis, and since called Cleopatra's Needle. But the irony that so often strikes one in the coexistences of Nature seemed, at the former place, to be expressed by the stinks with which the Column of Victory was surrounded; and at the latter, by a vociferous quarrel of feminine jealousy at the base of the sacred obelisk of the priests of On.

And these are almost the only standing monuments of that magnificent city which, for nearly a thousand years, from its foundation by the Greeks under Alexander, B.C. 332, to its conquest by the Arabs under Amer, A.D. 640, was the centre of at once the most turbulent political, and the most active intellectual life in the world. For the Schools of Alexandria, even more than its Marts, became the means of realizing that idea of Oneness which, inspiring him at once with the grandest schemes of world-conquest and world-union, and with the most consummate generalship in the execution of them, marks Alexander as a genius of the highest order.[1] But the city which, according to the legend,

[1] 'Conceiving he was sent by God to be an umpire between all, and to unite all together, he reduced by arms those whom he could not conquer by persuasion, and formed of a hundred diverse nations one single universal body, mingling, as it were, in one cup of friendship, the customs, marriages, and laws of all. He desired that all should regard the whole world as their common country. . . . . That every good man should be esteemed a Hellene, every evil man a barbarian.' Plutarch, *De Fort. Alex.*, cited by Merivale, *On the Conversion of the Roman Empire.* See Droysen, *Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen*, and *Geschichte des Hellenismus, oder der Bildung des Hellenistischen Staaten-Systemes*, and compare Hegel, *Phil. der Geschichte*, *Werke*, b. IX. p. 274. 'Die höchste Gestalt, die der griechischen Vorstellung vorgeschwebt hat, ist Achill, der Sohn des Dich-

preserved by Strabo,[1] he planned-out with flour, because chalk had failed, has moved considerably from its ancient site. Silent now are the banks of the Mareotic Lake, once covered with villas and vineyards; and silent now is the Mediterranean beach of the eastward harbour, once lined with marts, libraries, and museums, palaces, theatres, and temples. Yet on this silent strand let us walk up and down for a little. The place is beyond measure suggestive of thought. For here once was the chief laboratory[2] of a Revolution transcended in magnitude only by that amid which our own lives are cast.

SECTION I.

THE RELATION OF NEO-PLATONISM TO OLYMPIANISM.

1. We stand here between two great millennial ages of intellectual development. The first extends from Thales to Proclus; from the sixth century before, to the sixth century after Christ. The second reaches

ters, der homerische Jungling aus dem trojanischen Krieg. . . . Dagegen der zweite Jüngling Alexander die freieste und schönste Individualität, welche die Wirklichkeit je getragen, tritt an die Spitze des in sich reifen Jugendlebens und vollfährt die Rache gegen Asien.' See also 332, &c. But see on the other side, Grote, *History of Greece*, vol. VIII. pp. 464 flg.; and Niebuhr, *Lectures on Ancient History*, vol. II. lect. lxxiv. and lxxx. I agree, however, with Mr. Freeman (*Historical Essays*, 2nd series, p. 151) in his accordance with Bishop Thirlwall's estimate of the hero; 'His was an ambition which almost grew into one with the highest of which man is capable, the desire of knowledge and the love of good.' *History of Greece*, vol. VII. p. 119.

[1] XVII. p. 793.

[2] 'Cette étonnante chimie intellectuelle qui avait établi son principal laboratoire à Alexandrie.'—Ménard, *Hermes Trismegiste, Introd.* p. x.

from Boethius to Pomponatius; from the sixth to the sixteenth century of the Christian era. We stand in the midst of a vast revolution; in the midst of a great age of transition. On the one side, Classic and Imperial Antiquity; on the other, the Barbarian and Feudal Periods of Christianity. Between two Civilizations we stand which, in their intellectual conceptions, their poetic ideals, and their social polities, are in the most remarkable contrast. Amid the throng of questions and of thoughts that crowd upon us, we are first drawn to consider the relation of the thinkers of Alexandria, the then intellectual capital of the world, to the religious revolution in the midst of which they lived. They took, we know, the part of the Old Religion. Let us recall some of the chief facts connected with this very singular alliance between Neo-Platonism and Olympianism, the Greek form of that primitive class of Religions which—for the sake of a word, which does not, like Paganism, imply a Christian misjudgment—I have named Naturianism.[1] For in considering the cause of this choice of the Alexandrian thinkers between the Old Religion and the New, we shall have, I think, a very penetrating light thrown on the intellectual character of the Christian Revolution. And besides, in Neo-Platonism, considered in its relation to Olympianism, there should seem to be a very interesting parallelism to a phenomenon which is one of the most distinctive features of the Modern Revolution, in that culminating era of it in which we now live.

2. The facts which we must first note with respect to

[1] See above, *Introd.*, p. 218.

the relation of Neo-Platonism to Olympianism are certainly such as must excite both our surprise and curiosity as to the cause of that alliance which we know subsisted between them to the end. Neo-Platonism was strictly monotheistic, and utterly opposed to the worship of idols, and the practice of magic. But Olympianism, as a general historical fact, was a magic-practising, and idol-worshipping Polytheism. Of the monotheism of the Neo-Platonists, it is here unnecessary to say more than that the unity of God had, since the Sixth Century Revolution, been the openly taught doctrine of all philosophers. As to the worship of idols, even the late and unknown author of the treatise *De Mysteriis*, expresses the same contempt for it as Plotinus and Porphyry; and, like them, he condemns all material intervention in the communications of the soul with the Divinity. Magical practices would seem to be the almost necessary result of the universally prevalent popular belief in, and philosophical doctrine of, Demons. Yet, even the later and most theurgical of the Neo-Platonists, though attributing such maleficent influences to demons as Plotinus denied, still prohibited the operations of magic. And the whole school from beginning to end showed an invincible repugnance to mixing the worship of idols and magic, properly so called, with their high and spiritual mysticism.[1]

3. But further, not only in point of intellectual doctrine, and religious practice, but in point also of moral spirit, Neo-Platonism was in direct opposition to Olympianism. The old religion with which the Neo-

[1] See Vacherot, *Histoire de l'École d'Alexandrie*, t. II. pp. 143–4.

Platonists allied themselves instead of with that new religion with which they should, at first sight, seem to have had so much more in common; the old religion was a worship of the senses and of the passions; a religion which not only made Deity descend into the world, but gave it all the forms and all the feelings of Humanity; a religion of which the heaven, Olympus, was but such a world as the Earth; and the other life, Elysium, but such a life as the present, only more calm, sweet, and serene. On the other hand, one of the most characteristic doctrines of Neo-Platonism was just the distinction and separation of the two worlds of Time and of Eternity; this life it regarded not as the fulfilment, but as the probation of human destinies; it sought, therefore, to withdraw the soul from contact with the visible and material world, and to fix it in contemplation on the spiritual and invisible world; if it conceived the Cosmos as divine, it was so only as the realisation of the ideas of God in matter; and while urging to, and, in its chiefs, giving the example of, every moral virtue, it proposed as the true end of the soul the contemplation and love of God.

4. And yet, the next great fact which we have to note with respect to the relation of Neo-Platonism to Olympianism is, that, in order to defend this religion, to which it was thus even more profoundly opposed in its moral aspirations than in its intellectual conceptions; Neo-Platonism entered on a polemic, which gradually became an attempt at transformation not futile only with respect to Olympianism, but fatal to its champion At first, the philosophers of the widely eclectic, yet

profoundly original School of the Porter—Ammonius Saccas, the founder of Neo-Platonism, was but a common porter, or cornsack-carrier, (Σακκοφόρος)[1] here at Alexandria—pursued their speculations in congenial calm, and without disturbing themselves with any direct religious polemic. Christians and Neo-Platonists dispute to which of their sects Ammonius belongs.[2] And even Plotinus, in his refutation of the Gnostics, had in view Oriental doctrines generally, rather than Christianism.[3] But Porphyry not only endeavours to put new life into Olympianism, but Christianism he directly attacks. And Syrian as he was by birth, knowing Hebrew, and well versed in Judaic and Chaldean doctrines, he shows-up with a pitiless logic the improbabilities and contradictions of the Christian Scriptures, and devotes a whole book to the examination of the Prophecies of Daniel. Not yet, however, are Alexandrian thinkers drawn beyond the pale of the School. But Iamblichus marks the transition to a new epoch. Still philosopher, yet already priest, he unites the devoutness of faith to the enthusiasm of thought; opens to philosophy the sanctuaries of Greece and of the East; and initiates it in theurgic mysteries. After Iamblichus, philosophy quits the School, and enters boldly the Temple. Among his successors a few, such as Sopater, Edesius, and Eustathius, are still philosophers. But, for the most part, now the adepts of Neo-Platonism are less of philosophers than

[1] See Gothefred *ad Cod. Theodos.* 14, tit. 22.

[2] Eusebius, *Hist. Ec.*, vol. VI. p. 19.

[3] See Vacherot, *Op. cit.*, t. II. p. 148; and compare his *Essais de Philosophie critique* (*Ennéades de Plotin* traduits par M. Bouillet), p. 387.

of pontiffs and of statesmen. And whether living at the court, as Maximus and Priscus, or administering a province as Sallust, or dwelling in the temples as Chrysanthus, their great aim is to combat Christianism, and maintain or restore Olympianism.

5. What was the cause of this desperate struggle, this alliance with a religion so opposed, and antagonism to a religion apparently so much in harmony both with the philosophical teaching, and the moral spirit of Neo-Platonism? Before examining a question, the right answer to which will certainly throw the most instructive light on the intellectual character of the Christian Revolution, it seems desirable to cast a glance on the means by which the Neo-Platonists not only reconciled themselves to Olympianism, but endeavoured to make the old Hellenic religion triumphant in its struggle with the new Oriental faith. None saw more clearly than the Neo-Platonists that the old religion of Nature had had its day; that it did not, nor could not, without a complete transformation, satisfy the ideal wants of the time. Why, instead of accepting the new religion; why, instead of enrolling themselves in that Church of Christ, the rapid extension of which seemed so clearly to show that in it was the true satisfaction of all religious yearnings; why the Neo-Platonists attempted rather the immense task of transforming Olympianism; and why, continuing the work of Apollonius of Tyana, they went about from country to country, not only calling men to the practice of a more pure and severe morality, but opposing the new, and reforming the old

religion; is the question which we shall in the next section examine. Let us at present consider the means by which this transformation was attempted.

6. The means by which the Neo-Platonists sought to revive belief in Olympianism; to endow it with an idealist theology and morality, and to make of the ancient gods but personifications of its own metaphysical principles, was simply a reading of new meanings into the old myths. This, however, was done by them with perfect good faith; it was not merely a clever manœuvre inspired by necessity; they really believed, *à priori*, that every sort of truth might be found under the veil of the ancient myths.[1] That great law of the Development of Consciousness, which, as I have in the Introduction shown, is the ultimate form of Hume's profound theory of the natural history of Religion, teaches us to regard the early expressions of religious and poetic thought with very different eyes. And however partially only this law may as yet be accepted, because as yet so very partially worked out, in the explanation of the phenomena of Human History, all scientific thinkers admit, at least, that the view which this Law gives of myths is verified by an immense induction. Myths may now be considered as conclusively proved to originate, not in the conscious allegory of philosophic thought; but in the causation-notions of primitive ignorance, and the poesy of popular language;[2] *ab inscientia rerum, et a dictionis*

[1] Vacherot, *Op. cit.*, t. II. pp. 97 and 149.

[2] 'Mythology is only a dialect, an ancient form of language. . . . . It is neither philosophy, nor history, nor religion, nor ethics. It is, if

abundantia. Not, however, thus could they be regarded by those who had not our knowledge of the facts of primitive culture, and of the reaction on thought of its instrument, language. And hence that vast and immensely ingenious, but false and futile Science of Myths, by means of which the Neo-Platonists, like, as we shall presently see, certain theologians of our own day, who have not their excuse, attempted the impossible task of making the forms of an old religion hold the faith of a new age—and not burst.

7. Illustrations of the exegesis of this false hermeneutic Science of Myths may briefly be given from Plotinus, Porphyry, and Sallust. According to the first, we are to understand the mythical relations of Uranus, Saturn, and Jupiter as significant of those of the Neo-Platonic Trinity, the One, Intelligence, and the Universal Soul. By Uranus begetting Saturn, and Saturn, Jupiter, is meant the generation of Intelligence by the One, and of the Soul by Intelligence. Saturn is represented mutilating his father, because the generation of Intelligence involves the division and separation into two terms of the primitive Unity.[1] And the dethronement of Saturn by Jupiter is the replacing of Intelligence by the Soul, its organ, in the government of the world.[2] The reign of Saturn is the world of Immobility and Eternity; and therefore it is that he is always represented with chains. The reign of

we may use a scholastic expression, a *quale*, not a *quid*, something formal, not something substantial, and like poetry, sculpture, and painting, applicable to nearly all that the ancient world could admire or adore.' Max Müller, *Comparative Mythology—Chips*, vol. II. p. 143.

[1] *Enn.* V. VIII. 13. (Bouillet, *Ennéades de Plotin.*) [2] *Ibid.* V. I. 4.

Jupiter is the world of Time, of Movement, and of Life;[1] and he is the Demiourgos. In a similar manner Porphyry interprets the descriptions of Homer. And by the poet's 'veil of purple,' simple enough phrase though it seems, the philosopher shows us that we are to understand that body of flesh and blood which is, in the Mysteries, called the garment of the Soul. So, too, the travels and sufferings of Ulysses are shown to be a profound allegory of the Soul's destiny, condemned to labour, sacrifice, and grief, before entering the supernal life of Intelligence, the celestial Ithaca.[2] Sallust divides myths into various classes, theological, physical, psychical, material, and mixed. An example of the last is the Judgment of Paris, which Sallust thus interprets: The festival is the reunion of the various divine powers in the same centre; the golden apple is a figure of this world, the abode of strife and discord; and Paris is the soul living according to the senses, and distinguishing among the divine powers only sensual beauty.[3]

8. Such are some of the results of the Neo-Platonic Science of Myths. The history of its development is very interesting. Long before the Neo-Platonists, a profound veneration for antique myths, and taste for rationally interpreting them had been a distinguishing feature of all idealist schools. It is never religion itself which these philosophers attack, but the priests who are represented as having lost hold of all its deeper meanings. The return, therefore, of philosophy

[1] *Enn.* V. VIII. 10. [2] *De Antro Nympharum.*
[3] *De Diis et Mundo.*

to the doctrines of Pythagoras and of Plato brought with it everywhere respect and sympathy for the old mythology; but not till Plotinus do we find a set of explanations embracing all the chief points. He treats of them, however, only in reference to his philosophical theories. Porphyry is hardly more systematic, but he devotes to the explanation of the myths several important works. Both Plotinus and Porphyry show themselves disposed to believe that these symbols have a certain basis of truth, but they profess no absolute faith in the mythology of Olympianism. Certain myths they judge very severely, and they everywhere subordinate religion to science in their efforts at reconciliation. After Porphyry, philosophy embraces Polytheism without reserve. It is no more as hitherto simply religious, but a religion. To this it was driven by its struggle with Christianity. And this transformation at once of philosophy and of religion became possible, partly through the development now given to the science of myths, and partly through the generally received doctrine of Demons. Plotinus and Porphyry had shown on certain points the identity of religion and philosophy, but were far from putting this forward as a principle. But at length, in the treatise, *De Diis*, the work, if not of Sallust, at least of some other contemporary of Julian, myths are treated as the oracles of the Gods,[1] and myth and science are viewed as but two forms of one and the same thought, addressed, the one to the imagination, the other to the understanding. And, finally, not only a Science of

[1] Vacherot, *Op. cit.* t. II. pp. 121–6.

Myths, but, as by certain modern sectaries, a Science of spirits, or demons, is, in such works as that *De Mysteriis*, elaborated for the defence of the Old Religion.

9. But it would not do. And tragic and pathetic are the cries of despair in which the Neo-Platonists confess, at length, that inevitable is the triumph of Christianity. Standing before the vast columned arcades of that splendid temple of Serapis (Osiris-Apis), of which the uncertain site is yet not improbably marked by the Column of Diocletian,[1] yonder on the height outside the ancient walls, the philosopher Antoninus, suddenly seized with the prophetic spirit of his mother, Sospitra, appalled his disciples by the prediction, that 'the time would come when the glorious edifice before them would be overthrown, the carved images defaced, the temples of the gods turned into sepulchres, and mankind immersed in darkness.'[2] Or again, listen to Hermes, in the *Discourse of Initiation*—'O Egypt, Egypt! there will remain of thy religion but vague rumours, which posterity will not believe, words graven on stone recording thy piety. . . . . I address myself to thee most holy river, to thee I announce the Future. Streams of blood sullying thy divine wave will overflow thy banks. . . . . Dost thou weep, Asclepios? There will be things still more sad. Egypt herself will fall into apostasy, the worst of evils. . . . . In the weariness and exhaustion of souls, there will be but disdain for this vast universe, this glorious and perfect work of

[1] Wilkinson, *Handbook for Egypt*, 87*b*, 88*b*, 92*a*.

[2] Eunapius, *Lives of the Sophists*, cited by Lecky, *History of European Morals*, vol. I. p. 454. See, for the fulfilment of this prophecy, Milman, *History of Christianity*, vol. III. pp. 68–72.

God, this complex structure of forms and images in which the divine will, prodigal of marvels, has brought all together in a unique spectacle, a harmonious system, worthy forever of veneration, praise, and love. But they will prefer darkness to light, they will consider death better than life, and no one will regard the heavens. . . . . Such will be the old age of the world, irreligion and anarchy, confusion of all rules, destruction of all right.'[1] *Vicisti Galilæe!*

Thou hast conquered, O pale Galilean; the world has grown grey from thy breath;
We have drunken of things Lethean, and fed on the fulness of death.
O lips that the live blood faints in, the leavings of racks and rods!
O ghastly glories of saints, dead limbs of gibbeted gods!
Though all men abase them before you in spirit, and all knees bend,
I kneel not, neither adore you, but standing, look to the end.
* * * * * * * *
Though before thee the throned Cytherean be fallen, and hidden her head,
Yet thy kingdom shall pass, Galilean, thy dead shall go down to thee dead.'[2]

SECTION II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NOTION OF MIRACLE.

1. AND now, what was the cause of this stubborn resistance to the progress, and finally, of those cries of despair on the triumph, of Christianity? In its theological doctrines, particularly in its doctrine of the unity at once and trinity of the divine nature, Neo-

[1] Ménard, *Hermes Trismegiste, Introd.* pp. xcvi.-c. This Hermetic *Discourse of Initiation* is cited by Lactantius as an early work, but was, nevertheless, M. Ménard thinks, certainly written by a contemporary in the reign of Constantine. See p. ciii.

[2] Swinburne, *Poems and Ballads, Hymn to Proserpine,* pp. 79-80.

Platonism, as we have seen, much more closely resembled monotheistic Christianism than polytheistic Olympianism. And still more profound was its likeness to the new religion, and utter unlikeness to the old, in moral spirit. Whence, then, the stubbornness of its resistance, and the despair of its defeat? This is the question which we must endeavour rightly to answer, if we would gain a true conception of the intellectual character of the Christian Revolution. We must, then, distinctly separate this from the larger question as to the general causes of the fall of Olympianism, and the triumph of Christianism. What we here ask is simply what the cause was of the opposition to Christianism of all the thinkers most imbued with the spirit of Greek philosophy?

2. The causes of this opposition of Neo-Platonism to Christianism do not appear to me, as ordinarily assigned, to go to the root of the matter. It is very true that, at the time when the Alexandrian thinkers were roused to a direct polemic with Christianism, it had become apparent that Olympianism was not a mere religion, but a civilization, as indeed every great religion is; and hence, that it was not merely the old religion that was menaced, but the whole of the existing system of society. But, as the new religion was spreading with all the ardour of infinite achievement, why, except there was some fundamental difference of principle between the Alexandrian philosophers and the Galilean preachers, should the Neo-Platonists have opposed the progress of Christianity, not only as fatal to the old civilization, but as an anarchic superstition, fatal to all social order

whatever? Again it is true that both philosophies and religions have a profound attachment to their historical origin.[1] But to argue, that therefore it was that Neo-Platonism, as essentially Greek, notwithstanding the influence that, even in combating, had been exercised on it by the atmosphere of Oriental doctrines in the midst of which it was developed; to argue that it was simply because of the attachment of Neo-Platonism to its Greek origin, that it opposed the new Oriental religion of Christianism, seems to give but a rather superficial explanation; unless one can show further that, as deriving its origin from, and maintaining the traditions of Greek thought, Neo-Platonism had, for its basis a principle, the antithesis of that which was the basis of Christianism. And once more, it is true that the later Neo-Platonists could not but see that, with the triumph of such a religion as Christianism, not only would the Olympian temples be destroyed, but the philosophic schools would be closed. But why should this be; and why should an instinct of self-preservation thus impel Neo-Platonism to an alliance with that Olympianism to which it was, both in doctrine and in moral spirit, so profoundly opposed, except there was a still more profound antagonism between itself and Christianism; and must we not, then, endeavour to discover in what antithesis of principles this antagonism consisted, if we would penetrate to the true cause of the opposition of Neo-Platonism to—what Julian, in the last bitterness of the struggle, at one time

[1] Vacherot, *Op. cit.*, t. II. p. 94.

calls — the 'Christian Superstition,' at another the 'atheism (ἀθεότητα) of the Galileans'?

3. What the nature was of that antithesis of principles which we are thus led to believe was the true cause of the resistance offered by Neo-Platonism to Christianism can be discovered only in an analysis of their respective doctrines. Neglecting, then, what is merely accessory or subordinate in the vast system of the School of Alexandria, we find that what is essential in the Neo-Platonic philosophy may be reduced to three heads. These are its doctrine of Method; its theory of the Trinity; and its principle of Emanation.[1] All these are in closest organic connection. But it is in the theory of the Trinity that is concentrated the philosophy of the Alexandrians. No less important, however, is the theory of the Trinity in the system of Christianism. For with it is indissolubly connected the doctrine of Incarnation, and with this again, the plan of Redemption; this also is the theory which all the great heresies have attacked; Arius, for instance, denying the coeternity of the Father and the Son, and Nestorius, the identity of the Word with the man Christ Jesus. Evidently, therefore, it is in the analysis and comparison of the Neo-Platonic and Christian theories of the Trinity that we must seek to discover that antithesis of principles which our criticism of the causes ordinarily assigned has suggested as the true cause of the antagonism of Christianism and Neo-Platonism.

4. Till the work of M. Jules Simon on the history

[1] See Saisset, *Histoire de l'École d'Alexandrie, Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1844, t. VII. p. 790.

of the School of Alexandria, it was generally assumed that the Neo-Platonic and Christian Trinities were analogous. In the great dispute, therefore, on a subject which involved nothing less than the claims of two rival philosophies,[1] parties were divided only on the question as to whether Neo-Platonism had borrowed its Trinity from Christianism, or Christianism its Trinity from Neo-Platonism. M. Jules Simon demonstrated that they were essentially different, and hence concluded that neither had borrowed from the other.[2] Without doubt, Alexandrian philosophy, as M. Saisset points out,[3] and Osirian mythology, as I shall in the sequel have occasion to show, had had an influence on the development of that Christian conception of the Trinity which we find at length stereotyped in the Nicean Creed of the fourth century. But the fact of being influenced by, does not imply borrowing from, a rival doctrine. An essential difference may still be maintained. To demonstrate that such a difference there is between the Neo-Platonic and Christian Trinities, was the principal object of M. Simon; and his ablest critic admits that such a demonstration must be acknowledged to be 'un des grands résultats de son entreprise historique.'[4]

5. Let us see then, first, what the Neo-Platonic theory of the Trinity was. God, according to this theory, is the

[1] 'En comparant la Trinité chrétienne avec celle d'Alexandrie, M. Jules Simon ne compare donc rien moins que deux philosophies rivales.'—Saisset, *Revue des Deux Mondes*, t. VII. p. 808.

[2] *Histoire de l'École d'Alexandrie*, t. I. pp. 308–41.

[3] *Revue des Deux Mondes*, t. VII. p. 809 et seq.

[4] *Ibid.* p. 808.

One, the Absolute. But there emanates from God, Intelligence, an hypostasis of the One, and the Universal Soul, an hypostasis of Intelligence. The One is not an hypostasis, even the first, but is, in Alexandrian language, *hyper-hypostatic*.[1] And as the Universal Soul emanates from Intelligence, so, from the Universal Soul emanates an infinite series of beings. Thus the one, uniform, and necessary law of existence is Emanation; and through this law all the degrees of being are connected, from the absolute Unity to the extreme limits of existence. In the theory of the latest, as of the earliest Neo-Platonists, in the doctrine of Proclus, as well as in that of Plotinus, the entire universe is a system of hypostases, more or less immediately divine, all emanating from God by a necessary expansion, and returning to him by a concentration equally necessary.

6. Compare now the Christian theory of the Trinity. The three persons are not here, as in the Neo-Platonic Trinity, united by the same, but by a different relation. The Father begets the Son, but the Son does not beget the Holy Spirit. This Person is the fruit of the union of the Father and the Son, and *proceeds* from both the one and the other. Nor are these distinctions so puerile as they may to some appear. If the three hypostases of the Trinity are conceived as emanating, the second from the first, and the third from the second, each has an immediate relation only with that which precedes, and the first and the third are in a manner strangers to one another.

[1] Vacherot, *Histoire*, t. II. p. 439; see also his *Essais de Philosophie critique*.

But if the third Person is conceived as the very relation of the First and the Second, the Father and the Son, all three are profoundly united together, and form, to use the expression of Bossuet, 'une sainte et divine société.' And hence results another important consequence. The world must be thus conceived as profoundly separated from God. The Father, Son, and Holy Ghost form, as it were, a circle. They suffice for themselves. And if the world depends on God, it is by a bond altogether different from that which unites the divine Persons to each other. The world has neither proceeded from, nor has it been engendered, but *created*, by God. Not a necessary, and therefore a divine emanation, as in the Neo-Platonic system, the world is thus but, as it were, an accident. Its duration is but a point in eternity. And it needs but that the Hand be withdrawn which has formed it out of Nothing, and sustained it on the abyss, and all this fair world returns to the Nothing whence, for the glory of its Creator, it was commanded forth.

7. Now consider these two theories. Equally unverifiable they may, indeed, be, and equally dreams. But not on that account will the true student of Man's history turn away from the consideration of them. For he knows that nothing has hitherto exerted a greater influence on the destinies of mankind than mere feignings, dreams, fictions; most of them, no doubt, uttered in good faith; but none, therefore, the less false. It is, indeed, the tragic pathos of this fact that chiefly gives to the history of Humanity the profound, and inexhaustible interest as of a sublime drama. And the

scientific student further knows that, in different modes of dreaming, there may be discovered tendencies of thought, and general intellectual conceptions which it is of the utmost consequence, for a true understanding of the history of Man, duly to distinguish, and rightly to appreciate. Puerile, therefore, as these theories of the Trinity, both Christian and Neo-Platonic, may be, not trifling is the interest, nor trivial the task, of their examination.

8. Seriously, then, comparing the Christian and Neo-Platonic theories of God, is it not evident that they are distinguished by nothing less important than fundamentally different conceptions of Causation? In the Greek theory of Neo-Platonism, God, as the cause of things, is conceived as *in* the World; hence all the orders of being are knit together in a series of necessary relations; and, even in the relation of things to the First Cause of all, there is nothing arbitrary, but throughout the whole system of the Universe there is one pervading law. In the Judaic theory of the Christians, God, as the cause of things, is conceived as outside, and independent of the world; and hence, there is no necessary connection between the various orders of being; no necessary, and therefore predictable relation between the different classes of phenomena themselves, but only a purely arbitrary relation to a cause outside of them, an independent Creator. But the Neo-Platonic conception of the relations of things is thus seen to be fundamentally the conception of Science; and its theory of an Emanating Trinity, though but a dream, a prophetic dream; a dream of

LAW, and a prophecy of the theories of transformation, evolution, and development. On the other hand, the Christian conception of the relations of things is thus seen to be fundamentally the negation of all Science; yet its theory of a Creating Trinity, though but a dream, is also a prophetic dream; a dream of MIRACLE, and a prophecy of the most disastrous superstition, intolerant bigotry, and intolerable cruelty.

9. The Christian Revolution, considered in its intellectual aspect, is thus found to consist essentially in the development of a notion of Causation, the antithesis of that of Greek Philosophy, and of Modern Science. This may be a new result of the study of Neo-Platonic, and comparison of it with Christian, Philosophy. But let those who doubt the accuracy of this generalization, study the facts from which it is drawn. And if the study of Neo-Platonism is now found to have not only a direct, but revolutionary bearing on our appreciation of Christianity; it is in this but similar to every other direction whatever of modern research. And most curious it, indeed, is to observe how studies, apparently the most remote from the greater problems of the Modern Revolution, are suddenly found to have the most direct bearing on their solution. The general European study of the Neo-Platonists scarcely dates further back than Cousin; and he was reproached by his friends, and ridiculed by his enemies for an attempt so futile as that of reviving an interest in authors so deservedly forgotten.[1] But in France alone there swiftly followed histories of the School of Alexandria by students so thorough as those

[1] Saisset, *Revue des Deux Mondes*, t. VII. p. 786.

to whom I must here acknowledge my indebtedness—M. Matter, M. Jules Simon, and M. Vacherot. And now, generalizing the results of their researches, in their bearing on our theory of the origin of the intellectual conceptions of Christianity, we find that these are, in the first instance, at least, to be traced to the development of the Judaic notion of Miracle as the antithesis of the Greek conception of Law. Admirable, therefore, we must now acknowledge, was the inspiration of the Apostle, though all unconscious of the keenness of his satire, when he wrote: 'The Jews desire Miracles, and the Greeks, Knowledge.'[1]

10. But if so; if Christianity must, in relation to Neo-Platonism, be regarded as the development of a new and false notion of Causation; must we not confess that the philosophers of Alexandria had profoundly reasonable cause for their stubborn, uncompromising, and though silenced, yet unvanquished, resistance to the new religion of the Galileans? Nay more, must we not, though we are all now Christians—for are we not all, as Antony said, over the dead body of Cæsar, 'all honourable men?'—must we not, though Christians, yet thinkers, justify and laud this stubborn, uncompromising, and unvanquishable resistance to the progress of that religion which, having been triumphant, we now profess? And must we not, if we will but be candid, admit that every particular forecast of the consequences of the triumph of Christianity; every belief that mainly urged the Neo-Platonists to their desperate, and at length despairing resistance; every

[1] Cor. i. 22.

forecast of Greek philosophy as to the consequences of the triumph of this Oriental religion, has been only too fatally fulfilled? For consider these forecasts and beliefs as we find them in the polemic against Christianism, from Porphyry to Julian. They may be reduced to three; which let us, with all candour, examine, one by one.

11. First, there was foreseen the closing of the Schools of Philosophy, and the strangling of Science. And was not this anticipation verified by the event? How, indeed, possibly could free enquiry, the very life of Philosophy and of Science, have co-existed with miraculous dogma triumphant? And was it not just a question of Porphyry's[1] that, when men, at length, began again to think, originated the whole of that great movement of Scholasticism which, resulting in the suicidal conclusion that it was possible for the same thing to be at once true to the dogma and false, or at least indemonstrable to reason, virtually overthrew the whole intellectual system of Christianity? Secondly, it was believed that Christianism brought with it a view of Nature and of Humanity, which, depriving the former of all beauty, and the latter of all truth, save under a special providence, would necessarily lead to fanatical asceticism, and hateful intolerance. And was it not, in fact, so? Compare the Classic reverence with the Christian contempt for Nature;[2] compare with

[1] See below, chap. v. sect. ii.

[2] It is just its exceptional character that has made so famous the charming letter of Basil the Great (b. 326, d. 379) to his friend Gregory of Nazianzum, describing his mountain hermitage in the Armenian forest, overlooking the plain through which flows the rapid Iris. See Basilii M.

the persecuting bigotry of Christianity, while strong enough to dare it, the large tolerance of the Roman who did not molest even this new Oriental religion till it showed itself dangerous to the *Respublica*, the Commonwealth; compare the still nobler tolerance of the Greek, at once grounded on, and encouraging the attempt to show some aspect, at least, of truth everywhere—compare this with the narrow intolerance of that Christian philosophy which, till somewhat enlarged of late by the influence of the Modern Revolution, has seen outside the pale of Christianity, Heathens only, Pagans, and Idolaters, doomed to everlasting torment. Consider how logical are these results of contempt, at once, of Nature and of Humanity, and how necessarily they follow from the miracle-dogmas of Christianism. And knowing in your own soul how entirely, notwithstanding your Christian profession of faith, your sympathies now are with the tolerance of the Roman statesman and the Greek philosopher, do not hesitate to justify the single exception to the tolerance of the Neo-Platonist—his intolerance of the intolerance of the Christian. But whether the Alexandrian philosophers are thus justified or not, can we refuse to admit, at least, that their second forecast and belief as to the consequences of the triumph of Christianism, has been amply fulfilled? Yet once more, and it was in this that was summed up all the forecasts and beliefs that impelled and gave ardour to the polemic of the Neo-

Epist. xiv. p. 93, and ccxxiii. p. 339. Only in Gregory of Nyssa, the brother of Basil, do we find among the early Christians a similarly refined feeling of Nature.

Platonists; they anticipated in the triumph of Christianism, the domination of Superstition, and debasement by supernatural terrors. And were they wrong in their anticipation? Do not all we, millions as we now probably are of professing Christians who do, nevertheless, though deeply we reverence Jesus of Nazareth, not worship in him the infinite and eternal God, once on a time virgin-born, crucified, and reborn; do not we all also thus regard the distinctive dogma of Christianism as, in many at least of its consequences, a disastrous superstition? And do not we, too, regard with a contempt equal to that of the Neo-Platonists the giving to Morality, as, in fact, Christianity did give to it, the supernatural sanctions of Heaven and Hell, instead of those natural sanctions of the Individual Conscience, and the Common Good, which Greek Philosophy had begun, at least, to substitute for that base supernaturalism of the vulgar ethics to which the religion of the Galilean fishermen gave a new force, and consecration?

12. And yet, though all the particular anticipations of the Neo-Platonists were, their general anticipation as to the consequences of the triumph of Christianity was not, verified. The consequences of the triumph of Christianism were, in fact, the closing of the Schools of Philosophy, and the strangling of Science; a view of Nature and of Humanity which led to fanatical asceticism, and hateful intolerance; the domination of Superstition, and debasement by supernatural terrors. For all these mischiefs can be so clearly shown to be not only logically, but historically connected with the

fundamental intellectual conception of Christianity, that it is impossible truly to argue that they were subsequent only to, not consequent on the establishment of that religion—*post*, not *propter hoc*. And yet, though the Neo-Platonists were right in their particular anticipations of the consequences of the triumph of Christianism, they were wrong in their general anticipation, reasonable as, their premises having been historically verified, we must confess that it was. Christianity did not, as the Alexandrian philosophers concluded from the profound mischiefs that they truly saw in it, bring social anarchy. On the contrary, Christianity was the very force that, from universal anarchy, saved society. Nor only did Christianity thus reorganize society, but, intellectually, as well as morally, it has been, with all its mischiefs, of incalculable service, to the progress of Humanity.

13. This we shall see, if we now consider from the higher point of view offered by our ultimate Law of Man's History, that development of the notion of Miracle which our historical analysis has shown to be the essential intellectual characteristic of the Christian Revolution. Our general historical Law, as will be remembered, affirms that Thought, in its differentiating and integrating activity, proceeds from the simple conception of One-sided Determination, through the differentiation of Subjective and Objective, to the conception of Mutual Determination. Now, as I have already said, in the section on the discovery of this Law,[1] I mean by the phrase, 'simple conception of

[1] Above, p. 190.

One-sided Determination,' to characterise the primitive notion of Causation. In this stage of culture, it cannot properly be said that there is the notion of Miracle, any more than of Law. For both notions are implicit in this first stage. In order to the clear development of the notion of Law, there is needed the development of the notion of Miracle. This, we now see, was the great intellectual service performed by Christianity, under the predominating Semitic influences of its Oriental origin. But the relation of the development of the notion of Miracle to the clear and complete development of the notion of Law, cannot here be fully pointed out. A more favourable occasion will, doubtless, offer itself in the sequel.[1] Here I must content myself with but thus briefly indicating that the ultimate explanation of the development of the notion of Miracle, as the antithesis of that of Law, is to be found in relating it to that vast historical movement of the differentiation of the Subjective and the Objective, which was initiated by the great Revolution of the Sixth Century, B.C. And I trust that it will be one of the main results of this work to prove that such a differentiation is the true generalisation of the activity of that great middle period of Thought which, under the dominancy of Christianity, has prepared the way for that final conception of Causation as Mutual Determination, the establishment of which will be the triumph of the Modern Revolution.

14. But if I must here only thus briefly indicate how it was that, notwithstanding all its train of undeniable

[1] Below, chap. v. sect. ii.

mischiefs, and false as was its fundamental intellectual notion, Christianity was still of immense service to the intellectual progress of Humanity; the consideration of the service rendered by Christianity to the moral progress of Mankind must be altogether postponed. Not here, by the river of Egypt, is there, but hereafter, perhaps, on the hills of Syria—at Bethlehem, at Jerusalem, or at Nazareth—there may be, fit inspiration. But still, as, considering it from an intellectual point of view, I have unfavourably contrasted the Christian with the Neo-Platonic theory of the Trinity; I must here suggest, at least, the vast superiority, in a moral point of view, of the Christian conception. Just consider it. In the Neo-Platonic conception of the Trinity there is a mere repeated relation of sequence. The Persons, on the other hand, of the Christian Trinity are in such relations to each other as to form what can hardly by any phrase be more adequately expressed than by that, already quoted, of Bossuet's: '*une sainte et divine société.*' The Father, the co-eternal only-begotten Son, and the Holy Spirit proceeding from both the one and the other. Is it calculable the effect of such a supreme ideal of Love? What matters it that this sublime dream has no verifiable reality in a Supernatural Existence? Has not man thus set himself an ideal of Love, in the constraining beauty of which there is the prophecy of its realisation in Humanity itself?

15. Thus does the New Philosophy of History teach us to look, not with the mere impartiality of cold indifference, but with the high justice of many-sided sympathy on the great facts of the history of Man.

And so, if we take the side of the Neo-Platonists against Christianity, it is but because we see that what they saw of its mischiefs was true; and know that what we know of its benefits they could not know. But if we judge this religion without sentimentality, we judge it also without hatred. For there can be no hatred where there is no fear. And the New Philosophy of History not only assures us, by that great law which is its central doctrine, that the days of a religion, of which the fundamental intellectual conception is Miracle, are numbered, and its power over, at least, all those who can rise to the conception of Law, given to another; but assures us, by the incomparably grander reach of its sympathy when set side by side with the historical philosophy of Christianity, that the Revolution of which it is at once the philosophy and the religion will ultimately be triumphant; assures us that the Philosophy of History, of which the outcome is the Ideal of Humanity, will, not only because of its greater truth, but because of its wider love, ultimately triumph over that—beneficent as, notwithstanding all the mischiefs of its falsehood, in its day, it has been—that philosophy at once and religion of which the central figure is a miraculous Christ.

SECTION III.

THE RELATION OF BROADCHURCHISM TO NEO-PLATONISM.

1. If such a conclusion as that to which we are led by an historical analysis of the facts, and philosophical consideration of the bearings of the development of the notion of Miracle, excites loud murmurs of dissent; subtle arguings about the interpretation of myth and legend, in order to such a reconciliation of Reason and Faith as may haply content the former, and leave the latter untransformed; and a confused clamour of definitions of Christianity in which its intellectual aspect as a great historical revolution is left wholly out of account—standing where we now are, the futility of all this babble is too evident to permit of its disturbing our confidence in the conclusion by which it has been excited. On this silent shore, once so thronged with the varied fervent life of that great transitional age dominated by the Schools of Alexandria, we but hear the disputes of the later Neo-Platonists over again. Again this strand re-echoes with moral ideas and aspirations which have no adequate expression or due satisfaction in the Old Faith; re-echoes with innumerable explanations and interpretations,[1] allegorisings

[1] Of these, in ancient times, there were, at least, three distinct systems, which may be distinguished as the Stoical, the Euhemerist, and the Neo-Platonic. The first offered explanations founded on physical facts; the second, historical explanations; and the third, explanations partly by means of a theory of demons, partly by aid of mystical allegories. Quite singularly analogous are the hermeneutical systems of our Christian Latitudinarians.

and spiritualisings of the Old Creed; re-echoes with declamations that but testify to sense of the need, and want of the power of reconstruction. For again we approach the culminating epoch of a great age of Transition. Again, with an old religion, a civilisation is seen to be falling into ruin. And again, we hear the despairing cries of those who, notwithstanding all their love of the old religion, and all their subtlety in spiritualising its materialism, see, not only that it is doomed, but with it the whole social system of which it was the life. And yet, as then, the destruction of the old religion and civilisation was, so now the same phenomenon will be the prelude, not, as imagined, to universal anarchy, but to a new and higher religion, a new and higher civilisation.

2. But similar as is modern Latitudinarianism, or, to use a preferable, because shorter and Saxon word, Broadchurchism, to ancient Neo-Platonism,[1] the essential difference between them must not be overlooked; and, in pointing it out, I hope to clear away all doubt that may still exist as to the intellectual character of the Christian Revolution. Neo-Platonism fought for a true intellectual conception, or for what must be

[1] 'The restoration attempted satisfies nobody; criticism sees that it is but a compromise with the exigencies of an uncomfortable position; and conservatism prefers the old ruins to a castle in the air.'—*Saturday Review*, 1864, pp. 786-7, in a notice of Richter's *Ueber Leben und Geistesentwickelung des Plotin*. But with a really humorous Protestant blindness, it is to 'the partial reaction of our own age in the direction of Roman Catholicism,' that the rise and fall of the Neo-Platonic Philosophy is said to 'present a singular parallel.' Surely if any parallel is to be drawn at all, modern Roman Catholicism is the representative of the ancient Orthodox Paganism, and, as in the text I maintain, Protestant Broadchurchism of Neo-Platonism.

admitted to have been, at worst, the metaphysical rudiments of such a conception. Broadchurchism contends for a false intellectual conception. Both Neo-Platonism and Broadchurchism endeavour to reconcile Reason with Faith, in defending an old creed, by allegorising and spiritualising its myths and legends. But the law, now well established, had not in the Alexandrian age been even suggested, that miraculous narratives are simply facts of primitive culture,[1] and hence, that all allegorisings and spiritualisings of such narratives are mere dreamings. And further, the Neo-Platonic interpretations of myth had, for their ultimate object, the defence of what was essentially the notion of Law against that of Miracle; while the Broadchurch interpretations of myth have for their object the defence of some more or less attenuated notion of Miracle against that of Law. And, finally, as to the difference of the similar struggles of Neo-Platonism and Broadchurchism. Neo-Platonism fell because it opposed what was distinctively, though this it could not see, a Moral Revolution; and Broadchurchism, in all its thousand forms, will fall, because it opposes what is distinctively, though this it refuses to see, an Intellectual Revolution.

3. And here we, in fact, touch what is the gist of the whole matter. All the great phenomena of human nature, whether individual or social, are at once moral and intellectual. But at one time, the most active forces are of a moral, at another time, of an intellectual character. At one time it is new moral forces that,

[1] See below, chap. IV. sect. iii.

finding no adequate means of expression in existing intellectual forms, give birth to new, or remould the most fitting of the old, intellectual conceptions. At another time, it is intellectual forces that seem to give birth to new moral forces in breaking down old barriers, stimulating by new horizons, and, in giving freer scope, giving also more forceful vigour to the perennial moral enthusiasm of Humanity. Of the former character was the Christian, of the latter is the Modern Revolution. Christianity was an intellectual, because it was a moral, revolution. It developed the notion of Miracle, because there was not then existing any notion of Law adequate to the expression of its new moral sentiment. The moral characteristics, on the other hand, of the Modern Revolution are rather effects than causes of the great intellectual changes by which it is distinguished. The Neo-Platonists vainly imagined that old symbols could be made adequate containing forms of new moral ideas. And similar is the error of Broadchurchism, but greater, and even still more futile. For then, the new moral ideas were working out for themselves expressions of which the fundamental intellectual conception was false; and now, it is from the larger truth of new intellectual conceptions that those moral ideas arise in attempting to read which into the old symbols, Broadchurchism, like Neo-Platonism, does but destroy what it would defend, and what it would explain it but explodes.

4. Similar, then, is Broadchurchism to Neo-Platonism in the religious character, but dissimilar in the intellectual object of its activity. The chief activity of both,

in reference to religion, may be characterised as an interpretation of myths. But the intellectual object of Neo-Platonism was the preservation of, at least, a rudiment of the conception of Law; while the intellectual object of Broadchurchism is the preservation of, at least, a shadow of the notion of Miracle. Reflection on this difference will, I trust, clear away whatever doubt may remain as to the development of the notion of Miracle having been the distinctive intellectual feature of the Christian Revolution. And if we further consider the manner in which this notion of Miracle is now defended by Christian Apologists; how futile is the defence, and how suicidal, the abandonment of it; we shall not only see what the intellectual character was of the Christian, but how antithetical is the character of the Modern Revolution, and how immense its advance.

5. Some, for instance, give freely up all the Miracles of Christianity, save the greatest of them all, that of the Resurrection. Hold by it, and give up the others? Does not, then, the greater include the less? Or on what unverifiable, and *pro re natâ* assumption as to the habits of God, are the less *not* included in the greater? Others again, ignoring, or ignorant of, that real distinction between Law and Miracle, which is, in fact, as I hope in the sequel to make clear, the distinction between an earlier and later mode of conceiving causes; these other defenders, or rather apologists of miracle, seek to explain the Supernatural as the interference, not of an external and arbitrary power, but of a 'higher law.' Or again, eviscerating the Christian Creed of

everything that it is important to Christianity to prove, they represent what they have left of it as an 'hypothesis,' and talk in pseudo-scientific fashion of 'the method of its verification.'[1] But to what can such sophistries, sometimes pathetic, but oftener contemptible, be compared but to the homage that Vice pays to Virtue? If it received even the homage of Hypocrisy from all who had hitherto been unblushing offenders, would not Virtue be justified in thinking that the reign of Vice was coming to an end? And when even Christians themselves pay Science the homage of disguising the Supernatural, may we not justly conclude that their religion, based as it is on Miracles, is in the last stages of a struggle which can hardly but have an issue similar to that which ended the vain effort of Neo-Platonism?

6. 'Mais le sentiment que Jésus a introduit dans le monde est bien le nôtre . . . en ce sens nous sommes Chrétiens, même quand nous nous séparons sur presque tous les points de la tradition chrétienne qui nous a précédés.'[2] And though the defence of Miracle is now wholly given up, and every single dogma of the Christian Creed is maintained to be false, or at least not to be verifiably true, still Christianity is declared to be 'une religion universelle et éternelle,'[3] 'la religion éternelle de l'humanité,'[4] &c. Now, without question,

[1] It seems unnecessary to name, or more particularly to refer to, any of the innumerable essays of that transitional, and therefore popular, but ephemeral literature in which such views are to be found.

[2] Renan, *Vie de Jésus*, pp. 445–7. [3] *Ibid.* p. 444.

[4] Renan, *De la Part des Peuples sémitiques*, p. 23; compare also Strauss, *Leben Jesu*, b. II., *Schlussabhandlung*; and Mr. Matthew Arnold's essays on *Literature and Dogma*, &c.

there is a sense in which Jesus of Nazareth is, and for ever will be reverenced as a master, and beloved as a brother by all those who, 'having heard of him with the hearing of the ear,' have anything in their hearts of those divine Wants which are the germs of all religions, and some touch of which makes the whole world kin. But, in this sense, the sense in which these most advanced Christian Apologists, love and reverence the memory of the Prophet of Nazareth; Christ, however supreme his idealism and self-devotion may be reckoned, is still but a man; a redeemer still, but redeeming in no other sense than as, from materialism and selfishness, Sakya Muni, the Buddha, and St. Francis of Assisi redeem. And so to define Christianity as to call oneself a Christian because one thus believes in Christ cannot, I think, but appear to an unbiassed historical judgment, untruthfulness, to an unobscured moral sense, dishonesty.

7. For the fact is unquestionable that, as I have above pointed out, Christianity was, and, by the very nature of the human mind, could not but be, at once an intellectual, and a moral revolution. Nor do any know better than those scholarly critics to whom I have just alluded that 'the sentiment which Jesus introduced into the world' was but part of a great general revolution in moral feelings and aspirations; and that what was peculiar in the Christian sentiment was owing to the reaction of the form in which it was expressed. In the mere fact of being characterised by a larger fraternal sentiment, all the contemporary sects were very much on a level with Christianity; and the moral revolution of the time is just as visible in the writ-

ings of Olympians as of Christians.[1] But the special tone and character which the larger fraternal sentiment, as also the idealism, and mysticism of the age took in Christianity was, as it evidently could not but be, determined by the historical theory with which it was in Christianity connected, or, in other words, the intellectual form in which it was embodied. A definition, therefore, of Christianity, either as a sentiment only, or only as a doctrine, would be as inadequate historically, as it would be onesided philosophically. And this becomes further evident when we observe what was the chief cause of the prevalent moral ideas of the time exercising so much more powerfully regenerating a popular influence, as presented by Christianity, than as presented by any of the other sects which ran with it for so long in the great race, of which the prize was the government of consciences. For, without question, if we abandon the unverifiable dreams of theology, and study the verified facts of history, the chief cause of the triumph of Christianity over the Stoic, Epicurean, Neo-Platonic, and other sects which, while they fancied themselves foes, were but rivals, and distanced forerunners,[2] is to be found in the prodigious emotional power of that general theory of the origin, progress, and destiny of Mankind, of which the central figure, typified in all the Past, and triumphant in all the Future, is the crucified Son of God.

[1] See the works on the History of Morals of Zeller, Denis, Martha, Boutteville, Lecky, &c.

[2] 'Ce titre leur convient, quoique plusieurs soient contemporains de l'ère chrétienne, d'autres un peu postérieurs; car l'avénement d'une religion ne date que du jour où elle est acceptée par les peuples, comme le règne d'un prétendant date de sa victoire.'—Ménard, *Hermes Trismegiste, Introd.* pp. x. xi.

8. How, then, can men truthfully, though—so persuasive are the sophistries of sentiment—honestly they, no doubt, may call themselves still Christians when they have cast aside not merely the doctrine which is distinctive of Christianity in its intellectual aspect, but the doctrine to which at the same time, everything that is distinctive of it in its moral aspect is owing? Feeling must be expressed in words and doctrines; and the words and doctrines in which it is expressed react on the feeling. And this applies not only to the sentiment of Christianity historically, but also to the sentiment of Christ individually. We hear much talk of the 'pure' religion of Jesus, and of the 'pure' religion of the Gospels. But this 'pure' religion was no abstract sentiment; nor was it a mere morality, but already a tolerably definite Creed; and in the teaching of Jesus himself, if we are to trust the reports of it, are to be found the germs, at least, of all the doctrines of Orthodoxy. Yet, if this is so; then, when every dogma, not of the Fathers only, nor only of the Evangelists, but of Christ himself is discarded, and when the moral spirit of the religion they taught is expressed in quite new intellectual forms, and by that very fact profoundly modified; surely one gains nothing but a mere sentimental satisfaction—or what is, alas! in these days a far more general and powerful temptation to untruthfulness and dishonesty, material advantages—by departing from the historical definition, and ordinary signification of the words 'Christianity,' and 'Christian;' equivocating with them in some esoteric meaning of one's own, and 'paltering in a

double sense.' And when one has not only privately abandoned, but publicly shown the falsehood of every belief that has hitherto been ordinarily implied by the word 'Christianity;' if one still speaks of it as 'the eternal religion of Humanity,' this can surely, from a scientific point of view, be regarded as but a mere Neo-Platonic subtlety; a sophistry, with just such an amount of truth in it as to obscure the judgment of thinkers, and just such a likeness to a Judas-kiss as to intensify the hate of believers.

9. In order to unite we must distinguish; giving o things names with definite concrete meanings attached to them; and this, just in order that we may more clearly show how they are related to each other. The unity, for example, of the Physical Forces is not shown by *confusing* them all under some common name, but by *correlating* them under different names. Or, again, in showing the unity of Organic Species, the naturalist does not carry the same name across the most diverse transformations; nor imagine that, by giving different names with definitely limited meanings to different species, he does anything more than make the comprehension of their relations, that is, of their oneness, more clear and assured. Even in studying the transformations of belief, of thought, and of institutions, the same rule is followed, except in this single case of the transformation now, on all hands, admitted to be taking place in the Creed of Christendom. In this case, the most antagonistic beliefs are included under the same name. Nay, most singular of all, very many of those who profess in some sense or other to

believe Jesus of Nazareth to have been Very God of Very God, will now insist on calling, even those who deny that fundamental dogma of the supernatural character of Jesus, which, as we have seen, gave to Christianity not only its intellectual, but its moral distinctiveness, still Christians. The motive, however, of this unwonted liberality is but too apparent. The Christian party would otherwise appear too weak. But let us, who see in all the shifts and subtleties of Broad-churchism the signs of a Transition that will issue in a Revolution similar to, but incommensurably greater than that which Neo-Platonism, in thinking to impede, prepared, conceive Christianity, as in fact it was, a Revolution, not moral only, but intellectual also, and false in its characteristic intellectual conception; cease to give shelter to unmanly sentimentalities, and base dishonesties, by a use of the term opposed at once to its ordinary significance, and the facts of history; and name the Creed in which that larger fraternal sentiment which originated in a great Prechristian Revolution, and which the fictions of Christianity only narrowed, though they intensified, is carried on, and enlarged by union with the conception of Law, and a true Philosophy of History—Humanitarianism.

But the sun is now sinking over Alexandria, and, in the tender glow of his departing beams, deep sympathy arises with those pious regrets for a fancied beautiful Past, which are the profoundest cause of the subtle interpretations and unhistorical definitions against which, as

obscuring the true intellectual character of the Christian Revolution, we have been contending. Nay, even in our contention with them, we shall not now refuse to admire obstinate fidelities that still regard with longing the declining Orb of a long Human Age. But Humanity, in its vast progress, stops not to sympathise or to admire. It marches on, crushing without pity the belated defenders of vanquished causes, and letting the dead bury their dead.[1] And so be it, as it must.

Let us then turn to another aspect of life. For it were difficult to say whether one loses more of truth by having regard exclusively to what are ordinarily distinguished as the realities of existence, or exclusively to those great transformations of ideas, consciousness of which gives to the lower phases of life their humour and their pathos. And so, as we re-enter the modern city from our solitary stroll on the Mediterranean beach, or along the banks of the Mareotic lake, let us recall another aspect of ancient Alexandrian life than that which, in the analogy which it presents to the intellectual activity of the Present Age, we have hitherto been dwelling on. And grateful must be our thanks to the Poet who, though in time so long antecedent to the period on which we have been more particularly meditating, still —for popular manners change but slowly—brings home to us, with such delightful freshness and power, the joyous physical life coexisting with the anxious and aspiring intellectual life, glowing, so far and yet so near, with its vast transforming activity. Live, then, you charming Syracusans, Gorgô and Praxinoë, so dear

[1] Compare Ménard, *Hermes Trismegiste, Introd.* pp. ix.-x.

because so much of the universal Woman, 'das Ewig-Weibliche,' in you; live immortal in the many-nationed Alexandria in which you have still song-celebrated sisters,[1] in fair Greek Uranies and Athēnês, not the less lovable, perhaps, because more like you than their names; live side by side with those in whose hearts and brains worked the high thoughts and profound emotions which, though you prayed—

Χαῖρε, Ἄδωνι ἀγαπητὲ, καὶ εἰς χαίροντας ἀφίκεο,[2]

substituted for your beloved Adônis, Christ![3]

Yet the whirligig of Time brings its revenges. And as, in those days, Adônis and Osiris gave place to Christ, there is, in these days, being substituted for the supernatural ideal of Christ, the natural ideal of Humanity; and that, in spite again of women's prayers and tears. But now—having in the considerations suggested at Alexandria attained some such preliminary clearness, perhaps, with respect to the character of the Christian Revolution, as may put us in the right track in pursuing our further enquiries as to the origin of the myths of Christianity—let us bid adieu to the Capital of Neo-Platonism.

[1] Yá benát Iskendereeyeh!

* * * * *

Wa-sh-shefáif sukkareeyeh.—*Arab Song.*

[2] Farewell, beloved Adonis, and come-again to us then faring-well.

[3] See Arnold, *Essays in Criticism: Pagan and Mediæval Religious Sentiment.* There is here admirably contrasted with this Adonis-hymn of the Συρακόσιαι of Theocritus (B.C. 280) the *Cantico delle Creature* of S. Francis of Assisi, for a readily accessible original of which see Oliphant's *Life of S. Francis*, pp. 234–5. Compare Mr. Arnold's translation of the *Syracusans* in the above-cited work, pp. 193 fig., with that 'en vers François,' by Hilaire Bernard de Roqueleyre, Seig. de Longepierre: *Les Idylles de Théocrite*, Paris, 1688.

CHAPTER II.

AT THE ROCK-TOMB OF STABL-ANTAR.

'For which cause the ancients made Pan, that is Nature, to play upon an harp; but sense, which only passively perceives particular outward objects, doth here, like the brute, hear nothing but mere noise and sound and clatter, but no music or harmony at all; having no active principle and anticipation within itself to comprehend it by, and correspond or vitally sympathise with it; whereas the mind of a rational and intellectual being will be ravished and enthusiastically transported in the contemplation of it, and of its own accord dance to this pipe of Pan, Nature's intellectual music and harmony.'

CUDWORTH, *Intellectual System*, vol. III. p. 600.

THE ORIGIN OF THE MYTHS OF NATURIANISM.

AT the Rock-tomb of Stabl-Antar, high on the Libyan hills that rise behind Asyoot, the capital of the Saeed, or Upper Egypt, the reflections which had for some time been occupying me on the Aspects of Nature in the Nile-valley; on the Wants of Mind and the Powers of Nature as, in their interaction, the Cause of the Myths of those religions of the First Age of Humanity, which we have distinguished as Naturianism; and on that reflection of Nature in the Nile-valley which we find in Osirianism—these varied reflections seemed here to come, at length, into some measure of articulate clearness—'es leuchtet mir ein!'

Hitherto travelling alone, with the servants I had brought from Malta, at Cairo, Mr. P—— and his brother

Captain R. P—— asked me to join them, and we together chartered a dahabieëh, or Nile-boat, which was named, from a Spanish reminiscence, 'La Niña' (the Pet). And our voyage was neither the less impressive, nor the less delightful, because our progress was slow. For we were sailing up that ancient river Αἴγυπτος, at the mouth of which, before it was yet called only by the name of Nileus, a king of the land, Menelaos, in the Homeric legend, of a date here almost modern, had anchored his fleet. We had, on the far-stretching Tableland of the Pyramids of Geezeeh, of Abooseer, of Sakkara, and of Dashoor, entered on the exploration of a monumental world, taking us many millenniums back in Human History.[1] In the towns and villages along the banks, on the narrow strip between the river and the desert, there was, whenever we cared to land, perpetual adventure amid new forms of life. Returning to our dahabieëh, she looked always worthy both of her name and its memories, with her half-furled wing-like sails fluttering in the wind, as she lay-to, all flashing with, here but fit, and not gaudy colour, from her gay pennon, and great white wings edged with blue, from her black hull ribanded with red, white, green, and yellow, and from the Oriental costumes of her crew. And ever, from joyous sunrise, through midday splendour, to gorgeous sunset, we were in the midst of Aspects of Nature which, in the unchanged grandeur, silence,[2] and serenity of their beauty, had profoundly

[1] See Bunsen, *Egypt's Place*, vol. II. pp. 86–105.

[2] But it was not till after my return home that,—lying one sunny summer-afternoon on the greensward alone in Richmond Park, amid a

impressed the Human Spirit, and influenced its development, from ages immemorial. Yet, for more than a week, the feeling of it all was more oppressive than delightful; till, at length, landing at the little port of El Hamra, riding to, and through Asyoot, and then walking up the tomb-excavated promontory of the Libyan hills, we stood before Stabl-Antar.

Imagine a broad far-out-lengthened river with rich alluvial banks, wealthy with wheat and sugar, cotton also, tobacco, and innumerable vegetables, and overshadowed by frequent groves of village-hiding palms; here and there acacias, and one or two other trees, but the beautiful palm ever the undisputed king; imagine such river-banks everywhere soon, and so suddenly lost in the Desert that you can literally stand with one foot on the black, and life-teeming soil of the river-bank, and the other on the sands; and from the sands see rise a continuous range of steep desert hills towering, on either side, up; and imagine all bathed in a sunshine, the radiance of which, as it pours down from the depths of brilliant azure, seems almost unearthly. * * * I can fancy the lifegiving river, flowing within wide deserts, under walling mountains, and between banks of its own soil, left in its overflows, murmuring as it gleams beneath the strong, serene, and solemn light, murmuring to some disenchanted, but silently resolute one of this anarchic time the psalm of an heroic life—a life gleaming with the reflection of those ideas of divine beauty and love which have made all

divine chorus of birds,—I became *expressly* aware of the voicelessness of Nature in Egypt.

the Immortals independent of the inconstancy and unsatisfyingness of earthly prosperity and personal affection—a life which, in passing through a loveless desert-world, overflows but to make, of its sorrows, fairest fruit-covered banks. * * * But, if true students of History, we shall try to divest ourselves of merely personal accidents of feeling, and endeavour to lay ourselves open to the sights of this Nile-world in a manner at once more simple and profound.

SECTION I.

THE ASPECTS OF NATURE IN THE NILE-VALLEY.

1. Beholding the magnificent Oasis-valley at our feet, I recalled Mr. Buckle's affirmation, 'that, in the civilisations exterior to Europe, all nature conspired to increase the authority of the imaginative faculties, and weaken the authority of the reasoning ones.'[1] Well, suppose it granted—though I by no means admit that in Europe the Aspects of Nature are such as to have exercised no such influence on the imagination as History need take cognisance of—it could not hence follow, as he contends, that the division between European and Non-European civilisation must be the basis of the Philosophy of History,[2] unless the European peoples and their civilisations were autochthonous.[3] But they are not. Both have their

[1] *History of Civilisation*, vol. I. p. 118. [2] *Ibid.* pp. 138–9.

[3] Compare Littré, in a review of Mr. Buckle's work in *La Philosophie positive*, t. II. p. 65.

roots in Asia. In so far, particularly, as the springs of the civilisation of Christendom are, or have been, in Christianism, they have been in an Oriental Religion.[1] There can, then, be no such division between European and Non-European civilisation as Mr. Buckle affirmed. On the contrary, a general view of History presents the East and the West as exerting on each other the most important mutual action since the West existed. Not to speak of tides of conquest from each of them on the other, the East has, from all time, given to the West its Religions; and now the West, in giving its Science to the East, may perchance be found, it also, to give, with a New Ideal, the equivalent, at least, of a Religion. A Philosophy of History, therefore, that has a just estimate of the influence of Moral Forces will require that European Civilisation be studied in its Oriental, and even primæval religious sources. For if, as is affirmed by that axiom, by which I would express the fundamental scientific notion of Mutual Determination, *Every Existence is a System in a determined and determining System of Co-existences;*[2] then, the form of every existence is the result of the reciprocal action between an internal element and external co-existents. In the case of a later new religion, the most important of the external determinants will evidently be the atmosphere of cotemporary Thought and Belief. But in the case of the origin of a pri-

[1] Far more truly, at least, as the foregoing chapter has, I trust, already shown, and as will be more fully seen in the sequel, is Christianism an Oriental than, as Dean Milman calls it, a Greek Religion.—*History of Latin Christianity*, vol. I. p. 1.

[2] See *Introd.* above, p. 158.

mæval religion, it may be said, speaking generally, that there are no external determinants but the Powers and Aspects of Nature. And so, if we would thoroughly investigate the origin of a later religion, we must endeavour to understand, and if possible, even sympathetically realise the circumstances of the origin of that primæval religion, the atmosphere of which mainly determined the form of the later religion.

2. To apply this. Our introductory consideration of the intellectual character of the Christian Revolution has shown its essential feature to consist in the development of the notion of Miracle. We have briefly indicated the origin of this, in referring it to that Differentiation of Subjective and Objective which marks the Second of the Three Ages distinguished by our Ultimate Law of History. But the origin of the particular form taken by this Christian development of the notion of Miracle has still to be investigated. We shall, I think, find that one, at least, of the principal causes influencing it, was the atmosphere of Naturian, and more particularly of Osirian Mythology in which the narratives of the Evangelists were written, and the doctrines of the Apostles and Fathers elaborated. If so, it becomes of the highest interest to examine the origin of this Osirian Mythology, to the influence of which we thus trace the form taken by the miracle-dogmas of Christianity. For if one, at least, of the principal causes of the formation of these dogmas was the cotemporary Osirian mythology; and if this mythology itself can be naturally explained; then, the whole system of Christian dogma, including, of course, its

central theory of the supernatural character of Jesus of Nazareth, is but a mythology, of which the ultimate roots are in the causes which determined Osirianism. Hence, the study of the origin of the Osirian, is the study of one of the profoundest origins of the Christian religion and civilisation; and we see how false was that separation of European from Non-European History, to which Mr. Buckle seems to have been led by his strange and all-pervading fallacy as to the relation of Intellectual and Moral Forces. Let it be granted, at least, in the meantime, that the relevancy of the study of the origin of Osirianism to the inquiry which is the main subject of this book may possibly, in the sequel, be made clear.

3. But by what Method shall we endeavour to understand the influence of the Powers, and particularly of the Aspects of Nature as the external determinants of such a primæval religion as Osirianism? The cycles of Earth's history are of vastly longer period than the cycles of Man's history; and the Aspects, therefore, of Nature, which determined the religious ideas of our remotest ancestors, are, for the most part, still unchanged. Hence, Travel, as a Subjective Experimental Method, is the means by which we may learn to understand the conditions of the origin of a primæval religion. Comte has admirably remarked that, in Sociology as in Biology, there is, at least, an indirect experimental method in the observation of pathological or abnormal phenomena.[1] But what I would here point out is that, in the study particularly, though by no means

[1] *Philosophie positive*, t. IV. pp. 428, flg.

exclusively, of primæval religions and civilisations, Travel is to be used not only as a method for gaining, but as a method for appreciating facts; not only as an objective, but as a subjective experimental method; not only as a method by which facts may be diversely presented, but as a method by which we ourselves may be, as it were, the subjects of experiment, and may, by realising the effects of Natural Environment, be disciplined into sympathy with, and hence true understanding of the forces, especially of primæval origins. Even in the study of Natural Phenomena, the Experimental Method is needed as a means of subjective discipline, as well as of objective acquisition. For the advantage of Experiment, as the physical discoverer well knows, is not merely in its giving new facts, but in its fixing the gaze on common facts. And Experiment is utterly barren except it does so fix the gaze; except a man is thereby made so to feel the phenomena, to be so attracted by them, so to love them, we may almost say, that he broods over them in constant meditation, seeking an idea by which to connect them. If, then, we find that such a deep feeling of Nature has been the moral cause or condition of all the greatest discoveries in the Natural Sciences, how much more necessary must it be in those more complex Humanital Sciences, in which we endeavour to understand the influence of Nature on the development of Consciousness? For here it is not only necessary that the mind should be fixed on the objective conditions of the phenomena studied; but that, through sympathy, it should learn to see how these objective

conditions came to produce their subjective effects. The Aspects of Nature, and the Monuments of the People. The true student of Man's history will not be content with the mere knowledge that the former determined the shape and character of the ideas, of which the latter are the expressions in Art; but he will seek, in using Travel as a subjective experimental method, sympathetically to realise the causal relation; and hence, to be so impressed by the Aspects of Nature, here, for instance, in Egypt, as even they were who first wandered down into this oasis-valley, those great spirits who created the Egyptian Gods, and gave to Egyptian Art its Ideals.

4. Nor is what I or another may, from the impression made on ourselves by the physical aspects of Egypt, or any other primæval land, affirm to be probably such as that originally received by the builders of its monuments, an idle dream incapable of verification. The reception of a certain impression from certain Aspects of Nature implies certain co-existing conditions in the physical characteristics, the mental capacities, and the social organisation of the people, and certain sequential effects in the character of their Religion and Art. These serve inductively to check our deductions from what our subjective experience may lead us to assume as the impression originally made by the Aspects of Nature on the people whose primæval religion we are studying. Neither the *à priori* nor the *à posteriori* method alone lead to truth; for the views given by the former are but mere fancies till tested by actual forms; and the forms,

given by the latter method, are a mere chaos till set in order by ideas. And great and indispensable as is in Science the insight of imaginative genius, and in the Philosophy of History the divining power of sympathy, it can be turned to useful purpose only if directed, and held in check by the bit and bridle of the methods of objective research. Give Pegasus his head, and he careers but on the unsubstantial clouds. Yet no less assuredly is it true that, judged without sympathy, Man is misjudged. And great as are the defects in our historical knowledge, even still greater are the defects in our historical sympathies. And the reason of want of practical belief in the greater facts of historical interrelation is, not so much defect of proof, as that crampedness of the heart which makes sterile the intellect except in accustomed grooves. Hence, the intellectual conviction of historical law, and intellectual appreciation of historical forces must be quickened by the moral persuasion that arises from the widening of sympathy. And this, Travel should give. For its aim, as an historical method, not applicable merely to the case of the origin of a primæval religion, but generally, is, not the acquisition of the mere knowledge that may ordinarily be found in books at home, but the freeing of the heart from the cramping fetters of cant, custom, and conceit. And this, because without sympathy, there is no sacred religion that is not but a superstition; no profound philosophy that is not but a logomachy; no lofty heroism, but a selfishness. An unregulated sympathy—subjective impressions unchecked by objective facts—may, indeed, bear off the historical student into a mere cloudland.

Yet, without sympathy—winged Pegasus—it is impossible to gather aught from the fields of History, but the strewn husks of facts; impossible to reach to, or carry away the golden fruit of the heaven-smiling Tree of Human Life.

5. But let it be boldly stated, and clearly understood that Travel, thus used as a method of gaining historical insight through the enlargement of historical sympathy, is a means also of educating out of Christianity. For the intellectual theory of Christianity narrowed, if it intensified, the larger fraternal sentiment of the age in which it originated. It was Cicero, not Paul, who first uttered the word *Humanitas*. No such word, indeed, occurs in the Christian Scriptures. Paul, indeed, declared that 'there is neither Jew nor Gentile.' But this he affirmed on the narrow, mythical, and mystical ground of 'all being one in Christ Jesus.' Cicero, on the other hand, abolished the distinction between Greek and Barbarian, and pronounced the immortal words 'Caritas Generis Humani,' (dearness of the Human Race), and 'Totius complexus Gentis Humanæ' (embrace of the whole Human Family), in the enthusiasm of JUSTICE.[1] Christian sympathy is thus seen to be, not with men as men; but as sinners or as saints; as 'heirs of glory,' or as 'inheritors of damnation.' And the sympathy required by, and already

[1] *De Finibus*, b. v. c. xxiii.; see also *Pro Rosc. Amer.* c. xxii.; and Seneca, *Ep.* 65. Compare Proudhon, *De la Justice dans la Révolution et dans l'Église*; and Boutteville, *La Morale de l'Église et la Morale naturelle*. And, even centuries earlier in the development of the moral revolution of the Sixth Century B.C, we find the recordation of the 'great and wondrous deeds both of Greeks and Barbarians' to be the express aim of the 'publication of the researches of Herodotus of Halicarnassus.'

seen in the scientific methods of investigating History shows itself Un-Christian in this; that it takes up again the tradition of that idea and sentiment of Humanity which we owe neither to Jerusalem nor to Nazareth, but to Rome and to Alexandria; and thus, indeed, historical sympathy is not only not Christian, but has, in Christianity, with the crass and cramping influences of its supernatural historical theory, its chief antagonist. Yet, though indeed educating out of Christianity, in any historically verifiable definition of it, Travel, as a subjective experimental method, has besides its high scientific, no small moral value. And truly, if thirst for a more full, and noble life is felt, here, in Egypt, are the fountains to satisfy it. In the Garden of the Nile are found, at length, the fabled Fountains of Youth. For, from the overlying beds of the air-ocean one drinks in new life for the body. And one is offered, at least, new life for the mind, if, in the right use of Travel, one can not only see, but feel that the historic monuments of the land are not results only of such material conditions as cheap labour; nor antiquities, to be regarded merely as curious old clothes; but embodiments of primæval thought and emotion with which we may still come into living communion, and know ourselves kin with men of remotest ages. To one thus voyaging through the serene light of the Egyptian Sun, the Nile that has been beloved through so many ages of human existence, and on whose banks they are still *visible*, becomes, indeed, as a river of Elysium. And thus if one can drink of the life of others, one's own life is strengthened,

purified, renewed. For Travel, thus used, teaches that what ought to make existence desirable is but the joy of a sympathetic life in others; the joy of ever-increasing knowledge of Nature, and of Humanity; the joy of ever-widening love in that consciousness of oneness with all that is known, which performance of one's duty, as a part of the great Whole, gives even in its ever-uncontenting imperfection.

6. Let us, then, endeavour thus to increase, at once, our knowledge, and widen our sympathy; and, in laying ourselves open, in the most simple and profound manner possible, to the sights of this Nile-world, transport ourselves into a far past age of Humanity. For only thus can we hope to be so impressed by the Aspects of Nature in this oasis-valley as to gain what, as historical students, we seek—some realising sense of the impression made on the primæval inwanderers. New to Existence, with minds as yet uncramped by traditional beliefs, and open to all the grander impressions of Nature, with what wonder must the ancient Khamites have entered the valley of the Nile, in their southward and westward outwandering from the Asian cradle both of the Semitic and Aryan peoples![1] With us, school-geographies and-histories have, at the best, so obscured the wondrousness of the World, and, in general, so vulgarised the present scene of Consciousness, that it requires no small effort of imagination to

[1] See Bunsen, *Egypt's Place*, vol. IV. pp. 477 fig. and 557 fig. For a speculative map of 'The Track of the Aryans from the Primæval Country to India,' see vol. III. p. 456. By what particular route the Khamites entered Egypt is probably a question quite beyond settlement. But see Zincké, *Egypt of the Pharaohs*, &c.

realise the wonder of a nobly impressible[1] primæval race on entering, as they wandered through the Universe of the Unknown, such a sun-garden as the oasis of the Nile. No terrific thunderstorms, no volcanoes, no earthquakes here. A sublime monotony of azure sky; now effulgent with the radiance of the Sungod; now illuminated with the countless golden lamps of Night. A marvel of serene and infinite Splendour!

7. Such, our own experience would lead us to believe, was the fundamental impression of Existence made on the ancient Khamites by the Aspects of Nature in the Nile-valley. But, endeavouring to be ourselves affected by Nature here in such simple and profound fashion as those must have been in whom the Nile-world was reflected in the ideas of which the monuments of Egypt are the expression, another abiding wonder is seen, is felt throughout the land. In other countries, there is a succession of summer and winter; a succession of times of more or less exuberance, and of more or less sterility; a succession naturally associating itself with the phenomena of human life and death, and impressing them on the imagination. But in Egypt, alone of all the countries of the Earth, the Aspects of Nature present Life and Death in perpetual coexistence, and Death the elder, and more terrible. Just endeavour to realise the supreme adventure of wandering through an unknown Universe. Then,

[1] That the Khamites were such a people no one, I should think, who has seen their monuments, can doubt. And besides, all the evidences of language and of intellectual character generally seem to prove them to have belonged to the race of which Aryans and Semites were later offshoots. But see Huxley, *Congress of Prehistoric Archæology*, 1868.

coming down, let us say, from the Highlands of Syria, between the unexplored Ocean and the Plains of Mesopotamia, we enter the unheard-of and unimagined Valley of the Nile. Green oasis. Sandy desert. Limitless oasis-length. Boundless desert-breadth. If we were first impressed with the marvel of a serene, and infinite splendour; our next wonder-impression will certainly be derived from the perpetual coexistence of fair, fruitful river-banks, and terrible, bounding, and boundless deserts. For, associating this coexistence with that succession which is the tragedy of our being, we shall feel with quite new vividness and force what the wonder is of that tragedy. The abiding environment of Life by Death!

8. But yet another profound impression would the Nile-valley Aspects of Nature make on a primæval, and yet enlarged and impressible Consciousness of Existence. Utterly, for the most part, are the modern northern peoples, and particularly the dwellers in cities, unimpressed with any sense of that daily and yearly wonder which, judging from the most ancient hymns, seems of all others most to have affected the nobler primæval races. Yet we shall be quite unable truly to understand how the central myths of almost all religions and poesies originated, if we cannot, in some degree at least, realise the wonder with which men, when they had attained to the noble and, as it should appear, distinctively human capacity[1] of being impressed by the grander

[1] For consider the generalising power required in order to be capable of being consciously impressed by the more general phenomena of Nature.

Aspects of Nature, saw the daily and yearly-renewed, sublime spectacle of the birth, the lifecourse, and the death of the life-and-lightgiving Creator actually visible in the Heavens. It is, probably, the Starry Sky[1] alone that ordinarily excites in us moderns genuine wonder; an emotion in any degree comparable to that with which the poets of the first Solar Hymns beheld the phenomena of Sunrise, Sunprogress, and Sunset; for the knowledge that has taken from Day its wonder has given it to Night. And in Egypt, as a mountain-walled valley, this primæval wonder of Day would be peculiarly impressive. See the divine Sun, born on the eastern Arabian hills, pass across the valley in a long day of beneficently creative power, and unspeakable serene splendour; see him sink on the hills of the Libyan desert to enter, through gorgeous portals, the Land of the West; and see him, after the darkness and terror of the night, born again on the eastern hills in resplendent strength, for evermore renewed. A wonder of eternal Rebirth!

9. These, then, are the great successive phenomena, general features, and distinctive characteristics of the Aspects of Nature in the Nile-valley—an infinite, serene Splendour; an abiding environment of Life by Death; and a divine spectacle of eternal Rebirth. But the effect of each will not be adequately understood except we consider it in its relation to the others. Take, for instance, as the central impression, that made by the extraordinary, and unparalleled features of a limitless

[1] Kant, in his famous conjunction of the Starry Sky and Conscience as alone exciting in him wonder, spoke, without knowing it, not for himself only, but for the men of his time.

oasis sharply, on both sides, bordered by boundless deserts. Evidently, the subjective effect produced by such an Aspect of Nature will—setting aside, at present, the consideration of differences in the subjective element itself—be very much owing to two such other Aspects of Nature as those that coexist with it. The sunrise and sunset, so peculiarly striking in Egypt, and hardly to be named in primæval language except as birth and death, will naturally either suggest the ideal generalisation of the great features of the land, or greatly deepen its effect. And the serenity of the splendour, and beneficence of the might of the Sunstar will necessarily colour all the conceptions given by the physical characteristics of the land, and its daily divine spectacle—the conceptions of Life and Death, and eternal Rebirth. Nay, but for this serenity and beneficence, which is, as it were, the fundamental chord, the other Aspects of Nature would be expressed in entirely different ideal generalisations. For it has been suggestively remarked that Sunworship, with its accompanying myths of Death and Rebirth, is only to be found in those more temperate regions where he is welcomed as a friend, not dreaded as a scorching foe.[1] And so, Death being found to be followed by Rebirth, environed though Life might be seen to be by Death, both, as successive phenomena of Existence, would be felt to be amid an infinite Splendour.

[1] D'Orbigny, *L'Homme américain*, t. I. p. 242; see also Herodotus, vol. I. p. 216, vol. IV. p. 184, and Baker, *Albert Nyanza*, vol. I. p. 144, as cited by Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. II. p. 260.

SECTION II.

THE WANTS OF MIND AND THE POWERS OF NATURE.

1. BUT, though it may seem clear that there is some relation between such Aspects of Nature and the myth of Osiris, and mythology generally of Osirianism; yet, the more the subject is pondered, the more surprising it appears how such simple facts as those of the Sun's daily and yearly course could, however deep the emotions of delight, wonder, and awe with which they were regarded, have been—if they were indeed as appears—transformed into so splendidly elaborated a myth as that of the birth, life, and death of a God-Man, a vision of departure into Otherworlds of Darkness and of Light, and doctrines of Incarnation, Future Judgment, and Punishment or Reward. The origin, however, of this myth and of these doctrines is a problem that we cannot evade the attempt, at least, to solve. For if, as above suggested,[1] one of the principal causes influencing the formation of the narratives of the Evangelists, and the development of the doctrines of the Apostles and Fathers of Christianity was the contemporary atmosphere of Naturian, and more particularly of Osirian Mythology; then the study of the origin of the Osirian, is the study of one of the profoundest origins of the Christian religion and civilisation. But the explanation of the origin of Christianity we have taken up as standing in the same verifying relation to our Ultimate Law of History as the explanation

[1] See above, pp. 296–7.

of the Moon's motions stood to the Law of Gravity. And now that we see how the explanation of the origin of Christianity involves the explanation of the origin of those myths which should seem so importantly to have influenced its development, we should more clearly see how the explanation of the origin of Christianity involves everything implied in a verification of that theory of the Three Ages of Humanity which is the chief deduction from a more complete expression of our Ultimate Law of Man's History. For, in further reflecting on the myths of Naturianism, we see that there can be no thorough explanation of their origin, without an explanation of the origin of that philosophy of Spiritism which they imply. But to explain the origin of Spiritism is to explain the origin of that conception of Causation as a Onesided Determination which distinguishes, according to our Ultimate Law, the First Age of Humanity. And as this conception distinguishes also, though in a more abstract form, the Second Age of Humanity, and more particularly, Christianism; a natural explanation of its origin will evidently be, at once, an explanation of what is, in an intellectual point of view, most essential in Christianism, and a verification of that Law which distinguishes the First and Second Ages of Humanity by a relatively more concrete and more abstract conception of Causation as Onesided Determination. We thus further see that our Law of History is Ultimate, only in the sense of being deducible from a certain ultimate quality of the mind under the action of terrestrial conditions. And Mr. Buckle is, to say the

least, inaccurate in affirming that 'a discovery of the laws of European history is resolved, in the first instance, into a discovery of the laws of the human mind;' and that 'these mental laws, when ascertained, will be the ultimate basis of the history of Europe.'[1] For the laws of History cannot be thus confounded with the laws of Mind. Nor from the latter could any such fact as historical development be deduced.[2] The historic must, however, be connected with, though they cannot be deduced from, the systematic laws of Thought[3] and its ultimate properties. And this is what we would now proceed to attempt.

2. Our ultimate systematic Law of Thought, or general Metaphysical Principle, was expressed, as will be remembered, in the following terms:—*Every Sequence is the Satisfaction of a correlatively determined Want of Oneness.* And what we have now to attempt is to show that our Ultimate Law of History, and particularly that conception of Causation which it assigns to the First Age of Humanity, is referible to, and can, under the actual historical circumstances of the existence of Thought on this planet, be explained by such an ultimate systematic fact as that affirmed by this metaphysical principle. Let us, then, first endeavour clearly to understand the meaning of what I have distinguished as the metaphysical principle of Correlation. Just as the physical principle of Coexistence affirms,

[1] *History of Civilisation*, vol. i. p. 143.

[2] Compare Littré's remarks on the above-quoted passage in *La Philosophie positive*, t. ii. p. 66.

[3] Compare Mr. Hodgson's remarks on History, *Theory of Practice*, vol. ii. pp. 456–75.

negatively, that there is no such thing as an isolated body undetermined by coexistents, and thus possessed of absolute properties; and positively, that what a thing is, what its form, qualities, and motions are, depends on the relation between itself and the system in which it exists; so, the metaphysical principle of Correlation affirms that the sequences of thought are neither the products of external conditions acting on an internal element with no definite and spontaneous want and tendency of its own; nor the products of an internal element with any absolute endowments of any kind whatever; but are the products of the mutual action of that fundamental integrating activity of Mind subjectively characterisable as Want of Oneness, and of those correlative forms of Oneness which are, at once, results and conditions of the Mind's activity—Sensations and Images. Thus, on the one hand, we have a subjective Want of Oneness; on the other, an objective plurality of Differentiated Elements. And it is further to be remarked that those impressions which are the ultimate elements of the Mind's integrating activity are given us through channels, of which the correlative character is evident in what appears to me to be the *natural* Classification of the Senses.

I. Internal or General Senses:
   Senses of the Organs of Relation,
   „ „ Nutrition,
   „ „ Repro
II. External or Special Senses:
   Senses of Resistance and Contact,
   „ Smell and of Taste,
   „ Hearing and of Sight.

The two main divisions of Internal or General, and External or Special, I would defend as a deduction from Bichat's profound and most fruitful distinction of two Lives, the Vegetal and the Animal;[1]—or as I should prefer to call them (in relation to the Noetic Life, of which they are the elements), the Animastic and the Ideatic Life;—the one characterised by continuity and asymmetry, the other, by intermittence and symmetry. The subdivisions of the First Class of Senses evidently correspond with the three sets of vital organs. The subdivisions of the Second Class differ only from the usual enumeration of the Senses in the distinction of the sense of Touch into two senses, and the arrangement of the six thus given into three classes.[2] But the distinction of the sense of Touch into senses of Resistance and of Contact[3] is, I venture to think, not only justified, but required by those results of anatomical study and observation of paralytics which distinguish two groups of nerves, those of the skin, and those of the muscles, related to, but differing from each other in their roots, and mode of

[1] See *Recherches sur la Vie et la Mort*, and *Anatomie générale*, t. I. p. 73. Dr. Bain and others constitute the 'Organic Sensations,' or 'Sensations of Organic Life,' into a separate class, but without founding on that theory of Bichat's, which seems to me to give the true reason of the distinction which they rightly draw. On the correspondence between Bichat's distinction of the two lives, and the distinction which Schopenhauer drew between Will and Intelligence, see *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*; and compare F. de Careil, *Hegel et Schopenhauer*, pp. 236 flg.

[2] Compare Mr. Neale's three classes of six senses, *Analogy of Thought and Nature.*

[3] Compare Dr. Bain's class of 'Feelings connected with Movement,' *The Senses and the Intellect*, pp. 67, flg., and what he says of 'Sensations of Touch involving Muscular Feelings,' pp. 185, flg.

transmission;[1] and two groups of sensations, the one enabling to appreciate the state of the skin, the other the state of the muscles, and either of which may be paralysed while the other remains intact.[2] And the arrangement of these six senses in three classes is, I think, justified by its correspondence with those three classes of external physical events which are the indirect conditions of these senses respectively. These may, I think, be distinguished as,—for the senses of Resistance and of Contact — Mechanical Pressures, molar and molecular;—for the senses of Smell and of Taste—Chemical Combinations of gases or of liquids; and for the Senses of Hearing and of Sight—Mechanical Undulations, aërial or ætherial.[3] Ultimately these six special forms of sensation are reducible to the two correlative classes of Time-sensations, or sensations of Sequence—Smell, Taste, and Hearing; and Space-sensations, or sensations of Coexistence—Contact, Resistance, and Sight.[4] And generally in this classification I would remark that it presents to us the lower life of General Sensation, of Want, and of Unconscious Will, in relation to the correlative forms of those specialized sensations from the results of which is developed the whole incalculably vast and varied universe of Intellectual Cognition.

[1] Brown-Séquard, *Journal de Physiologie*, t. VI. pp. 124–615, cited by Taine, *De l'Intelligence*, t. I. p. 257.

[2] See Oxenfeld, *Des Névroses*; Landry, *Traité des Paralysies*, &c.

[3] Classified these senses might also be according to their direct or immediate conditions—the molecular movements of certain nervous centres of the brain. But these molecular movements are not at present sufficiently known to enable us, in accordance with their distinctions, to classify, as yet, the senses.

[4] Compare Hodgson, *Time and Space*, p. 87, flg.

3. But now comes the important question, What is the cause of one integration rather than of another; of this sequence of thought rather than of that; what really determines that a certain sensation, or idea, shall revive, attract, or associate itself with now this, and now that previous sensation or idea? This is for the explanation of historical, as well as of individual sequences of thought, the fundamental question. It is true that in the law,[1] or laws, of the Association of Ideas, we have a specific law, or specific laws, of the action of the Mind in those differentiations and integrations which constitute its activity. But it is not enough to be able, after the fact, to refer to the Law of Contiguity, or to the Law of Similarity. For one may have the same sensation a hundred different times; and on each of these occasions it may, and still in accordance with the Laws of Contiguity and of Similarity, revive a different previous sensation, associate with itself a different image, or it may revive no previous sensation or image at all. Take an instance. A student, thinking, we shall say, on this very subject of the Association of Ideas, rises from his chair better to pursue his thought in walking about. It is winter; snow is drifting against the windows; and on the further side of the large room he has the sensation of a cold wind on his forehead. He has also the sensation more than once of, say, tramping on a piece of coal carelessly dropt, or left unswept-up by his servant.

[1] See Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. II. p. 238; Spencer, *Principles of Psychology*, p. 520; and Taine, *De l'Intelligence*, t. I. p. 164.

These sensations, however, awaken no images, entirely fail to associate themselves with any ideas. But after a time he becomes aware that his thoughts are running on quite a new subject—a pleasing but trivial fancy,—and at once the former train of thought on the Association of Ideas is resumed in trying to discover what possible link of contiguity or similarity could have connected this trivial fancy with the metaphysical meditation by which it had been preceded. Such a link may, or may not be found. For though a link there certainly is, it may, according to the theory of Latent Thought, not have risen into Consciousness. But suppose such a link is really found, and that there is thus seen to have been something *in common* between the last thought of the metaphysical meditation, and the first of the trivial fancy; yet, though the succession of thought is thus brought under the Laws of Association, is it not evident that these are merely phenomenal laws which afford no explanation of the *cause* of the change from the one subject of thought to the other?

4. Thus, by the Laws of Association, the cause of Association is as unexplained as, by the Law of Gravity, is the cause of Attraction. It is, however, now seen by physicists[1] that it may be possible to go beyond even the vast generalisation of Newton, and to attain a definite relative conception, not merely of the phenomenal law, but of the cause of Attraction. And by metaphysicians also, it is now seen that the Laws of

[1] See Whewell, *History of the Inductive Sciences*; Saigey, *Physique Moderne*, &c.

Association are not ultimate,[1] and that we may perchance get beyond them to a verifiable conception of the cause of Association. I have in the Introduction pointed-out that the conception of Atoms, generalised as the principle of Coexistence, affords, or may at least possibly lead to, an explanation of the cause of Attraction; and that a similar explanation of the cause of Association is afforded by our conception of Moods, and generalisation of it as the principle of Correlation. Apply, then, this conception and principle to the explanation of such phenomena as those instanced in the foregoing paragraph. How can the cause of the sensations of cold, and of tramping on a particle of coal, not having associated with themselves any image or idea, be explained save by the fact that there was nothing in them which the then *mood of mind* could seize on with satisfaction? Hence it was that they were left standing, as we may say, isolated. And as it was because there was *no* change in the state of mental want that these sensations did not affect the train of metaphysical meditation, so it was because there *had* then occurred such a change, that the last thought of that meditation connected itself with the trivial fancy. The Want of Oneness, which had at first its ideal satisfaction in gaining clearness on a certain metaphysical subject, had changed to a Want which could promise itself satisfaction in an easier direction. But though this change in the state of Want determined a change in the succession of thoughts;

[1] See, for instance, Spencer, *Principles of Psychology*, pp. 506, flg., and Hodgson, *Time and Space*, pp. 258–9; and compare Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. II. p. 240, and Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*, *Phil. Works*, vol. I. p. 128.

yet the form of the new state of Want, or rather the form in which it found satisfaction, was itself, as we have seen, determined by the laws of that succession. And so, we have an illustration of that mutual determination which is expressed in our definition of Moods. But further. Having thus considered the case of no change in a train of thought, notwithstanding the occurrence of special outward sensations; and the case of such a change, notwithstanding that there is no such outward occurrence; consider, thirdly, the resumption of the original train of thought. What is the cause of this resumption? Another change in the state of mental Want, and such a change as shows the intermediate state of Want to have been simply a Want of Rest, arising from the fatigue of a prolonged state of tension.

5. To the questions, therefore, What is the cause of Association?—Why is there this sequence of thought rather than that?—On what is it that the differences in Association depend? I reply generally that, among the multitude of sensations and images contiguous or similar in previous experience, *that* one is revived which best fits the present Mood, Emotion, or Volition.[1] The Law of Intelligence is, therefore, *not* that affirmed by Mr. Spencer, namely, that the strength of the tendency which the antecedent of any psychical change has to be followed by its consequent is proportionate to the

[1] As to the influence of emotion, pleasure, or interest, as a cause of Association, compare Brown, *Philosophy of the Human Mind*, Lect. v.; Mill (James), *Analysis of the Human Mind*, ch. iii., and the notes thereon in the edition of J. S. Mill; Hamilton, *Works of Reid*, Note D * * *, p. 913; and Hodgson, *Time and Space*, pp. 258–269, 270–75.

persistency of the union between the external things they symbolise.[1] For the extent to which the successions of Thought are, as we have seen in the above illustration, determined by States of Want—Moods, Emotions, or Volitions—is thus entirely ignored; the strength of the internal tendency is made to depend entirely on the persistency of an external union; and hence, no mere disclaimer of materialism can save the resultant philosophy from being essentially materialistic. But, just as without a definite subjective conception of the Internal Spontaneity, we are necessarily landed in a materialistic philosophy; so, *with* such a conception of the Will, *absolute* in its character, a philosophy is necessarily idealistic; and only with a definite conception of the Internal Spontaneity, at once subjective and *relative* in its character, can a philosophy be truly reconciliative of idealism and materialism; reconciliative, therefore, of freedom and necessity;[2] and so, not critical, or analytic only, but synthetic. The form, therefore, of the Internal Spontaneity must be conceived

[1] *Principles of Psychology*, pp. 520–1.

[2] Defining the Will as 'the passing of an ideal motor change into a real one' (*Principles of Psychology*, p. 613), and stating the Law of Intelligence as above, Mr. Spencer logically thus writes of Freedom:—'From the universal law that, other things equal, the cohesion of psychical states is proportionate to the frequency with which they have followed one another in experience, it is an inevitable corollary, that all actions whatever must be determined by those psychical connections which experience has generated—either in the life of the individual, or in that general antecedent life whose accumulated results are organised in his constitution' (*Ibid.* p. 617). But 'Experience' must, according to our principle of correlation, be conceived as itself the result of the mutual action of an internal and an external element. And hence follows a doctrine, not certainly of an *absolute*, but of a conditioned Freedom, and of a Freedom the more complete, the more complete the knowledge of its conditions.

as, though determining, itself determined. And hence we ask, On what does the change in the state of Mental Want,—or, on what does the present Mood, the simplest form of Mental Want,—itself depend? I would reply that psychical changes, varying Wants of Oneness, or Moods, are not so much effects as subjective aspects of physical changes, or varying Differential Relations of our bodily organs. Hence the present Mood depends chiefly—as mood, temperament, and character generally will, I think, be found ultimately to depend—on the Animastic as distinguished from the Ideatic Life; and hence on Sensations of the first, internal, or general class. Thus, considering the two lives of which our life is composed, we see the one determining the Want that underlies, or rather is the subjective aspect of our mental Activity; and the other, furnishing the correlative elements in the integration of which that Want is satisfied. But the sensations of the Animastic Life are the results of the relations of our bodily organs with the environing powers of Nature. And, as on these Sensations depends the character of the Mood; which again, as we have seen, is the chief element in the determination of the Association of Ideas; we see of how fundamental importance physiological considerations must be, both in the individual history of men, and in the general history of mankind. But if the Animastic Life determines the Mood, or special Want of Oneness, it is, as has been said, the Ideatic Life that furnishes, through its six specialized senses, the correlative Sensations and Images, in the integration of which that Want is satisfied. And we thus see how precise a correlate the

subjective conception of Moods is—as indeed the general principles of our Method require that it should be—of the objective conception of Atoms. As the material Atom is not conceived as an 'entity,' neither is the mental Mood so conceived; but each is conceived as an element of a *system*. And—if Causation is to be defined, in the way in which alone it would appear to be scientifically defined, namely, as Reciprocal Action, or Mutual Determination, — only through some definite ultimate conception of a *system* can, I would submit, a truly scientific explanation of phenomena, whether in their subjective, or in their objective aspect, possibly be given.

6. Conceiving, then, the Internal Spontaneity in this completely relative fashion, and the Mind generally as in a systematic relation with what we call the World, it becomes of the utmost importance to consider the action of the Powers of Nature as determinants of the character and sequences of Thought as we find it exhibited in History. Now the Powers of Nature, in the relation in which we have here to consider them, are manifested in the character of the Climate, the composition of the Soil, and, the result of these, the degree of the Food-productiveness.[1] Looking down here from Stabl-Antar, we see a power of food-

[1] Mr. Buckle's classification of 'those physical agents by which the human race is most powerfully influenced, under four heads; namely, Climate, Food, Soil, and the general Aspect of Nature' (vol. i. p. 36), is evidently illogical. For no one of the first three is of so general a character as the fourth, and they should all three, therefore, be considered as belonging to one class. Such a class is that of the Conditions, or Powers of Nature, which is of correlative generality with that of the Aspects of Nature.

production which, as we recall the familiar glens and hill-sides of Scotland, with utmost toil cleared of heather and of stones, seems altogether marvellous. Let us trace out the fatalities of these prodigious Nature-powers. Nor let the word affright us. Rather let consideration of the fatality of Man's primæval existence teach us to glory in the freedom which is given to him, at length, by Science. Man is not born, but becomes free. And strangely is Science misrepresented when it is said to be only a doctrine of necessity. It is, certainly, a doctrine of necessity, in so far as it clears away those theological logomachies about 'Freewill,' which would never have arisen but for the need of reconciling the Semitic notion of an Almighty Personal Creator with Aryan conceptions of Law and of Justice. The theological doctrine of Freewill is, in fact, but a noble, and indeed pathetic attempt on the part of the pigmy, Man, to justify the giant, his imaginary Creator, by taking all the blame of Evil on himself. And Science clears all this folly, noble as in aim it may be, away. For it shows that the sources of Evil, the causes of Sin and of Misery, lie, not in a once-on-a-time sudden, causeless, sinful choice, but in the physical conditions of Man's existence, and the necessities of his development. But if Science, in the knowledge which it gives of the conditions of Man's existence, shows him to be, while ignorant of them. in bondage to them; it shows him also to be in proportion to his knowledge of these conditions, and power thence arising of modifying them, free. Science, with its doctrine of Law, thus begins, indeed, its teachings with fatality; but only to

end them with giving the proud and godlike consciousness of freedom in the power which is the crown of knowledge. Theology, on the other hand, with its doctrine of Arbitrary Will, begins, indeed, its teachings with freedom; but only to end them with giving the base and slavish consciousness of fatality, in the unevadable corollary of divine predestination, and human weakness, depravity, and damnation.

7. Let us, then, trace out the fatality of the Nature-powers of the Nile-valley with the assurance that, in doing so, we shall but increase our consciousness of that freedom which, though not born to, we have, through Science, won. First of all, we see as a necessary consequence of the Egyptian Climate and Nilotic Soil, an early and vast creation of wealth. And with respect to these two causes of this pre-requisite of Civilisation, we remark that the latter, the productiveness of the Soil, must have been here the most powerful; though Climate also is here sufficiently favourable in its effects on the energy and habits of the labourer to have, at least, greatly aided that production of wealth which was chiefly the result of the spontaneity of the Soil. But further, by these Powers of Nature is primævally determined the relation between the upper and lower classes, and hence the whole constitution of Society. For this depends on the distribution of power; this, on the distribution of wealth; this, on the rate of wages; this, again, on the state of the labour-market; this, on the increase or diminution of the population; this, on the kind and quantity of the popular food; and this, evidently, on the Climate and Soil. Now,

the popular food of Egypt, the spontaneous growth [1] of its Soil and Climate, was the palm, of which the fruit is, at once, in the highest degree nutritious, and abundant.[2] And thus, the Nature-powers of the Nile-valley, which attain their climax in shooting-up and over-shadowing us in the benignant leafage, and bountiful fruit of the palm, determined, not only the speed with which wealth was created, but the proportions in which it was divided.

8. But having thus summarily traced—to do so in detail were unnecessary with Mr. Buckle's second chapter to refer to—the wealth of Egypt, and the immense difference in the social distribution of it, to the Physical Powers of the Nile-valley; let us now see what the secondary consequences were of these economical results of the Egyptian Nature-powers. By the encouragement which abundance, and hence cheapness of food gave to the labourers to reproduce their species, they were, in fact, encouraged by the ironical bounty of Nature to overstock the labour-market against themselves; hence, to lower the cost of labour, and the rate of wages; and hence, to leave a vaster surplus of the wealth of the valley in the hands of the employers of labour. But poverty, or a return for labour which gives but a sufficiency for physical needs, has, as its consequence, ignorance. For where is then the leisure to learn? But the consequence of ignorance is superstition, and of that, slavery. See, then, the vast

[1] Wilkinson, *Ancient Egyptians*, vol. II. p. 372.

[2] There is also the *dhourra*, of which bread is made, and which yields a return of two-hundred-and-forty for one.

moral and intellectual consequences that are the secondary results of that unequal distribution of wealth of which the cause is the very abundance of wealth. Or, is it objected that the reproduction of his species, to which the labourer was encouraged by the cheapness of his food, did not necessarily entail a minimum return for his labour? Then consider how those very conditions which gave cheap food were, in Egypt, conditions of powerlessness against robbery and oppression.[1] For how, in such a valley as that of Egypt, could their numbers avail the labourers in a demand for a juster apportionment of the wealth of the land? Stronghold there was none, where discontented spirits might gather and fortify themselves; evidently none could be erected on the banks, by the side of the impregnable fortress-temples of their masters; and almost as evidently none could be maintained on the mountains on either side, because of their absolute waterlessness. Nor, fruitful as the soil was, could they, for the sake of insurrection, or any other purpose whatever, intermit their attention to it, as this fruitfulness depended on an intricate system of irrigation; and moreover, the Government being in possession of the river, could at any time stop the irrigation, by destroying the shadoofs, and canals of a malcontent district. And further, the mighty river, bountiful as to the labourer it was, was also a broad highway which would have enabled the Government swiftly to suppress any attempt at social revolution, had

[1] This has been pointed out by Zincké, *Egypt of the Pharaohs and the Khedive*, p. 18.

any boldest of Egyptian labourers been capable of the audacity of such a conception. To poverty, then, or to but a sufficiency for physical existence, the very productiveness of the Nature-forces doomed the Egyptian labourer; and the special conditions of that productiveness condemned him to a powerlessness perpetuating that poverty. But the consequences of a perpetuated poverty are, as has been said, ignorance, superstition, and slavery. And to these we thus see the Egyptian labourer doomed by the Powers of his Oasis-valley, in a secondary, but no less fatal manner than to a vastly unequal share of the wealth which these Nature-forces, with so marvellous a productiveness, bestowed.

9. Such, then, were the derivative effects on the lower classes of that unequal distribution of wealth to which their existence, as lower classes, was owing. Let us now consider the secondary consequences to the upper classes of that unequal distribution to which they also owed their relative position. First of all, they had evidently thus given to them immense material resources. But what was to be done with this vast surplus of wealth? What, particularly as taxes were not paid in coin, but in kind, in labour, and in produce? Was there not, in the mere vastness of the forces at their command, a stimulus to the creative imagination? And in what way but in imperial conquests, and in monuments that should be the everlasting wonders of the world, could they possibly think of making use of a wealth so vast? In what way, at least, save in a gross sensuality, which a noble race would, even without a special experience, certainly know

to be in its issue anarchic and suicidal? But just as we found that the consequences of ignorance, itself the result of poverty, were superstition and slavery; so we shall now see that the consequences of an imagination, stimulated to creative activity by vast material resources, were knowledge and power. For how can power be attained without knowledge; and why, save the imagination has set an end, and conceived a design, should we trouble ourselves to know? And thus we trace to the Physical Powers of the Nile-valley, not only that accumulation of wealth which is the prerequisite of Civilisation; but that distribution of wealth which created poor classes and rich; and further, to these primary results of the Egyptian Nature-powers we trace a long train of moral and intellectual consequences: among the poorer classes, ignorance, superstition, and slavery; among the rich, an unparalleled grandeur of artistic imagination, the most profound and far-sighted practical knowledge, and power the most successful in realising the dreams of imagination, even when stimulated to Titanic sublimity.

10. All, therefore, contended for by Mr. Buckle as to the importance, and indeed fatality, of the conditions of Climate, Soil, and Food, is admitted. Nay, we would point to the Powers of Nature as the determinants of a fact far more profound than any of those he ever attributed thereto. Not only do I admit that stone structures, excavated temples and tombs, and enduringly bright colours depend on material conditions; nor only that the grandeur and beauty of the Egyptian monuments had their external determining con-

ditions in aristocratic classes left free for intellectual occupation and religious enthusiasm, and great multitudes of servile classes kept cheaply in life; nor only that such social and political, and hence moral and intellectual inequalities—all that depends on the distribution of wealth, the cheapness of labour and the luxury of leisure—are determined by the Powers of Nature. I go further. It was, no doubt, an important contribution to the science of History to have made at least more popularly clear the connection of such facts as these with the conditions of Climate, Soil, and Food; and so, to have drawn greater attention to the historical application of that science of Wealth founded by Adam Smith, and to the verification by Statistics of the laws to which we are thereby led.[1] Henceforth, the study of Economic must be considered to be as necessary for the historian, and politician, as the study of Physiology to the psychologist, and educator. And just as the study of Orectic, a combination as it is of Physiology with Psychology, has, or ought to have, (as, indeed, we have already indicated by our Classification of the Sciences and the Arts,) the most important practical results for Pædagogic; so, the study of Economic we may now see to be the indispensable foundation of Politic.[2] But I go further.

[1] 'Political Economy supplies the means of connecting the laws of physical agents with the laws of the inequality of wealth, and therefore with a great variety of social disturbances; while Statistics enable us to verify those laws in their widest extent.'—*History of Civilisation*, vol. I. p. 756.

[2] In this relation Mr. Buckle speaks of 'the noble Science' of Political

11. I would maintain, not only that such facts as those above-instanced, but that the most essential fact of all,—the character of the primitive conception of Causation,—is determined by the Powers of Nature. For, so far as all our knowledge would lead us to believe, Man neither did attain nor could have attained even that lowest stage of civilization at which speculative thought begins, except under the physical conditions of Tropical Countries. Yet, such is, in these countries, the character of the Powers of Nature, and such is their influence in determining, not only the accumulation, but the distribution of Wealth, that the Oriental Civilizations were necessarily based on vast multitudes of poor, ignorant, and enslaved labourers. Hence, even if the Aspects of Nature were not such as to inspire awe, uncertainty, and terror, and hence be hostile to acquisition of knowledge of the interrelation of phenomena; and even if, through such knowledge, the nobles and priests attained to comparatively high conceptions of Causation; these would never be diffused among the people, but reserved as mysteries for the initiated. And in considering the causes of the

Economy as having 'an importance which it would be difficult to exaggerate' (vol. I. p. 91). 'Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*' he declares to be, 'looking at its ultimate results, probably the most important book that has ever been written, and containing the most valuable contributions ever made by a single man towards establishing the principles on which government should be based' (vol. I. p. 194). And again, 'Well may it be said of Adam Smith, and without fear of contradiction, that this solitary Scotchman has, by the publication of one single work, contributed more towards the happiness of man than has been effected by the united abilities of all the statesmen and legislators of whom history has preserved an authentic account' (vol. I. pp. 196–7). But this certainly strikes me, though a countryman of Adam Smith's, as more generous, than judicious praise.

vast spread and influence of disastrous superstitions, the element of external force must never be forgotten. The popular mind has never been left free to choose, or to form its own beliefs, but has ever been instructed and directed by a more or less powerful organization of priests and soldier-allies, whose interest has lain, not in the weakening, but in the strengthening of Superstition. But castes of soldiers and of priests are mainly the results of physical conditions. And we thus see that, as determinants both of ignorance and of servitude, the Powers of Nature have not only determined the history of Thought and the development of Consciousness; but, in thus connecting the primitive conception of Causation with the physical circumstances of the primitive development of Thought, we see that the very fact of Thought having a history originated in physical necessities; and hence, if we find that the necessary Causation-theory of ignorance is a conception of Onesided Determination, we shall see that the fact that intellectual development begins with such a conception originated, not in any *absolute* quality of the mind, or inherent necessity, but in the relation between the mental Spontaneity and those special Terrestrial Conditions in which Thought was, necessarily, as it would appear, first developed.

12. I would then proceed now to show that the conception of Causation implied in the myths of Naturianism,— that Spiritism or the conception of Causes as Spirits,—is due simply to an ignorance of the true relations of things which resulted, in the way above shown, from the economical effects of the Powers of

Nature. The phenomena, from which the theory of Spiritism was an inference, may be distinguished as of three classes. And the most penetrating light is, I think, thrown on the causes of this primitive conception of Causation by the examination and explanation of those similar or identical phenomena of what I would call *Homianism*, vulgarly accounted for by a revival of the theory of 'Spirits.' Now the first and most important of the phenomena which would appear originally to have given rise, and still to give countenance, to the theory of Spirits is the fact of Appearances, not material, being seen, and Voices, not natural, being heard. But a scientific explanation of such phenomena is found in this profoundly important fact, that the ultimate seats of the senses are, not their external organs, but certain nervous centres of the brain; that the molecular movements which are the ultimate physical conditions of our sensations may be excited in these nervous centres quite independently of external objects corresponding to our sensations; and hence, that the necessary and sufficient condition of sensation is an action merely of the nervous centres.[1] In the determination, by vivisection, of the functions of the Pons Varolii[2] and Corpora Quadrigemina,[3] these centres seem to have been identified for all the senses, save that of smell. The fact, then, is that it is not necessary that any such object should exist, as our eye assures us that we see, and our ear tells us that we

[1] See Taine, *De l'Intelligence*, t. i. l. iv.: *Les Conditions physiques des Événements moraux.*

[2] Vulpian, *Physiologie du Système nerveux*, pp. 541-8.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 557.

hear. It is by no means necessary that, in order to see objects, or hear voices, there should proceed from an external object rays that impinge on the retina of the eye, or vibrations which strike the drum of the ear. It is sufficient, in the one case, that there be merely certain molecular motions in the Corpora Quadrigemina; sufficient, in the other, that there be certain molecular motions in the Pons Varolii. For the causes of these molecular motions are not necessarily external objects, but may be internal influences proceeding either from a disordered state of the organism, or from the mental suggestions either of a dominant idea, or of another mind. Who that has fully realised the consequences and general bearings of this great fact will deem the evidence commonly offered in favour of the objective reality of supernatural sights and sounds anything but simply ignorant, irrelevant, and puerile? For the evidence that is offered for such occurrences establishes, at most, the veracity of the persons who report them; while the essential thing is, not proof of this, but proof that there were no such subjective causes at work as we know to be capable of producing phenomena apparently objective. But where is such proof to be found; where is there more than, at most, a dim consciousness that such proof is needed; and where is there *not* proof of subjective conditions perfectly sufficient to produce the phenomena ignorantly attributed to supernatural objective beings?

13. But a theory of 'Spirits' being thus suggested as the very natural and reasonable inference from such

phenomena as immaterial Appearances and Voices, not otherwise then explicable, two other great classes of phenomena tended to confirm men in this theory. Of these, the first to be noted are phenomena of Motions unquestionably not caused by ordinary material impulses. But we now know that motions which must formerly have appeared explicable only by the action of Spirits are to be clearly explained either from the development of electric and magnetic forces, or generally, of vibrations; or from the great physio-psychological fact that muscular movements are unconsciously produced, not only by present mental ideas, but by forgotten mental impressions. This is the fact which especially applies to the explanation of Table-turning. And this would appear to be the only phenomenon peculiar to modern Spiritism;[1] though it is doubtful if there is even this single peculiarity[2] in the contemporary epidemic; doubtful whether we do not find it distinctly recorded only because people, in former times, had 'supped too full of horrors,' to make such a trifle as Table-turning appear worth mentioning. But if we have not an identical, we have, at least, a similar, and similarly explicable ancient fact in the movements of the Magician's Wand, or Divining Rod. And M. Chevreuil's explanation of the ancient,[3] confirms and elucidates Faraday's explanation of the modern phenomenon[4] of

[1] 'On n'a signalé nulle part ailleurs que dans l'événement contemporain, à ma connaissance du moins, les tournoiements de tables, cette agitation des meubles, et ces tapotements.'—Littré, *Médecine et Médecins*, p. 65.

[2] 'Car M. Chevreuil a déterré un texte ancien, obscur il est vrai, mais qui semble bien les indiquer.'—*Ibid.* p. 43.

[3] *Baguette divinatoire.* [4] *Athenæum*, July 2, 1853.

muscular movements unconsciously determined by mental states. That these mental states should not necessarily be present ideas, but may be past and forgotten mental impressions, is certainly very remarkable. Yet the fact that much mental work is done without consciousness has been acknowledged since the time of Leibnitz; was worked out by Sir W. Hamilton in his theory of Latent Thought;[1] and, as stated by Dr. Laycock,[2] suggested to Dr. Carpenter his theory of Unconscious Cerebration.[3] And the natural explanation by this fact of phenomena of motion-produced sound, apparently indicative of the action of supernatural intelligent agents, should seem to be clear and complete.[4]

14. But there is a third great class of phenomena which has confirmed men in that theory of Spirits, originally suggested by what seemed the clearest testimony of the senses. Under this third class we would include those extraordinary states assumed, gifts shown, and influence exerted by certain individuals which would certainly at first appear explicable only on a theory of the action of supernatural beings. But of all such phenomena a subjective, and natural explanation is now given by this third great fact. The automatic or spontaneous activity of thought may either have *no* one definite aim or direction whatever, and so, be determined entirely by outward suggestion; or, on the other hand, expectation, or a dominant idea

[1] *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. I.

[2] *On the Reflex Action of the Brain* (1844).

[3] *Human Physiology*, (5th Edition, 1853).

[4] See *Quarterly Review*, *Electro-Biology and Mesmerism*, 1853, and *Spiritualism*, 1872.

may give to it an aim and direction *so* definite and determined as to exclude all suggestion from without; and in both cases these mental states will manifest themselves in physical phenomena. And such a generalisation would appear to include everything essential in the more detailed statement of the eminent author of the article, in which the 'Quarterly' examined, in 1853, the pretensions of Electrobiology and Mesmerism, and to have the further advantage of being free of terms or phrases introducing the vexed question of the nature of the Will. 'From the sum,' he says, 'of the principles we have been enunciating it will follow, that, if the human mind should lose for a time its power of volitional self-direction, it cannot shake off the yoke of any "dominant idea," however tyrannical, but *must* execute its behests;—it cannot bring any notion with which it may be possest to the test of common sense, but *must* accept it, if it be impressed on the consciousness with adequate force;—it cannot recall any fact, even the most familiar, that is beyond its immediate grasp;—upon any idea, therefore, with which it may be possest, the whole force of its attention is for the time concentrated, so that the most incongruous conception presents itself with all the vividness of reality; —and finally, if the automatic activity of the mind, when freed from the controlling power of the *will*, should depend more upon *external* than upon *internal* suggestion, and should hence take no determinate direction of its own, one idea may be readily substituted for another by appropriate means; and the whole state of the convictions, the feelings, and the impulses to

action may be thus altered from time to time, without the least perception of the strangeness of the transition.'[1] The facts thus summarised apply more particularly to the explanation of those phenomena vulgarly called Mesmeric or Magnetic, scientifically, Hypnotic. And had it been known that, as Mr. Braid discovered, Hypnotism and the consequent phenomena may be produced, not only by the eye or influence of another person, but equally well by oneself on oneself, by means, for instance, of any bright object held before the eyes; and had it been known also to what the wondrous motions of the Magician's Wand and Divining Rod were really, as M. Chevreuil showed, due; not only would the theory of Spiritism have lost much of its apparent probability, but priests and sorcerers would have been deprived of what should seem to have been potent instruments for exciting awe, confirming in superstition, and procuring obedience. But suppose that the three great facts just-stated are not sufficient scientifically to explain all the phenomena that have given rise to, or still countenance the theory of 'Spirits' —suppose there are residual phenomena not explicable by any one, or any combination of the above-stated facts, we are far from being at the end of our scientific resources of explanation. Only be it remembered that a scientific explanation is ever an explanation starting from known or verifiable facts, and involving the notion of mutual determination. And as illustrative of such a further explanation of 'Spiritist' phenomena, I would

[1] *Electro-Biology and Mesmerism* in the *Quarterly Review*, September, 1853, p. 510. Compare Carpenter's *Principles of Human Physiology*, and Holland, *Chapters on Mental Physiology*.

venture to suggest such an hypothesis of *Solidarity*, or rather such an application of the fact of Solidarity, as that below-noted.[1] For I am inclined to think that

[1] This hypothesis is but a combination of these highest generalisations of Modern Science, namely: the conception of bodies as systems of molecular motion; the conception of bodies, further, not as isolated, but as acting mechanically on each other as parts of a system; and the conception of mental states and changes as having equivalents in states and changes of molecular motion. Let, then, bodies, conceived as systems of motion, be further conceived, in accordance with that hypothesis of Matter suggested by Faraday, (*Experimental Researches*, vol. II. p. 284, and vol. III. pp. 44 flg.), confirmed by those facts which destroyed the theory of electrical induction being an 'action at a distance' (*Ibid.* Series xi.), and further developed in my conception of Mutually-determining Atoms,—let bodies be conceived, not as isolated, but as parts of a system, and as acting universally on each other through mechanical 'lines of force,' variously deflected in their mutual action, but directly, or indirectly exerting influence in spheres of quite indefinite extent. And further, let the accepted fact of psychology be borne in mind, that all mental action whatever is but an aspect of a certain mechanical action; every feeling, every thought, every desire or volition implying, rather than being a consequence of certain molecular motions, and mechanical changes. And yet further, let some bodies be conceived as either permanently or occasionally more capable than others of affecting, and being affected by the lines of force from other bodies. Then, just as the molecular motion of any one organ of an animal body varyingly affects, and is affected by the dynamic equilibrium of every other organ; so may individual bodies, conceived as systems of motion, not only varyingly affect, and be affected by each other through a mechanically conceived medium; but such influence may be a consequence of mental actions which, if they have all mechanical equivalents, would, through a medium, be mechanically communicable. For suppose a mental change takes place in an individual, and he becomes possessed by a certain strong feeling or desire. On *its* material side, this mental change, and supervening condition is a certain change, and supervening state of molecular motion. If, then, other bodies, and particularly other animated bodies, are systems of molecular motion; and if all bodies are more or less directly connected through mechanical lines of force raying out from each, and varying in character with the mechanical and psychological state of each; then, a change in the mental condition of an individual, being a change also in his state of molecular motion, *must* affect the mechanical states, and hence mental conditions of others, though unquestionably, such influence *may* be so infinitesimal as to be quite incognisable.

such facts as, for instance, some of those of which we disguise from ourselves the wonder by glibly calling them 'instinctive;' those perhaps, also, of the contagion of ideas, and particularly of religious enthusiasms; those, generally, of the unconscious cotemporaneity of similar mental states, and ideas; those also of the peculiar influence exerted by certain individuals; and, further, facts of verified dreams, sudden unaccountable anxieties, and strange impulses of which so many persons can tell in reference to others to whom they have been tenderly attached, and who have been in distress while they have been absent—such facts as these, or some of them, may, I am inclined to think, possibly be found to require for the completion of their scientific, and the destruction of their spiritist explanation, some further development of the conception of Mutual Determination. And thus there may, after all, be found to be truth in Magic. For Magic, as the great thinkers of Alexandria desired, at least, to conceive and practise it, was not a supernatural theurgy, but a natural science. They conceived the world as a whole, of which the diverse parts correspond to, and react on each other in the same way as the organs of a single body. Just as they endeavoured to reduce the myths of religion to philosophy, they attempted to base the arts of magic on all that was then known as physical, physiological, and psychological science.[1]

And should, therefore, facts be found to require and

[1] See Vacherot, *Histoire de l'École d'Alexandrie*, t. II. pp. 145–6; and compare Maury, *La Magie et l'Astrologie*, p. 91.

to warrant such an hypothesis of Solidarity as that which I have suggested, there may be found to be no less of truth in the Magical notion of Mutual Influence, than Faraday has acknowledged that there was in the Alchemical notion of Transmutation.[1]

15. But confining ourselves here to the consideration of the three above-stated sets of facts by which the vast majority, at least, if not all the phenomena, from which Spiritism, the Philosophy of the First Age of Humanity, was the general inference, are now otherwise explained; we have to note that these general facts may themselves be generalised, and the meaning of them be thus made more evident. For it will be observed that the tendency of each of these three general facts is to show the potency of subjective causes in the production of phenomena. They may, therefore, I think, be all generalised into this one great fact, namely, that Subjective Causes produce phenomena which, by the uninstructed mind, may reasonably be attributed to Objective Causes. But see what a sudden and immense verification this is of our Ultimate Law of History. This Law affirms Progress to be essentially an advance from a conception of Onesided Determination, in which the Subjective and the Objective are not duly distinguished, to a conception of Mutual Determination, in which there is, at length, a due distinction of these two elements, or classes of forces. And we now see that the conception of Onesided Determination, the conception of Causes as 'Spirits,' arises from nothing else but just a non-differentiation of Subjective and Objective,

[1] *Experimental Researches*, vol. III.

a non-discernment of what is due to merely Subjective Forces; a non-recognition of the laws of Mental Activity. But seeing this, we see also that it is just by a differentiation of Subjective and Objective, just by a discernment, or recognition of what is respectively due to Internal Forces and External Conditions, that the conception of Mutual Determination is chiefly to be characterised; and hence, we see further that there could have been an advance from the earlier to the later mode of conceiving Causation only by means of a great period of Transition in which, through the Differentiation of Subjective and Objective, preparation was made for the final conception of their Reciprocal Action, and hence, for the conception of Causation as Mutual Determination. The Theory, then, of Spirits originated simply in not distinguishing what has reality merely as part of one's own present consciousness from what has an independent reality; from not distinguishing what has its cause in oneself, from what has its cause in something outside of oneself; and stories, therefore, of Spirits which characterise the whole mythology of Naturianism originated, not in the existence or action of such beings, but simply in a mental activity undisciplined as yet in distinguishing what is due merely to personal, and what to independent outward forces. But as the Scientific theory of Causation has arisen from a larger, and more accurate, so this Spiritist theory arose from a narrower, and less accurate, knowledge of the relations of things, or, in a word, from ignorance. Ignorance, however, we have seen to be the necessary result of those

special Terrestrial Conditions under which Thought was, necessarily also, as it would appear, first developed. And so, our theorem is proved that, not from any absolute quality of the Mind; and still less from any such actual existences as 'spirits;' but simply from the peculiar, and probably necessary conditions of mental development, philosophic Thought began with conceiving Causes as Spirits; began with the conception of Causation as a Onesided Determination; began with the theory of Spiritism. But it is in this Philosophy, thus resulting from nothing higher than an ignorance determined by the economical effects of the Powers of Nature; it is in this Spiritist Philosophy that the Naturian Mythology, and every theological Mythology whatever has its root. The Philosophy, indeed, of Spiritism is the soil from which these branched mythologies naturally and necessarily spring. And hence, in showing of what phenomena the Spiritist Philosophy was the generalisation, we analyse, as it were, the soil which produced these Mythologies. And, in discovering the mental facts which I have above stated, and so neutralising the elements of that soil, we destroy, not the roots only of the Mythologies which it has produced, but the very soil in which they were rooted.

SECTION III.

THE REFLECTION OF NATURE IN THE NILE-VALLEY.

1. HAVING thus seen what is the theory of Causation implied in the myths of Naturianism, and what is the origin ot that theory, the theory of Spiritism; we see at once both what the character is, and what is the origin of the character of the Consciousness in which the aspects of Nature are primævally mirrored. But before proceeding further to show that the great myth of Osiris is but a reflection of Nature in a Consciousness conceiving causes as 'spirits,' let me briefly point out the prodigiously momentous and far-reaching effects of that primitive conception of Causation, of which the character is determined, as we have seen, by the economical effects of the Powers of Nature. The one distinctive characteristic of Man as compared with other animal races is progress. But why? Because, speaking generally, men alone inherit, add to, and transmit tradition. See, then, how necessarily determinative of the whole after-history of Thought was the character of its primitive conceptions. See how great was the error, already noted, of Mr. Buckle in affirming 'the great division between European Civilization and Non-European Civilization to be the basis of the philosophy of history,'[1] the fact being that the most important elements of civilization, the religious beliefs of Europe, are all founded on traditional

[1] *History of Civilization*, vol. I. pp. 138–9.

conceptions of Oriental origin. And see how vast is the revolution involved in tracing to their source all Spiritist conceptions whatever, and even such last theistic beliefs as those which, with all his antitheological zeal, were still cherished by Mr. Buckle; the vast revolution involved in discovering them to be but forms of that primitive conception of Causation, the untruth of which is almost sufficiently evidenced by the conditions of its origin and diffusion. This discovery and the revolution made by it are due to Philosophy. And hence such a difference of function, as implies the very reverse of such an isolating division as Mr. Buckle contended for, is to be recognised between the East and the West in the general history of Humanity. The thinkers of the West, amid Aspects of Nature that, as Mr. Buckle has pointed out, were more favourable to the development of the reason than of the imagination, have, in the fearless investigation of the interrelations of phenomena, arrived, at length, at the conception of Causation as Mutual Determination. But this progress has been made in the midst of, and in opposition to those Spiritist or theological conceptions of Causation derived from the East. And hence the true 'basis of the Philosophy of History' is the conception, not of a 'great division' which isolates the West from the East, but of a functional difference which brings East and West into more evident correlation, and necessary connection.

2. Now, in showing that the Religions of the First Age of Humanity are reflections of Nature, and hence rightly distinguished by the name of Naturianism, and

in showing, more particularly, that the myth of Osiris is a reflection of the Powers and Aspects of Nature in the Nile-valley; I would first point-out that such a conclusion is but a corollary from our fundamental metaphysical principle of Correlation, and hence supported by all those facts and reasonings which tend to the establishment of that principle. For this principle, as we have seen, presents to us all human notions whatever, even those reckoned, by the idealist school of metaphysicians and moralists, 'innate,' as really products only of the mutual action between, on the one hand, Sensations and Images as determined and determining coexistents, and, on the other hand, that fundamental Integrating Activity of the mind which, in its subjective aspect, appears as Want of Oneness. It is the sublime force of this Want and Activity, and the fact that the results of it are, through language, transmitted, accumulated, and transformed—it is this that distinguishes the mind of Man from that of the noblest even of his Elder Brethren. This Want and Activity differing not in kind, but in sublimity of development, from that which manifests itself in the brute, is that 'active principle and anticipation' of which the great English Platonist, in the passage which I have taken as motto to this chapter, speaks as enabling the mind 'to comprehend' Nature, 'correspond, and vitally sympathise with it,' not hearing in it 'but mere noise and sound and clatter,' but an 'intellectual music and harmony,' wherewith it is 'ravished and enthusiastically transported.' And it is to the reciprocal action between this 'active principle and anticipa-

tion,' this Want and Activity, on the one hand, and on the other, the Powers and Aspects of Nature, that I would trace the origin of the Mythologies of Naturianism.

3. For myths are the score, as it were, of that music which the human Mind hears in Nature; the score of that music discoursed by the pipe of Pan; and the necessary creation of beings in whom Want of Oneness, and spontaneous Integrating Activity, manifests itself in those highly developed forms which we call generalising reason, and poetic imagination. In myths, facts do not appear in the simple form which would be adequate to their particular expression, but in a general and ideal form determined by the genius of the people, and the symbolism of their language.[1] A myth, in the true sense of the word, may be defined as an ideal conception which is the symbol of an actual verity.[2] Myths, if we use the term in this general sense, belong to the scientific, as well as to the theological stage of human intelligence. And in the formation of theological as well as of scientific myths, the imagination has had to conform itself to the condition of not opposing itself to the general state of knowledge. But in the period to which the latter class of myths distinctively belong, the knowledge with which they have to be in accordance has so immensely increased as to have given

[1] Compare Strauss, *Leben Jesu*, b. I. Einleitung, § 8, ss. 29:—'Bestimmt man hienach von Seiten der genannten Forscher (Gabler, Schelling, und Bauer) den Mythus in Allgemeinen als Darstellung einer Begebenheit, oder eines Gedankens in geschichtlicher, aber, durch die sinnliche phantasie-reiche Denk-und-Sprachweise des Alterthums, bestimmter Form.'

[2] Compare Littré, *Avant-propos* to his translation of the *Leben Jesu*, p. xx.:—'Une conception idéale, mais renfermant une vérité interne qu'on retrouve quand on veut.'

an entirely new conception of Causation; and hence the vast difference between the ideal conceptions of this period, and those of the theological age. With us, the difficulty is to stimulate the imagination to the embrace of all the facts actually known. With them of old, the difficulty was to restrain the imagination within the very narrow circuit of known facts; though for the most part, unfortunately, they were not aware of any such difficulty, because unaware of any such duty; and hence the mythic symbol, the ideal conception was so overelaborated as speedily to obscure utterly, to all but the initiated, or those of keenest insight, the original fact. Compare, for instance, such an ideal conception as that of the life, death, and resurrection of Osiris; or that of the Soul, and its Other-world progress to the Region of Sacred Repose; compare such ideal conceptions with those, for instance, of Universal Gravitation, and Eternal Evolution. The latter, no less than the former, are myths in that general sense above assigned to the term. Universal Attraction, and Eternal Evolution, no less—perhaps one ought rather to say infinitely more—than the stories of Osiris and of the Departure into Light, are magnificent achievements of the Mind's integrating activity, sublime satisfactions of its want of Oneness. But though, as ideal conceptions, these later myths are no more absolutely verifiable than the earlier; yet are they symbols, or representations of reality accordant with an infinitely greater number of actual objective facts; and the more completely the facts shine, as it were, through the symbol, the more perfect it is.

4. Certain Egyptologers—after the manner of those scholars who, with all their classical knowledge, have so little penetrated to, and drunk of that classical spirit which is, in fact, identical with the spirit of Science,[1] that they would have us see divine adumbrations of Christian theology in Greek mythology,—certain Egyptologers have, by that Christian character of Osirianism which we shall have in the next chapter to point out, been led to maintain for the Osiris-myth an origin in some sort of supernatural revelation. But the hypothesis of such an origin is only another example of the Spiritist theory of events, and its refutation, like that of this theory generally, is twofold; in showing, first, that the phenomenon may be naturally explained; and secondly, that the supernatural theory of it belongs to but the primitive stage of the conception of Causation. Such a twofold refutation I have, at least, indicated in defining myths generally as ideal conceptions, the symbols of actual facts; in referring to the mind's fundamental integrating activity, or Want of Oneness, as the active force in the creation of such ideal conceptions; and in pointing-out that, under the primitive conditions of the action of this myth-weaving activity, it was given for the threads of its loom but such figments as Spirits. In the case of the Osiris-myth, the facts were simply those of the Sun's annual and daily motions, and the phenomena therewith connected. Or, stating this from a subjective point of view, the external

[1] And the fact of this identity of spirit solves, as I think, the question of the place of classical studies in a complete scientific education.

determinants of the Osiris-myth were simply a certain sequence of Sensations, and such Images of an infinite Splendour, a death-environment of Life, and eternal Rebirth, as we have in our own experience verified as those naturally connecting themselves with the sensations derived from Nature in the oasis-valley of the Nile. These sensations and images were the matter, so to speak, on which worked the integrating activity, and Want of Oneness of the primæval Egyptian mind; and in the reciprocal action of this integrating activity and these sensations and images, we find the cause of the creation of the Osiris-myth. Curious it, no doubt, is that so elaborately splendid a myth as that of Osiris should have, as kernel of actual verity, only such phenomena as those of, or connected with, the Sun's annual and daily course; wonderful that an ideal conception should have so immensely transcended and altogether transformed simple natural facts in a story of the birth, life, and death of a God-Man, a vision of departure into Light, and doctrines of Incarnation, Future Judgment, and Punishment or Reward; tragical that, notwithstanding the utter unreality of these imaginings, they should have exercised so incalculable an historical influence.

5. And yet, I venture to think that, the more fully and carefully we consider what would deductively appear to be the necessary, and what inductively we find to be the actual results of the reciprocal action of the Mind's spontaneity of Integrating Activity and Want of Oneness, and Nature's Powers and Aspects; the more unevadable will seem the conclusion, that to

such a reciprocal action, and—however like it may be to the distinctive myth of Christianity—to no supernatural revelation, must be traced the myth of Osiris. For, as we have seen, the Physical Conditions, under which Humanity was developed, were such as necessarily to determine an originally ignorant, and undifferentiating conception of Causation. But this conception of Causation is the very matter of the Osiris-myth; the very stuff of which it is woven; and all the rest is mere arrangement and colouring. Yet further. The Powers of Nature, as we have also seen, were such as, in determining at once a large production, and an unequal distribution of wealth, to create two very distinct social classes; one, few in numbers but rich, and leisured; the other, immensely numerous, but indigent, and laborious. And Osirianism is in this a most striking reflection of the Powers of Nature, that it presents, on the one hand, evidences of high thought and deep emotion; and, on the other, facts of the grossest and most debasing superstition; on the one hand, glimpses, at least, of a highly philosophical esoteric doctrine; on the other, fullest views of an idolatrous exoteric doctrine, the tool of priestly domination. And thus, the multitudinous idolatry of popular Osirianism is traced to the fact generally of the Egyptian religion being, like all primæval religions, founded and—considering the conditions of the primitive development of Thought—necessarily founded on the philosophy of Spiritism; and to the fact, more particularly, of the Physical Powers of the Nile valley being such as to have caused the vast mass of the

people to exist in the superstitious ignorance and submissive obedience of—poverty.

6. But consider now the relation of the subjective Aspects to the objective Powers of Nature. Subjective are, no doubt, both the Powers and the Aspects of Nature; subjective, in the profoundest sense, is the External World still, however it is viewed. For the sudden rapt imagination of the poet—

> We are such stuff
> As dreams are made on—

was, in fact, so far as there was truth in it, but that lifelong thought of the contemporary philosopher from the enunciation of which our Modern Period dates—*Cogito, ergo sum.* But though fully acknowledging the profound subjectivity of all phases of Existence, states of Consciousness may still be distinguished as subjective and objective; and the correlation of such states, and hence, the correlation of the objective Powers, and the subjective Aspects of Nature, examined. Now, what we call the Powers of Nature is but Nature considered in its relation to the bodily organism, and social organisation of Man; while that which we distinguish as the Aspects of Nature is but Nature considered in relation to the integrating activity of the mind of Man. And we see the relation of the Powers to the Aspects of Nature in this, that the Nature-powers of the Nile-valley, in the way in which they supplied the physical wants of Man, and hence, influenced his social organisation, tended, at the same time, to produce or maintain in him such mental capacities of generalisation and of emotion as I have above

ascribed to the ancient Khamites, in attempting to realise and depict the Aspects of Nature as reflected in their primæval consciousness. Tribes utterly savage, wandering over a barren soil in an uncertain climate, have not food enough for the body, largely to reflect Nature in their mind. Yet even so, there is a correlation between the monstrosity and incoherency of the Aspects of Nature, in their necessarily incomprehensive view of it, and the sterility and stormfulness of the Powers of Nature. But high generalisation and noble emotion imply the satisfaction of bodily wants, and a certain security and leisure. And the Powers, therefore, of Nature must be beneficent, if its Aspects, in a primæval consciousness, are beautiful. And so, from beautiful Aspects of Nature we may argue to beneficent Powers of Nature. In a word, the Aspects of Nature are ever relative to the character of the consciousness; and as the character of the consciousness is mainly determined primævally by the Powers of Nature, there must evidently be a correlation between the objective Powers, and the subjective Aspects of Nature.

7. And now as to the verification of our assumption that some such impressions as those made upon ourselves of infinite Splendour, of the environment of Life by Death, and of eternal Rebirth, were those made on the creators of the Gods, and builders of the Monuments of Egypt. For 'the reception of a certain impression from certain Aspects of Nature implies,' I have said, 'certain coexistent conditions in the physical characteristics, the mental capacities, and the social organisation of the people, and certain sequential effects

in the distinguishing features of their religious ideals, and the expression of them in Art.' First, then, the consideration of the physical characteristics, the mental capacities, and the social organisation of the Ancient Egyptians, will be found, I think, to verify our belief that the impressions they received from Nature were probably distinguished by, at least, comparatively high intellectual generalisation, and comparatively deep moral feeling. And hence, we may feel satisfied that, in the mere fact of implying such characteristics, there is no improbability that the impressions which we have ourselves received from the Aspects of Nature here, were such as those primævally received by the creators of the Egyptian Gods. In this, however, we have but a negative verification. Let us consider more particularly whether we do not find in Osirianism reflections of Nature actually similar to those which have been impressed on our own consciousness. What say its Records, literary and artistic? What, its Scriptures, and its Monuments? For Sounds and Forms are the elements of two different orders of Language. Neither sort of language can be thoroughly understood without the other. And hence the languages that address respectively the Ear and the Eye are, in their mutual relation, like a bilingual inscription. Now, when we turn to the Sacred Books of the Osirian Religion, do we not find in that drama of the Departed Soul which is represented in the most ancient of them, the Funereal Ritual, a verification of what, from our own experience, we have assumed that the ancient Khamites were, by their entrance into, and

abode in the Nile oasis-valley, impressed with as the great facts of Existence—an infinite Splendour, a death-environment of Life, and an eternal Rebirth? Do we not find in the central ideas of Osirianism, and particularly in the degree in which they possessed, and the manner in which they were expressed by the Ancient Egyptians, but a detailed utterance of what we have assumed to have been their fundamental conceptions, or rather emotions of Existence? Are not the ideas of Death, Judgment, and Immortality, in the gravity and splendour with which they are presented in the Osirian Religion, and in it, more than in any other primæval religion, made prominent—are not these ideas as thus presented evidently derived, even from such impressions as have been made on ourselves, by the great features of the Osirian Land? Consider it. Do not the Aspects of Nature and the Myths of Osirianism seem so to complete each other, that the one is but the counterpart of the other? Are not, in these Myths, the impressions received of Existence but woven, by the Mind's integrating activity, into a magnificent tale? And is not Osirianism, thus, but a re-reflection, as it were, in the mirror of Consciousness of the Aspects of Nature?

8. And now look at the Monuments. Wander over that great plain which, on the outskirts of the Libyan Desert, bears on its rocky, but sand-covered platform, some sixty Pyramids, in three grouped masses, northern, central, and southern; descend the low-roofed slides, and grope through the secret passages to the lofty vaulted chambers of the Royal Sarcophagi, in the heart

of the rock, under these Titanic cairns; and filling yourself with the wonders of that plain, get down into that vast subterranean Hall, alternately, on either side of which, are the chambers that vault the Sarcophagi of the Sacred Bulls. Or, at Thebes, ride past the famed Colossi, and the voiced Statue that, of old, hailed the morning-sun through the once many-streeted plain, round which curve the Memnonian Mountains, up the rocky defile, at the back of the hills, to the Tombs of the Kings; enter the sloping galleries leading to transversal halls, ever deeper, and grander, and all covered with mystic sculptures, still glowing with gorgeous colours in the depths of the pyramidal mountains; and, returning, see by moonlight the sublime ruins of Karnak, all oversculptured with an historic literature. Finally, having moored during the night at Aboo-Simbel, suddenly behold, in the morning, the colossal Gods that, in the unutterable majesty of their serene beauty, sit enthroned before the Ethiopian Temple of the Sun. Are we not justified in considering the characteristics of these monuments, their grandeur of proportion, gorgeousness of colouring, and serenity, yet mystery; the innocent gaiety which marks the depicturing of the comedy of This-world life, so wonderfully contrasting with the representation of it by Aristophanes, Terence, or Molière; and the tragic gravity of the imaginings of that Other-world life, which ever enspheres all, and into which some are for ever passing—are we not justified in considering such characteristics of the monumental art of Egypt a verification of our belief that, in the impressions made

on ourselves by the Aspects of Nature in this oasis-valley—impressions of an infinite Splendour, an abiding environment of Life by Death, and an eternal Rebirth—we realise the very impressions made on the primæval inwanderers, and so, with a joy of sympathy, as well-founded as it is intense, come into living contact with the inmost creative forces of Egyptian Religion, Civilization, and Art?

9. I would but make one further remark in concluding these considerations on the origin generally of the myths of Naturianism, and of those, more particularly, of Osirianism. A lesson also for the Present, as well as an instruction with regard to the Past, may, I think, be derived from the Nile-valley Aspects of Nature, when the impressions of them are, with due simplicity and reverence, received and reflected by the soul. Life and Death, eternal Rebirth, and an infinite Splendour! May we not, through the profound feeling of this here in Egypt, learn, not only what the creative ideas were of the ancient Egyptian Religion and Art, but also what the very truth is of Existence? Realising this, the dogmas of Christianism, but transformations, as we shall presently see, of the myths of Osirianism, are burst asunder as figments which, though in their day they may have given men the highest notions of Existence of which they were then capable, do now but dome us in from those simple realities of the Universe which increased knowledge and wider love have given us the capacity of being conscious of, and made content to acknowledge unutterable. Noble and beautiful were the

ways in which the Egyptians expressed the truth of Existence. Yet it was, for the most part, but in the language of such fictions as children amuse themselves with. Nay more, these fictions, though they were given a new life by Christianism, were literally believed only by the ignorant multitude. By us, then, of a maturer age, by us of a better disciplined imagination, let consciousness of the Death-environment of Life, of eternal Rebirth, and of the infinite Splendour that ever enspheres our passing joys and sorrows, find more manly forms of expression than unverifiable dreams about the Hereafter, and the Unknowable.

At length, descending from Stabl-Antar, I rejoined my companions at the foot of the mountain, by the Moslem Cemetery, in the desert, separated by a palm-and-acacia grove from the city. Remounting, we galloped into the town, went into a Bazaar, to supply ourselves with the pipe-bowls for which Sioot is famous, and then to a bath. In the dimness of the vaulted labyrinth in which I lay, but clearness of the unvaulted thought that follows Egyptian ablutions, the ideas to which I have above endeavoured to give expression absorbed me again, till admonished that it was after sunset, and that the bath must be closed. So, laying aside my chibouke, I arose, dressed, remounted, and rode through the gates, now deserted, at which in the morning there had been an eager throng. And it was in a magical gloaming, under heavens fast filling with stars, that I rode back to the sacred river.

We continued our voyage with the usual excursions on shore, till, in about a week, we came to Tentyra, or Dendera, with its famous temples.[1] At Keneh, on the opposite bank, a Christmas-eve entertainment was given, to one or two other Nile-voyagers and ourselves, by Fadl Pasha, the Governor of Upper Egypt. And worth recalling, in contrast with that Ancient Egyptian life, not the forms only, but the inmost creative forces of which we have been endeavouring sympathetically to realise, is that Arabian night of Modern Egyptian life:—the cavalcade, at sunset, from the river to the palace; the feast, at which the champagne, we had sent a case of as a present, was not found by the Pasha to have been forbidden by the Prophet; the *fantasia* of Almeh, or Dancing-girls,[2] that followed, and grew ever wilder as night advanced, though one of the sisterhood had, but the previous day, been murdered, in a love-quarrel, by a soldier; the courtyard, and gardens illuminated with a thousand lamps, and having, as captive denizens, strange and beautiful desert

[1] The religious war of the Tentyrites, the foes, and Ombites, the friends of the Crocodile, gave occasion to Juvenal's still-applicable satire:—

'Tanta potest religio suadere malorum.'

He certainly travelled in Egypt, and was probably here, but the story of his exile is doubtful. See Lewis, *Juvenalis Satiræ*.

[2] Lady Duff Gordon thus graphically describes the Egyptian dance:—'At first I thought the dancing queer and dull. . . . But the captain called out to one Lateefeh . . . and then it was revealed to me. She started to her feet, and became the "serpent of old Nile"—the head, shoulders, and arms eagerly bent forward, waist in and haunches advanced on the bent knees—the posture of a cobra about to spring. . . . It is "Vénus toute entière à sa proie attachée;" far more realistic than the fandango, and far less coquettish, because the thing represented is *au grand sérieux*—not travestied, *gazé*, or played with.'—*Letters from Egypt*, pp. 160–1.

animals; and the ride back to our dahabiëh-home, preceded and accompanied by servants or slaves with flaming torches, while, in the doming heavens over all, shone the stars in the splendour of eternity, and across the sands the nightwind blew in baptismal purity in our faces.

For such is the twofold world of Egypt; on one bank of life, scenes of present existence, not unfrequently like those of the Tales with which the fair Shahr-ázád (Deliverer of the City) entertained, for a thousand-and-one nights, the Sultán Shahr-yar (Friend of the City);[1] on the other, resurrections—if, in being impressed by the Aspects of Nature in the Nile-valley, even as the primæval Khamites and ancient Egyptians were impressed, we have been able, not merely to unswathe the mummies of past lives, but to evoke, and come into felt contact with, their once informing spirits—resurrections of living souls, such as that which we may have beheld at the Rock-tomb of Stabl-Antar.

[1] For the spelling and meaning of these Persian names I am indebted to the kindness of the great traveller and linguist who may, it is to be hoped, one day give us a really full and faithful translation of the *Arabian Nights*—Capt. Richard Burton.

CHAPTER III.

ON THE TEMPLE-ROOF AT KARNAK.

'Osiris was called the "Manifester of Good," or the "Opener of Truth," and said to be "full of goodness (grace) and truth." He appeared on Earth to benefit Mankind, and after having performed the duties He came to fulfil, and fallen a sacrifice to Typho, the Evil Principle (who was, at length, overcome by His influence, after His leaving the world), He rose again to a new life, and became the Judge of the Dead in a Future State. The Dead, also, after having passed their final ordeal, and been absolved from sin, obtained in His name, which they then took, the blessings of eternal felicity.'

WILKINSON, *Ancient Egyptians*, Second Series, vol. I. p. 320.

THE CAUSE OF THE CHRISTIAN DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION.

On the Temple-roof at Karnak—on the roof of that Osirian Temple which, in the antiquity of its memories, the colossal grandeur of its architecture, and the wonders of the vast templed amphitheatre, and sepulchred hills on which it looks, is, even in its ruins, the most sublime Temple on Earth—considerations, one day, both on the Christian character of Osirianism, and on the Osirian character of Christianism, suggested an hypothesis of the origin of doctrinal Christianity in the influence of the myths of Naturianism (or of what, as the most developed system of them, may be considered as their representative, Osirianism,) on the form taken by those new moral aspirations traceable to the Sixth

Century Revolution (and which may be considered as represented by Messiahism)—an hypothesis which, as enlarged into a general theory by connection with our Ultimate Law of History, I would now, in some of its proofs, briefly set-forth as a verification of our deduction from that Law of a moral transformation of the Myths of Naturianism, as the natural sequence of such a Revolution as that which initiated what this Law distinguishes as the Second Age of Humanity.

But first, a few words on our approach to Thebes,[1] the hundred-gated Thebes, ἑκατόμπυλοι Θῆβαι, of which Homer sings;[2] but of which the glory was, even in Homer's time, a thing of the past, and the fame, even then, legendary.[3] It was after a voyage of three weeks from Cairo, and a day or two after the Christmas-eve entertainment at Keneh to which I have, in the last chapter, alluded. There was no stir in the calm air. 'La Niña's' great sails were loosely furled, and her crew were on the river-bank tracking her up. Of human life there were few signs; but of bird life there was a wonderful variety. Besides geese, and the ordinary waterfowl—pelicans, cormorants, herons, flamingoes, hawks, a solitary soaring eagle, and vultures. The

[1] From Tapé, in the Memphitic dialect of Coptic, pronounced Thaba, and signifying *the head*, or capital of the country.

[2] *Iliad*, IX. 379–85.

[3] 'It was in 1550 B.C. that the modern Thebes began to be celebrated in Asia, through the brilliant campaigns, exploits, and works of the second and third Thutmôsis. The former splendour of Thebes dated from fifteen centuries farther back, and was consequently beyond the historical knowledge of the Ionians.'—Bunsen, *Egypt's Place*, vol. IV. p. 591. In quoting this passage, I do not however mean to affirm that I am entirely satisfied with the evidence on which Bunsen supports his chronology.

latter were on, or hovering near, a carcass on a mud-island. A half-starved dog or two kept approaching and retreating, longing for the carrion, but fearing to hasten their own doom by interfering with the vultures' prey. Various were the passions of the mud-island, but all was amid the serene splendour of the sun of Egypt. At length night fell, and a breeze then sprang up, but for which we should still have had to moor below our hopes. As it was, we did not get-up till after midnight. Yet, though there were hardly even shadows to be seen, glorious as was the starlight, I did n t turn-in till two o'clock in the morning. For we had arrived, at length, at Thebes, and were moored at Luxor,[1] with Karnak beyond, and, on the other side of the river, the Memnonian Plain.

After many days spent in wandering through the temples, palaces, and tombs of the Libyan suburb, and of the Southern city, I found myself, at length, one afternoon, alone on the Temple-roof at Karnak. And there let my readers also now place themselves. Passing through that vast hall of Titanic columns which, whether sublime in the blaze of midday, or appalling amid the shadows of moonlight, has been, for so many successive ages of Man's history, an unparalleled wonder of human genius and power, let us ascend to the roof, an immense platform of hewn rocks set end to end, and side by side; and there, in the midst of all the grandeurs, historic and artistic, of Karnak, and beholding across the river the templed plain of the Colossi, swept

[1] Luxor, El Uksor, or El Kosóor, signifies *The Palaces*, and was called by the ancient Egyptians Southern Tapé.

round by the Libyan hills with their labyrinths of priestly tombs, and gorgeous deep-descending galleries of royal sepulchres; there, let us meditate together on a subject which must, I should think, urge itself, in these days, more or less strongly on the attention of every serious thinker in such a place,—the historical relation of the beliefs about Christ to those, so singularly analogous, about Osiris. No doubt, the consequences of the verification of that hypothesis of the origin of Christianity, which here suggests itself, will be in the highest degree revolutionary. But little impressed can we be with the sublime scene around us, if fear can obscure our judgment, or, within any other bounds than those of historical fact, and logical deduction, restrain our argument.

SECTION I.

THE CHRISTIAN CHARACTER OF OSIRIANISM.

1. REFLECTING here on the general results of our Egyptian studies, we are first of all struck with what I may call the Christian character of Osirianism. But before proceeding to point this out, and to state the hypothesis which this Christian character of Osirianism suggests, it may be desirable to offer a few remarks on the outward, and hence more vulgarly appreciated characteristics of the Egyptian religion. For, in amazement at any likening of Osirianism to Christianism, or of Christianism to Osirianism, many readers

may, as if in settlement of any suggestion even of a causal relation between Osirianism and Christianism, ask, 'Were not the Egyptians, as a matter of fact, idolaters, and worshippers, indeed, of the most grotesque and monstrous idols?' But let us understand what idolatry means. Possibly, you who put this question may be more of an idolater than were the ancient Egyptians when they first created their Gods. Idolatry is ceremonial worship when the meaning of the ceremonies and symbols is lost. We are helped to the understanding of this by the study of language in its first formations. Names, as a class of signs,[1] are themselves but a kind of symbols. In the formation of a language, they are at first uttered certainly not without a meaning; they certainly are the attempt to denote some thing, or express some want, hitherto nameless, unutterable. Yet these names, at first so meaningful, may in time so completely lose their original meaning, as to become the terminations of a declension.[2] So symbols, animal-headed deities, and others. What if the symbol, in later times, so lost its meaning as to be itself worshipped? Originally it had carried the mind from itself to that which it signified. And as, in Language, 'the formation of substantive nouns is the first stage of personifying God;[3] so, in Religion, the creation of symbols is the first stage of

[1] 'A name is a word taken at pleasure to serve for a *mark* which may raise in our mind a thought like to some thought we had before, and which, being pronounced to others, may be to them a *sign* of what thought the speaker had, or had not, before in his mind.'—Hobbes, *Computation or Logic*, ch. ii., cited by Mill, *System of Logic*, vol. II. p. 23.

[2] See Muller, *Lectures on the Science of Language*.

[3] Bunsen, *Egypt's Place*, vol. IV. p. 566.

idolatry. We shall hereafter have occasion to consider idol-creation more fully, and from other points of view. Here I will only remark, that a reference to the idolatry of the Egyptians is unfortunate, if it is intended thereby to disprove the likeness of Osirianism to Christianism. For we shall find that it is just in comparing these two Creeds in this matter of idolatry, that—when we set Jehovianism between them—their likeness comes out most strongly—the religion of Abraham, whether as Judaism, or as Mohammedanism, acting as a foil, and bringing out with startling clearness, at once the Osirian character of Christianism, and the Christian character of Osirianism.

2. But is the Animal-worship of the Egyptians next objected against any comparison of Osirianism with Christianism, or any hypothesis with respect to the origination of the latter in a transformation of the former? Well, it is admitted that that exaggerated care for animals which becomes a superstitious worship of them is not a feature of Christian religious emotion. But in the Animal-worship which—probably derived from an aboriginal African element in the population[1]—was, soon after the time of Menes, incorporated with Osirianism throughout the Empire, there should seem to have been an idea which modern Science tends more and more clearly to establish—the identity, namely, of the principle of life in all its manifestations.[2] 'And what is this,' asks Bunsen, 'but a specific adaptation of that consciousness of the

[1] Bunsen, *Egypt's Place*, vol. IV. p. 637.

[2] See Spencer, *Principles of Biology*, and *Principles of Psychology*.

divinity of Nature, which is implied in all the religious consciousness of the Old World?'[1] The doctrine of transmigration thus became a sacred link between animal and human life. And 'the community between the human and animal soul being once admitted, we can understand how the Egyptians at last arrived at the idea of worshipping in animals a living manifestation of Divinity.'[2] But if a similar doctrine is not found in Christianism, one is tempted to say that the want of it is much to be regretted. For there have been, and even still are, few worse features in Christian Civilization than its apathy to animal suffering.[3] And it is very noteworthy that it was the great Apostle of the Utilitarian School of Moralists who, in that very year from which dates a new period of the Modern Revolution, 1789, introduced into European Ethics the consideration of 'the interests of other animals.'[4] So likewise, a new care for, and new appreciation of animals is one of the characteristic features of Comte's conception of the New Religion of Humanity.[5] And if, at length, men are beginning *again* to become sympathetically aware that other animals also besides themselves feel

[1] Bunsen, *Egypt's Place*, vol. iv. p. 640.

[2] *Ibid.* vol. iv. p. 641.

[3] As to Christian cruelty generally, we must not recall the gladiatorial combats of the Roman amphitheatre, without recalling also the heretic burnings of every chief town in Christendom. Nor is Classic civilization to be judged by the days of its decline; but rather, as also Christian civilization, by the days of its prime. And that the Middle Ages were the prime of Christian civilization is proved by the fact, that the movement which has, since then, modified Christianity has tended more and more to sweep it, both as a doctrinal, and as a social system, away.

[4] Bentham, *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, ch. xvii.

[5] See Mill, *Comte and Positivism*.

pain, and that it is shameful and dastardly to inflict pain unnecessarily upon them; if there is now some hope that Christian 'sports' may, at length, be done away with, and animal-barbarities generally; and if, in realising that fact of physical kinship with our Elder Brethren, which Science affirms, and Christianity scouts, there is being developed some nobler sympathy also with them—this, at least, it must be admitted, is certainly not owing to any doctrine in Christianism that can be paralleled in Osirianism.

3. The considerations thus suggested on the 'Idolatry' and on the 'Animal-Worship' of the Egyptians, may, I trust, prepare us candidly now to consider the more essential doctrines of Osirianism—those dotrines which are so remarkably similar to the great dogmas of Christianism. And with respect to what the great religious doctrines of the Egyptians really were, we are not now in any doubt. For one of the grandest achievements of Modern Science[1] has been the translation of their Funereal Ritual, the 'Todtenbuch,' or 'Book of the Dead,' as Lepsius called it, or as it calls itself, the 'Departure into Light.'[2] It belongs to

[1] 'The interpretation of the extinct languages of Egypt and Central Asia will ever rank as one of the distinguishing features of the nineteenth century.'—Birch, in Bunsen's *Egypt's Place*, vol. v. p. ix.

[2] Or 'Manifestation to Light,' according to Champollion and Dr. Birch. The complete translation by the latter was only published with the fifth volume of Bunsen's *Egypt* in 1867. But I had with me at Thebes the previous volumes, besides Wilkinson's *Ancient Egyptians* and other works; and I had the advantage of perusing and making copious extracts from the translation of an American Egyptologer who was residing at Luxor. Even Dr Birch's translation, however, must be considered as representing the state of hieroglyphical knowledge rather twenty years ago than now—so long was its publication, owing to various causes, delayed. The translation of the 'Todtenbuch,' to which students

Bunsen's fourth class of those Sacred Books which would form collectively the Bible of the ancient Egyptians, and is scarcely posterior to 3,000 years before our era.[1] For, as Bunsen points out, we have a very remarkable proof that the origin of the prayers and hymns of this Ritual belongs probably to the Pre-Menite Dynasty of Abydos, between 3100 and 4500 B.C., in the fact that we find one of these hymns,[2] not in its original simplicity, but already mixed up with glosses and commentaries, inscribed on the coffin of Queen Mentuhept of the eleventh dynasty. This monumental text agrees with the printed text of the Turin papyrus. And though the first year of the eleventh dynasty, which lasted forty-three years, cannot be placed earlier than 2782 B.C.;[3] yet, if we consider the many stages that must have been passed through, before the original hymn, learned by heart, and recited from memory, became mixed-up with scholia in an undivided sacred text, we cannot but date its composition and primitive use many centuries anterior to that dynasty in which we find it thus embedded in explanations. This hymn implies not only the worship of Osiris, but the whole system of doctrines connected with his redeeming life on Earth, and judicial office in Heaven. Yet an antiquity, even greater than is thus witnessed-to, we are obliged to assign to Osirianism, by the fact that the Osiris-myth itself mentions

must now refer, is that by Brugsch, now in course of publication. My references, however, here, will be to Dr. Birch's Translation, as probably more accessible to the majority of readers.

[1] Bunsen, *Egypt's Place*, vol. iv. p. 646.

[2] It forms chapter xvii. of the Ritual. See Birch's translation in *Egypt's Place*, vol. v. pp. 172–80.

[3] Compare *Egypt's Place*, vol. v. pp. 29, 88, and 94.

'Byblus (Gebal in Phœnicia) as the place where Isis brought up the young Osiris.'[1] And this derivation from Asia is further confirmed by the universally admitted identity of 'the fundamental ideas of the worship, and sacred ceremonials of Adonis and Osiris.'[2] To the very earliest period, then, of the history of Humanity, as the history of Thought, we must carry back the ideas of the Osirian Faith. And yet, we may possibly find in the sequel, that it is but a transformed Osirianism that, to this day, dominates Christendom.

4. Considered as a whole, the 'Departure into Light' is a revelation in something of an epic, and even occasionally dramatic form of the departure of the Soul into the Other-world, of its judgment, and of what is required of it, in order to its final beatific reception by its Father Osiris. Its formularies may, perhaps, best be arranged under such heads as the following:—I. General Address. II. Address to each of the Forty-two Assessors. III. Announcement of Justification. IV. Telling the names of different parts of the Temple. V. Blessings, &c.[3] According to Egyptian notions, it was 'essentially an inspired work; and the term Hermetic, so often applied by profane writers to these books, in reality means inspired. It is Thoth himself who speaks, and reveals the will of the Gods, and the mysterious nature of divine things to man.'[4] Portions of them are expressly stated to have been written by

[1] *Egypt's Place*, vol. IV. p. 347. [2] *Ibid.*

[3] Compare Birch's introduction to his translation, *Egypt's Place*, vol. V.

[4] *Ibid.* p. 133.

the very finger of Thoth himself, and to have been the composition of a great God.[1] And in this, it may be noted by the way, that we see an illustration of what, in the Introduction, was pointed out as one of the general characteristics of the First Age of Humanity, namely, the authorlessness, for the most part, of its Literature, and its attribution to supernatural sources. But sacred this Ritual was also esteemed as 'assuring to the soul a passage from the Earth; a transit through the purgatory and other regions of the Dead; the entrance into the Empyreal Gate, by which the souls arrived at the presence of God, typified by the Sun; the admission into the Bark, or Orb of the Sun, ever traversing in brilliant light the liquid ether; and protection from the various Liers-in-wait, or Adversaries, who sought to accuse, destroy, or detain it in its passage, or destiny.'[2] In this most ancient book of the Osirian Scriptures there is, no doubt, not only a vast mass of unintelligible ritualistic allusions, but evidence of gross superstition. Not, however, without evidence of this, are also the Christian Scriptures. And it must be borne in mind that the Osirian Bible had not the good fortune to be, in the formation of its canon, purged, as was the Christian, of impurer, apocryphal elements. Yet, notwithstanding this misfortune, the religious tone of the Osirian Ritual is such as the following brief extracts may serve, though inadequately, to illustrate.

5. Very touching are some of the expressions in

[1] See chapter lxiv., rubric.

[2] Birch in *Egypt's Place*, vol. v. p. 134.

which the Departed calls on Osiris to save him from his Accusers, from the Lake of Fire, and from the Tormentors. Addressing these with the noble boldness of great faith, 'Says Osiris Anfanch . . . while you strive against me, your acts against me are against Osiris. . . . . To strive against me, is as against Osiris.' Again. 'Let me come, having seen and passed, having passed the Gate to see my Father Osiris. I have made way through the darkness to my Father Osiris. I am his beloved. I stab the heart of Sut. I do the things of my Father Osiris. I have opened every door in heaven and earth. I am his beloved son. I have come from the mummy, an instructed spirit.' And again. 'Says Osiris Anfanch, save me, as thou savest what belongs to thy word; catch me up; the Lord is God, there is but one God for me (or, before the Lord of Mankind, there is but one Lord for me).' A passage, this, which is but one of many[1] proving the monotheism of the better instructed, or more deeply thinking of those whom the narrow ignorance of that Creed propagated by the Galilæan Fishermen sets down as 'idolatrous heathens.' He who is thus represented as speaking in a certain stage of his progress to the region of 'Sacred Rèpose,' is more particularly described in the beginning of some papyri as 'Osiris Anfanch of the true faith, born of the lady Souhenchem of fair fame.' The prefix to the man's name of that of God himself is the 'new name' which every true believer receives after death. In other passages the good man is even spoken

[1] See below, Chap. IV. Sect iii.

of as an Osiris. 'The Osiris lives, after he dies, like the sun daily; for as the sun dies, and is born in the morning, so the Osiris dies.' And finally, as to that immortality which is so ignorantly imagined to have been 'brought to light by the Gospel,' the Osiris exclaims in another passage: 'I do not die again in the Region of Sacred Repose.' And again. 'Whosoever does what belongs to him, visibly (individually?) his soul participates in Life Eternal.' And again. 'Plait for thyself a garland . . . . thy life is everlasting.'

6. But it is the central doctrine of Osirianism that more particularly claims our attention. 'The peculiar character of Osiris,' says Sir Gardner Wilkinson, 'his coming upon Earth for the benefit of mankind, with the title of "Manifester of Good" and "Revealer of Truth;" his being put to death by the malice of the Evil One; his Burial and Resurrection, and his becoming the Judge of the Dead, are the most interesting features of the Egyptian Religion. This was the great mystery; and this myth and his worship were of the earliest times and universal in Egypt.'[1] And, with this central doctrine of Osirianism, so perfectly similar to that of Christianism, doctrines are associated precisely analogous to those associated in Christianism with its central doctrine.[2] In ancient Osirianism, as in modern Christianism, the Godhead is conceived as a Trinity, yet are the three Gods declared

[1] *Ancient Egyptians* (Popular Edition), vol. i. p. 331. Compare Second Series of the larger work, vol. i. p. 320.

[2] See below, Sect. iii., for the proofs that such doctrines were associated with the central doctrine as to the character of Osiris.

to be only one God. In ancient Osirianism, as in modern Christianism, we find the worship of a Divine Mother and Child. In ancient Osirianism, as in modern Christianism, there is a doctrine of Atonement. In ancient Osirianism, as in modern Christianism, we find the vision of a Last Judgment, and Resurrection of the Body. And finally, in ancient Osirianism, as in modern Christianism, the sanctions of morality are a Lake of Fire and tormenting Demons, on the one hand, and, on the other, Eternal Life in the presence of God. Is it possible, then, that such similarities of doctrine should not raise the most serious questions as to the relation of the beliefs about Christ to those about Osiris; as to the cause of this wonderful similarity of the doctrines of Christianism to those of Osirianism; nay, as to the possibility of the whole doctrinal system of Modern Orthodoxy being but a transformation of the Osiris-myth? But if so—you logically argue with amazed incredulity—all the most sacred dogmas of the Christian faith would be proved to have originated but in the influence of a 'heathen' religion—a religion over the scenes of which we Christians ordinarily pass with the most complacent contempt? Nay, if so; if the doctrines of Christianism had but such an origin; must not Christian 'Revelation' be acknowledged utterly worthless to prove the reality of any one of the supernatural facts which its doctrines affirm—even a Personal Immortality, for instance, or a Personal God?

7. Well, be the consequences what they may, we must find out what is the fact. And there is cer-

tainly no escape in the desperate hypothesis to which the manifestly Christian character of Osirianism has driven some to have recourse—the hypothesis that these doctrines of Osirianism were, somehow or other, themselves a 'supernatural revelation.' For the discovery of Osirianism is the discovery of the missing link between Christianism and Heathenism generally, the religions of the First Age of Humanity, or what I have termed Naturianism. It has hitherto appeared not only a crime but a blunder, not merely a blasphemy but a frivolity, to compare the Christian doctrines of the Trinity, of the Incarnation, and of the Death and Resurrection of Christ with the similar doctrines of Naturian Religions. But the doctrines of a Trinity, of an Incarnation, and of the Death and Resurrection of a God-man are developed in Osirianism with such gravity, such moral purity, and such splendour, that we cannot hesitate to honour them by a comparison with these doctrines as developed in Christianism. Yet, from Osirianism the gradation is so gentle through the whole series of Nature-worships down to the lowest, that, having compared the story and worship of Christ with the worship and myth of Osiris, we find ourselves necessarily comparing the Christian story and worship with the worship and myth of Dionysus, nay, of Adonis, and of Thammuz,—of Thammuz,

> Whose annual wound in Lebanon allured
> The Syrian damsels to lament his fate,
> In amorous ditties all a summer's day.[1]

And hence if, to support the common belief in the

[1] Milton, *Paradise Lost.*

supernatural origin of Christianism, it is concluded that the manifestly similar and unquestionably earlier doctrines of Osirianism had a supernatural origin; then, as we thus find it impossible to draw a line separating the highest of the Heathen religions from the lowest, a supernatural origin must also be supposed for all those Heathen religions in which we find—and where do we not find?—the story of a divine man dying, and—though but to rise again—'in amorous ditties' annually lamented.[1] But so great are the interests at stake, that even an hypothesis so wild as this, it may be attempted to defend. For, as has just been pointed-out, if these Heathen beliefs in the incarnation of a God-man, and in Heaven and Hell, have no sort of supernatural authority; and if Osirianism is, indeed, the missing link that connects Christianism with every one of these religions; what authority is there for the objective reality of any one of those supernatural existences, belief in which is thus found to be common to Christianism, and Heathenism generally? An attempt, therefore, will doubtless be made to prove the supernatural and divine origin of Heathenism. And truly, when we recall Christian denunciations of, and missions to the 'Heathen;' when we find that the essential doctrines of 'Heathenism' are, just as in Christianism, a Trinity, an Incarnation, and a Future State of Reward and Punishment; hence that—as such doctrines can have no guarantee of objective reality, except they have had a supernatural origin—*all* must have had such an origin,

[1] Λῆγε γόων, Κυθέρεια, τὸ σήμερον ἴσχεο κομμῶν.
Δεῖ σε πάλιν κλαῦσαι, πάλιν εἰς ἔτος ἄλλο δακρῦσαι.
Bion, *Epitaph. Adon.*

or none; and hence that, to guarantee the validity of their own beliefs, Christians must maintain the divine origin of those of Heathenism; there is seen such a profound and tragic irony in the situation that we become more than ever attached to the study of that sublime Drama—the history of Man.

8. Any hope, however, of establishing a theory of the supernatural origin of the doctrines of Osirianism, how 'Christian' soever they may be, has had, I trust the ground cut from under it, by the facts in the foregoing chapter brought together in explanation of these doctrines as *myths*. For, before any theory of the supernatural origin of these doctrines can be maintained, the facts must be met which were in the foregoing chapter summarised as explanatory of the origin of the myths of Naturianism. These facts were, as will be remembered, first, those which define the character of the spontaneity of Mind; secondly, the facts of the conditions under which this spontaneity worked in primæval societies; and thirdly, those explanations of modern spiritist conceptions which confirm the theory by which we explain the origin of primitive spiritist conceptions. Before any rational attempt, therefore, any attempt worthy of scientific notice, can be made to account for the Christian character of the doctrines of Osirianism, and of the other 'Heathen' religions, by attributing to them some sort of supernatural origin in a 'primitive revelation;' these three great classes of facts, psychological, economical, and physio-psychological, in the foregoing chapter summarised, must be shown to be, not only severally, but

jointly inadequate to explain, as not only of a natural, but as of a very low natural origin, the formation of such doctrines as those which give to Osirianism its Christian character. Nor are these the only facts which must be met before a scientific hearing even can be gained for any hypothesis that would give to the doctrines, whether Christian or Osirian, of a Trinity, a life, death, and resurrection of a God-man, and an Other-world of Reward and Punishment, any sort of supernatural origin, and hence any degree of authoritative sanction. For besides the great classes of facts just-specified, those also must be met which, in proving the conception of Mutual Determination to be the true and ultimate conception of Causation, show such hypotheses, as this of a supernatural origin of these doctrines, to belong properly only to, or to be derived from, the earlier, and more ignorant stages of men's knowledge of the relations of things. And seeing that these facts have not as yet been met by any of the arguers for the supernatural origin; and therefore authoritative truth of theological doctrines; we must conclude that if, similar though the doctrines of Christianism are to the myths of Osirianism, and of Naturianism generally, a special and independent origin *cannot* be proved for them; they were but derived from, or but transformations of these myths, and therefore that belief in them has, at bottom, no diviner sanction than the labour-driven ignorance and priest-ridden servility which—resulting from the economical conditions under which mental spontaneities originally worked—led to what were but the mere

subjective fictions of the myth-creating imagination being taken for objective realities. Our hypothesis, as it first presented itself, was, simply, that the similarity of the doctrines of Osirianism to those of Christianism was such as to be naturally explained only by showing that the earlier, importantly influenced the development of the later Creed. But we now see that, if it is to such an origin that the doctrines of Christianism are to be traced, we cannot stop here. If the Christian doctrines of the Trinity, Incarnation, and Other-world, are in any way to be derived from the myths of Osirianism, or generally, of Naturianism; they had in these myths but their proximate origin. Their ultimate origin must, therefore, have been identical with the origin of these myths; and like that to be found but in those base conditions, in the foregoing chapter set forth, of primitive spiritist conceptions.

9. Unquestionably, the verification of an hypothesis which, to such an origin as this, would trace the myths of Christianity, is of the very gravest import. For it is almost incredibly tragical, that the sorrow of a Milton, for instance, in meditating on the death of Christ, had—so far as that sorrow was occasioned by the thought of a divine person, an incarnate God, who had come voluntarily on earth for the good of mankind—no more ground of actual objective fact than the lamentations of the Syrian damsels, whom the great Christian poet, all unconscious of being himself the victim of a similar bitter-sweet delusion, scornfully represents as, 'in amorous ditties,' bewailing such a fiction of their own imaginations as a Thammuz or Adonis. And yet, if

we consider the hypothesis here suggested, on the Temple-roof at Karnak, in relation to our Ultimate Law of History, we shall see that such an origin as we have here been led to suppose for the doctrines of Christianism—we shall see that a transformation of the myths of Naturianism in such doctrines as those of Christianism—is but a deduction from our Ultimate Law, and a deduction, the verification of which will be one of the most important verifications of that Law. For, of that Law the great central affirmation is, that the passage from the earlier to the later mode of conceiving Causation is through a transitional age marked by the differentiation of Subjective and Objective; a differentiation implying a great development of individuality, of subjectivity, of morality; but not a differentiation implying anything more than greater abstractness merely in the primitive spiritist conception of Causation. But if so, then it will evidently follow that the spiritist beliefs which have dominated the First Age of Humanity, will not be destroyed, but only undergo a *moral* transformation. And what is it that we find in the doctrines of Christianism but just this—all the old myths of Osirianism revived in such an identical fashion *intellectually*, that, —put but Christ for Osiris,—and the general description of the one creed is an accurate description of the other? Only in the moral spirit of Christianism is there a change. But this is just what, from our Ultimate Law of History, we should expect to find; and the fact, therefore, which can be for it but a most important verification. This changed moral spirit,

however, in no way affects the objective-validity of the myths in which it is expressed. These continue to be but a *language*; a language in which other sentiments were expressed before Christianity; and a language which, after Christianity, will still survive for the expression of ideal emotion. And shocking though to some may be the thought of the utter unreality of the supernatural beings affirmed by Christianism, as by Osirianism; such is the spectacle here, at Karnak, presented, of the sublime tragedy of Human Existence; that, if it is in any degree duly felt, it will be impossible for one to shrink from clearly stating to oneself the truth, however destructive it may be. As other Ideals have perished, so,—it would be presumptuous to deny, —may ours. Very far are we from being the first who have experienced the agony of discovered delusion.

SECTION II.

MESSIAHISM, THE OSIRIS-MYTH, AND JESUS.

1. It is, then, as a deduction from our Ultimate Law of History that we have now to verify the hypothesis originally suggested here, at Karnak, as to the origin of the doctrines, or, as we must now call them, the myths of Christianity, and hence, as to the cause of the Christian development of Religion. Our original hypothesis, an induction from the fact of the Christian character, in an intellectual point of view, of Osirian-

ism, simply was, that the later, must have been importantly influenced in its development by the earlier creed. But considering this hypothesis in its relation to our Ultimate Law of History, it has become developed into a general theory which affirms that the transformation of the myths of Naturianism, in a moral religion like Christianism, was the necessary consequence of such a revolution as that which, as verification of one of the first deductions from our Ultimate Law, we have discovered in the Sixth Century B.C. It is this general theory, therefore, that we have now to verify, or rather to sketch the general outlines of the method of verifying; and this, as I have pointed-out in the Introduction, not merely for the sake of explaining the origin of Christianity, but for the sake of the most definite and concrete verification, that suggests itself, of our Ultimate Law. How, then, are we to proceed in such a verification? Consider it. Our General Historical Law is, and can be, Ultimate only inasmuch as it expresses the Law of History as a Law of Thought. Hence, to verify any such concrete deduction from this Law as a moral transformation of the myths of Naturianism, we must not only actually discover such a transformation, but explain it in accordance with our general conception of Causation in its subjective aspect. And this, for two reasons. In the first place, if historical phenomena are to be explained as manifestations of a Law of Thought, we must evidently put ourselves at the subjective or inward point of view, and explain these phenomena from the action of certain external conditions on certain

internal spontaneities. Secondly, if an explanation is to verify our Historical Law, it must verify not only our special deduction from it, whatever that may be, but also its concluding affirmation, namely, that the conception of Mutual Determination is the true conception of Causation. But our conception of Causation, in its subjective aspect, fulfils both these conditions. For it puts us, at once, at the internal point of view required, and it defines, in this aspect, our general conception of Mutual Determination. What, therefore, must be our procedure in verifying the deduction of such a religion as Christianism from such a verified deduction as the Revolution of the Sixth Century B.C. is now clear. It must be founded on that principle of Correlation which we have stated as defining, in its subjective aspect, the conception of Causation as Mutual Determination.

2. That principle, equally applicable, if true, to individual, and to historical Thought-origins, was, it will be recollected, stated in these terms:—*Every Sequence is the Satisfaction of a correlatively determined Want of Oneness.* And hence, if our procedure is to be founded on this principle, Christianism must be regarded as, and shown to be, the satisfaction of certain moral wants in clothing themselves with a form the most suitable of all those derivable from the intellectual conditions of the time; and further, it must be shown that these moral wants were none other than those generally characteristic of that Revolution which verifies the second deduction from our Ultimate Law. Thus, as may already have occurred to the reader, our

problem is found to be not only a problem of the origin of Mental Species, but a problem, the solution of which is sought in an explanation analogous to that given of the origin of Natural Species by the facts generalised in the Law of the Conditions of Existence. And necessarily so. For our principle of Correlation is but an expression, in relation to phenomena subjectively viewed, of the very same conception of Mutual Determination of which our principle of Coexistence is an expression in relation to phenomena objectively viewed; and this principle of Coexistence, if our brief exposition of it in the Introduction has been in any degree adequate, will have been seen to be, at once, a more definite and a more general expression of the Law of the Conditions of Existence, and hence of the Darwinian theory of Natural Selection.[1] For, if Existences determine their Coexistences, they must have in them a principle of Permanence and Heredity; and if Existences are determined by their Coexistences, they must be characterised also by Variability. From such reciprocal action Natural Selection will result as the survival of the Existence most in harmony with its Coexistences in the struggle caused by Multiplication.[2] And hence, new species will become explicable as Existences, the Variations of which have stood the test of the eliminating power of Selection, have been accumulated by Multiplication, and fixed by Heredity. Now, our principle of Correlation is, as has

[1] Compare Darwin, *Origin of Species*, pp. 206, 489–490.

[2] See Spencer, *Principles of Biology*, vol. II. Part vi.—*The Laws of Multiplication*; and Carpenter, *Principles of Physiology*, p. 529 (3rd edition), as cited by Mr. Spencer, *Ibid.* p. 439.

been said, but an expression in relation to mental phenomena of the conception of which the principle of Coexistence is an expression in relation to natural phenomena. And in thus pointing-out that, from this principle of Coexistence may be derived the principles, incomparably the most successful in the explanation of Natural Origins,' I trust that favour may be bespoken for that principle, its subjective correlate, by which we would explain Mental Origins generally, and here, one of the most important of these—Christianism.

3. Founding, then, on this principle of Correlation, and hence,[1] conceiving the cause of Mental Origins generally as a Correlatively determined Want of Oneness, we have—in attempting to explain the origin of Christianity in accordance herewith, and as a verification of our Ultimate Law of History—to show, not only that, in facts of the moral and intellectual Condition of certain Individuals, there was an adequate cause of such a myth as that of Christ *originating*; but further, that, in facts of the moral and intellectual Condition of cotemporary Society, there was an adequate cause of such a myth as that of Christ *taking*. For we must never forget that historical phenomena, if always social, and therefore to be accounted for only from great social causes, are no less always individual; hence, not to be truly accounted for except from the interaction of individual and social forces; and hence, further, that explanation of historical phenomena must ever have, as twofold basis, an individual, and a social psychology. But moral and intellectual Con-

[1] See above, Introd., Sect. III. Subs. i. p. 166.

ditions, whether Individual or Social, can be rightly understood only in relation to the great general movement of the Historical Period of which we happen to be considering a special moment. Our facts, therefore, will naturally arrange themselves in three classes. First, Historical Facts; or facts of the general movement of the Period immediately preceding the origin of Christianism. Secondly, Social Facts; or facts of the general state of Society at the time at which Christianism originated. And thirdly, Individual Facts; or facts of the life, character, and relations of the persons whom Christianism originated with. The main social facts I have desired briefly to indicate by the words which stand at the head of this subsection—Messiahism, the Osiris-myth, and Jesus. For these words, I would have understood as symbolising, the first, the general moral wants of which Christianism was the satisfaction; the second, the most powerfully determining of the intellectual conditions under which Christianism originated; and the third, the character of the persons by whom the facts of the life of Jesus of Nazareth were told and travestied. In the following paragraphs, however, I propose only to give a few illustrations of the facts which might be stated under each of these three heads. Nor will any new facts be brought forward. What I aim at, and hope to accomplish, is merely to show that if known facts are rightly combined and truly presented, they bring home, with irresistible force, the conclusion that the doctrines of Christianism had their origin in but a moral and, considering the facts of the Sixth Century Revolution, a necessary

moral transformation of the myths of Naturianism; and hence that, in the conditions of this transformation, is to be found the cause of the Christian development of Religion.

4. Now, the first of the above-distinguished three classes of facts from which an explanation of the origin of Christianism, as the most definite concrete verification of our Ultimate Law of History, is to be derived, is, as I have said, made up of the facts indicative of the character of the general movement of the Period immediately preceding the origin of Christianism. Of the facts, then, of this first class, let me now proceed to instance a few of the more characteristic. And, first of all, it has to be observed that Christianism originated at the close of a great five-hundred-year-long movement at once of moral and intellectual development, and of social disorganisation. For, as I have in the Introduction pointed-out, as the verification of one of the main general deductions from our Ultimate Law, there had occurred in the sixth century before Christ, a vast Revolution embracing all the civilized peoples of the Earth; a revolution, at once moral, intellectual, and social; a revolution, of which the unity is even more striking than the simultaneity of its diverse movements. For each and all of the new religions, or reformations of religion, distinctive of this revolution in its moral aspect, were marked by a greater simplicity at once and grandeur of intellectual conception; each and all of them were distinguished by a greater breadth of fraternal sentiment, and purity of moral idea; and

each and all of them were directly opposed to the universally prevalent idolatries of mythological Naturianism. These were all similar, and hence, indeed, one of the chief causes of the unity of this great revolution; the practical aims of its diverse movements being thus determined by similar conditions. But further, the philosophical movement showed, more and more clearly as it progressed, the same general character and tendency as the religious movement, in its relation to the idolatrous Nature-worships. Yet, great as was the intellectual revolution, there was no power in it to raise, in any considerable degree, the general level of *popular* intelligence. And this non-effect of it we shall presently find to be an element no less worthy of consideration with reference to the origin of Christianism than the positive effects of this great Pre-Christian Revolution. Similar to the tendencies of the moral and intellectual, were those also of the social revolution, and of the establishment of that world-empire of Persia, through the conquests of Cyrus and his son Cambyses, which was followed, before the close of the period by the world-empires of Alexander and Greece, of Cæsar and Rome. For these all tended to the disintegration of the old national idolatries, and to the formation of sentiments of all-embracing fraternity.

5. In illustration of the general movement of the Pre-Christian, or what I have distinguished as the Classical Period, I would point out more particularly how the Revolution of the Sixth Century and the establishment of the first World-empire affected Egypt. It was not a

native prophet, as in China, India, and Palestine; but a Persian conqueror who first brought Osirianism visibly within the sweep of the transforming influences of the widest, perhaps, and most far-reaching of known revolutions. For Cyrus, the founder of the Persian Empire, had resolved to complete his magnificent scheme of world-conquest by avenging Asia on Egypt for the many victorious raids that had, in former times, issued from this hundred-gated Thebes and other Egyptian capitals. But he was suddenly called to his north-eastern frontier, and falling there in battle (529 B.C.) with an uncertain barbarian tribe,[1] had to bequeath the completion of his designs to his equally ambitious, but unequally capable son. So Cambyses sought for a pretext to invade and conquer Egypt. This, at length, he found, when the maiden who had been sent him by the King of Egypt, in reply to his insolent demand of the king's daughter as a secondary wife, astonished him, in the midst of an embrace, with the assurance that he had been duped, and that she was not really the king's daughter he imagined.[2] And war, therefore, a war of Asia with Egypt, was forthwith diligently prepared. What a fine humorousness such personal incidents have amid those vast historical forces of which the individual actors in the great drama are all unconscious! After four years of preparation, Egypt was at length, in 525 B.C., invaded by the Persian monarch, lord of Asia. Amasis was now dead; so it was, as so often happens, on his innocent

[1] Rawlinson, *Ancient Eastern Monarchies*, vol. IV. p. 378.
[2] Herodotus, III. i.

successor that retribution fell; and, in a great battle before Memphis, he was irretrievably defeated. But the Persians, though, as Zoroastrians, opposed to idolatry, were ordinarily as tolerant to conquered peoples, as magnanimous to deposed kings. So, it should seem to have been mainly through what is called accident that this Zoroastrian conquest of Egypt seriously affected Osirianism. For, his capacity being unequal to his ambition, the expeditions of Cambyses from Thebes here, eastwards to the great Oasis, and southwards to Ethiopia, miscarried; and the Egyptians, taking heart, rebelled. Then it seems to have appeared to him politic, as it must undoubtedly have been pleasant, to vent his disappointment and rage in unusual severities on the leaders, and unusual outrages on the religion of the rebellious, though vanquished, people. And so, he not only had their King executed, but stabbed, with his own hand, their Calf—'the sacred calf believed to be incarnate Apis; the body of priests, who had the animal in charge, he ordered to be publicly scourged; he stopped the Apis-festival by making participation in it a capital offence; he opened the receptacles of the dead, and curiously examined the bodies contained in them; he intruded himself into the chief sanctuary at Memphis, and publicly scoffed at the grotesque image of Phtha; finally, not content with outraging in the same way, the inviolable temple of the Cabeiri, he wound up his insults by ordering that their images should be burnt.'[1] After this came

[1] Rawlinson, *Ancient Eastern Monarchies*, vol. II. p. 390. Evidences of the hostility of the Zoroastrian, or Mazdayaçnian, to the Osirian

the wars of Persia with Greece, and the return-wars of Greece with Persia. And at length, in 332 B.C., the Persian Satrap Mazakês surrendered Memphis to the avenger of Greece, Alexander the Great, hailed by the Egyptians as a deliverer, rather than submitted to as a conqueror.[1] To him succeeded the Greek dynasty of the Ptolemies, till in 30 B.C., Cleopatra, content with enthralling Cæsar, let her country be enthralled by the Romans. Seven hundred years after (640 A.D.) came the conquest by the Arabs. And Osirianism having now, as I hope in the end to prove, become Christianism, Egypt became Mohammedan.

6. But note further, in illustration of the general social movement of the Pre-Christian or Classical Period, the fact that, and the way in which, Egypt and Greece, Osirian Mythology and Hellenic Philosophy, now came into contact. A silent and unobserved, but ultimately far more powerful cause of the transformation of Osirianism than was the Persian Conquest, had been unconsciously set in operation, nearly a century before. For towards the end of the seventh century, B.C. Psammetichus procured the aid, against his rivals of the Dodekarchy, of Greek mercenaries, Ionians, and Karians, whom he established on the Pelusiac or eastern branch of the Nile, at a place called Stratopeda, or the Camps;[2] and he further permitted the settlement of

religion are still to be seen in sculptures in which the human figure of the Sun is absent, and his disk represented without the Egyptian wings and asps, but sending forth many-handed rays, after the manner of the Persians.—Sharpe, *Egyptian Mythology*, p. 70.

[1] Arrian, III. 1, 3; Curtius, IV. 7, 1, 2; Diodorus, XVII. 49.

[2] Herodotus, II. 154.

Greek merchants at Naukratis, on the right bank of the Kanôpic Nile.[1] But when a country is once opened up to traders, there speedily follow travellers, philosophers, and poets. And so, when Naukratis had become a Greek port, there came to Egypt, with many others less illustrious, and as we can, with more or less certainty in respect to each, affirm, that long line of Greek poets, philosophers, and travellers which includes the names of Alkæus, Thales, Solon, Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Herodotus, and Plato.[2] Mr. Grote, therefore, may well say that 'the opening of the Nile by Psammetichus constitutes an epoch in Hellenic thought.'[3] But no less of an epoch was it in Egyptian belief. For the very fact of such 'liberalism,' evinced as it further was by the offering which the son of Psammetichus, Nekôs, on his victory at Megiddo over Josiah, king of Judah, made to the Milesian Temple of Apollo,[4] and the donations of his later successor, Amasis, to Delphi and other Grecian temples[5]—the very fact of such 'liberalism' showed a portentous change, not only in the policy of the Egyptian government, but in the religion which had hitherto been the life of the Egyptian civilization.[6] And with Amasis, in fact, ends the history of ancient Egypt. Within six months of his death, came the

[1] See Grote, *History of Greece*, vol. II. pp. 496–7, with respect to the apparently conflicting statements of Herodotus, and of Strabo.

[2] See Diogen. Laer.; and compare Brandis, *Geschichte der Philosophie*; and as to Plato particularly, b. II. ss. 141 flg.

[3] *History of Greece*, vol. II. p. 507.

[4] Herodotus, II. 159.

[5] *Ibid.* 181.

[6] Compare Sharpe, *Egyptian Mythology*, ch. ii. as to the earlier influence of the Phœnicians in modifying the religion of Lower Egypt.

Persian Conquest, and thereafter, as we have just seen, the successive conquests of the Greeks, the Romans, and the Arabs. But the foregoing facts show us that, though the Revolution of the Sixth Century first came visibly in contact with Osirianism through the Persian Conquest, it had its action already prepared for by, or rather, is itself already seen working in the phil-Hellenic sympathies of the later native sovereigns of Egypt. And there is an incident connected with the first settlement of Greeks at Naukratis which enables us with a delightful vividness to realise that opening of the Nile to Greek merchants which had such immensely important historical consequences. Charaxus coming, among the first,[1] to Naukratis, with a cargo of wine, became so enamoured of the beautiful Thracian hetaira, Doricha, usually called 'Rosy-cheeks' (Ῥοδῶπις), recently brought here by a Samian merchant named Zanthês, that she got from him all his gains; she, once the fellow-slave of 'Æsop the fable-writer,'[2] continuing successfully her trade with the traders, ultimately became wealthy, and so, as still happens, turned religious;[3] and he, returning to Mitylênê, was greatly ridiculed for his losses in a famous song,[4] by

[1] 'We can hardly,' says Mr. Grote, citing Clinton and Ulrici, 'put the age of Sapphó lower than 600–580 B.C.'—*History of Greece*, vol. II. p. 505, n.

[2] Herodotus, II. 134.

[3] 'Rosy-cheeks,' when she became 'good,' devoted a tenth of her fortune to purchasing for the oracle at Delphi a great number of spits for roasting oxen whole. An odd gift. Could it have had any connection in her mind with memories of the men who, at her 'oracle,' had been roasted whole?

[4] 'A song,' says Mr. Grote, as above cited, 'which doubtless Herodotus knew, and which gives to the whole anecdote a complete authenticity.' See Athenæus, *Deipn.* XIII. 596.

his sister—she whom the ancients called '*the* Poetess,' as Homer they called '*the* Poet'—Sapphô.

7. As illustrations of our first class of facts, those indicative of the character of the general historical movement of the Pre-Christian Period, the foregoing must here suffice. And we now pass on to our second class of facts—those, namely, indicative of general Social Conditions, moral, intellectual, and political, at the time of the origin of Christianism. Now the first, and for us the most important of the facts indicative of the character of the Moral Forces, amid which that transformation was effected of the myths of Naturianism, which we find in Christianism, is the change in Jehovianism witnessed to by the development of the Messianic notions of the later Hebrew Literature. These visionary speculations should seem to have originated on the disruption of the kingdoms of Israel and Judah after the temporary union of the Hebrew tribes under David and Solomon, and the general and irretrievable decline of the Jewish state. The influence of Zoroastrianism, with its moral Dualism, and elaborate theory of the Spirit-world, should seem, in no inconsiderable degree, to have determined the development of these Messianic notions during two centuries of dependency on Persian masters. And, increased only in fervour by the misfortunes of the people, and the successive insults of Assyrian, Macedonian, and Roman conquerors, these unvanquishable hopes, which had, about a century and a half before, taken more definite form in the books attributed to the ancient prophets Daniel and Enoch, were at their top of expectation in the genera-

tion cotemporary with Jesus.[1] But it is the changed spirit of Judaism that is most remarkable in these Messianic dreams, and the cotemporary Jewish Literature. And of this we have now the most ample evidence in our fuller knowledge of the Talmud. For such terms as 'Redemption,' 'Baptism,' 'Grace,' 'Faith,' 'Salvation,' 'Regeneration,' 'Son of Man,' 'Son of God,' 'Kingdom of Heaven,' were not, as we have hitherto ignorantly believed, invented by Christianity, but were household words of Talmudical Judaism. No less loud and bitter than in the Gospel, are, in the Talmud, the protests against 'lipserving,' against 'making the law a burden to the people,' against 'laws that hang on hairs,' against 'priests and pharisees.' And 'the Ethics of the Talmud and of the Christian development of Judaism are, in their broad outlines, identical.'[2]

8. But, secondly, not to speak at present of the high moral sentiment, and inwardness or subjectivity characteristic of the Eastern development of the great

[1] 'The real origin of the conception of a superhuman Messiah was despair of human aid combining with a more developed angelology.'—Mackay, *Progress of the Intellect*, vol. II. p. 305. And so, Dr. Davidson: 'No reward or restoration in Eternity was known. Hope could not turn in that direction. It must find comfort on Earth. And this was realised in the expectation of Messiah—a wise, righteous, and victorious king, who should restore the theocracy in its completeness, and introduce a time of prosperity and peace.'—*Introd. to the Old Testament*, vol. I. p. 2 *b*. As to the unauthenticity and the true meaning of the Messianic chapters of Isaiah (xl.–lxvi.), see Ewald, *Die Propheten des Alten Bundes*, b. II. pp. 403 *flg.* Generally as to Messiahism, see Mackay, *Progress of the Intellect*, vol. II. ch. vi., vii., and viii.; Ewald, *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, b. VIII.; and Renan, *Vie de Jésus*, ch. I. See also above, *Introd.* Sect. III. Subs. iii.

[2] See Deutsch, *The Talmud*. *Quarterly Review*, vol. CXXII. (1867), pp. 437 *flg.*

Sixth Century Revolution; not at present to refer more particularly to Confucianism, and to Buddhism;[1] we find even in the Classic Literature of Greece and of Rome such a higher morality and more comprehensive feeling of human brotherhood, that the changed Judaism of the later Hebrew Scriptures, and of the Talmud, can have a supernatural character assigned to it only by the folly of ignorance, or the falsehood of priestcraft. The Messianic dreams of the Jews were but the most definite and intense form of universally prevalent apocalyptic visions.[2] In part, this was caused by the spread throughout the world of the immemorial Zoroastrian conceptions of History as the conflict of a Good and Evil Principle, a conflict which, after 'latter days' of terrible calamities, issues, at length, in a period of millennial peace, and the final triumph of Ahura-mazda. Partly, these unlimited hopes were the result of the great era of peace on which the world had entered under Augustus Cæsar, and of that visionary melancholy which ordinarily follows an age of revolution.[3] And the moral sentiment which, in the Greek and Roman world, accompanied these apocalyptic visions, was similar to that which we find in Jewish Messiahism. Ideas of world-conquest and of world-union had successively inspired Cyrus, at the beginning of this great revolutionary period; then, some two hundred years after, Alexander; and some two hundred years after him again, Cæsar. And

[1] See below, Chap. IV. Sect. ii.

[2] See Ewald, *Ueber die Entstehung, etc., der Sybillischen Bücher.*

[3] See Renan, *Vie de Jésus*, pp. 17–18.

now the ideas of these world-conquerors were transformed into the popular sentiments to which a great orator gave utterance in such new words and phrases, as 'Caritas Generis Humani,' 'Totius complexus Gentis Humanæ,' and 'HUMANITAS.' Refraining, at present, from commenting on these classical passages, I shall but commend them to the reflection of the reader.[1]

9. Such, then, was the immense pre-Christian moral change in Judaic Jehovianism, and in Greek and Roman Olympianism, as witnessed-to by their respective Literatures. But no less was the moral change in the other great religion of the West, Egyptian Osirianism, and this, also, as witnessed-to by its Literature—that distinguished as Hermetic. Of this Literature, however, I shall have occasion to speak farther on; and here, in illustration of the moral change in Osirianism, I shall but refer to the immensely significant fact that Osiris had gradually become a God to be feared rather than to be loved.[2] The ancient Goddess of

[1] 'Magna est enim vis HUMANITATIS: multum valet communio sanguinis.' (Cicero *Pro Rosc. Amer.* c. xxii.) 'Nihil est tam illustre, nec quod latius pateat, quam conjunctio inter homines hominum, et quasi quædam societas, et communicatio utilitatum, et ipsa CARITAS GENERIS HUMANI; quæ nata a primo satu, quo a procreatoribus nati diliguntur, et tota domus conjugio et stirpe conjungitur, serpit sensim foras, cognationibus primum, tum affinitatibus, deinde amicitiis, post vicinitatibus; tum civibus, et iis, qui publice socii atque amici sunt; deinde TOTIUS COMPLEXU GENTIS HUMANÆ, quæ animi affectio suum cuique tribuens, atque hanc, quam dico, societatem conjunctionis humanæ munifice et æque tuens, JUSTITIA dicitur; cui adjunctæ sunt pietas, liberalitas, benignitas, comitas, quæque sunt generis ejusdem.' (Idem, *De Finibus*, l. v. c. xxiii.) 'Homines quidem pereunt; ipsa HUMANITAS, ad quam homo effingitur, permanet; et hominibus laborantibus, intereuntibus illa nihil patitur.' (Seneca, *Ep.* 65.) Compare Virgil, *Ecl.* iv.; Juvenal, *Sat.* xv.; and see below, Chap. IV. Sect. ii.

[2] These changes of feeling towards particular Gods are very remarkable;

Nature, Isis, the divine Mother, with her son, Horus, often represented as a Child in his Mother's arms, had now become the chief objects of religious passion. Their worship was at its height when Antony and Cleopatra were conquered by Augustus, and Egypt became a Roman province.[1] And the conquerors were so carried away by the superstitions of the conquered, that, as Juvenal says, the painters of Rome almost lived on the Goddess Isis, just as, in later centuries, they have made their living by the Goddess Mary. Reflect now on this. Reflect on the immense change in moral sentiment indicated by such a fact as that of Osiris—once, though Judge of the Dead, addressed as 'my Father Osiris,' to whom the believer approached as a 'beloved son,'[2] being now feared; such a fact as that of Horus, once conceived as a crowned King, the avenger of his Father, being now represented as a Child in his Mother's arms, or as a Babe within the leaves of a lotus-flower; such a fact as that of worshipping, instead of a Judge of the Dead—a Child. Reflect on the precedence which Isis and Horus had now taken of Osiris, and the passionate love with which they were adored. Have we not in this worship a visible sum-

yet they have been predicted. For though Set or Typhon is commonly known as the Devil of Egyptian Mythology, Schelling (*Vorlesungen über die Mythologie*) was brought, on mere speculative grounds, to lay it down as a postulate, that 'Typhon must, at some early period, have been conceived by the Egyptians as a beneficent and powerful god.' And the fact, of which Schelling was quite unaware, is that Typhon was thus worshipped throughout all Egypt down to the 14th century B.C. See Bunsen, *Egypt's Place*, vol. IV. p. 310.

[1] Sharpe, *Egyptian Mythology*, p. 85.

[2] See above, Sect. i. p. 368.

mary, as it were, of the whole strain of moral feeling characteristic of the time—its Messianic dreams, new tender Humanitarian sentiment, and apocalyptic visions of universal Rebirth or Palingenesis? In the memorials of the Isis-and-Horus-worship, have we not the most transparent symbols of the feminine principle of that extraordinary age in which Christianism came to the birth? And as the wholly natural character of that birth becomes clear, may we not truly see in the statues and sculptures, still preserved, of Isis nursing Horus, Christianism on the knee of Nature?

10. Or, if this is not yet clear, consider next those facts indicative of the character of the Intellectual Forces of the time. We have just seen how Christian, already before Christianism, were the Moral Forces of Humanity. And the question now is, What will probably be the shape and character of those beliefs in which these Moral Forces will ultimately find the most widely captivating expression? The question can be scientifically answered only as the result of investigation of the cotemporary state and relations of philosophic speculation and vulgar belief. As to the first, then, we have to note this remarkable fact, that, in the course of its five-hundred-years' development since Thales in the Sixth Century, speculation, at first characteristically physical, had, at its culminating epoch, become metaphysical, then characteristically ethical, and was now theosophic. And this development of Speculation will, I think, be found to have been the result of the mutual action of two elements, which do not appear to have been as yet by any means adequately

studied in their relations to each other—the philosophy of Greece and the theosophy of Egypt. For Greek philosophy (as, indeed, everything else) has been hitherto studied too much *by itself*, except, indeed, we look on such study as preparatory only. But, studied as part of a great general movement, the influence that must have been, and was, directly or indirectly, exercised by characteristically Egyptian ideas on all the greatest of the Greek thinkers down to, and inclusive of Plato, becomes at once apparent. Afterwards, however, there was probably an even still more powerful reflex influence exercised by the successors of these philosophers on Egyptian thought, when Egypt became, first a Greek kingdom, and then a Roman province. Of this reflex influence further evidence has recently been discovered of the most interesting character. For though the importance of Philo, as a precursor of Christianity, has long been acknowledged, between the Hellenistic Jews and the first Gnostic sects a link was missing. It is now found in that Egyptian Literature, in part cotemporary with the Apostles, which goes under the name of Hermes Trismegistus, and which originated in the encounter of the religious doctrines of Egypt with the philosophical theories of Greece. Thence arose the theosophy which characterises the intellectual speculation with which the Classic Period ended, and the Christian began. Of these Hermetic books, particularly to be named are the *Poimandres*,[1] and the *Sermon on the Mount.* For in them, the nascent, and

[1] *Poimandres* signifies 'Shepherd of Man,' and was used to designate the Supreme Intelligence.

in them the dying beliefs meet, and give each other the hand. 'And it was right,' as their latest translator says, in concluding his introduction to them, 'it was right that they should be placed under the patronage of the God of Transitions, who explains, appeases, and reconciles; of the Conductor of Souls, who opens the gates of birth and of death; of the God of the Twilight, whose golden ring sparkles at sunset to throw worn-out races into an eternal sleep; and at sunrise, to call new generations into the agitated sphere of life.'[1]

11. Such, then, was the state of philosophic speculation. And we have now—in further considering the character of the Intellectual Forces of the time at which the old Osiris-myth became attached to Jesus of Nazareth—we have now to remark that, modified as were the heathen creeds, and weakened as was belief in them, not only in Egypt, through the Persian Conquest, and Greek Philosophy, but generally, throughout the civilized world; yet the state of popular intelligence remained the same, and as undisciplined as ever the activity of the mythic imagination. Nor is this to be wondered at. Among all the effects of the Sixth Century Revolution there was none tending to such a popularising of scientific ideas as could alone have disciplined imagination and raised the level of intelligence. And besides, as Bunsen and so many others have pointed-out, the Osiris-myth was not only not peculiar to Egypt, but was originally derived from Asia. 'Osiris,' says Bunsen, 'seems to be but the

[1] Ménard, *Hermes Trismegiste*, Introd. p. cxi.

Egyptian form of the early Asiatic idea of the Deity, sacrificing himself in creation, and coming to life again in man. So Baal, so Adonis. The history of Osiris is the history of the circle of the year, of the Sun dying away, and resuscitating itself again. . . . And it is very probable that the name of Osiris is not originally Egyptian, but the primitive Asiatic epithet of Almighty God, the Lord.'[1] The ideas of a faith, so deeply rooted, could not yet be destroyed; could only change their attachment. The myths, indeed, of Dionysos, Baal, and Adonis, survive only in the folklore, the country customs,[2] and nursery tales that interest the antiquary. But similar as was the myth of Osiris, it had a moral strength and grandeur of development which certainly portended for it a nobler transformation. This greater strength may, I think, be traced in the way I have indicated in the foregoing chapter, to the effect of the Nile-valley Powers and Aspects of Nature as external determinants of the specially grave and earnest character of the development in Egypt of the common myth of a dying Sun-God. But however this may be, it is certain that—modified as were men's beliefs in, and modified as were the doctrines of Osirianism, whether considered as the national religion of the Egyptians, or as the representative of the ancient Nature-worships generally—modified in no degree was the popular ignorance which made these beliefs possible, and rooted still in the

[1] Bunsen, *Egypt's Place*, vol. IV. pp. 332–3; compare also pp. 348–352; but see Sharpe, *Egyptian Mythology*, p. 7.

[2] As, for instance, the Beltain fires till recently kept up in the northern parts of this island. See Forbes-Leslie, *Early Races of Scotland*, vol. I.

hearts of the Western peoples was the central myth of all their religions.

12. Consider more particularly the continued prevalence in the East of the popular belief in Incarnation. Perhaps the most remarkable illustration of this which I could select is the belief of Alexander the Great that he was the son, not of Philip, but of the Supreme God; sanctioned as this belief, and the claims founded on it, were by the great Osirian oracle of Ammon.[1] If, as Plutarch[2] says, and Arrian[3] hints, he made this claim to be a superhuman personage merely for the purpose of overawing the Oriental races he had resolved on conquering, we have at least a proof of what people in the East were ready to believe, at the time of the origin of Christianity. For certainly since Alexander's time scientific conceptions had neither advanced among philosophers, nor spread among the vulgar. But Mr. Grote, noticing this opinion of Plutarch's, says that the divine claims made by Alexander seem rather to have arisen from 'a genuine faith,' and 'sincere belief;'[4] pupil of Aristotle, though he was, a man of the most splendid intellect, and never so carried away by his uninterrupted and unparalleled successes as to omit those precautions and that attention to details which only consist with perfect sanity. And according to the statements of Ptolemy, Aristobulus, and Kallisthenês, companions and cotemporaries, various miraculous providences distinguished his march through the desert to the oasis of

[1] Τεκμήρια δ' ἔστιν ἐκ τῆς ἐκ τοῦ Διὸς γενέσεως τὸ μέγεθος τῶν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι κατορθωμάτων.—Diodor. XVII. 51.

[2] *Alexand.* 28. [3] VII. 29, 6.

[4] *History of Greece*, vol. VIII.

the Oracle. Yet, for the honour of human nature it must be added that, extraordinary as was the genius, and deserved as was the unparalleled success of Alexander; the chief Macedonian generals, Parmenio, Philôtus, and Kleitus, opposed these pretensions of the king to be the son of the Supreme God as ὕβρις, barbarian insolence, and contemned belief in them as δεισιδαιμονία, barbarian superstition; just as the chief priests and elders of the Jews opposed the claims made by, or on behalf of Jesus to a similar dignity, and contemned the notoriously ignorant Galilæans, his principal supporters. And yet, though such claims might excite the indignation, and such beliefs, the contempt of the educated; they came quite naturally to the ignorant populace; among whom the belief in Incarnation was still as prevalent; the myth of a God-man dying and rising again, as enchanting; and the death-songs of Linus,[1] of Adônis,[2] and of Manerôs,[3] as pathetically affecting as ever.

13. But, in the investigation of Social Conditions, we must not only note, as in the foregoing paragraphs, the general state of moral Want, and intellectual Speculation and Belief, but the character also of social Activities. Now, with respect to the social activities of the time in which Christianism arose, three great facts have to be noted. In the first place, the cessation of warlike activity—the world was in the Roman peace. Secondly, an immense new religious activity. And, thirdly,

[1] See Paus. IX. 29, and Herod. II. 79.

[2] See Bion, *Epitaph. Adon.* It belongs, however, to but the Idyllic Age, and is unfortunately the finest example we have of these Threnoi.

[3] See Athen. *Deipn.* XIV. p. 620A, and Plut. *De Iside et Osiride*, s. 17.

among the new religious sectaries, one man of supreme moral genius. This greatest of the prophets of that prophetic time, was born in Galilee of the Gentiles, and grew up amid a population neither purely Jewish nor purely Gentile, but mixed.[1] And it is thus, at least, possible that Jesus may be, indeed, more truly called the son of Mary[2] than the son of Joseph; and that, Semite as, like the religion he founded, he was on his mother's side, he was, like that religion also, Aryan on his father's side.[3] But it were both idle and unseemly to speculate on the secrets which that maiden of Nazareth, his mother, who has had a destiny so wonderful, 'kept in her heart.'[4] For our reverence for the son must still and for ever extend to his mother, from whom he probably had,—one would fain, at least, believe this to be commonly the case,—his nobler qualities—his profound idealism, and his self-sacrificing love. And whatever may have been the facts of the doubtless 'immaculate conception,'—for gross or base is the thought that it is usually otherwise,—of those that chiefly concern us respecting Jesus of Nazareth, there can be no doubt. For the affirmation that the narratives of the Evangelists are either inspired or impos-

[1] 'On croyait (non sans raison) que le sang juif était chez eux très-mélangé.'—Renan, *Vie de Jésus*, pp. 208–9.

[2] As to the character of the maidens of Nazareth, see Rogers (Miss E.), *Domestic Life in Palestine*.

[3] Even, however, if Jesus was, indeed, the son of Joseph, so mixed was the population of Galilee that, as M. Renan says, 'Il est donc impossible de soulever ici aucune question de race, et de rechercher quel sang coulait dans les veines de celui qui a le plus contribué à effacer dans l'humanité les distinctions de sang.' *Vie de Jésus*, p. 22.

[4] The recurrence of this expression with reference to Mary (see, for instance, Luke II. 19, συνετήρει—and Ibid. 51, διετήρει πάντα . . . ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτῆς) is certainly remarkable, and would seem to indicate that a certain reflective reserve was one of her traditional characteristics.

tures; and hence, the argument that, if not wholly accepted as inspired, they must be wholly rejected as impostures, from which no historical facts whatever are to be drawn, can be only noticed with contempt, and even indignation; seeing how often this argument is used to the ignorant by those who would not dare to present it to the educated. For one of the chief inductive generalisations of modern historical research is that kernels, at least, of actual fact are to be found in most myths and popular legends, just as even our dreams have some reminiscence in them of facts. Doubtful, therefore, as, in many minor points, may be the accuracy of the reconstructions of the life of Jesus, with so much learning and genius attempted by Renan, and by Strauss,—doubt there can at least be none that such a man there was as Jesus of Nazareth; that he was of a supremely noble moral nature; that he made a profound impression on the lower orders from whom he sprung, and with whom he chiefly associated; that, as effect at once and cause of this, he either himself claimed, or had claimed for him a supernatural character; and that he was, while still young, ignominiously crucified—though not before he had made himself immortally beloved.

14. We come now to our Third Class of Facts, or those respecting the character and relations of the Individuals with whom Christianism originated. Now a transformation of the Osiris-myth,—of the myth of a dying Sun-God, of the myth of a God-man who came on earth for the benefit of Mankind, was put to death by the power of the Evil One, but rose again to be-

come the Judge of the Dead—such a myth could hardly, so far as our knowledge goes of mythogenetic phenomena, have been completely transformed, except from becoming attached to some actual historical personage, who greatly impressed himself on the popular imagination, and met with a tragical death.[1] But considering the state of popular intelligence at the time of the origin of Christianity, the state of intelligence witnessed to by such facts as those which form our second class, the miracle would have been if the story of such a life and death as that of Jesus had *not* taken the common form of the myth of the God-man coming on earth for the benefit of mankind, being put to death, and rising again victorious, 'very early in the morning,' as the evangelists particularly mention,[2] like the reborn Sun. Or, is this doubted? Then consider, first, what, as a matter of fact, was the intellectual condition of those who reported and wrote the story of the miraculous birth and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth. It was simply no higher than that of the most uneducated 'Spiritualists' of the present day. For let those who believe in Biblical, yet ridicule Modern stories of Spiritist marvels consider how really similar they are. Are, for instance, Modern Spirit-lights

[1] As, for instance, in comparatively modern times, Arthur and Merlin. For, in my *Arthurian Localities*, I was, I believe, the first to point out, and I hope, in an enlargement of that work, under the title of the *Arthurian Romance-Cycle, its Mediæval Development, Premediæval Origin, and Modern Revival*, more fully to show, that the romances of Arthur and Merlin are poetical elaborations of popular Sun-myth accretions round actual historical facts and personages of that very remarkable century, the sixth after Christ. See *Arthurian Localities*, pp. 5, 15, &c.

[2] *Matt.* xxviii. 1; *Mark* xvi. 2; *Luke* xxiv. 1.

and -fires not believed in? But did not Ezekiel behold, 'and lo, a likeness in the appearance of fire'?[1] And did not the assembled Christians on Pentecost see 'tongues of fire'?[2] The touching of people's knees by Spirits? But were not Jacob, Elijah, and Daniel so touched, and did not, indeed, the Spirit whom the first encountered so seriously maul him that 'the children of Israel eat not of the sinew which shrank, which is upon the hollow of the thigh, unto this day'?[3] Spirit hands? But was there not 'the form of a hand put forth that,' says Ezekiel,[4] 'took me by a lock of mine head'? And are we not told by Daniel[5] that there 'came forth the fingers of a man's hand, and wrote upon the plaster of the wall, and the king saw the part of the hand that wrote'? Supernatural winds? But came there not on the day of Pentecost 'a sound from Heaven as of a rushing mighty wind'?[6] And was not, on another occasion, 'the place shaken where the disciples were assembled'?[7] Marvellous productions of fruit? But is it not recorded that 'Aaron's rod brought forth buds, and bloomed blossoms, and yielded almonds'?[8] Nay, productions also of 'lobsters,' and of 'live eels'? But did not Pharaoh's Magicians rival Moses and Aaron in the production of live frogs?[9] Incredible transits through the air? But had not Philip[10] and Ezekiel[11] such experiences as well as Mr.

[1] *Ezekiel* viii. 3.
[2] *Acts* ii. 3.
[3] *Genesis* xxxii. 32.
[4] *Ezekiel* viii. 3.
[5] *Daniel* v. 5.
[6] *Acts*, ii. 2.
[7] *Acts* iv. 31.
[8] *Numbers* xvii. 8.
[9] *Exodus*, viii. 7.
[10] *Acts*, viii. 39 and 40.
[11] *Ezekiel*, iii. 12 and 14. Compare 1 *Kings* xviii. 12, and 2 *Kings* ii. 16.

Home? And in wonder, nay, if our belief is seriously claimed, in ludicrousness also are not the most extravagant of modern 'Spiritualist' stories but fair parallels of such Biblical ones as those of snakes[1] and asses[2] that speak, men who voyage in the bellies of fish,[3] and swine that are possessed of devils?[4] The unquestionable fact, therefore, is that the Osiris-like story of Christ was written by persons to whose miraculous narratives no credit whatever would now be, nor, indeed, was, even in their own time, given by educated persons, save of such a character as those who in these days give credit to the similar fictions of 'Spiritualism.'

15. But we are not left with mere general probabilities with respect to the influence of the Osirian myth on the Christian development of Religion. For we have now to note, not only that the early Christians belonged generally to the most ignorant classes of society;[5] but that the less ignorant of them, such as Luke the physician, and author, as it should seem, of the Acts,[6] as well as of the Third Gospel, had been, in whatever education they had had, especially under the influence of Naturian, or, using the term in its representative sense, Osirian mythology;[7] and that even

[1] *Genesis*, iii. 1.
[2] *Numbers*, xxii. 28 and 30.
[3] *Jonah*, i. 17.
[4] *Matthew*, viii. 32.
[5] 'La Palestine était un des pays les plus arriérés; les Galiléens étaient les plus ignorants des Palestiniens; et les disciples de Jésus pouvaient compter entre les gens les plus simples de la Galilée.'—Renan, *Les Apôtres*, p. 18: compare *Vie de Jésus*, ch. ix.; *'Les disciples de Jésus.'*
[6] See Renan, *Les Apôtres*, pp. x. flg.; but compare Davidson, *Introd. to the New Testament*, vol. II. pp. 269 flg.
[7] Luke was a physician of Antioch according to Jerome, *De Viris Illustr.* c. 7; but a native of Philippi according to Renan, *Les Apôtres*, p. xii. He was probably a Greek, and not improbably a manumitted slave. See Davidson as above cited, p. 2.

Paul, incomparably the most able and learned of them all, was still but a tentmaker, and had, though a Roman citizen born, no tincture of Greek science.[1] Yet further, that the Christian development of Religion originated in Northern Palestine, in *Galilee of the Gentiles*, is in itself a fact of the most suggestive significance. For our theory, broadly stated, is that Christianism originated in the influence of the mythological atmosphere of those disintegrated creeds of Naturianism, represented by Osirianism, on the form taken by those moral ideas represented by Messiahism. And in looking for a verification of this theory in circumstances bringing these two sets of forces into mutual relation, we not only find that a half-Gentile province was the cradle of Christianity; and not only that there was hence, from the very first in this new Jewish sect, a kindness for Gentiles,[2] and tendency to be influenced by Naturianism;[3] but it was in a wholly Gentile city far beyond the bounds of Palestine,[4] in Antioch, the third capital of the Roman Empire,[5] that the new sect first established itself under the distinctive name of Christians. It was from Antioch that, persecuted by the Judaism which naturally, and, from its

[1] 'Sa vie extérieure ressemblait à celle d'un artisan qui fait son tour d'Europe, et sème autour de lui les idées dont il est pénétré.'—Renan, *Les Apôtres*, p. 8.

[2] Renan, *Vie de Jésus*, ch. xiv., '*Rapports de Jésus avec les Païens et les Samaritains.*'

[3] The result of which we see more particularly in the mythological Gospel of Luke.

[4] All Syria to the Amanus was, however, considered by the Jews as forming part of the Holy Land. See Renan, *St. Paul*, p. 4.

[5] 'Primum Antiochiæ . . . . celebri quondam urbe et copiosa, atque eruditissimis hominibus, liberalissimisque studiis affluenti.'—Cicero, *Pro Arch. Poet.* III. (B.C. 62).

point of view, rightly considered the new sectaries blasphemers 'against Moses and against God,'[1] Christianism (and already long before any of the Gospels had been written[2]) turned formally and systematically to the Gentiles;[3] and it was this great capital of Oriental Heathenism that was the first capital of Christendom.[4] Note further, that there were traditions in Judaism, and thence-derived Messianic beliefs, that tended to bring this new Judæo-Gentilism into special connection with that Egypt which had nurtured the most moral and highly developed, and hence, the most influential, of all the ancient Nature-worships. And of the traditional importance assigned to, and respect entertained for Egypt by the Jews we have a very curious illustration in the legend[5] of the flight thither of Joseph with Mary and the infant Jesus. For the criticism of Strauss[6] has conclusively shown that Matthew's narrative of this flight originated, not in facts of the infancy of Jesus, but in traditions of that of his people. The flight of Jesus could not be, like that of Moses, *from* Egypt; so, that the tra-

[1] *Acts* vi. 11.

[2] The canonical gospel even of Matthew cannot be put before A.D. 100. See Davidson, *Introd. to New Testament*, vol. i. p. 514.

[3] When Paul left Seleucia, the port of Antioch, on his first voyage, A.D. 45. See Renan, as above cited.

[4] After the founding of Constantinople the power of Antioch began to decline; but the splendour of the birthplace of the golden-mouthed Chrysostom continued till, in 583 A.D., it was half ruined by a *second* earthquake; and soon after, it was utterly desolated by the Persians under Chosroes.

[5] Compare the legends of the infancy of Cyrus, of Romulus, and of Augustus, told respectively by Herodotus (i. 108), Livy (i. 4), and Suetonius (94); and those also of Abraham in the Talmudical, and of Moses in the Scriptural tradition.

[6] *Leben Jesu*, b. i. absch. i. kap. ix.

ditional importance of Egypt might not be lost, the flight of Jesus was *to* Egypt; and thence, almost in the very words in which Moses was recalled from Midian, Joseph was desired by the Angel to return 'into the land of Israel.'[1] But yet further. This new development of Judaism came very soon, not only indirectly under the influence of the Osiris-myth, in the influence exerted by the mythic notions of Naturianism generally, but directly under the influence of Osirianism itself. For the Egyptians were not only among the first, but were also the most zealous and influential of the converts to Christianity. Their faith in their old religion had been weakened by the scepticism and ridicule of their Greek masters; and in Christianity they accepted with enthusiasm a new religion which had the singular fortune to have the charm at once of novelty and of familiarity. It was in their power too, to make Christianism still more like their old Osirianism. And it was, in fact, the Egyptian Church, through its spokesman Athanasius, that made Greek Arianism heretical, and settled what should be the orthodox creed of Christendom. It was Athanasius who drew up the Nicene Creed,[2] which declares that there is one God, the maker of all things, and yet that the one Lord Jesus Christ was not made; that he is coeternal with God, and yet was begotten by God on the Virgin Mary; that God is

[1] Compare *Matth.* ii. 20 with *Exod.* iv. 19 (LXX).

[2] The Nicene, therefore, is the true Athanasian Creed. That ordinarily so called should seem to have been a forgery of a much later date (the sixth century A.D. ?), to which importance was given by the political sagacity of Charlemagne, who saw in it an instrument for consolidating his new Empire of the West. See Ffoulkes, *The Athanasian Creed.*

deathless, and yet that it was very God of very God who was crucified by Pontius Pilate, and died on Calvary. But in all this, old Osirians were, according as one reckons, either above or below seeing any contradiction.

16. Still, fully adequate as, no doubt, are the facts in the two foregoing paragraphs stated—first, the naïvely ignorant spiritist conceptions of the disciples and biographers of Jesus; and, secondly, the knowledge they possessed of, and influence that was actually exercised on them by the myths of Naturianism—fully adequate as are these facts—given Messianic expectations, and an actual highly impressive prophetic life and early tragic death—fully adequate as are, doubtless, these facts to account for the formation of such a new Osiris-myth as that which we find in the narratives of the three Evangelists—we have still further to account for their story not remaining, as any similar narrative now-a-days would, a mere popular legend. To the great Ephesian this was due, the author of the Fourth Gospel, popularly, but quite uncritically, attributed to St. John, and to Paul of Tarsus. In the intellectual education of neither of these two great founders of Christianity was there anything either to prompt, or to give them the power critically to examine the current mythological narratives of the life of Jesus—but the contrary. For Paul's enthusiastic moral spirit having, from the current popular representations, conceived Jesus as a man without sin, a being fulfilling the Law without that struggle which Paul felt in himself; for him it *naturally* followed that

the story of his life and death should be that of a God-man.[1] And so also, but in a different way, with the Fourth Evangelist. For, deeply imbued with the Alexandrian doctrines about the Word, the Logos, the Son of God,[2] the miraculous stories of the disciples would find nothing in his Egyptian theosophy with which they would not readily accord. But see how,—not the character only of the moral aspiration of the time, but the character also of its intellectual speculation, making it possible that the miraculous narratives of the fond fishermen of Galilee about their great compatriot should be credited by men of such forceful and original genius as the great Ephesian and the Jew of Tarsus,—see how, taken up by such men as these, the fortune of the new Osiris-myth was made. Paul, in taking up the Christ-legend of the Galilæans, not only gave expression to that sense of sin which was one of the most prominent moral characteristics of the time; but made of the myth a means also of powerfully persuading to righteousness. And by John, if so we may call him, the Galilæan fishermen's story was not only introduced and presented in the language of the highest philosophy, or, at least, theosophy of the time; but there was run into the new Osiris-myth a sentiment in the expression of which simplicity, ineffable tenderness, and sublimity were so extraordinarily mingled—as, for instance, in that scene in the sepulchre-garden at dawn. Think of the Word that was in the beginning with God, and that was God, saying to a poor weeping

[1] Compare Arnold, *St. Paul and Protestantism.*

[2] See next Section, § 4.

woman, ere his ascension on high—'Touch me not, for I am not yet ascended to my Father; but go to my brethren, and say unto them, I ascend unto my Father, and your Father, and to my God, and your God.'[1] Is there in all literature a scene more touching and sublime, or—so profoundly revolutionary? We know how powerful a persuasive of the truth of an affirmed fact is simply its satisfaction of emotion. Can we, then, wonder that men should have sunk back again into belief in what, intellectually, was but a mere Osirian mythology, when with such divine moral beauty presented; or—revival though Christianism was of but old myths, by all the thinkers of antiquity seen through, and of old superstitions, by all the classic moralists contemned[2]—shall we otherwise regard the formation of, and capability of being affected by, the Christ-myth, than as revealing in human nature a moral depth and sublimity of passion that give glorious promise for the future of Humanity?

17. To sum up now. The origin of Christianism, or the cause of the Christian development of Religion, can, I think, be at once clearly and naturally, in a word, scientifically, explained only by conceiving the era of Christ as the mid-period in a great millennial age of development; by tracing the forces then visible and their relations to the vast and world-wide revolution, moral, intellectual, and political, of 500 years before Christ; and showing how, during the 500 years after his birth, the old mythological creeds were transformed into the new Osirianism of Christian Orthodoxy. The

[1] *John* xx. 17. [2] See below, Ch. IV. Sect. III.

great points in the new religion of Jesus are its high morality, and its wonderful miracles. The former is believed to afford internal; the latter, external evidence of the supernatural character of Christianity. Such a belief can be conclusively demonstrated to be false only by showing that the spirit of the new religion was but a special manifestation of a general moral revolution; and that the narratives of, and belief in miracles, which gave its form to the new faith, were but the result of the non-destruction by this great revolution of those old mythological creeds which it had been able but to disintegrate, and so, in fact, make their influence on new developments only more powerful. And brief, and in every way inadequate as has been the foregoing rapid survey of historical facts, one clear result, at least, it may, I trust, have had. Rapid as our survey has been, it has, I trust, brought some degree, at least, of conviction to my readers that, just as in the history of Nature, so, in the history of Humanity, a great event can be scientifically accounted for only from the action of long-working forces; that the greater the event, the farther back must we go in order that we may really understand how it, at length, came about; and that, if, in the case of Christianity, we thus go back, we find, 500 years before it appeared, a revolution which developed such moral forces, and set free such intellectual forces, as may be shown to have, in their mutual action, naturally had, in the West, such a result as Christianism.

18. In the West. For if the true explanation of the origin of Christianity is to be found only in tracing it

back to the great Pre-Christian Revolution; the true appreciation of the character and destiny of Christianity is to be found only in conceiving it as but the Western result of that world-wide revolution. Otherwise, even in giving at least a partially scientific explanation of its origin, we shall almost certainly be led to an extravagant appreciation of its character and destiny. Thus, for instance, M. Renan not only remarks on the fine saying of Jesus to the woman of Samaria[1]—'il dit pour la première fois le mot sur lequel reposera l'édifice de la religion éternelle;'[2] but of the fancy of the poor Magdalene that she had actually seen and heard him whom her passionate heart so longed once again to see and hear, M. Renan says—'Sa grande affirmation de femme: "Il est ressuscité!" a été la base de la foi de l'humanité.'[3] In the first remark it may, perhaps, be admitted that there is a certain partial truth, though the 'première fois' is altogether untrue. Of the second, what can be said but—poor Humanity, if its religion is to be everlastingly founded on a fiction! From such extravagancies we are saved by a truly scientific, that is to say, *relative*, conception of Christianity. And thus to conceive it, we must ever bear in mind, not only the general character of the revolution in which it originated, but the correlative character of the Eastern development of that revolution. It is true that we find in Christianity a high moral tone, a large fraternal sentiment, and a subjectivity, or inwardness, of which the above-referred-to saying of Jesus may be taken as a typical expression.

[1] *John*, iv. 21 and 23.
[2] *Vie de Jésus*, p. 234. [3] *Les Apôtres*, p. 13.

But not only do we find all these characteristics, as has been above pointed out, in the Classical, the Hebrew, and the Egyptian Literatures of the time; but in the Eastern Literatures also, derived, like these, from the great Sixth Century Revolution. As for the morality, with such ignorant presumption characterised as peculiarly Christian: 'The doctrine of our master,' said the Confucian Thing-tseu, 'is simply this: to have an upright heart, and to love your neighbour as yourself.'[1] And as for the subjectivity of Christianity, its tendency to give importance to faith rather than to works, to the disposition of the heart rather than to external observances: this is not only the general characteristic of all the religious developments of the Sixth Century Revolution; but is, in an especial manner, the characteristic of Buddhism.[2]

19. Only, then, in studying the Christian Revolution as part of a still greater Revolution; only in studying the Christian Development of Religion as part of a general Subjective Development of Humanity; only in thus studying the problem of the origin of Christianity in a thoroughly relative manner, can a truly scientific explanation be obtained. And what is more, only in thus explaining it, can, I believe, the entirely human origin of Christianism be conclusively brought home to the popular intelligence. For otherwise, there will still hang some doubt about so wonderful a fact as that that

[1] Pauthier, *Quatre Livres sacrés de la Chine*, p. 86.

[2] 'A new form of religion which has well been called subjective, as opposed to the more objective worship of Nature.'—M. Müller, *History of Sanscrit Literature*, p. 32. Compare B. St.-Hilaire, *Le Bouddha et sa Religion.*

belief in the resurrection from the dead of Jesus of Nazareth, about which has gathered a system of doctrine so vast and so subtle—that that belief which has been the central core of so great a civilization—that that belief which has had so many thousands, nay, tens of thousands of noble martyrs since Stephen, 'looking up steadfastly into heaven, saw the glory of God, and Jesus standing on the right hand of God,'[1] should have been altogether false. Only when it is found that the fact is that, in the tragic history of Humanity, there have been many similar ironies, will men fully realise that such a widespread, passionate, and grandly creative belief could have been, and was, in the first instance, but the hallucination of a poor hysterical[2] young woman, whom even persons so uncritical as the Galilæan followers of Jesus would not, at first, believe,[3] and whose evidence, in such a matter, would now be esteemed utterly worthless. And only when it is found that the historical facts are, that neither in the morality, nor in the doctrines of Christianism was there anything new —that what was new was only the combination of the most prevalent, the most deeply rooted, and the most charmingly affecting of all popular superstitions, with what was best and purest in the moral spirit of the

[1] *Acts* vii. 55. The impression one gets of Stephen is, I think, one of the finest things in History — *ἀτενίσαντες εἰς αὐτὸν ἅπαντες . . . . εἶδον τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ ὡσεὶ πρόσωπον ἀγγέλου* (vi. 15). *Κύριε Ἰησοῦ, δέξαι τὸ πνεῦμά μου* (vii. 59). *Κύριε, μὴ στήσῃς αὐτοῖς τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ταύτην* (vii. 60.) Reading this, the *Martyrertod* seems the most enviable of all exits from existence.

[2] In the superstitious language of the time, 'she had been possessed by seven devils.'

[3] *Mark* xvi. 11.

time—and further, that in the mixed blood, education, and general relations of the first Christians there were adequate determining conditions of such a combination —only when, in such a method as that above sketched of examining the origin of Christianity, we find that such were the historical facts, will it be fully seen how true was the word 'spoken of the Lord by the prophet,[1] saying, Out of Egypt have I called my Son'[2]—Out of the Osiris-myth have I called my Christ.[3]

SECTION III.

THE OSIRIAN CHARACTER OF CHRISTIANISM.

1. 'EGYPT'S PLACE in Universal History' thus seems to be with such a clearness and verifiable certainty defined, as that widest-minded, most learned, and noblest of modern Neo-Platonists who first stated the problem neither ever did, nor, with his futile attachment to Christianity, ever could have arrived at.[4] As at once the most moral, and intellectually the most highly developed of the old Nature-worships, Osirianism and Brahmanism alone held together against the great Sixth Century Revolution. The others it wrecked into the fragments that survive but in the legends and customs which only

[1] *Hosea* xi. 1. [2] *Matthew* ii. 15.

[3] The words of Hosea actually, of course, referred to the people of Israel, elsewhere also spoken of as the 'Son of God;' as, for instance, in *Exodus* iv. 22, and in *Sirach* xxxvi. 14. But one is just as entitled as another to give an unhistorical meaning to ancient texts. And as did Matthew, so may I.

[4] See *Egypt's Place*, vol. IV.

the antiquary can recognise as once having belonged to a coherent creed and popular worship. But Brahmanism still maintained itself in the midst of the vast religious and social renovation due to the great Indian prophet of the Revolution, and after more than a thousand years of subserviency, in the eighth century B.C., expelled from India the purer faith of Buddha. Osirianism, on the contrary, while virtually maintaining itself, underwent an immense transformation. Changed, as we have seen, immensely before the origin of Christianity, by the general influence of the Sixth Century Revolution, it was, by such changes, only made the more capable of powerfully determining the development of the New Religion. So, after another 500 years, if Osirianism has disappeared altogether under its old name, Christianism has established itself. And in the same century in which Brahmanism re-established itself in India, the new Christian Empire of the West was established by Charlemagne. The place, we thus see, of Egypt in relation to the general history of Mankind, is the place of its Religion. And the history of Osirianism divides itself into three great periods—the period, first, of its existence as the grandest and most elaborate of the Western Nature-worships; then, the great transitional millennium, first, of its disintegration, and then of its transformation through the influence it exercised on the development of Christianism; and thirdly, that later stage of it, in which the ancient myths of those Nature-worships represented in the West by Osirianism have, with a new attachment, and a profounder moral spirit, become the creed of Christendom. And now, as this theory of Egypt's Place is

but a corollary from that above-given of the origin of Christianism; and as that theory was suggested by consideration of the Christian character of Osirianism; I would proceed to point out with some particularity that Osirian character of Christianism which it is the general result of the theory to establish. It is an unquestionable historical fact, that the narratives of the Evangelists and the doctrines of the Apostles and Fathers *took* shape in an atmosphere of Osirianism. The above theory, briefly stated, affirms that they *owed* their shape to that atmosphere. And I would now endeavour at once to verify this conclusion and bring it home to my readers, in pressing the question of natural or supernatural origin with reference to each of the great doctrines separately of Christianism.

2. And, first, as to the Trinitarian nature of the Godhead. The question is, whether the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is a supernatural revelation as to the nature of God, or whether it is but, under a new name, an old Osirian dogma about the Unknowable. The orthodox Christian Triad, speaking generally, is a Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. The subtleties which distinguish the Greek from the Roman Orthodoxy need not here detain us. The Triad, however, which is most popular with the vast majority of Christians is a Father, Mother, and Son. Now, such also was the Trinity most commonly worshipped throughout ancient Egypt, namely—Osiris, Isis, and Horus. And we have a hieroglyphical inscription in the British Museum, as early as the reign of Swechus, of the eighth century before the Christian era, showing that the doctrine of

Trinity in Unity already formed part of the Egyptian Religion, and stating that, 'in the group just named, "the three Gods only made one person."'[1] The Trinity specially worshipped here, at Thebes, was Amun-Ra, Athor, and Chonso; and the first Person of this Triad, as the 'Concealed' or 'Unutterable,'[2] is analogous to the less anthropomorphic conceptions of the first Person of the Christian Trinity. Add to this the historical circumstance already mentioned, namely, the direct and important influence exercised by the early Egyptian Church and its bishops in determining the form of the Christian Creed, and particularly this very article of it; and it will hardly, I think, remain doubtful that the Christian Trinity is, not a supernatural revelation of a divine reality, but a natural transformation of a human fiction.

3. And now as to the incarnation of the Second Person of the Trinity, in Jesus of Nazareth. We have historic evidence that the first two chapters of Matthew formed no part of the original Gospel.[3] And neither Mark nor John gives any such story of a miraculous birth as is narrated in these prefixed chapters of Matthew, and in the first two chapters of Luke. What was the origin of this story—supernatural fact or natural fiction? Now we not only know that Osiris was considered to be such a God-man as Jesus is represented

[1] Sharpe, *Egyptian Inscriptions*, Pl. 36, 4, 5.

[2] 'AMN, Ammon, was certainly in the eyes of an Egyptian rightly considered as the "concealed" God, according to the Ritual and to Manetho, and this is his real meaning in Egyptian.'—Bunsen, *Egypt's Place*, vol. iv. p. 357.

[3] See Davidson, *Introduction to the New Testament*, vol. i.

to have been; but we find that the incidents of the Annunciation, the Conception, the Parturition, and the Adoration related by Luke, read almost as if they were copied from the sculptures here, at Luxor, of the miraculous birth of King Amunothph III.; we know further, that, entirely *natural*, entirely in accordance with the due course of things, appeared to the Egyptians, as to Orientals generally, save the Jews, an incarnation of the Deity, through a miraculous birth; we recall the fact that Alexander was declared and believed to be the Son of the Supreme God; and we know also that, as the priests told Herodotus, every new Apis-bull was believed to have been begotten without earthly father, and solely by 'the power of the Highest overshadowing' the cow, his mother, which never had a second calf. Duly considering these facts, can we have much doubt as to the exceedingly natural origin of the story of the incarnation of the infinite God in the son of Mary, the peasant maiden of Nazareth?

4. Thirdly, as to the Fourth Evangelist's representation of Jesus as the Word of God. Is this divine Word to be considered as a supernal reality, or as a mere human, and more particularly Osirian notion? The answer will be found in reflection on these facts. Fourteen centuries before this Evangelist wrote, we find in Osirianism this notion of the Word as the First-born, and Son of God. And on the walls of the great Temple at Philæ, and on the gate of the Temple of Medinet-Abou here, at Thebes, we read in the very words of St. John's Gospel: 'It is he'—this divine Word symbolized by the Sun—'it is he who has made all that is,

and without him nothing has ever been made.'[1] But further, in the study of that Egyptian Literature contemporary with the origin of Christianity, and which goes under the name of Hermes Trismegistus, we are particularly struck by the resemblances between the *Poimandres*, and the first chapter of *St. John*.[2] These similarities of idea and expression are the more remarkable as they could not have arisen from either work copying the other. For there is no trace in the *Poimandres* of the Incarnation-dogma of the *Gospel*; and it is highly unlikely that the author, had he known it, would not have alluded to it, either as an adherent, or an opponent. These resemblances, therefore, must be explained from the works having been written about the same time, and under the influence of the same Egyptian ideas, the one, among the Hellenistic Jews of Alexandria, and the other, among those of Ephesus. The question, therefore, which we have to consider, more definitely stated, is: Did the mystic notions of the Fourth Gospel about the Word, the Son of God,

[1] See Mariette, *Mémoire sur la mère d'Apis.*

[2] Consider, for instance, the parallelism of these passages:—

Poimandres.	*St. John.*
I am the Light, Intelligence thy God. . . . And the luminous Word of Intelligence is the Son of God. They are not separated, for union is their life.	In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God.
That which hears and sees in them is the Word of the Lord; Intelligence is God the Father.	That was the true Light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world.
Blessed be thou, O Father! the man who belongs to thee desires to partake of thy holiness, even as thou hast given to him power.	As many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God.

originate in a supernatural revelation, or in the fact that these notions, of the most ancient date in Egypt, were, through the influence of Osirianism, already common among the Hellenized Jews whom the author of this gospel specially addressed? The three other Evangelists, addressing the Jews of Palestine, had said: 'The Messiah whom you expect has come, He is Jesus, in whom we show you all the characters attributed to the Messiah by the Prophets.' The fourth Evangelist, on the other hand, addressing the Hellenistic Jews, says to them: 'The Word of which you speak, without whom was not anything made that was made, and who is the true Light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world, lo, he was made flesh and dwelt among us. His own received him not; but you, if you will receive him, he will make you the sons of God.'[1]

5. Let us now pass to the consideration of the Resurrection. Unlike the Miraculous Birth, it is in all the Evangelists. But if, though Christ is sepulchred in the Holy City of Jerusalem, he rose again; so also did Osiris, though he lies buried in the Sacred Island of Philæ, rise again. And surely when we find the chief Temple of the very island of his sepulture sculptured with the resurrection of Osiris; when we see at Philæ, in the chamber over the western adytum of the Temple of Isis, the whole story that forms the central article of Christian faith represented, not in connection

[1] Compare Ménard, *Hermes Trismegiste*, p. lxi.:—'M. Matter va jusqu'à penser que l'Évangile de Saint Jean a été composé principalement pour combattre le gnosticisme naissant. Pour moi, dans le premier chapitre de cet Évangile, je crois voir moins une polémique indirecte qu'une intention de propagande.'

with the modern God of Christendom, but the primæval God of Egypt; when we realise the immense importance of the historical fact that Osirianism had made the myth of the death and resurrection of a God-man one of the most popular and easily credited superstitions throughout the birth-countries of Christianity; and when we consider that the narratives of the Evangelists were compiled from popular traditions, and did not assume their present shape till more than a century after the events they record;[1] the probability that the narratives of the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth originated, not in a fact of *his* life, but of the state of mind of *those* who recorded it; the probability that—whether the result of his Crucifixion was actually death, or but suspended animation—the narratives of his resurrection were but the attaching of an old myth to a new name; the probability that the supernatural Christ, as distinguished from the man Jesus of Nazareth, was, not a miraculous manifestation of Heavenly Love, but a natural transformation of Human Superstition—becomes almost incalculably great? Let the question be pondered as Science requires, without prejudice, and without fear.

6. After the presumed fact of the Resurrection, the dogma of the Atonement must next, and fifthly, submit itself to the question, whether or not it is but a natural transformation of a pre-existing Superstition? It is in the *Epistle to the Hebrews* that the death of Jesus is first distinctly represented, not as a Martyrdom, but as an Atonement; and he himself, not as the Teacher of a New Religion, but as a Redeemer and Mediator. As originally believed in by the Christian Church, and

[1] See above, n. 2. p. 408.

with special distinctness expounded by St. Irenæus,[1] the Atonement was a ransom paid to the Devil for the release of his claims over Man—a transaction in which Christ, in point of fact, cheated the Devil—though in this there was nothing shocking to the moral sense of the time, quite the contrary indeed. The later and orthodox doctrine of the Atonement as a vicarious satisfaction of the justice of God the Father we owe to St. Anselm. Now, it must be admitted that the Egyptians do not appear to have, as yet, in Osirianism, risen to the subtlety of making very God of very God, 'the One of One' as they expressed it, satisfy the demands of his own justice by himself atoning to himself for the sins of those whom he receives into his kingdom. Still, Atonement was an article of belief as important in the Osirian as in the Christian Creed. But it was lesser Gods, and not himself, who made atonement to the Judge of the Dead. 'And on a funeral tablet in the British Museum, dated in the sixty-second year of Rameses II., we see the deceased has placed them [these lesser gods] on the altar before Osiris as his sin-offering.'[2] When, therefore, we see all this doctrine of Atonement and Mediation in the Osirian sculptures and drawings; when we find that, under the direct influence of Osirianism, it had already been introduced into the Apocryphal books of the Old Testament;[3] and when further we find that it—as, indeed, all the other doctrines

[1] *Cur Deus Homo.* [2] Sharpe, *Egyptian Mythology*, p. 52.

[3] In *The Wisdom of the Son of Sirach*, written by a Jew living in Lower Egypt, and probably in Alexandria, Elijah is said to have been taken up to heaven for the purpose of acting as a mediator to pacify the wrath of God, and turn his heart again towards his children. Ch. xlviii. 10.

we are here passing in review—was a notion common to the Heathen religions generally,[1] can we doubt that the idea of Jesus as a Mediator, and of his death as an Atonement, originated, not in the supernatural, but in the natural inspiration of the author of the *Epistle to the Hebrews*,—originated in the atmosphere he breathed of Osirian superstition?

7. Next in logical order there comes for consideration the subject of Hell and the Devil. Now it is true —and it is not my fault if it is impossible to express the fact in its simplicity without an appearance of unbecoming levity—it is true that the whole Christian System is built upon Hell; and that, without the support of the Devil, it would fall in. If any one doubts the seriousness of this, let him but reflect what would remain of Christianism without the Incarnation, Atonement, and Resurrection—nothing certainly historically recognisable under that name—and let him reflect how utterly groundless and reasonless these beliefs would be without Hell under them. Yet, fundamental as Hell is, let us venture, with reference to it also, to put the question as to origin which we have above asked concerning the other dogmas of Christianity. Is the Christian Hell a revelation from Heaven, or but a revival, and, considering what the central belief is of Christianism, a necessary revival of the Osirian Amenti? Consider these facts. We find the Christian representations of Hell with all its paraphernalia of Lakes of Fire and Tormenting Demons already sculptured and drawn for us on the Tombs and Funereal Papyri of

[1] See, for instance, Mackay, *Progress of the Intellect*, vol. ii. ch. v.

Osirianism. How gratuitous, then, were the hypothesis of a supernatural revelation of what man had been already able so elaborately to imagine of himself! Yet further, the very core of Christianity is the belief in a Dying God, who, after his Resurrection and Ascension, becomes Judge of the Dead. How, then, could it save itself from borrowing the Hell which is implied in, and indispensable to the existence of this Osiris-myth? And the question has the more force when we find that, in Mosaic Jehovianism, or Judaism, which abjured the Osiris-myth, there is neither Hell nor Devil.[1]

8. Seventhly, and lastly, we have to ask whether the apocalyptic visions of a General Resurrection, Last Judgment, and Renewal of all Things, are supernatural revelations shown by Christ 'unto his servants of things which must shortly come to pass,' or but natural transformations of pre-existing human, and more particularly Osirian dreams? Certain, at least, it is that these were all distinctive doctrines of Osirianism. And not the visions only, but the imagery in which they are expressed is to a very considerable extent, at least, Osirian. The seven spirits, for instance, before the throne of God[2] is an Egyptian notion.[3] Another Egyptian figure is the war against the Dragon, or Serpent of Evil,[4]

[1] The serpent that tempted Eve was merely one of the speaking animals so common in early popular tales. There could not, indeed, be a devil in primitive Jehovianism. For, with a charming naïveté, both good and evil were attributed to Jehovah himself, and the Devil of the Jews should not seem to have been invented till between the dates of the Second Book of Samuel and the First Book of Chronicles. See Réville, *Histoire du Diable.*

[2] *Revelation* i. 4. Compare also iv. 5, and v. 6.

[3] Sharpe, *Egyptian Mythology*, p. 96.

[4] *Revelation* xii.

which is represented several times on the Sarcophagus of Omenepthah I., sculptured about B.C. 1200. Again, the description of Heaven,[1] the Judge on his throne, the four and twenty elders around the throne, the four living creatures with animals' heads, the Lamb standing before the throne, and the book-roll, seem all to be copied from the Great Trial Scene of Osirian Mythology.[2] Have, then, the Christian doctrines of Heaven and Hell, and visions of a Last Judgment, &c., any other than a natural and indeed Heathen origin, and have they, for their truth,—for their accordance, that is, with objective facts—any guarantee whatever?

9. Such, then, is the Osirian character of the doctrines of Christianism; and such is the question which, with respect to every one of them, is here, on the Temple-roof at Karnak, forced upon us; nor that only, but in a way utterly negativing the claims made for them to a supernatural origin, answered. And the aspect which Man's history thus presents of stationariness at once and progress is, I think, both remarkable and instructive. It is indeed one of the chief lessons of the new Relational Philosophy that all phenomena have correlative aspects, and that, regarding them on one side only, they can never be truly judged. But what an illustration of this we have in Christianism! In one aspect of it how vast, how incalculable the progress from the old Nature-worships! In another aspect of it, how small, how infinitesimal the change! In moral spirit how immeasurably different! In the outlines, at least, of doctrinal form, how extraordinarily similar!

[1] *Revelation* iv. [2] Sharpe, *Egyptian Mythology*, p. 96.

For it has been merely for the sake of brevity that I have here paralleled Christian doctrines with those merely of Osirianism. Similar parallels might have been brought forward from almost every one of the other Naturian Religions, and particularly from Brahmanism. There was, indeed, as to doctrine one great difference between Naturianism and Christianism. Although both were really monotheistic,[1] the monotheism of the one was an esoteric; that of the other, an exoteric doctrine. Christianity, as a monotheistic religion, was, in fact, a vast democratic revolution through the preaching to the masses of an idea hitherto, for the most part, reserved for the few. The secret of the initiated was now communicated to the vulgar. And yet, even admitting this, and forbearing to press the fact that, as a trinitarian monotheism, the exoteric monotheism of Christianism was not, like the exoteric monotheism of Judaism and the esoteric monotheism of Heathenism, a *pure* monotheism—how small was really the change! For how soon was a whole new polytheism constituted in the worship of Saints! And so,—vast as, in the moral aspect of it, is the progress seen in Christianism—how stationary does Humanity appear to have been when we compare this new Creed, in its intellectual aspect, with the mythical Creeds not yet disintegrated or transformed by that great revolution, nearly two thousand five hundred years ago! But it is just this universal and perpetual coexistence of contradictories that gives to Existence its wealth, its wonder, and its interest.

[1] Of this the proofs will be given in showing how fully recognised by all the deeper thinkers of antiquity was the mythical character of the gods.

Such, in some sort of clear shape at last, were the reflections that occupied me that afternoon on the Temple-roof at Karnak. But then, it must be confessed that thought was altogether overpowered by emotion. For, the consequences of all this? If Christianism thus originated but in the influence of the Osiris-myth on the development of Jewish Messiahism; if it thus originated, not in divine revelation but in human ignorance; how wide will be the destructive consequences of a popular realisation of such a fact; how incalculable the reconstructive consequences of that New Ideal of which—mind filled and heart touched by the wonderful transformations of those successive ages of Human Existence visible around one here—some glimpse, at least, seemed to be caught!

It was the oppression of the vast Revolution seen in the progress of the New Philosophy of History, and especially in that application of it which shows the natural, and indeed, from an intellectual point of view, somewhat low natural origin of Christianism, that had chiefly impelled me to get up to the solitude of the Temple-roof, and to seek for hours, in vain, some relief in clear and definite thought. . . . It was a similar oppression that, on a previous day, spent till afternoon in the Tombs of the Kings on the other side of the river, had urged me to climb the bare rocks to the highest peak of the pyramidal hills in whose depths these Tombs are excavated, and alone there, try, but in vain, to shape into thought what were, as yet, but unutterable feelings. At length, warned by the setting Sun, I had to descend again

to the Memnonian Plain, and was only able in some degree to shake off the intolerable oppression when, on coming down on the Colossi, I met the flocks and herds returning, in the evening-glow, with their shepherds and herdsmen, to their common refuge. But what was that? Tombs of the Dead, now the Homes of the Living! And in what have we found that Christians shelter themselves from the evils of existence but in ancient Myths, which have been more or less fitted for present habitation by the cleaning-out of the mummies of their original constructors? Well may despair almost seize on one who has been, not in name only but in very truth, a Christian, when that Incarnation which has given him in Christ an everliving Brother and Friend is found, by such an historical investigation as the foregoing, to be but an old myth with a new life in it. Yet that very survey of the history of Humanity which has destroyed, gives the hope at least of a reconstruction of the Ideal. For see how this theory of the origin of Christianity connects all the ages, connects all the great races of Humanity. And no country perhaps on earth is more fitted than Egypt to impress on one this connection, to make one feel the moral importance of it, and to give one faith in the adequacy of that New Ideal which seems to arise in the scientific survey, and sympathetic realisation of the history of Humanity. For nowhere else can one so readily and surely realise in one's own experience the impressions which were the determining conditions of the religion, and of the life-ideals of a primæval people. Nowhere

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